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When women become perpetrators of suicide bombing, their agency – their ability to act 
upon and affect the world – is often denied. There are a number of reasons for this and one 
this thesis considers is that – as females – they are not expected to be violent. Accordingly, 
such women are judged to be coerced or incompetent, and so unable to rule themselves 
sufficiently as agents. Models of autonomy propose various frameworks for assessing 
whether acts or persons are self-governing, and the relational approach in particular has 
garnered much support recently. However, some aspects of the relational account remain 
under-theorised, including how autonomy might be measured.  
 
In this thesis, I aim to bring these two elements together by examining whether an 
extension of the relational model may offer a way in which to estimate the autonomy of the 
bombers in a more nuanced fashion. I make two claims. First, that the relational conception 
of the agent and autonomy ‘fits’ the bombers. Second, that my spectrum view, which is 
rooted in the relational approach, maps the bomber’s autonomy approximately but in 
detail. As such, my spectrum view is a befitting notion of autonomy and allows a graded 
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Are female suicide bombers autonomous? When women become perpetrators of political 
violence, this question – the crux of which concerns issues of gender, violence, and agency – 
is often raised. Since she is female, and not thought to be capable of violence, however, the 
suicide bomber’s ability to act upon and affect the world from her own volition is often 
doubted. She is insouciantly denied agency and agency-undermining excuses for the attack 
are sought: she was physically coerced, mentally incompetent, spiritually compelled, 
emotionally frenzied, but she did not wilfully do it. A proper attribution of agency is usually 
withheld, if even considered. 
 
Debates about autonomy speak directly to this question since autonomy theories aim to 
distinguish desires or persons that are self-governing from those that are not, with differing 
models generating distinct criteria for how this is established. The longstanding liberal 
account, for instance, has typically discussed autonomy as an individual and internal capacity, 
while the recent relational approach has focussed on social and external dimensions. The 
relational model in particular has garnered momentum and support for how it conceptualises 
autonomy, who can be autonomous according to it, and how autonomy can be evinced under 
it. However, relative to the liberal account, it is still in its infancy with some under-theorised 
aspects, and one such area is how autonomy comes to be measured.  
 
In this thesis, I bring together these theoretical and practical domains in order to develop a 
nuanced way of gauging the autonomy of the female suicide bombers. I do this by outlining 
and evaluating the liberal and relational approaches, before applying and extending the 
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relational model specifically to the bombers to assess its fit, and finally offering a relational 
spectrum along which to plot the women’s autonomy. In so doing, I make two claims. First, 
that the relational conception in general persuasively represents the suicide bombers as agents 
and their autonomy. In defending this point, I also contend that the relational agent and 
autonomy is a model that is, in fact, appropriate for all persons. However, it is particularly 
suited to the bombers of the case studies as their autonomy is harder to represent accurately 
on other models. Second, that my spectrum view can map and measure various features of 
autonomy in some detail for each bomber, and, in so doing, makes it possible for comparisons 
between the bombers and their autonomy to be made. The details of this (worked out in 
chapter five) are, by necessity, approximate and experimental, but still valuable in providing a 
means to measure and contrast the autonomy of individuals. In these ways, I argue that the 
spectrum that I propose, which is situated in the relational account, can overcome some of the 
misrepresentations of the women and offer a way to plot and compare autonomy – in this 
thesis, primarily of the bombers but, outside this thesis, it may also be useful for plotting and 
comparing autonomy in other instances and potentially for all.  
 
The thesis is split into four broad sections (and five chapters in total). First, I set out the case 
studies of female suicide bombers – the focus of this thesis – and use empirical evidence and 
portrayals of the agency of these women to produce pictures of their autonomy (chapter one). 
Second, I characterise liberal and relational models of autonomy and outline standard 
critiques of these – particularly of liberal models – and gaps in current theories – particularly 
in relational models – to show where my relational spectrum view aims to supplement and 
improve present accounts (chapters two and three). Third, I apply the relational account to the 
case studies to demonstrate that it is appropriate for representing the bombers and their 
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autonomy (chapter four). Fourth, I further develop the model and outline and apply a 
spectrum of autonomy. This is to show how it allows for a more detailed mapping and 
estimate of autonomy, which would aid in differentiating better along the spectrum of 
autonomy for each individual and for comparing individuals (chapter five).  
 
To start, the first section (chapter one) explores the case study of female suicide bombers and 
their agency in three parts. First, I outline examples of women from various conflicts around 
the world who have adopted the suicide bomber role. Second, I suggest that women are 
expected to conform to the ‘peaceful woman’ stereotype and, when they transgress this by 
behaving violently, are ‘explained away’ as either ‘victims’ or ‘ideal warriors’. Third, I argue 
that both the ‘victim’ and ‘ideal’ narratives serve to distort the women’s agential capacities; 
either they are perceived and understood as lacking agency altogether or they have abundant 
levels, but neither portrayal accurately represents their agency. I, thus, contend that female 
suicide bombers are denied proper agency for their acts. 
 
The second part (chapters two and three) moves to the theoretical realm and examines two 
dominant models of autonomy. In chapter two I characterise liberal autonomy using five 
themes: authentic desires, procedural independence, local and basic autonomy, consistency, 
and the distinction between autonomy and responsibility. Having outlined this understanding 
of liberal autonomy, I then present standard critiques in the contemporary debate to show 
some of the limitations and possible weaknesses of the view. Following the now mainstream 
critiques, I suggest that liberal accounts of autonomy are problematic because they tend to 
construct the agent individualistically and tend to focus too much on internal obstructions to 
the will. In chapter three I present five unifying traits of relational autonomy: the social agent, 
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social autonomy, a spectrum of autonomy, broad motivations, and complex identities. Again, 
building on the literature, I highlight concerns about the agent being determined and that 
autonomy is too socially conceived. I argue, however, that the relational account can 
overcome such problems and that it is promising for female suicide bombers (the argument of 
the next section) as the standard critiques of liberal autonomy make ascribing autonomy to 
female bombers particularly hard. In this way, the standard critiques of liberal accounts are 
deemed effective against this charge.  
 
The third section (chapter four) applies the relational model to the case studies to assess 
whether it suitably represents the female suicide bombers. I do this by considering the agent 
and autonomy. On the agent, I maintain that the relational approach prioritises the connected 
self and this permits a rich picture of both these bombers, who are social selves, and why they 
act, which is usually in an interconnected way. On autonomy, I argue that the relational model 
develops a socially constitutive account that mirrors how these bombers engage in and 
exercise decision-making well. My claim is that, for these two reasons, the relational 
approach offers a befitting representation of these women as agents and of their autonomy. 
Further, I contend that, we may be able to extend this position and suggest that the model is 
suited to all agents and their autonomy. Though particularly relevant to the bombers (because 
their autonomy is more difficult to recognise on less social conceptions), the relational 
account may represent other persons well too (because they too are likely to be social selves 
with a social autonomy). However, since the argument is about the bombers, we do not need 
to accept this possible expansion to non-bombers; we merely need to recognise it for the 
women of this thesis, and I argue that we can. 
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The final section (chapter five) proposes my spectrum view of autonomy, which attempts to 
expand the relational account by offering a way to measure the female suicide bombers’ 
autonomy in a nuanced fashion. I do this in three parts. First, I describe the theoretical 
features of my spectrum by outlining three axes (constraints, self-regard and reflection). 
Second, I apply my view using four of the bombers to show how this spectrum view permits 
us to plot different elements of autonomy and estimate the women’s autonomy overall, and to 
compare the women’s autonomy against each other. Third, I argue that a consequence of my 
relational, degree-based approach is that the ‘victim’ and ‘ideal warrior’ narratives of the 
bombers (from chapter one) are likely to become more complex.  
 
Therefore, I contend that the relational approach in general is a good fit for the female suicide 
bombers (and perhaps for all), and that my spectrum view (a relational notion) in particular 
offers a detailed map of the bomber’s autonomy. This allows us to distinguish and measure 
elements and the extent of autonomy, to approximately place each bomber on the spectrum 
and to compare degrees of autonomy between bombers. Where we are concerned to attribute 
the bombers with autonomy, however limited, my spectrum view, rooted in the relational 
model, meets this aim.   
 6 
1. FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS 
Introduction 
In the first chapter, I discuss female suicide bombers who will serve as the fulcrum of this 
thesis.1 I explore several sample cases of bombers from across the world as well as general 
issues regarding their agency in order to introduce both the phenomenon and problems with 
how they are presented. I do this in three sections. First, I situate the role of the suicide 
bomber within other diverse roles women have assumed in political conflict and highlight the 
(perceived) transgressive nature of violent women. Second, I examine the ways in which 
various societies and media portray the bombers given this breach of gender norms. Third, I 
consider how these depictions affect descriptions of the women’s agency. In so doing, I argue 
that gender stereotypes render violence perpetrated by women unacceptable and that female 
suicide bombers are cast (depending on the context) as negatively or positively extraordinary 
in order to reinstitute conventional gender norms. I contend that such representations 
undermine or exaggerate, but – in both instances – misdescribe, the bomber’s agency.  
 
I, therefore, highlight first, that women, just like men, can be violent and hold manifold 
reasons for suicide bombing that warrant acknowledgement and second, that a fair account of 
the bombers as actors in the world is required, otherwise there is a failure to appropriately 
reflect this agency. In this regard, I introduce the core themes of this thesis in this chapter: 
that better interpretations of the bombers and what they do are required since women do carry 
out attacks and it is unlikely that a binary (completely non-agential or wholly agential) 
                                                           
1 Parts of this chapter have been published as a journal article. See Marway (2011). 
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classification of these acts fully captures the complexity of their agency. In the final chapter, I 
offer a way to approximately measure the women’s autonomy in order to potentially fulfil this 
function, but for now I explore the female suicide bombers, which will be our illustrative 
focus.  
 
Women and Violence: Norms and Roles in Conflict 
In the first section, I survey the gender norms surrounding violence and roles women have 
undertaken during political conflict in order to contextualise and draw out problems with the 
female suicide bomber. I offer evidence of women in a range of violent roles and examine 
ways in which these patterns of activity and behaviour conflict with common gender 
stereotypes. I embark upon this task in five parts, starting broadly and gradually becoming 
more narrowly focussed. First, I outline the general relevance of gender and binary 
constructions thereof. Second, I discuss more particularly the norms that govern, and roles 
that exist for, men (as violent) and women (as peaceful) in war. Then, I consider 
inconsistencies with these stereotypes by setting out examples of women that (in part three) 
are indirectly aggressive (as morale boosting mothers and arms transporting supporters, for 
instance) and (in part four) directly threatening (suicide bombers) participants in conflict. 
Fifth and finally, I analyse how these violent roles flout female gender norms of passivity to 
varying degrees. In this section, I will argue that women do adopt violent roles of differing 
extremes in war and that this shift contradicts dominant gender norms.  
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Gender norms and typical narratives outside conflict: social and political binaries  
First, I address the significance of gender in broad terms in order to better understand the 
motivations behind the dilemmas that the bombers pose (and that I go onto discuss in 
subsequent sections). This comprises of two parts, first, I outline the social and political 
features of gender as well as its pervasiveness and how it is internalised as ‘natural’ and 
second, I set out some narratives of women in line with this specific reading of gender. 
Relying on standard arguments in the literature, I highlight that accepted gender binaries 
dictate the kinds of narratives and roles associated with and expected of women in non-war 
contexts, and – as will be considered in the next section – these directly inform their expected 
roles in war too.  
 
i. Gender as construct, and gender internalised 
First, by way of context and background, I sketch understandings of gender in two parts, first, 
gender as a social and political construct and second, the ‘normalisation’ of a particular 
conception of gender is discussed. In so doing, I outline the point in the standard literature 
that gender is a social and political fabrication but has become internalised by women and 
men alike. 
 
To start, gender can be described as both social and political construction (de Beauvoir, 1949; 
Butler, 1990). As a social concoction, for instance, understandings of gender are widely 
shared. Gender norms consist of “(1) norms of masculine and feminine behaviour which are 
embodied in social practices, and (2) the habitual ways of acting that people acquire as an 
effect of those norms” (Stone, 2007, 67). Gender incorporates communally and routinely 
accepted behaviours that are expected from male and female bodies. As a political 
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formulation, this social notion is not neutral but mimics specific and underlying power 
dynamics. Some, for example, argue that patriarchy has sought to foster and systematically 
maintain unequal power relations between men and women, and that a particular 
understanding of gender has been constructed to facilitate this (Engels 1884; Pateman 1988). 
In this picture, those who hold power (men) regard themselves as the standard, while the 
powerless (women) are considered their opposite or, in other words, binaries of 
norm/aberration (respectively) are engineered. Wendy Lynne Lee, for instance, explains that 
in the dichotomies of “male/female, masculine/feminine, heterosexual/homosexual, 
straight/queer, human/animal, self/other, white/black, us/them” (Lee, 2010, 16), the first of 
the pairing is set up as superior and ‘normal’ and the second its inferior or deviation. To 
reiterate, in the male and female dynamic, “he is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the 
Other” (de Beauvoir, 1949, 16). Gender, then, is not only socially but – in patriarchy – 
politically constructed too: “women’s position is not dictated by nature, by biology or sex, but 
is a matter of social and political contrivance” (Pateman, 1988, 225). Though gender is a 
socially forged concept, its current and particular manifestation is politically motivated and 
shaped.  
 
Second, despite gender norms being constructed, they are ubiquitously passed off, reinforced 
and embraced as ‘natural’; categorically not contrived (Calhoun, 1997). To examine this, I 
first, discuss an example and second, outline internalisation. First, to illustrate, consider the 
occupations that women and men have been ascribed according to their respective ‘natural’ 
dispositions. In the private sphere, for instance, women have been cast as ‘natural’ carers and 
confined to the home, so duties of childcare and homemaking have been shaped such that 
women disproportionately fulfil these than men. Similarly in the public sphere, women are 
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not afforded the same economic, political or social opportunities as men to develop skills that 
men are ‘naturally’ seen to possess but have in fact learned through their privilege (Enloe, 
1989). This is so because “patriarchal society conflates sex and gender, deeming appropriate 
for women only those jobs associated with the traditional feminine personality. Thus, in the 
United States, for example, women are pushed into jobs like nursing, teaching, and childcare, 
while they are steered away from jobs in business, science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics” (Tong, 2009, 34). Women do not ‘naturally’ opt for these vocations, rather they 
are manoeuvred into them by the already-skewed, male-dominated, constructed system in 
place.  
 
The second point is about internalisation. Since gender norms are presented as ‘natural’, there 
are repercussions for those that shift away from the pattern. Non-conformers are regarded as 
transgressing nature. Given this, women and men are socially disciplined to adopt feminine 
and masculine norms. With regard to women, for example, Catherine MacKinnon argues: 
 
Conditioning to these values permeates the upbringing of girls and the 
images for emulation thrust upon women. Women who resist or fail, 
including those who never did fit – for example, black and lower-class 
women who cannot survive if they are soft and weak and incompetent, 
assertively self-respecting women, women with ambitions of male 
dimensions – are considered less female, lesser women. Women who 
comply or succeed are elevated as models, tokenised by success on male 
terms or portrayed as consenting to their natural place and dismissed as 
having participated if they complain (MacKinnon, 1997, 71).  
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Women who (purposely or through necessity) subvert norms breach what it means to be a 
woman and – though this notion is created and not ‘natural’ – are spurned.2 Further, as these 
social punishments are entrenched, they eventually become self-administering such that 
women discipline themselves to achieve the particular construction of womanhood. Women 
(and men) who have been successfully socially regulated about ‘natural’ femininity tend to 
endorse it, and they internalise and adopt these attitudes, even though the conception is 
fabricated (Bartky, 1990).3 Thus, as has been argued extensively in the gender literature, 
gender norms – though socially created and politically skewed – are nevertheless espoused.  
 
ii. Typical narratives in non-conflict 
Having set out how gender is constructed but considered ‘natural’, in the second part of this 
section I explore representations of women in non-war settings. Drawing on the standard 
literature, I profile the ascribed narratives or roles of the ‘virgin’, the ‘temptress’, the ‘mother’ 
and the ‘witch’. These are, in no way, exhaustive but, based on the binary notion of gender, 
are illustrative of stereotypical narratives or roles for women that are opposite to those of 
men. 
 
On the first narrative, the ‘virgin’ is regarded as an innocent, demure and unadulterated 
maiden, and is distinct from men, who are typically cast as more sexually dominant, in her 
                                                           
2 In this regard, women must be both ‘not-men’ and ‘women proper’, whereby they fit a particular patriarchal 
construction of femininity. If they fail to adopt this construction, society considers them different to the norm 
and thus not ‘women proper’. They are considered deviations and aberrations, as will be explored with female 
suicide bombers in this chapter. 
3 It is in this sense that gender becomes particularly significant for this thesis. In addition to conspicuous 
oppressions of conflict and war, there are less obvious oppressions that gender might entail. Women might adopt 
particular goals or desires that are underpinned by suspect (where this implies being socially and politically 
constructed, subordinating, and internalised) gender norms of women as (for example) the ‘natural’ homemakers 
and men as the ‘natural’ breadwinners. These present a more covert kind of oppression to war, but it is 
oppression nonetheless. These different oppressions will be discussed more fully in chapters four and five.  
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sexual naivety. She is the symbol of vulnerability and someone to be protected, but also – as 
an adolescent – a figure of emerging desirability (Driscoll, 2002; Caputi, 2004). The second 
narrative is the ‘temptress’ and, in contrast to the virgin, is a deliberate seductress who is 
highly sexualised. She entices men into sexual acts in roles such as the siren or provides them 
with sexual ‘services’ as the prostitute (Butcher et al., 1974; Caputi, 1998, 2004). Notably the 
virgin and temptress are not wholly dissimilar since they are extremes of the same scale of 
women as sexual objects: either pure and ripe for sexualisation or already sexualised. Though 
seemingly different, both are framed in terms of sex for and in opposition to men, and so both 
(given gender norms) are legitimate narratives and roles for women. The third narrative is the 
‘mother’, who is usually the self-sacrificing nurturer, and dissimilar to the self-focussed, 
career man. She is the figure that bestows life and is central to family life, so she is valued 
and a necessity, but she is also taken for granted in this role (Butcher et al., 1974; Kaplan, 
1992; Meyers, 2002). The final narrative is that of the ‘witch’ who, as non-maternal and even 
supernatural, is markedly different to the mother. She is not a woman who nourishes and 
attends to others, but one that attracts suspicion and so is distant from others (Meyers, 2002; 
Caputi, 2004). Again, just as with the ‘virgin’ and ‘temptress’, though the ‘mother’ and 
‘witch’ seem distinct, they are contrasting ends on a permissible scale, though in this instance 
the range concerns deference to others. While the ‘mother’ is self-depriving, the ‘witch’ is not 
because others shun her, but both are different to the independent man. Though apparently 
contradictory, they are deemed legitimate narratives and allowable roles for women.   
 
These four archetypes, in differing ways are admissible. Two of the roles – the virgin and 
mother – adhere to norms of women as passive and altruistic and are regarded as positive. The 
other two roles – the temptress and the witch – follow norms of women as whores or 
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sorceresses and so have negative connotations. Either way, however, they are equally 
tolerable since they are within the range of which women are permitted to be. In other words, 
though some stereotypes are less favourably perceived than others, all are narratives defined 
in opposition to men, and these are therefore possible narratives for women to fulfil. When 
women veer off prescribed narratives or roles, however, consequences ensue (as I will discuss 
in the rest of this section).  
 
Thus, in this first section, I have introduced gender in non-war contexts using arguments in 
the standard literature. I have highlighted that gender is a social and political construction, 
with socially reinforcing and self-policing habitual roles for men and women. In addition, I 
recognised that specific dichotomous narratives and roles are ascribed to both sexes.  
 
Gender norms and typical roles in conflict: ‘peaceful woman’ and ‘violent man’ 
Second, I now shift from a non-war to war situation and consider the gender norms and roles 
that women are permitted in this context. To do this, I first, reiterate how – even in political 
conflict – male and female norms and roles are constructed in contrast to each other and 
second, explore this notion through the ‘peaceful woman’ and ‘violent man’ norms and 
consequent permitted roles. I will suggest that the presumptions about men being violent and 
women being peaceful frame the kinds of behaviours men and women are expected to display 
in war.      
 
To start, I restate the understanding of gender norms and roles while emphasising the 
relevance to war. As outlined above, gender is contrived such that the female and male are 
classified in opposition to each other – the private/public, weak/strong, carer/breadwinner 
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binaries respectively, for example. Gender norms and roles in political conflict follow suit, 
both in being polarised pairings and extensions of permissible non-war roles. For example, 
though there are various combinations, the “beautiful soul” and “just warrior” (Elshtain, 1985, 
45) for females and males respectively is one duality (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007; Sjoberg, 
2010).4  In such narratives, women and men take on similar traits to non-conflict situations: 
while men have belligerent tendencies in war and peace alike, women are deemed non-
aggressive in both cases. Thus, gender binaries exist in conflict just as they do in non-conflict, 
and the characteristics of those binaries in war often complement those in non-war.    
 
Second, I investigate this claim by considering, first, the ‘peaceful woman’ and ‘violent man’ 
stereotypes and second, some of the activities that can be associated with these narratives. 
Beginning with the ‘peaceful woman’, the female norm in war is often that of the ‘docile 
nurturer’ with the associated traits of altruism, passivity and fragility that (allegedly) 
resembles her gender group outside of conflict. That is, woman is “pictured as frugal, self-
sacrificing, and, at times, delicate…In matters of war and peace, the female beautiful soul 
cannot put a stop to suffering, cannot effectively fight the mortal wounding of sons, brothers, 
fathers. She continues the long tradition of women as weepers, occasions for war, and keepers 
of the flame of nonwarlike values” (Elshtain, 1985, 45). Reflecting ostensible ‘virtues’ of the 
                                                           
4 The “just warrior” that Elshtain uses is one manifestation of how masculinities are framed in war (Hutchings, 
2008) just as the “beautiful soul” that she employs (drawing on Hegel, 1977) is one example of how femininities 
are regarded. This pairing is being drawn upon as an illustration and because of the combative (instead of, say, 
the technical or scientific) nature of the suicide bomber role, and it is these violent versus peaceful features that 
are explored here. Moreover, Kimberly Hutchings argues that, though men are not a homogenous group 
(‘maleness’ is distinguished in terms of, for instance, the ‘hegemonic’ and ‘subordinated’), masculinities in war 
involve contrasts between different types of men and they also ultimately involve a contradiction with women 
(Hutchings, 2008). In this way, the feminine is considered non-masculine and inferior, and this can be seen in the 
rhetoric of war. The enemy, for instance, is often feminised, such as the US being considered male and Iraq 
female at the state level, and US army personnel who are regarded as male and Iraqi prisoners of war (that they 
tortured) as female at the individual level (Sjoberg, 2007, 2010; Enloe, 2004). Binaries between male/female, 
then, have long been entrenched in war. Thus, though there are different types of dualities and the oppositions 
are simplifications (as will be seen in this chapter), the point is that such a distinction between the male 
(violent/strong) and female (peaceful/weak) exists. 
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feminine as dainty, self-abnegating, limited to the private sphere, and submissive, the female 
role in conflict, according to the ‘peaceful woman’ stereotype, then, is peripheral. Women are 
unresisting and incapable, anxiously awaiting the return of their men-folk and lacking the 
power to contribute to the war effort (Elshtain, 1985, 1995). In this respect, women – cast as 
the antithesis of the aggression synonymous with war – are ultimately deemed non-actors in 
conflict.  
 
By contrast, the ‘violent man’ archetype takes the male norms to be equivalent to the 
‘aggressive protector’, with the zealousness, authority and bellicosity that are (apparently) the 
hallmark traits of men in non-conflict circumstances too. Men, for example, are “construed as 
violent, whether eagerly and inevitably or reluctantly and tragically” (Elshtain, 1995, 3–4) 
and, in war, this assigns them the role of the warrior. Further, men “fight as avatars of a 
nation’s sanctioned violence” (ibid) where they hold a courageous reason for carrying out 
violence (such as defending the vulnerable, including women and the country) rather than a 
cowardly one (such as committing a war crime).5 Reflecting perceived male traits of strength, 
chivalry, dominating the public realm, and aggression in non-conflict, man plays a central role 
in conflict and carries out violence in order to protect the weak (Elshtain, 1985, 1995). Men, 
then, are considered to be truculent and powerful when compared to women and so are 
deemed to be actors in war. In conflict, therefore, gender norms are contrasting and aligned to 
non-war stereotypes; whereas the male holds a principal and violent position, the female 
occupies a secondary and non-violent one.  
                                                           
5 In other words, it is a moralised notion of male violence. As Elshtain argues, “the just warrior is a complex 
construction, an amalgam of Old Testament, chivalric, and civic republican traditions…[where] ‘male physical 
force could sometimes be moralised’ and ‘thus could provide the foundation for an ideal of warlike manliness.’ 
This moralisation of collective male violence…continues to exert a powerful fascination and to inspire respect” 
(Elshtain, 1985, 45). Further, she argues that women do not participate because they are presumed innocent, but 
that they are also the reason that men, as just warriors, go to war (1995). 
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These distinctions, however, do not imply that women can never be aggressive and men can 
never be passive.6 For example, women can use violence in certain non-war scenarios – 
“exceptions to the [non-violent] rule include: fending off an attacker, especially a rapist; 
defending her children; fighting back against a terribly abusive husband; some sporting 
activities” (Eager, 2008, 3). Given this precedence in non-conflict, we can imagine that a 
defensive use of force by women is permissible in similar predicaments – of rape and abuse, 
or of aiding children – in war.7 Likewise, just as men can shun macho behaviour in peacetime 
– by holding a religious faith, for example – so too can they avoid partaking in violence – by 
contentiously objecting to it on religious grounds – in wartime. In both the female and male 
examples, the binaries are indeed made more complicated, yet it remains that the broad norms 
for the female as non-violent and male as violent remain the same. Thus, though there may be 
exceptions, the general rule persists.    
 
Second, the kinds of behaviours and activities that flow from these gender norms of 
peacefulness and violence are opposite too. In the ‘peaceful woman’ stereotype, for example, 
the roles usually include those of pacifists and bystanders. In this category, women do not 
take part in violence at all, either on the principled grounds of an outright objection to 
violence, or in a non-active way as onlookers to the aggression. Though pacifists may carry 
out acts of protest or civil disobedience and though bystanders may continue in their 
traditional female roles (so they are not entirely non-actors), both roles are distinctly non-
                                                           
6 Of course, violent women and non-violent men are equally transgressive of norms of femininity and 
masculinity. Eager, for instance, argues, “just as we are fascinated by women terrorists, we are equally 
fascinated, although certainly not to the same extent, by male conscientious objectors. They are exceptions to the 
supposed ‘rule’ of how men and women are supposed to behave vis-à-vis violence” (Eager, 2008, 21). Both 
these women and men breach gender norms relating to violence.  
7 Note, however, how the violence permitted is defensive as opposed to aggressive and in this respect it is not 
deemed to be a transgression. More will be discussed about the transgressive nature of political violence for 
women in subsequent sections of this chapter.   
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violent and exemplify the passive norms linked to the ‘peaceful woman’. As ‘violent man’, on 
the other hand, men typically take up the roles of soldiers and combatants. There is an 
assumption that men are legitimately violent participants in war, either as fighters on the front 
line or engaged in the battle in other ways, and this adheres to non-war norms that underpin 
the ‘violent man’. These kinds of roles indicate how women and men typify the norms 
associated with the female and male in conflict and non-conflict.  
 
The ‘peaceful woman’ and ‘violent man’, then, are just one set of gender norms that exist in 
conflict, and the pacifist and soldier are but some examples of the roles and activities that 
reflect these norms respectively. Other roles are possible, however, and in the next two 
sections I consider women who are involved in violence, either indirectly or directly, and in 
so doing arguably transcend the ‘peaceful woman’ norm. 
 
Atypical roles for women I: indirect violence, and the mother and the supporter 
In this part I consider violent roles for women in conflict beginning with the indirectly 
violent. Though the phrase ‘indirectly violent’ may appear, at first glance, to be a misnomer 
(why not label it ‘non-violent’ if violence has not occurred?), it refers to eschewing violent 
acts but engaging in violent struggles. Though the woman may not commit any violent 
activity, she is a participant in the violence in a way that the pacifist or bystander (as passive) 
or the activist (as political but non-violent) is not.8 I will discuss just two of the roles women 
have had that fall under this category in the form of the ‘mother’ and the ‘supporter’. I will 
argue that women have occupied indirectly violent positions. 
                                                           
8 By focussing on violent roles, these other roles that could fall within the ‘peaceful woman’ norm are set aside. 
These include the actively non-violent (such as peace activists, without political allegiance, and who seek the 




The first role I explore is that of the ‘mother’. This is an informal, non-conscripted position 
that can comprise one or all of several elements, including three that I will trace here: bearing 
children, raising them as combatants, and showing pride in sacrificing offspring.9  
 
Taking childbearing first, women in the indirectly violent ‘mother’ role are encouraged to 
give birth to (preferably) male babies who will eventually constitute the movement’s or 
nation’s future soldiers. As a responsibility that women alone can fulfil (in any context), it has 
often been their principal and overriding function in conflict. Indeed, Mia Bloom argues, “the 
primary contribution expected of women has been to sustain an insurgency by giving birth to 
many fighters” (2007, 95). This reproductive role, then, is intended to literally replenish troop 
numbers. Yet, it also figuratively regenerates the cause by defying the enemy and boosting 
morale, since it ensures the ethnic and “biological survival” (Swindell, 2005, 238) of the 
group. A mother from Sarajevo, for example, planned to “fireoff one baby every year to spite 
the aggressors” (Salzman, 1998, 350) in her contribution to the political goals. Given that the 
birthing mother bolsters the number of fighters in the long-term and the resolve of the group 
in the short-term and is a duty in which many actively partake (though the reasons for this 
involvement may be complex), it is a significant indirectly violent way in which women have 
participated in conflict.  
 
                                                           
9 The term “combatant” is intended to describe any person involved in the violent conflict, whether they are part 
of an officially recognised national army or an unofficial insurgency or revolutionary movement. In this thesis, it 
is used interchangeably with words such as “fighter”, “soldier”, “warrior”, “insurgent”, “revolutionary”, and 
“martyr” (for example) unless otherwise stated.  
 19 
The second aspect of the ‘mother’ role is nurturing children to become combatants. Women 
are expected to raise loyal individuals who are devoted to the cause and eager to fight for it. 
This rearing role, again, is one that women are considered to be suitable for given it is an 
extension (albeit with a violent tone) of the activities they typically assume in society. Samira, 
a Palestinian mother of two young boys, for example, states, “it is the duty of every 
Palestinian mother to encourage her sons and daughters to become martyrs” (Samira in 
Victor, 2003, 102) and it is in cultivating willing soldiers that mothers are judged and praised. 
Similarly, in Chechnya, the ‘mother’ role is “to raise children, form their characters, and make 
them strong so that they became warriors for the Islamic faith (mujahideen) when they grew 
up” (Bloom, 2007, 97). As well as physically reproducing, then, the mother’s responsibilities 
also include nurturing and conditioning children to be sympathetic to a particular ideology. 
Through this act, the women are indirectly participating in the violence.  
 
The final feature of the ‘mother’ role is sacrificing her offspring and showing pride in her 
child’s commitment to the struggle. Sacrificing children is the actualisation of the indirectly 
violent tasks of bearing and raising soldiers in which the ‘mother’ is already engaged. A 
woman commented, for example, that “we Palestinian women, we give birth to them, we 
bring them up and we bury them for the revolution” (elderly peasant woman in Sayigh and 
Peteet, 1986, 122). The sacrifice of children for the cause, then, is ostensibly a fitting 
conclusion of the ‘mother’ role in conflict. Moreover, whatever capacity children serve in, the 
‘mother’ duty commends expressions of admiration rather than signs of lamentation when 
reflecting on the sacrifice. Um Nidal, the mother of Mahmoud Farhat, a nineteen-year-old 
Palestinian suicide bomber, for example, stated, “I began to pray from the depths of my heart 
that Allah should give me ten Israelis for Mahmoud, and Allah granted my request, and 
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[Mahmoud’s] dream came true when he killed more than ten Israelis. I began to utter cries of 
joy” (in Victor, 2003, 170). Whilst proclamations of pride need not be genuine or devoid of 
sorrow, they are a culmination of the ‘mother’s’ success in procreating and nurturing 
combatants.10 The sacrificing of children and the (expressed) contentment thereof contributes 
to the indirectly violent role of ‘mother’.  
 
Thus, the ‘mother’ duty includes bearing, rearing, and sacrificing children as well as 
displaying pride in their child when the acts carried out are aligned to the goals of the specific 
political struggle. This role is an indirectly violent way that women participate in conflict 




The second indirectly violent role I address is women as ‘supporters’ of war. I consider two of 
the varied ‘supporter’ roles women have held, first, informally assumed responsibilities as 
civilians and second, more formal duties as members of insurgencies. These both indicate 
roles that are more violent than bystanders or peaceful activists.  
 
First, as civilians, women have sustained movements by carrying out tasks that blatantly defy 
the opposing side. They have propagated their group’s message, publicly objected to unfair 
treatment, and thwarted policies and acts directed at weakening male fighters, for example 
                                                           
10 As Christopher Reuter contends, however, pride may be the only acceptable emotion to express in public. He 
argues, “if these parents did not express pride, they would be guilty of a double betrayal: first, of the child, who 
would otherwise have died for nothing; and also of his faction, or even the community as a whole, which for its 
part is flattered that its struggle is now seen as so important and sanctified by the self-sacrifice it inspires” 
(Reuter, 2004, 15-16). Although mothers proclaim pride, therefore, it may not always be genuine and it by no 
means excludes other emotions, such as sorrow, in private. 
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(Victor, 2003).11 Yet, these women are distinct from the peace activist who protests but does 
not align herself to one group or another, but rather is committed to peace. Women as 
‘supporters’, by contrast, pick a warring side and challenge the adversary, albeit in an 
indirectly violent way. Further, civilian women’s status as civilians and women has enabled 
them to carry out, not just overt but, covert ‘supporter’ tasks. In Sri Lanka, for example, by 
assuming a clandestine ‘supporter’ role, civilian women were considered to be the “backbone 
of the war: running arms, procuring survival necessities, acting as communications systems, 
doing reconnaissance” (Nordstrom, 2008, 72), activities that, if executed by combatant or 
civilian men, would arouse suspicion. Likewise, in Ireland, civilian women carried munitions 
in their bags for the Irish Republican Army, which evaded the British Army’s surveillance 
checkpoints (Alison, 2004). Civilian women, then, have carried out vital ‘support’ positions, 
both publically and privately during conflict, which can be considered indirectly violent roles.   
 
The second ‘support’ role is women as members, and under the formal command, of 
revolutionary or military groups. In this role, though women serve alongside men, they often 
continue to adopt ancillary, rather than combative, duties (Enloe, 1988). In Chechnya, for 
example, “female insurgents were initially used merely to supply medical aid, food, and water 
to the men; they also carried weapons and ammunition across enemy territory and maintained 
the guerrillas’ morale” (Bloom, 2007, 98). Here, women are members of the same movements 
as men but instead of being involved in the fighting, a duty that is left to the men, they are 
supportive of them. In insurgencies, women are encouraged to “cling to their ancestral role of 
                                                           
11 For example, in Palestine: “women wrote and circulated leaflets, joined in demonstrations and protests, 
scrawled slogans on the walls of buildings, hoisted flags, donated blood, violated curfews and closures, and 
helped organise alternative means of educating their children. Women defied the Israeli army’s policy of 
confiscating Palestinian agricultural produce. They physically tried to prevent Palestinian boys and men from 
being arrested” (Victor, 2003, 9-10). In carrying out political acts like disobeying curfews and obstructing 
arrests, women in civilian ‘supporter’ roles have often organised themselves, rallying mass support and 
allegiance to the cause. 
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care takers, moral supporters, sustainers of food and medical care, and raising of children” 
(Beyler, 2003b, 9). Again, these are familiar roles that women adopt in their newer positions 
within a violent organisation. Their roles, however, may expand over time, such that other 
specialist skills are required and developed. Women, for example, have been trained to 
“gather intelligence information” (Victor, 2003, 134) and scope out targets. This demonstrates 
a shift towards more expert ‘support’ tasks relative to the civilian woman or the insurgent that 
takes on administrative responsibilities, but is still non-combative (Alison, 2004). In either 
form, such roles are closely aligned to the groups executing aggression, so that though the 
women are not directly engaged in violence, they certainly are indirectly involved because 
they are recruited members.   
 
The ‘support’ role, then, may involve women as civilians or operatives. When women engage 
in a civilian capacity, they assume overt and covert reinforcement roles. When they are 
enlisted in an insurgent capacity, the assistance can vary from being a carer or administrator 
to a technical specialist, but it is supportive and indirectly violent nonetheless. In this regard, 
the women who are in these ‘support’ roles are participants in violence, but in an indirect 
way. 
 
In this section I have considered women’s indirect violent engagement during times of 
conflict. Two of the diverse roles women have assumed include that of the ‘mother’ – who 
gives birth to, raises, and sacrifices children to the war – and the ‘supporter’ – who is either a 
civilian that champions a violent group or a signed-up member of one that takes on an 
ancillary function in combat. They are roles that are distinct from peaceful involvement but 
they are also different to directly violent roles, which I discuss next.  
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Atypical roles for women II: direct violence, and the female suicide bomber 
The second set of roles is the directly violent, a set that includes female suicide bombers. To 
consider these roles, first, I briefly set out some data contextualising suicide bombing and, 
second, I present individual cases as evidence of directly violent roles. Together these will 
demonstrate that women do take on aggressive roles.  
 
First, though the statistics and history of suicide bombing varies, it is helpful to summarise the 
origins and scale in order to provide some background. The modern phenomenon of suicide 
bombing can be traced back to Iran in 1980 and, although it is predominately still men that 
fulfil this role, women have increasingly been involved since the first female attack in 1985.12 
During the period 1985 and 2011, for example, there have been some 145 female bombers, 
which accounts for 21.2 percent of all attackers (Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism – 
CPOST, 2011). Other research places this figure closer to 220 women, which represents 15 
percent of all bombers between 1985 and 2006 (Schweitzer, 2006).13 Of the 76 organisations 
who employ the strategy of suicide bombing, recent reports suggest that sixteen have utilised 
women as bombers (CPOST, 2011), which has doubled from earlier estimates of around eight 
or nine.14 These movements are varied and include those with secular, religious, nationalistic 
and theocratic aims (Skaine, 2006). Some groups, for instance, seek nationalistic 
independence using a secular philosophy (nationalistic/secular), such as the Syrian Socialist 
                                                           
12 The first modern day attack was by Hossein Fahmideh, a 13-year-old Iranian boy, who, in 1980, detonated a 
grenade under an Iraqi tank in the Iran-Iraq war, killing himself and, according to Iranian legend, causing the 
enemy to retreat. Suicide attacks, however, have a longer history, arguably traceable to the Crusades and 
hashishins, and being employed by Japanese kamikaze pilots in the Second World War (Reuter, 2004). 
13 CPOST and Schweitzer’s figure include both ‘successful’ (bombs that were detonated) and ‘unsuccessful’ 
(bombers that were prevented) attacks, irrespective of the number of deaths caused. 
14 Mia Bloom cited original figures. She claims, of the “seventeen groups that have started using the tactical 
innovation of suicide bombing, women have been operatives in more than half of them.” (Bloom, 2007, 95) 
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National Party (SSNP), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK), and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) military wing, the al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade, which also encompasses the faction Fatah. Other groups seek nationalistic 
independence by employing religious ideology (nationalistic/religious), such as the Chechen 
rebels, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hamas. Differently still, some groups seek 
theocratic goals under a religiously motivated movement (theocratic/religious), such as al-
Qaeda, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (CPOST, 2011; Cunningham, 2008; Skaine, 2006).15 
There are different reasons, then, for organisations using women in this role. Though 
cursorily, here I have indicated the extent and context of female suicide bombing.  
 
Having provided this synopsis, I now document 12 examples of female suicide bombings 
carried out by each of these groups: Sana Mehaydali, Thenmuli Rajaratnam, Leila Kaplan, 
Wafa Idris, Dareen Abu Aishen, Ayat al-Akhras, Hawa Barayev and Luisa Magomadova, 
Hiba Daraghmeh, Hanadi Jadarat, Reem Saleh al-Riyashi, Muriel Degauque and finally, an 
unnamed bomber. In addition, I describe the case of an implementer, Zina, and a failed 
suicide bomber, Zarema Muzhakhoyeva, as closely related roles to those of the bombers. In 
presenting these, I do not intend to provide a comprehensive chronology of female suicide 
bombing but instead illustrate women working within diverse geographically located and 
ideologically driven organisations and operating under unique circumstances.16 For each case, 
                                                           
15 The nationalistic/secular, nationalistic/religious and theocratic/religious categorisations have been slightly 
modified from Cunningham’s original classification to include non-Muslim based groups. Rosemary Skaine also 
includes the Lebanese based group Hezbollah and Iraqi insurgents in the organisations that have used women as 
suicide bombers. 
16 These particular examples have been chosen because they are unique and “firsts” (Zedalis, 2004, 2) for 
various reasons. For instance, the first suicide bombing, or the first time a particular organisation used a bomber, 
or the first mother to be used, and the specific details are outlined in each case. This section does not intend, 
however, to probe the perpetrator’s reasons behind these acts, but some assumed ‘reasons’ will be set out in 
‘Responses to Women’s Violence’ (section two) in this chapter, as well as explored in the application chapter 
(chapter four).  
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I chronicle the role of the perpetrator, the movement that claimed responsibility, and the 
conflict in which it occurred.  
 
i. Sana Mehaydali 
The first example is that of Sana Mehaydali, who on 9 April 1985, at age 17, became the first 
female suicide bomber. Having joined the SSNP in February 1985, her first and only 
assignment was to drive a Peugeot filled with explosives into military vehicles used for 
transporting Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers into Bater al-Shuf Jezzin, South Lebanon 
(Skaine, 2006; Schweitzer, 2003). Mehaydali and between one and five Israeli soldiers were 
killed, and two others sustained injuries in the bombing (Bloom, 2007; Zedalis, 2004). The 
SSNP have taken responsibility for 12 suicide bomb attacks, of which five (including 
Mehaydali) involved women (Beyler, 2003b). 
 
ii. Thenmuli Rajaratnam/ Dhanu 
Thenmuli Rajaratnam, or Dhanu, is the second female suicide bomber I discuss. Dhanu, a 
woman in her late twenties was a fully trained Black Tigress, which is the elite female suicide 
bomber wing of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. In April 1991, Dhanu and another Tiger, Shubha, 
received orders to travel to Madras to prepare for an attack against the Indian Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi at a forthcoming election rally in Tamil Nadu, India. The women underwent 
two rehearsals – one on 17 April, when Dhanu failed to touch the feet of her practice target, as 




On 21 May, before the trip to Sriperumbudur, Shubha and another LTTE conspirator, Nalini, 
fitted Dhanu with the first known use of a customised suicide vest, packed with explosive 
materials, such as C4 based grenades, trinitrotoluene (TNT), and steel balls, all controlled by 
a detonation switch (Skaine, 2006). As one of only three individuals who had pre-authorised 
security clearance from the Indian authorities, Dhanu was escorted to Prime Minister Gandhi 
without delay. As planned, she garlanded and bowed down to touch the feet of the Prime 
Minister in a customary act of respect before detonating her bomb, which killed between 16 
and 18 people, including herself and Ghandi, and injured 33 others (Skaine, 2006). Dhanu 
was not only the first woman to wear a suicide vest but also to assassinate a head of state 
(Skaine, 2006; Pape, 2006).  
 
With over 200 attacks associated with the LTTE, the group is widely recognised to be the 
most proficient at deploying suicide bombers. Of this number, women have participated in 
approximately 30 to 40 percent of missions (Beyler, 2003b) and comprise some 60 percent of 
the elite suicide-bombing unit, the Black Tigers (Reuter, 2004).   
 
iii. Leila Kaplan 
The third case is Leila Kaplan, a 17-year-old member of the PKK, based in Turkey. On 25 
October 1996, Kaplan became the first female to disguise herself as a pregnant woman before 
detonating a bomb in front of Adana Police Rapid Deployment Force headquarters in Adana, 
Turkey (Skaine, 2006; Eager, 2008). She killed between three and five people and wounded 
twelve (Skaine, 2006; Beyler, 2003a). The PKK have executed 21 suicide bombings, with 14 
of them, representing 66 percent of the total, perpetrated by women (Beyler, 2003b). 
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iv. Wafa Idris 
Wafa Idris was a 26-year-old Palestinian woman and a regular volunteer with the Palestinian 
Red Crescent (Victor, 2003), and is the fourth suicide bomber I consider. On 27 January 
2002, she travelled from her home in the al-Amari refugee camp in Ramallah to Jerusalem, 
passing the checkpoint at Kalandria, most likely in an ambulance belonging to the Red 
Crescent. She went to Jaffa Road, a popular shopping street in Jerusalem, and carried with her 
a rucksack containing a ten-kilogram bomb packed with nails. The bomb exploded near 
revolving doors in a shoe store in the shopping area, killing Idris, an 81-year-old Israeli man, 
Pinhas Toukatli, and wounding between 40 and 150 bystanders (Skaine, 2006; Victor, 2003; 
Brunner, 2005). Idris is widely recognised as the “first shahida” (Eager, 2008, 179), the 
feminised version of the Arab word shahide, or martyr, who sacrificed herself for the 
Palestinian cause (Victor, 2003; Bloom, 2007). Although Idris was not believed to be 
affiliated to any organisation, it was the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, the military wing of the 
PLO, who claimed responsibility for the act two days later, arguing that Idris had acted upon 
Arafat’s call to arms in his “Army of Roses” (Victor, 2003, 19) speech that morning. The al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Fatah have collectively claimed responsibility for nine ‘successful’ 
and seven ‘unsuccessful’ female suicide bombings (Skaine, 2006) since the Second Intifida, 
starting with Idris’ attack.   
 
v. Dareen Abu Aishen 
The fifth female suicide bomber is Dareen Abu Aishen, a 21-year-old English literature 
student at al-Najah University, Nablus. On 27 February 2002, Aishen left a car driven by two 
male dispatchers and walked towards the Israeli Maccabim checkpoint in West Ramallah, in 
the West Bank. She walked about fifteen metres before Israeli soldiers called for her to stop 
 28 
and present her identification papers, to which she responded by running away. After about 
six metres, on a road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, a soldier fired at her and she 
simultaneously detonated the bomb she was carrying (Victor, 2003; Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs website, 2003). Aishen was the only person who died but two soldiers were severely 
injured and her two male chaperones were wounded (Schweitzer, 2008).  
 
Aishen initially approached Jamal Mansour, the leader of a local Hamas group, to be a 
bomber but he dismissed her as a candidate because she was a woman, stating, “when we run 
out of men we shall start using women” (Daraghmeh, 2002, 1). Aishen’s sister, Shireen, said 
that her sister’s reply was, “well, then we'll have to go to Fatah” (ibid). The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 
Brigade, of which Fatah is a part, claimed responsibility for the attack accepting her as a 
legitimate martyr. She was the first woman to leave a martyrdom video (Victor, 2003) and, 
despite the attack being claimed by al-Aqsa, she wore a Hamas headband (Skaine, 2006).  
 
vi. Ayat al-Akhras 
The sixth bomber is Ayat al-Akhras, who was an 18-year-old politics and journalism student. 
On 29 March 2002, she left her home in the Dehaishe refugee camp near Bethlehem and 
travelled to Kyriat Hayovel in Jerusalem, where she set off her ten-kilogram bomb, packed 
with nails and screws, at the Supersol supermarket during the Passover. The attack killed 
three people and injured between 22 and 28 IDF soldiers and she has been the youngest 
bomber in the territories (Skaine, 2006; Schweitzer, 2008; Victor, 2003). In her martyr’s 
statement, she declared that she was “going to fight instead of the sleeping Arab armies who 
are watching Palestinian girls fighting alone” (Skaine, 2006, 128) while “doing nothing” 
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(Victor, 2003, 211) to end the occupation. The attack was organised and carried out on behalf 
of Fatah (Victor, 2003). 
 
vii. Hawa Barayev and Luisa Magomadova 
Next is the example of the first time two suicide bombers were used as part of the same attack 
and the first bombing claimed by the Chechen rebels. On 7 June 2000, Hawa Barayev, a 22-
year-old Chechen woman, and Luisa Magomadova, a 16-year-old Chechen girl, drove a truck 
filled with explosives into a temporary Russian Special Forces (OMON) base in Alkhan-
Khala, Chechnya, killing between two and 27 Russian soldiers (Eager, 2008; Sjoberg and 
Gentry, 2007; Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008; Beyler, 2003a). Women have carried out 
some 42 percent of all the suicide bombing attacks claimed by the Chechen rebels, which 
equates to 46 out of 110 bombings in total (Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2008).  
 
viii. Hiba Daraghmeh 
The eighth case I discuss is Hiba Daraghmeh, a deeply religious, 19-year-old English 
literature student enrolled at Quds Open University. On 19 May 2003, Daraghmeh disguised 
herself as an Israeli woman and entered the Amakim Shopping Mall in Afulah. She detonated 
explosives in her suicide belt close by to the entrance, killing herself, three civilians and 
wounding between 52 and 83 bystanders (Skaine, 2006; Victor, 2003; Eager, 2008). This was 
the first attack claimed by the religious PIJ, although it was carried out as a joint attack with 
the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade (Skaine, 2006). In total, the PIJ has taken responsibility for two 
‘successful’ and three ‘failed’ female suicide bombings (Skaine, 2006).  
 
ix. Hanadi Jadarat 
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The next woman is Hanadi Jadarat, a 29-year-old lawyer, who had recently completed her 
studies in Jordan and returned to Jenin to open a practice. In early October 2003, she left her 
trainer’s (Yasser Obeidi, a military commander of the PIJ) home in Zboda, close to Jenin, and 
slipped passed the Israeli checkpoint into Haifa. On 4 October (two days before Yom Kippur), 
she travelled, in disguise as an Israeli woman and with accomplices, to Maxim’s, a restaurant 
on the beachfront that both Israeli Jews and Arabs frequented. She detonated a ten-kilo bomb 
that was hidden in her rucksack, which killed herself, 19 others, and injured over 60. This 
attack was also carried out on behalf of the PIJ, but Jadarat is considered the first 
‘professional’ woman to be involved in suicide bombing (Victor, 2003; Skaine, 2006; CPOST 
2011). 
 
x. Reem Saleh al-Riyashi 
The tenth case is Reem Saleh al-Riyashi, a 22-year-old mother of two children. On 14 January 
2004, al-Riyashi’s husband escorted her to a drop-off point close to the Erez checkpoint 
between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Upon reaching the checkpoint, she feigned an illness and 
refused to pass through the metal detectors, telling Israeli soldiers that a metal pin in her leg 
would trigger the alarms and requested, instead, a body search (Jaber and Mahnaimi, 2004). 
Al-Riyashi was instructed to wait in a building in the Erez industrial zone for a female soldier 
to conduct the search but, upon entering the building, she detonated a five-kilo bomb filled 
with ball bearings and screws that she was carrying. She killed herself and four Israeli 
soldiers, and injured between seven and ten Palestinian civilians (Skaine, 2006; Brunner, 
2005). Although the attack was executed in collaboration with the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, 
this was the first attack that Hamas were involved in and the first time a mother was used 
(Skaine, 2006; Brunner, 2005). Hamas has arranged 74 bombings in total and claimed it has 
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been responsible for two ‘successful’ and three ‘unsuccessful’ female suicide attacks 
(CPOST, 2011; Skaine, 2006). 
 
xi. Muriel Degauque 
The eleventh example that I present is Muriel Degauque. On 9 November 2005, Degauque, a 
38-year-old Muslim convert originally from Charleroi, Belgium, detonated a bomb close to 
American troops and Iraqi police in Baqubah, Iraq. Degauque died in the attack and one 
American soldier sustained minor injuries. She was the first known female suicide bomber of 
Western appearance claimed by al-Qaeda and her instructions were believed to be from 
Jordanian militant, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Eager, 2008; Skaine, 2006; Cunningham, 2007; 
Zedalis, 2008; Browne and Watson, 2005; Smith, 2005). In total, al-Qaeda has claimed 
responsibility for 153 suicide bombings across the world, of which five have been by women 
(CPOST, 2011). 
 
xii. Unnamed bomber 
The last case is a 17-year-old, unnamed bomber, who detonated her device outside the World 
Food Programme Distribution Centre (set up for families displaced by anti-Taliban military 
operations) in Khar, Pakistan on 26 December 2010. When stopped for routine security 
checks just outside the Centre, she threw two hand grenades into a crowd of 300 people, 
including police and military personnel, queuing for aid before activating her suicide belt. She 
killed between 43 and 45 people, and wounded 80 to 102 others. She was the first confirmed 
female bomber claimed by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Dawn, 2010a,b; Guardian, 2010; 
Jerusalem Post, 2010).17 This is the only female suicide bombing attack that Tehrik-i-Taliban 
                                                           
17 There were at least two other cases of suspected female bombers in Pakistan before this, but these were not 
confirmed or claimed by the Pakistani Taliban. The group claimed this attack, but the female nature was not 
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Pakistan have so far authorised, though they have been responsible for fifty bombings in total 
(CPOST, 2011).  
 
xiii. Zina 
In addition to these female suicide bombers, I also consider two closely aligned roles in this 
section. The first is Zina, who was a student at Bir Zeit University, and had the role of 
implementer. On 30 July 2001, she travelled with a bomb, concealed in a nail-strewn beer 
can, to the Coop supermarket on Jaffa Road, Jerusalem, placed it on a shelf with similar 
products, and activated the timer to explode an hour later. Though the bomb was successfully 
triggered, it failed to result in causalities. Subsequently, on 9 August 2001, she helped 
Izzedine Masri (a male martyr) cross three gated checkpoints along the Israeli border and 
detonate his ten-kilogram bomb, hidden in a guitar case, outside Sbarro’s Pizza restaurant, 
close to the supermarket. The bomb killed 15 people and injured 130 and was carried out on 
behalf of Hamas. She was sentenced to 25 years in prison as an accomplice in the Sbarro’s 
Pizza bombing (Victor, 2003; Schweitzer, 2008). 
 
xiv. Zarema Muzhakhoyeva 
The second related role (and the final example) I consider is Zarema Muzhakhoyeva, a 22-
year-old, would-be or failed suicide bomber. On 9 July 2003 she travelled to three different 
cafés in Moscow with a 1.5-kilogram bomb in her rucksack, but was unable to set-off the 
bomb at any of the locations despite pressing the button some “20 times” (Muzhakhoyeva in 
Groskop, 2004, 32). Russian police detained her at the fourth café from which she attempted 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
commented on explicitly. An attack on 26 June 2011 involving a husband and wife team in Kolachi, Pakistan 
was claimed by the group and the sex of the bombers was highlighted, with Pakistani Taliban spokesman, 
Ahsanullah Ahsan, claiming that the use of a woman, “shows how much we hate Pakistani security institutions” 
(Ahsan in Mahsud, 2011). 
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to activate the device, and a bomb disposal expert died in the process of trying to defuse it. 
She is currently serving 20 years for her involvement on behalf of the Chechen insurgents 
(Groskop, 2004; Strauss, 2004).  
 
In this section I have charted 12 cases of female suicide bombing, as well as that of an 
implementer and a failed bomber. The activities of the bombers differ from both the indirectly 
violent ‘mother’ and ‘supporter’ roles (since they physically carry out – or attempt to carry 
out – violent attacks) and the non-violent bystander and activist ones (as they are neither 
passive nor unbiased towards the parties in the conflict). Thus, the 14 cases I have described 
in this section are examples women as direct perpetrators of violence.  
 
‘Peaceful woman’ gender norm and women in violent roles 
In the final part of this first section, I draw out salient complexities relating to aggressive 
females, the sorts of violence exhibited, and the ‘peaceful woman’ gender norm. I do this by 
examining, first, the impact that the roles have on classifications of gender and second, asking 
whether the problems identified are better understood in terms of violence. I will argue that 
women in violent roles are perceived to be transgressive – to varying extents – of both gender 
and violence norms.  
 
First, violent roles in war affect the ‘peaceful woman’ gender norm in differing ways 
depending on whether they are first, indirectly or second, directly, violent. Taking indirect 
violence first, there is both some and paradoxically little modification to the gender norm. On 
the one hand, for example, the mother and supporter are not averse to being complicit in 
aggressive activity, which distinguishes them from the resigned bystanders or pacifists that 
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more readily fit the ‘peaceful woman’ caricature. By raising combatants, sacrificing their 
children, and supporting the war effort through transporting arms, women play active roles in 
conflict that destabilise the passivity engendered in the ‘peaceful woman’ stereotype. On the 
other hand, by not engaging in combat or inflicting force in the way soldiers do, mothers and 
supporters are not actually violent and thereby retain aspects of the peacefulness that is 
associated with females. In this regard, they remain entrenched within the ‘peaceful woman’ 
framework. Whilst obscuring the non-participatory feature of the paradigm, therefore, 
indirectly violent roles nevertheless continue to perpetuate other key elements, such as non-
aggressiveness, of the ‘peaceful woman’ gender stereotype. 
 
By contrast, and second, women who are directly violent more compellingly infringe gender 
norms. Female suicide bombers, like mothers and supporters, are operatives in conflict but, 
unlike them, the bombers are executors of violence too, and so are irrefutably aggressive 
actors. The suicide bombers undermine female archetypes because “women are not supposed 
to be violent” (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, 2) but, rather, are meant to conform to the ‘peaceful 
woman’ norm. Yet the bombers conspicuously flout these requirements. Indeed, Cindy Ness 
argues: 
 
as typical social roles and expectations associated with females virtually 
negate their potential for aggression, females who carry out terrorist acts, 
whether fighting for secular or religious ends, have historically been seen as 
violating conventional notions of gender and power…their behaviour 
represents a challenge to the social order (Ness, 2008, 2).  
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Women who are directly aggressive, that is, defy the peaceful norms by which they are 
expected to be bound and instead encroach upon the violent norms reserved for men. Put 
differently, they contravene the “male monopoly” (Brunner, 2005, 30) on violence when they 
carry out such attacks.  
 
Thus, I have argued that the gender stereotype of ‘peaceful woman’ is challenged to some 
extent when females are indirectly violent but is obfuscated to a much greater degree when 
women are direct perpetrators of violence. It is when women expand their roles in conflict 
(either from a peaceful or indirectly violent) to a directly violent role that gender norms are 
most clearly transgressed.  
 
Second, I consider whether these transgressions are better framed in terms of violence rather 
than gender norms. Since violence committed by anyone is generally condemned in many 
societies (there are laws prohibiting actual bodily harm right through to murder) but is 
sometimes allowed (as in situations of self-protection), the issue might be that suicide 
bombing is more aligned to the former type of violence than the latter. Perhaps it is the 
unsanctioned nature of the aggressive behaviour, not the gender of the perpetrator at all, that 
is the crux of the female bomber ‘problem’ (what makes it an infraction). In this regard, 
morally unjustified violence (such as the – male or female – terrorist, paedophile, or gangster) 
violates the non-violence norm per se, whereas morally permissible violence (the male ‘just 
warrior’ or the mother protecting her child) does not. Male suicide bombers, for example, are 
often derided as being “craven homicidal lunatics” (Atran et al., 2003, 1536) because of the 
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perceived taboo of their violence that kills others and themselves.18 As this is the same 
violence female suicide bombers employ, and she is in breach too, it can be suggested that it 
is the violence – not the gender – that is the nub of the matter in both cases. If violent women 
are an issue because they are immorally violent (and not because they are women), then it 
seems that aggression of this kind is seldom approved whoever perpetrates it.  
 
Yet, even being attributed with violent tendencies in the first instance is gender dependent. 
While engaging in proscribed violence is at least within the spectrum of possible male 
conduct (so it is plausible for men to embark upon prohibited aggression), it does not 
constitute a comparable feature of the woman’s repertoire (it is not conceivably open to her). 
That a suicide bombing attack perpetrated by a man is analysed with due seriousness while 
one perpetrated by a woman is not is an illustration of this. As Paige Whaley Eager argues: 
 
male suicide bombing, whilst repulsive to most observers and researchers, is 
viewed in some way as more ‘understandable’ given the particular 
macrolevel or mesolevel factors. In other words, some might argue that it is 
to a certain degree understandable that a male Palestinian would detonate 
himself and kill and maim as many civilians as possible given the deep 
sense of alienation, humiliation, and despair he might feel living under 
Israeli occupation; however, the female suicide bomber’s motivations are 
rarely afforded the same speculation (2008, 24). 
 
                                                           
18 On the contrary, suicide bombers are usually well educated, rational individuals acting from varying motives. 
As Atran argues, “study after study shows that suicide attackers and their supporters are rarely ignorant or 
impoverished. Nor are they crazed, cowardly, apathetic or asocial” (Atran, 2004, 5). 
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Though the severity of the bombing is equivalent, it is because women are adjudged incapable 
of forbidden violence that the aggression is deemed transgressive (rather than solely because 
the violence is of a particularly heinous sort, which is at the root of the infringement for men). 
A violent woman, like the suicide bomber, therefore, violates both the norms against 
disallowed violence and gender; she enacts a “double transgression” (Sjoberg and Gentry, 
2007, 15). This makes her unique to a violent man because her act “is a qualitatively different 
matter from a man doing the same thing [. . .] – the gender of the bomber being the critical 
factor here, not [just] the act itself” (Ness, 2008, 11). In this way, female suicide bombers are 
more troublesome than their male counterparts because they challenge norms twice over 
(gender and violence). 
 
Thus, women who inflict direct violence, such as the female suicide bomber, disobey the 
‘peaceful woman’ stereotype to a greater degree than those engaged in indirect violence, such 
as the mother and supporter. Directly violent women are ‘problematic’ in a second sense too, 
because they defy societal norms against proscribed violence. This makes them more 
troubling than men who carry out such violence.  
 
In this section I have discussed norms and roles relating to women in political conflict in 
order to situate and introduce some complexities around the female suicide bomber. I have set 
out the gender norms of ‘peaceful woman’ and ‘violent man’ in war that were underpinned by 
passive and aggressive norms in peace respectively, and I indicated that women typically hold 
non-violent roles in conflict that adhered to this norm. I then explored women in increasingly 
violent roles, either indirectly (as mothers or supporters) or directly (as female suicide 
bombers). I argued that these violent roles challenge gender norms. While indirectly violent 
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roles test the boundaries to some extent, directly violent ones are, incontrovertibly, more 
transgressive. Further, norms against prohibited aggression are also breached. Together, this 
makes female bombers more controversial than their male peers.  
 
Responses to Women’s Violence 
Having outlined the ‘problem’ of the female suicide bomber, in this section I investigate 
possible ‘solutions’ to her. In particular, I explore a range of societal responses to these 
women that both accounts for her and reinstates gender and violence norms that she disrupts. I 
do this in three parts, first, I briefly examine how violent women specifically are ‘explained’ 
in order to preserve norms of ‘peaceful woman’ generally, before I consider in more detail 
examples of how this shift manifests itself in societies that (in the second part) reject and (in 
the third part) endorse (to some degree) the use of female suicide bombers. I will contend that, 
though with differing emphases, both societies seek to maintain the ‘peaceful woman’ norm 
and do so by peddling the impression that female bombers are dissimilar to non-violent 
women.  
 
Explaining transgressive behaviour 
First I outline approaches to explaining violent women, focussing on societal analyses that 
attempt to unravel the transgressive behaviour. I do this by prioritising and exploring the 
pattern of responses in first, broad attitudes and second, the media. Though these two facets of 
society are inextricably linked (the media does not operate in a social vacuum and attitudes 
are not unaffected by the media), they will, for the purposes of clarity, be discussed somewhat 
separately. I will argue that a significant attitudinal change is to disassociate violent from 
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‘normal’ women, and that media interpretations credit and reinforce these bids to ‘explain 
away’ the bombers. Moreover, I will hint that different societies and groups adopt these 
strategies to particular ends, and I will spend the subsequent two parts of this section 
substantiating this claim. 
 
First, I explore societal attitudes towards transgressive women. In order to repair the break 
with convention that violent females present (the disconnect, that is, between norms and 
behaviour), society can address the situation in one of two ways. Either the norms in general 
(pervading stereotypes can be revised to include the offending conduct) or the violent women 
in particular (specific incidents that transgress otherwise apt norms can be explained) can be 
reconstructed. The latter option of reinterpreting single cases of violence is far less demanding 
than the former of overhauling stereotypes.19 Specifically, it is more expedient for female 
suicide bombers and their violent acts to be, as Ness describes it, “reframed or rhetorically 
repackaged” (2008, 12) than it is for the system that denies women the capacity for violence 
(amongst other behaviours) to be so. Particular instances of violent women, therefore, need to 
be explained. 
 
One way in which the discrepancy between peaceful norms and violent female behaviour can 
be resolved is by distinguishing violent and ‘normal’ women (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007). A 
contrast can be made between “violent female political actors [and] the acceptable and 
normal conception of women as nurturing, caring individuals” (Eager, 2008, 12). In this way, 
‘normal’ women preserve their peaceful, passive characteristics that bar violent behaviours, 
                                                           
19 The reason for this is two-fold. First, because – as the norms are political, in as much as they are social, 
constructs – the dominant group seeks to maintain the existing order rather than effect change. Second, because 
reaching the tipping point for the successful transition to new archetypes is a cumbersome process, as any 
emancipatory movement will testify. 
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whereas ‘non-normal’ women possess the hostile, assertive traits that enable them to 
perpetrate aggressive acts. By drawing this distinction, society standardises peaceful women 
and “fully other[s] violent women” (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, 13), so that most women are 
understood to adhere to widespread norms, while a few can be isolated as different. In this 
picture, this separate contingent transgresses gender stereotypes that are otherwise appropriate 
for all ‘normal’ women. 
 
Already distinct from most women in order to sustain gender norms, this ‘othered’ group can 
be ideologically explained one further time by particular societies or movements for political 
ends. Depending on the circumstances, they can, for example, be construed negatively (where 
female suicide bombers are not utilised) or positively (where they are), thereby engendering 
the correlative attitudes of rejection and acceptance in the community.20 That is, “the public at 
large, depending on the context, sometimes cheers and valorises these women or at other 
times condemns and demonises them” (Eager, 2008, 3). I will examine this claim about 
acceptance and rejection in greater detail later but, for now, suffice to say, political groups 
and sub-groups can create biases in the explanations offered for ‘othered’ women that impacts 
societal attitudes towards them. Thus, violent females are separated, with a particular spin, 
from ‘normal’ women, which reflects and affects social attitudes towards them.   
  
Having considered social approaches for dealing with the ‘problem’ of violent women, I now 
examine media strategies for responding to it. The media reports not just facts but facts 
encased in particular narratives that explain events using shorthand terms, interpretations, and 
biases that its audience can understand and with which it can quickly engage (West, 2004; 
                                                           
20 This is argued in Marway, 2011. 
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Nacos, 2008). In this regard, it has descriptive and inventive purpose, or as Jessica West puts 
it:  
 
framing and myth-making functions. In ‘selecting and highlighting some 
facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to 
promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution,’ the media 
frames an event in society’s consciousness. Moreover, in contributing to the 
production of myths, the media provides the stories that ‘make sense of a 
society for a society’ (2004, 5). 
 
In using existing references and stereotypes and in structuring and linking incidents in 
selective ways, the stories are more exaggerated and easier to comprehend, and the media 
bolsters current, and forges new, myths in that society to explain events back to it.21  
 
Where violent women and the transgression of norms are concerned, for example, the media 
frames reports so they resonate with societal attitudes about female suicide bombing but also 
develops its own streamlined narratives that make this telling easier. Societies that prohibit 
and those that sanction the female bomber can illustrate this. Just as some societies reject 
female violence and others endorse it, so too the media in those communities follow suit and 
also simultaneously devises its own tropes that society can recognise. I will flesh out 
examples of these trends in the following parts of this section, but the key point here is that 
                                                           
21 In these ways, the narratives of women in non-conflict are important, as these help frame interpretations of 
women in conflict. Such representations will be explored in the rest of this section.  
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different media explanations give credence to, uphold, and trigger various societal attitudes 
about female violence.22  
 
I have suggested, then, that one way in which the transgressions of violent women are 
dissipated is to regard them as different to ‘normal’ women and that this attitude can be 
propelled and accelerated by media reports. In the next two sections, I set out evidence of how 
these ‘othering’ trends manifest themselves in different societies: those that prohibit and those 
that permit (to some extent) female suicide bombers.  
 
Female suicide bombers as unacceptable 
In this section I discuss contexts where violent women are ‘othered’ and considered to be 
unacceptable. In this setting, the female bomber is constructed as deficient and “less than a 
woman” (Eager, 2008, 3) in order to account for her act whilst maintaining the ‘peaceful 
woman’ norm. As Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry argue, “if the women who commit violent 
crimes and political violence…can be discredited as women and seen as ‘bad women’ or 
‘femininity taken to an irrational extreme’ then they can exist in a world that holds intact the 
stereotype of women’s fragility and purity” (2007, 13).23 Where female violence is rejected, 
such women are therefore constructed negatively.  
 
Focusing on the causes of their ‘defective’ femininity, these responses rationalise violent 
women in two ways, first, as suffering from personal traumas (‘bad’) or personality disorders 
                                                           
22 Differing societal biases can be seen at the most rudimental level of the terminology used for these attacks. 
While ‘suicide bomber’ or ‘Black Widow’ is a Western construct, ‘martyr’ or ‘shahida’ are more likely in 
Middle-Eastern media (Whitehead, 2007; Nacos, 2008). The way the media frame the bombers even at this level, 
then, reflect particular societal attitudes to these violent women. 
23 Sjoberg and Gentry (2007) have explored the ‘othering’ of violent women through the narratives of mothers, 
monsters and whores (30-49) and they focus on the West’s treatment of such women. This thesis considers both 
societies where female bombers are unaccepted and accepted.    
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(‘mad’) that hinder their ‘proper’, nonviolent, development and second, as enduring imposed 
hardships that precipitates violence (the ‘victim’ trope). In so doing, female suicide bombers 
are cast as inferior aberrations that are understood by society through a ‘victim’ narrative, 
while peaceful women continue to be ‘normal’, ‘full’ women. 
 
i. ‘Bad’ and ‘mad’ women 
In the first set of explanations, the female bombers are cast as different to ‘normal’ women 
because they suffer individual impediments of various kinds, including two that I will explore 
here. First, they suffer distress that accompanies psychological traumas (a weak version) and 
second, they suffer abnormalities that are associated with psychiatric disorders (a strong 
version). By explaining the bombers in either of these ways, they are distinguished from 
‘normal’ women as either ‘bad’ or ‘mad’; in short, not ‘normal’ women.  
 
‘Bad’ 
On the weaker account, women are regarded as afflicted by social stigma that causes them 
psychological upset. Personal difficulties – such as, improper relationships with men, 
reputations of collusion with the enemy, lacking suitable characteristics for marriage, or 
holding irregular aspirations, for example (Schweitzer, 2008) – are pointed to as ‘proof’ of 
their subnormal social status as “misfits or outcasts” (Bloom, 2005b, 59). This provides 
reasons for seeing them as different to ‘normal’ women.  
 
To elaborate, where unsuitable relations with men are concerned, for instance, these women 
are derided for “having had sexual relations before marriage or an affair during marriage” 
(Schweitzer, 2008, 133) or being “pregnant out of wedlock” (Victor, 2003, 201). These 
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scenarios lead to the women being renounced by their societies for failing to be ‘good’ 
women. In terms of conspiring with the group’s adversaries, the bombers are sometimes 
deemed to belong to “families that carry with them the stain of collaboration, which obligates 
the woman’s sacrifice in order to cleanse the family name” (Schweitzer, 2008, 133). Here, the 
women and their families are rejected by society for being traitors. At other times, they are 
considered to be missing the appropriate traits to fulfil their roles as women, such as being 
“barren…[or having] a physical defect that lowers a woman’s desirability as a wife” (ibid) 
and which results in them rebuffed by suitors in particular and society in general. Differently 
still, the women are unwanted because they are “unmarried at a relatively advanced age” or 
“divorced” (ibid), and which means that they are no longer prime candidates for being wives 
in their societies. Finally, where women have aspirations outside the roles they are expected 
to have, they are “the target of ridicule and exclusion because they [a]re educated and 
intelligent” (Victor, 2003, 201). They are ‘outsiders’ in their societies for having career goals, 
as opposed to settling for being a domestic homemaker. In whichever form, these women are 
ostracised, labelled “damaged goods” (Schweitzer, 2008, 131), and marginalised (for reasons 
spanning ineligibility as a wife to an inability to follow social mores about what women 
should be) in the societies of which they should be a part. In other words, they are considered 
‘bad’, not ‘good’, women.  
 
Responses such as these ‘other’ the bombers through scandal, seeking out the social pressures 
that could impinge on and compromise their standing in the community, and which can be 
used to ‘explain’ their (presumed) damaged psychological health. They are separated from 
‘normal’ women and judged to be tragic anomalies, and in so doing the broad ‘peaceful 




The stronger version of the ‘defective’ explanation suggests that female suicide bombers 
suffer from psychosis; they are ‘mad’. Sjoberg and Gentry argue that violent women are 
construed as “monster[s and…] as insane, […] no longer woman or human” (2007, 13) but, 
rather, delusional and out of control. These responses focus not on personal pressures but 
individual abnormalities: “mental illness plays a part, since not all marginalised women 
within the Palestinian society kill themselves. Pathology plays an important role” (Professor 
Masalqa in Victor, 2003, 28). ‘Evidence’ of the bomber’s ‘madness’ includes first, the 
impaired interpretation of their ‘accepted’ roles, second, the severity of their anger and third, 
their sexual depravity. In all of these instances, the bombers are considered to be different to 
‘normal’ women.  
 
In the first example, female bombers embrace their social roles (in contrast to the ‘bad’ 
woman above) but do so to an uncontrollable extreme. They are women who are caring and 
nurturing but construe these ‘normal’ female dispositions in an irrational way; they are 
mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters who have “gone awry” (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, 13). 
Through their ‘madness’, they are unable to discern the proper levels of love and sacrifice for 
their families or country – which ‘normal’ women can grasp – and are instead excessively 
doting and self-abnegating – which leads to the flawed logic of suicide bombing (for the 
‘good’ of others and despite the certainty of one’s death). In this regard, the bombers are seen 
as unreasonable and are ‘faulty’ compared to ‘normal’ women.  
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The second indication of their ‘madness’ is the anger they display. Female suicide bombers 
are judged to be ferocious women. They are “more macho” (Alison, 2004, 457), “more 
fanatical, more cruel, more deadly” (Nacos, 2008, 228) than, not just ‘normal’ women, but 
men too, and this acute temper is attributed to a psychotic, unstable streak. The women are 
considered to harbour the kind of “cold rage” (Cooper, 1979, 151) that leads to fighters in the 
LTTE, for instance, to have a “fearsome reputation” (Alison, 2004, 457). Likewise, it is this 
fury that caused hostages in the Dubrovka Theatre Siege to claim that the women were 
“severe with us […and that] with the women I had no desire to speak” (Hostage in Speckhard 
et al., 2004, 319) lest there be repercussions.24 This is a brutality that is beyond the pale of 
‘normal’ women and explainable only by the bomber’s derangement.  
 
In the final example, women are ‘mad’ because of their intense sexual depravity (Sjoberg and 
Gentry, 2007). Rather than a bomber’s error being average sexual curiosity that their society 
condemns (as in the ‘bad’ scenarios above), this is an altogether more extreme sexuality that 
makes these women deviant. They are either heterosexual “erotomania[cs…or] erotic[ally] 
dysfunction[al]” (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, 13); hypersexual or not sexual enough. 
Alternatively they are “excessive . . . lesbian[s]” (Eager, 2008, 3), which is a view that regards 
“the terrorist as lesbian, because everyone knows no ‘real woman’ would hijack planes or 
cripple middleage men by shooting them in the kneecaps” (Jacoby in Nacos, 2008, 229). By 
possessing ‘unorthodox’ (abnormally dominant or subservient hetero- or homo-) sexual 
                                                           
24 However, even this perception about the women’s severity is based on accepting false norms about women 
being unable to be violent and thereby there is something askew with these women. As Lisa Kruger argues, “the 
idea that women are more ruthless arises from cultural myth as well as the notion that if a ‘pretty, small girl’ 
becomes violent she must be extra ruthless since it’s ‘not in her nature’. There is no substantial evidence that 
women terrorists are more ruthless or more dangerous. Such claims are largely based on perceptions” (Kruger in 
Skaine, 2006, 35 - unpublished email interview between Lisa Kruger and Rosemary Skaine, September 16, 
2005).  
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compulsions and obsessions, violent women are both aberrant and inferior to ‘normal’ 
women’s ‘moderate’ (hetero-) sexuality.  
 
In ascribing the violent behaviour to psychosis – using ‘evidence’ such as their unhinged 
interpretation of duties, or their anger or sexuality – female suicide bombers are distinguished 
from ‘normal’ women. Further, the bombers are deemed to be inferior to the norm because 
such women do not carry out violence. Through this, the ‘problematic’ women are explained 
and the norm of ‘peaceful woman’ remains intact. 
 
The first response to violent women where they are unacceptable, therefore, is to ‘other’ them 
from ‘normal’ women (in order to protect gender norms) by presenting female suicide 
bombers as faulty, isolated irregularities. They are women either undergoing personal traumas 
(‘bad’) or are psychotic (‘mad’), and are not ‘real’ women.   
 
ii. ‘Victims’ 
The second way in which violent women are explained by societies that find female suicide 
bombing unacceptable is through media portrayals, which base their reporting on the ‘bad–
mad’ ‘othering’ process to weave a narrative that the public understands. In doing this, the 
media attempts to “re-establish some kind of rational argument in order to provide their 
audience with comprehensible explanations” (Brunner, 2005, 39) for the female suicide 
bomber’s act. In particular, I suggest that media in these societies excuse the women using the 
‘victim’ narrative, where they are deemed injured parties, whether at the hands of first, a 
ruthless enemy or second, a coercive terrorist regime. In either case, these victimised women 
are presented as not electing to be violent, but rather being pushed into it. This is a narrative 
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both that society immediately understands and that preserves the view that women are 
generally peaceful.  
 
Victims of ‘hostile’ forces 
In the first set of examples, women are direct or indirect victims of an occupying force, with 
violence meted out at either the women or their families and communities. As victims of 
direct aggression, it is reported that enemy combatants sexually defile these women, who then 
turn to violence for retribution. Dhanu, for instance, was “allegedly raped by soldiers from the 
Indian Peacekeeping Force when it was posted in Sri Lanka for three years” (Goodwin, 2007, 
6) and thereafter was determined to become a bomber. In other instances, such as in Dagestan, 
women are clandestinely “abducted […and then] tortured” (Harding, 2010, 30) into becoming 
bombers by Russian forces so that Russian authorities gain a political excuse to ‘retaliate’. 
Here, they are direct targets of surreptitious activity by the enemy. Differently, the women 
experience degradation of other sorts: “the [Israeli] army stormed […Daraghmeh’s] family 
house. One of the soldiers tore up Hiba’s textbooks and a copy of the Koran…a week 
later…as she was walking to school, an army jeep stopped her and soldiers forced her to take 
the veil off” (Ghazali, 2003, 1). Such incidents are presented as angering the women enough 
to take justice into their own hands as bombers. These women, therefore, suffer violence 
personally from their foes.  
 
As victims of indirect force, on the other hand, enemy troops harm the women’s extended 
family and communities. The women witness aggression towards their male relatives, for 
instance, whom enemy forces routinely humiliate, torture or “sho[o]t dead” (BBC News, 2005, 
1), thereby prompting violence by the women out of “despair and revenge” (Wente, 2003, 1) 
 49 
for family deaths. Aishen, for example, became a suicide bomber because she “had lost 
members of her extended family in shootings” (Copeland, 2002, 1), and likewise, Degauque 
is reported to be a bereaved widow, mourning from the loss of her second husband, who was 
executed by occupying forces in Iraq (BBC News, 2005). These women are reported as 
grieving victims. In other instances, the violence is not towards loved ones but the community 
at large. Idris, for example, is reported to have reacted to the suffering of “all the wounded 
people she saw in the ambulances. She wanted to help her people” (Malbrook Idris in BBC 
News, 2002, 1) generally rather than her family specifically. Though the enemy forces prey on 
their families or communities, not the women themselves, these women experience violence 
indirectly nonetheless.  
 
Through a narrative of violent women being resentful and vengeful (because they have 
experienced – immediately or vicariously – rape, torture, or assassination from callous foreign 
occupiers), these bombers are involuntarily reacting to insurmountable hardships. In this 
regard, they are victimised, and considered to be responding begrudgingly to violence they 
have endured and not making a decision to act. 
 
Victims of ‘friendly’ forces 
Second, female suicide bombers are victims of militant terrorist organisations (that are 
supposedly fighting on their behalf), who exploit either their forlorn circumstances or their 
naive susceptibility. In the former scenario, the women are in situations of hopelessness that 
are capitalised upon by the insurgents. The widowed and failed Chechen bomber, 
Muzhakhoyeva, for instance, is “not a defiant Islamist desperate for a place in heaven. Her 
story is one of poverty and desperation” (Groskop, 2004, 32). She is reported as being given 
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the chance to clear her debts by becoming a martyr but then covertly “drugged regularly in 
her orange juice” (ibid) by Chechen militants to prevent her reneging on the agreement.25 
Here, the potential bomber was not only bereaved and mourning the death of her husband but 
was trapped and misused by the Chechens. Similarly, Kaplan was someone in a difficult 
situation, having witnessed a hesitant PKK combatant, Turkan Adiyaman, being shot in front 
of her by the PKK “as an example of the fate that befalls shirkers” (Reuter, 2004, 165). She 
too was in despair and ill-treated. These women are deemed victims of terrorist organisations, 
who exploit their discontent. 
 
Alternatively, the women are regarded as gullible and easily manipulated. For example, 
female bombers are reported to be innocent girls lured into disreputable relationships by 
calculating men who force them to act. One account, for example, read: “Palestinian masters 
of mass murder have themselves had affairs with vulnerable young Palestinian girls in order 
to compromise their ‘honour’ and to season them, pimp-style, for martyrdom” (Chesler, 2004, 
1). Here, the women are helpless and too trusting of these sinister men. For instance, al-
Riyashi, a married woman, was reported to have a lover who was also a member of Hamas 
and whose (alleged) intention for her was to be shamed precisely so she could redeem herself 
as a bomber. She was “told to choose between being killed by her family as an unfaithful wife 
or die as a heroine in a suicide bombing” (Daily Mail extract, Berkowitz, 2005, 616). These 
women are regarded as impressionable individuals, exploited by unrelenting terrorists.   
 
                                                           
25 Viv Groskop paints a vivid picture of Muzhakhoyeva’s plight: an unplanned pregnancy, early marriage 
brought about by social mores, and the death of her rebel husband. In her effort to escape her husband’s family, 
who treated her like a “household slave” (2004, 32), she stole from them and amassed many debts in failed 
attempts to flee, at which point she encountered Chechen militants, who offered to repay her debts if she became 
a martyr. Once she agreed, she was allegedly held against her will. 
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Framed as vulnerable (through either despondency or immaturity) these reports present the 
bombers as “lost soul[s] led astray” (Smith, 2005, 1) by manipulative insurgents. These 
women are dupes, who are taken advantage of by those who profess to be fighting for their 
communities. They are coerced victims, not wilful actors.   
 
The victimisation frame, therefore, presents women as resorting, rather than rationally 
deciding, to engage in suicide bombing. Either they avenge harms done by enemy forces or 
lack alternatives after being tricked by ‘friendly’ ones. In both cases, they do not choose to be 
violent, and in both cases the victim notion is quickly understood. This provides an easy to 
comprehend narrative for aberrant violent women and distinguishes them from ‘normal’ 
women.  
 
In this section, I have explored responses in societies where female violence is prohibited. In 
these instances, violent women are differentiated from ‘normal’ women as aggressive because 
they are faulty (‘bad’ or ‘mad’). Further, they are presented as impelled to act (‘victims’) 
because this is a media narrative allied with the ‘defective’ explanation and that individuals 
can immediately identify and understand. This ‘explains’ violent women while preserving 
gender norms of ‘peaceful woman’ in a clear way for society. 
 
Female suicide bombers as acceptable 
In the final section, I consider contexts that endorse (to some extent – as will be clarified) 
female violence; where violent women are ‘othered’ and acceptable. As in societies where 
such violence is disallowed, the women deviate from their gender stereotype but, unlike those 
societies, they are construed positively. To achieve this, society must substantiate “the breech 
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of its social order to itself in its own cultural terms” (Ness, 2007, 88). In other words, the 
departure from the norm must be justified, in language that resonates with that community, if 
the support of the people is to be garnered.26 This appeal is expected whenever violence is 
systematically used by political organisations – since any aggression breaks non-violence 
norms (recall that the male suicide bomber is ‘problematic’ too). Yet, it is demanded to a 
greater extent when female violence is employed – since there is a “double transgression” 
(Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, 15) of (gender and proscribed violence) norms.27 Insurgents must 
                                                           
26 Even if the broad political aim of terrorist organisations, such as gaining national independence, is supported 
by the affected community, the tactic of suicide bombing itself is more controversial and its legitimacy 
contingent upon public sanctioning. In this regard, “organisations that use humans as weapons would not exist 
without community support” (Zedalis, 2008, 55). The group is thoroughly dependent on wider society to 
condone the tactic. For this to happen, the violence “needs not only to have the expected pragmatic 
consequences but also to be judged appropriate” (Whitehead, 2007, 46) by the people, such that it is presented 
and seen as strategically necessary and ideologically sound. If successful on this count, the organisation can rely 
on the support of the community. As Bloom argues, “when the bombings resonate positively with the population 
that insurgent groups purport to represent, they help the organisation mobilise support. If suicide bombing does 
not resonate among the larger population the tactic will fail” (Bloom, 2005a, 78). If it convinces the wider 
public, the suicide bombing attacks come to be regarded as “from the people for the people” (Reuter, 2004, 169) 
and necessary, legitimate and praiseworthy. 
 
Moreover, the justification for this kind of attack often happens in later phases of the struggle, rather than at the 
beginning (though note that Barayev and Magomadova were employed from the start of the battle for an 
independent Chechnya, which is unlike many other campaigns for freedom). Bloom (2005a) and Eager (2008) 
both argue that it is easier for groups to engage in ‘standard’ warfare tactics before moving to ‘non-standard’ 
varieties, of which suicide bombing would be a part. Bloom contends, “militant groups are more likely to adopt 
suicide bombing as a strategy, and the tactic is more likely to resonate positively with the population, after other 
strategies have been tried and failed” (Bloom, 2005a, 78).  
27 Note also that any organisation or state that employs violence must justify that violence. Each side of the 
conflict, then, has its own narrative and grounds for war and, where female suicide bombers are involved, 
women have a certain “utility” (Ness 2007, 87) for sustaining military advantage and are useful rhetorical tools 
in this strategy. In this regard, just as violent women are ‘othered’ from normal women, so too is the ‘wrong’ 
side of the conflict ‘othered’ from the ‘right’. Those that do not use bombers, for instance, castigate the other as 
barbaric and uncivilised and, as Claudia Brunner argues, a dichotomy that devises a “rational, emancipated, and 
enlightened first world” (Brunner 2007, 964) non-user of female suicide bombers (the ‘right’ side) and an 
“oriental, third world, Muslim/Arab, far away, and necessarily other” (Brunner 2007, 964) who does (the 
‘wrong’ side) is evident. This assigns political, military, and moral legitimacy to the former while undermining 
the latter. Similarly, where female bombers are used, the women have a military value in raising awareness of 
the conflict and being able to evade detection (Bloom 2007; Ness 2007), but also serve to underscore the moral 
superiority of insurgents. By highlighting that women, usually considered to be virtuous in society, take up these 
roles draws attention to the ‘worthiness’ of the cause – that “we even sacrifice our best and brightest to bring 
salvation” (Brunner 2005, 35). Further, by emphasising the asymmetry of power, the tactic is portrayed as a 
morally permissible “last resort [. . .] the weapon of the weak” (Brunner 2005, 35), but morally ‘right’, side of 
the conflict. Each party then has tactical advantages when women are used as suicide bombers. Of course, 
warring sides drawing on the utility of violence and rhetoric to justify battle exists in conflict more generally. 
There are, for example, theoretical parallels, with various theorists justifying violence on the grounds of 
instrumentality, necessity and virtue, as well as employing persuasive arguments that focus on aesthetics, 
tragedy, sublimity and rhetoric (Frazer and Hutchings, 2007). However, the use of women as suicide bombers – 
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provide stronger evidence when contraventions are by women than by men to convince the 
wider group of their legitimacy. 
 
This ‘othering’ and endorsing of violent women can be achieved in two ways, first, by 
elevating their cultural or religious status (so they are ‘revered’) and commending their acts 
(so they are ‘cheered’) and second, by presenting them as just partakers of violence (the trope 
of the ‘ideal warrior’). By doing this, the bombers are ‘othered’ as exceptional women using 
the terms of the easily comprehensible ‘ideal warrior’ narrative, while ‘normal’ women 
continue to abide by the unexceptional ‘peaceful woman’ norm.  
 
i. ‘Revered’ and ‘cheered’ women 
In the first part, I explore explanations in societies where violent women are ‘othered’ and 
where that non-conformity is commended. To justify the violation, groups utilising women 
bombers can first, lay a precedent for female violence by culturally or religiously historicising 
it (‘revere’ the women) and second, reward the behaviour (‘cheer’ them) though, third, there 
are also some caveats (the violence must be a temporary and sole transgression) that must be 
abided (Ness, 2008).28 Through this process, and with the limiting conditions honoured, the 
women are separated from ‘normal’ women and approved by society.  
 
‘Revered’ women 
The otherwise norm-contravening status of violent women is mitigated when organisations 
link the aggression to a mutual and treasured history, such that the behaviour becomes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for all their perceived uniqueness – adds another way in which both sides of the conflict appeal to utility and 
rhetoric. 
28 Ness (2008), drawing on Schalk (1997), uses these themes of historicisation, rewards and conditions in 
relation to religious groups utilising female bombers. Here, both secular and religious groups and the ‘othering’ 
process are considered.  
 54 
esteemed by association. Organisations may, for example, point to familiar (real or fictional) 
violent females, prominent principles, or pivotal struggles from the past as paragons to justify 
the necessity for female bombers in the present conflict (Schalk, 1997; Ness, 2008). By 
connecting the transgressive bomber to society in this way, the behaviour is “historicis[ed]” 
(Schalk, 1997, 35) and embedded “within a collectively shared past where it can draw its 
sustenance from symbols that transcend time” (Ness, 2008, 12). In associating the women and 
the past, the violent females are ‘othered’ from ‘normal’ women but, instead of being ‘bad’ or 
‘mad’, are held in high regard (‘revered’). 
 
To illustrate, insurgents have historicised female violence whether they have a secular or a 
religious ethos. Taking the secular groups first, examples of violent women from the past and 
their use in previous conflicts have been used to sanction the bombers in contemporary wars. 
For instance, the (then) leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, referred to Sathyabama, 
Krishna’s wife, who participated in mythical battles in Hinduism and the role of women in the 
national army in order to make Black Tigresses more palatable to the Tamil community 
(Schalk, 1997). This connects female bombers to figures of antiquity in a positive way. In 
another example, Yasser Arafat of Fatah built upon the historic role of women as self-
sacrificing in the first Palestinian Intifada to not only galvanise support for a second Intifada 
but to also hint at one where women took up more aggressive positions. He argued, “you [the 
women] are my army of roses that will crush Israeli tanks…the hope that will liberate your 
husbands, fathers, and sons from oppression. You will sacrifice the way you, women, have 
always sacrificed for your family” (Arafat in Victor, 2003, 19-20).29 In relating expected and 
valued roles of women in former conflicts with potentially expanded roles in the current 
                                                           
29 Though it is not clear that it was his intention to introduce a policy of female suicide bombers, Arafat’s speech 
was certainly the catalyst for attacks by women in Palestine. Indeed, that afternoon Wafa Idris became the first 
bomber in the territories. 
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injustice, the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour (such as female aggression) 
is blurred. Thus, by drawing a parallel between previous esteemed violent women or past 
roles in other conflicts endured by the society, secular groups justify the aggression of female 
bombers in small and incremental steps.  
 
Similarly, theocratic organisations have identified historic violent women from the past as 
tolerable models for modern violent women (Ness, 2008). Hamas, for instance, claim that the 
first person to die for Islam was a woman (Sumayah Zawjat Yasir), and Sheikh Abu al-
Hassan cites the Prophet’s aunt as a famous example of a female warrior: she “came down 
from the women’s citadel, and fought a man from among the infidels who climbed up the 
citadel. She killed him but took care to protect Islamic morality by refraining from stripping 
and disarming him” (al-Hassan in Ness, 2008, 27). Just as in secular organisations, religious 
groups connect historical female violence to present day suicide bombers too. Differently 
from secular groups, however, they also utilise religious principles, such as reinterpreting 
Jihad, to justify female violence (Ness 2008; Cook 2008). For example, as David Cook (2008) 
argues, Jihad as fard kifaya suggests that the threat is serious enough for the “Muslim, adult, 
sane, free, male, and able-bodied” (41) segment of the community to fight, but Jihad as fard 
’ayn is the appropriate understanding of Jihad when the crisis facing Muslims is “existential” 
(Cunningham 2008, 93). This latter interpretation compels every individual (including 
women) to bear responsibility (without asking the permission of men - Sister Al, 2007) to 
engage in combat.30 Pervasive and eminent religious principles then have been tweaked and 
                                                           
30 Salafist movements (like al-Qaeda) as well as other religious organisations (such as Hamas) have adopted 
these revamped religious doctrines that rely on existential threats to the group to dispense with otherwise 
orthodox principles – such as the need for women to be escorted by a male member of the family when outside 
the home. Under the reinterpretation, women can now leave the house and participate in Jihad without anyone’s 
permission and without a chaperone because they are fighting for Islam’s survival (Cook, 2008; Cunningham, 
2008).  
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tied directly to women’s violence to allow legitimate participation. Thus, by connecting 
historical religious figures and doctrines to the female bomber, the violence is made more 
acceptable.  
 
In secular and religious organisations alike, therefore, violent women are ‘othered’ from 
peaceful (‘normal’) women and linked to venerated (‘non-normal’) violent women, past 
injustices, or the substance of sacred tenets that permit female violence in specific contexts. 
By emulating these esteemed figures, appealing to shared events, or embracing these holy 




Once ‘historicised’, female violence is made more socially acceptable by rewarding, rather 
than punishing, the behaviour. Building on the culture of martyrdom and “popular-culture 
hero-worship” (Reuter, 2004, 13) of male bombers, female suicide bombers are similarly 
praised as “heroes […and] have entered immortality” (Beyler, 2003b, 11). The women 
achieve an iconic status, with processions for burials, and statues, libraries, and exhibitions to 
commemorate them, as well as recreations of their acts. In so doing, the bombers are 
separated from ‘normal’ women in their violence, but they are also exonerated; the women 
are ‘cheered’. 
 
For instance, grand funerals are often arranged to acknowledge the sacrifice of female suicide 
bombers. After attacks by women in the Middle East, for example, “hundreds of Palestinians 
showed up at their funerals to pay their respects” (Beyler, 2003b, 11) and equally in Sri Lanka 
“scented candles, garlands of flowers, and papier-mâché effigies of the dead decorate their 
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shrines” (Reuter, 2004, 160) to honour their contribution. Further, family members refuse to 
mourn these women at the funerals, seeing their martyrdom as a “gift” (Jadarat – father of the 
bomber – in Berkowitz 2005, 615) and exclaiming, “why should we cry? It is like her 
wedding day, the happiest day of her life” (Thaher Jadarat – brother of the bomber – in 
Berkowitz 2005, 615).31 By organising elaborate funerals and celebrating rather than grieving, 
society salutes the bombers acts.  
 
In a different example, the women and their acts are memorialised. Saddam Hussein, for 
instance, allegedly commissioned a statue built in honour of Idris (BBC News 2002, 1) and a 
library at Yemen Children’s Hospital was named after her in 2009 (Middle East Media 
Research Institute – MEMRI – 2009, 1), indicating that Idris received acclaim for her acts. 
Exhibitions have also been curated to document and celebrate the work of suicide bombers 
such as the ‘Sbarro Café Exhibition’ in Palestine, which marked the anniversary of the 
bombing of the café in August 2001 in which Zina was instrumental. The admiration for the 
bombers and their acts at this show was evident: “the Sbarro section of the exhibit was replete 
with body parts and pizza slices strewn across the room. The walls were painted red to 
represent spattered blood. Another part of the exhibit glorified the ‘martyrs’ who carry out 
suicide operations” (Anti-Defamation League, 2002, 1). In this exhibition, suicide bombers 
                                                           
31 This response is similar to the ‘supporter’ role of mothers discussed in typical roles in conflict in the earlier 
parts of this chapter. As was noted there, families here too may be following the pattern of publicised joy and 
privatised grief when the bombers are women (Tzoreff, 2006, 19). For example, Mabrook Idris, the mother of 
Wafa Idris, initially exclaimed, “I am proud that my daughter died for Palestine, proud that she gave her life for 
us all. Thank God, thank God…” (Idris in Victor, 2003, 37). However, as Barbara Victor notes, “after an hour of 
sitting with her, talking with her, listening to her, Mabrook Idris is weeping. ‘If I had known what she was going 
to do, I would have stopped her,’ she says. ‘I grieve for my daughter.’” (Victor, 2003, 37). In this way, though 
the mothers and families of the women grieve privately, they are joyous publicly because this is the only 





(including females) are praised for their efforts. Such tributes glorify these women and their 
attacks. 
 
Finally, the female bomber’s acts are imitated and re-enacted by the youth. For instance, 
“martyrdom has become the most popular trend that separates the ‘in’ kids from the nerds” 
(Victor, 2003, 190) and many applaud it. This trend is discernible in the playground “with 
some children in the Gaza strip emulating martyrdom operations in childhood games such as 
conducting mock funerals of suicide bombers” (Eager, 2008, 194). Similarly, it is present in 
the classroom when a 12-year-old girl claimed that she wanted to be a martyr, “to follow my 
brother…and in honour of Wafa Idris, who proved that women can do as much as men” 
(Victor, 2003, 191). Whether for recreation or learning, these children think highly of suicide 
bombing and seek to emulate it. There is, then, admiration for these women across society, 
including amongst the young.  
 
These examples of lavish funerals, ostentatious tributes, and mimicking acts of bombing have 
all demonstrated that the bombers are iconised in societies that regard them as permissible. 
This praise spans society, including families, communities, and the youth. The suicide 
bombers are ‘cheered’ women, aggrandised and different to ‘normal’, non-violent women.  
 
Caveats to ‘revered’ and ‘cheered’ women 
In the final part of this section, I lay out some conditions to sanctioning violent women. In 
particular, female aggression is only extolled on two provisos: that the bombers neither breach 
other norms of femininity nor permanently transgress the nonviolent one (Ness, 2008). These 
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caveats make ‘revering’ and ‘cheering’ the women easier because broader gender norms are 
preserved in the long term. 
 
Under the first limitation, the violent women must not breach any other norm beyond the 
‘peaceful woman’ one. As already guilty of violating the violence/gender norms, female 
suicide bombers must be exemplary in and perpetuate other norms of femininity: they “must 
in all other ways ‘belong’ to their social world” (Ness, 2007, 88–9). By sustaining these wider 
norms, the bombers only require justifying on account of their proscribed violence as women. 
In the LTTE, for example, women combatants are expected to maintain many aspects of 
‘femaleness’ and chasteness in the broader culture, so the group “issued rules of behaviour 
and mimicked familial relationships” (Stack-O’Connor, 2007, 50; Alison, 2004, 456). Men 
and women lived separately, and were not allowed to marry (initially at all, but subsequently 
only to a male comrade), or have sex outside of marriage. In so doing, violence was cast as 
the only distinguishable (and to be explained) trait when compared to ‘normal’ women.  
 
Under the second constraint, the bombers must be regarded as interim. Since rewarding 
female violence implies the eventual normalisation of violent women, this consequence must 
be circumvented by presenting female bombers as a “necessary” – owing to the grave 
circumstances facing the group – “but temporary” (Alison, 2004, 458) measure. Both 
theocratic and secular organisations follow this rule. For example, the definition of the 
religious principle fard ‘ayn (that theocratic organisations utilise) is based on an imminent 
threat that demands extraordinary, but short-lived, action. Similarly, strategies of leaders (in 
secular groups) to employ women fighters has “frequently been stymied by [...] society, 
which has tended to resist expanded roles for women and only allowed such expansion under 
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extreme stress, and then only for limited periods of time” (Cunningham, 2008, 88). In both 
examples, violent women are permitted only insofar as their ‘normal’ (peaceful) roles will 
resume once the threat has passed. Broader gender norms must remain post the conflict.  
 
The caveats, then, are that female violence is allowable only if other aspects of gender norms 
are honoured (so violence is the sole anomaly to justify) and the transgression is temporary 
(so the ‘peaceful woman’ norm is intact in the end). By adhering to these two stipulations, 
violent women can be sanctioned; they can be both ‘othered’ from ‘normal’ women and 
approved.  
 
In this section, I have investigated how violent women might be accepted in societies. I have 
suggested that they could be ‘othered’ from ‘normal’ (peaceful) women by exalting 
(‘revering’ and ‘cheering’) them. I also highlighted that this ‘othering’ cannot be a permanent 
or multiple challenge to the ‘peaceful woman’ norm, since such moves would be too far a 
transgression for society to accept. 
 
ii. ‘Ideal warriors’  
The ‘othering’ process is evident in a second way through media narratives of violent women 
that trace the ‘revered–cheered’ responses and offer simple stories that society understands. In 
contrast to the rationalised accounts discussed earlier, however, media in these contexts 
present the women as romanticised, noble figures “using another kind of language, a kind of 
poetic storytelling” (Brunner, 2005, 39) and shared (rather than individual) motivations to 
‘explain’ them to the public.32 Here, women are framed, not as ‘victim’, but as either ‘ideal 
                                                           
32 Instead of focusing on individual traits and explanations (pathologies and personal traumas, for example) as 
Western media tends to do, these accounts are more communal (drawing on cultural injustices faced as a group, 
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woman’ or ‘liberated female warrior’ – together, ‘ideal warriors’ – and these are accessible 
tropes for society.   
 
‘Ideal’ 
As ‘ideal woman’, female suicide bombers are presented as either, first (at their best) 
inimitable prodigies or, second (at their worst) exemplary, though replicable, models. Women 
in the first camp are portrayed as unique and possessing admirable traits that other women 
lack including, “supreme qualities of purity, beauty, piety, and rare brilliance” (Schweitzer, 
2008, 132).33 Using Idris to illustrate, the bomber has been attributed pious qualities and 
labelled a “merciful angel” (Bahgat in al-Ahrami, MEMRI, 2002b), as having “freed us from 
our sins” (Qandil in al-Arabi, MEMRI, 2002a), and of even acquiring the apotheosised status 
of “Jesus Christ” (Victor 2003, 26). Similarly, Idris’ beauty is seen as exceptional and pure. 
Columnists, for instance, have commented that “her dreamy eyes and the mysterious smile on 
her lips, that competes with the famous smile some artist drew on the lips of Mona Lisa – 
Wafa’s smile is more beautiful” (Muntasir in al-Ahram, MEMRI, 2002b). Such references 
focus on these women as unblemished, virtuous and virginal and, unlike the victimisation 
frame, here the media characterise them as ‘ideal’ candidates for suicide bombing. They are 
not coerced into, but are making an honourable decision to die. As ‘ideal women’, female 
bombers are conveyed as sublime. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for instance). In this regard, “contrary to the individual-based explanations predominating in the Western media, 
many Arab quotations in the discussions about the women martyrs draw a picture where community enjoys a 
distinct priority over the individual” (Brunner, 2005, 39). These differences will be discussed again in 
representations of their agency in the next section of this chapter and in chapter five.  
33 Yoram Schweitzer (2008) introduces the “virtuous heroine” (132) theme in opposition to the “damaged 
goods” (ibid) interpretation in the West. In this section, attention is drawn to how this contributes to ‘othering’ 
the female bombers.  
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In the second portrayal, suicide bombers are ‘ideal women’ because they are shining 
examples, or better versions, of ‘normal’ female roles, particularly the ‘sacrificing mother’. 
They are, for instance, finer mothers than just “the Mother of a Shahid” (Tzoreff, 2006, 14) – 
which is typically valued as a contribution. They “will not settle for being mothers of 
martyrs” (al-Din in al-Akhbar, MEMRI, 2002a) – expected of ‘normal’ women – and demand 
instead to be “time bombs” (al-Din in al-Akhbar, MEMRI, 2002a) – an enhanced (‘mother-
plus’) role. These women have already sacrificed their sons or are “widowed mothers” 
(Speckhard et al. 2004, 324) and so qualify as ‘good’ mothers, but in sacrificing themselves 
too, they are preferable and ‘ideal’ ones to be imitated. Even where bombers are childless, the 
rhetoric of the mother is employed, and the women are regarded as ‘giving birth’ not to a 
child for the cause – a ‘normal’ role – but to a ‘free nation’ – a much grander mothering role. 
In this way, the suicide bomber is a worthy model and alternative “for a woman who will 
never be a mother” (Silva in Gunawardena, 2006, 84) and never raise a martyr. In giving up 
their own bodies, children and husbands for the movement, these are quintessential sacrificing 
mothers to be followed and ‘ideal women’. 
 
By presenting the bombers as either unsurpassable or re-creatable examples, these women are 
romanticised through the ‘ideal woman’ narrative. In framing them this way, the reports 
reflect the societal responses to the violent women as ‘revered’ and ‘cheered’ and so the 
bombers are more comprehensible to their communities.  
 
‘Warriors’ 
Where the bombers are portrayed as ‘liberated female warriors’, there are two elements to 
consider, first, warriors and second, liberated women. In the first ‘warrior’ element, the 
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women are constructed as more like men because of their heroism, courage, and defiance. For 
instance, the narrative emphasises her qualities as protector of the nation (usually a male role) 
instead of someone to be protected (typically a female role). She is framed as a guardian, 
rather than a nurturer: “a nation that has in it [a woman like] Wafa Idris will never be 
defeated, will never be humiliated” (Qandil in al-Arabi, MEMRI, 2002a), and as a champion 
of resistance, rather than an obsequious homemaker. Though comparing women with men is 
similar to responses above (where women were said to be more aggressive than men), in this 
context it is construed positively rather than negatively. Idris is reported, for example, as 
doing “what the strong, proud men do” (al-Din in MEMRI, 2002b) and even of being their 
superior and a role model: “it is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who 
teaches you the meaning of Jihad, and the way to die a martyr’s death” (unknown, MEMRI, 
2002a). The woman’s act is like the man’s, but in this narrative it is lauded (rather than 
criticised). Thus, the ‘warrior’ is more akin to the (perceived) dynamism of men, who make 
active decisions to die, rather than the (ostensible) passivity of women, who do not.  
 
Complimenting this warrior frame is the ‘liberated female’, where women suicide bombers 
are applauded for being emancipated in a respectful and demure way. Such liberation is not 
about “equality with men, and […women’s] right to be prostitutes, to strip, to reveal their 
charms” (al-Magdoub, MEMRI, 2002a), which al-Magdoub puts forward as a caricature of 
Western feminism. Rather, the liberation is reserved and “silent” (ibid) yet more effective and 
deadly: “it is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded […] myths about […her] 
weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement” (in al-Sha’ab, MEMRI, 2002a). In their 
‘appropriate’ emancipation, female bombers are both ‘othered’ from ‘normal’ women in their 
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culture (who are peaceful but non-liberated) and from Western women (who are peaceful but 
‘shamelessly’ liberated) and, in their differentiation, attributed decision-making powers.  
 
In the ‘liberated female warriors’ narrative, then, the bombers are portrayed in an idyllic 
fashion; they are both similar to male warriors and are ‘appropriately liberated’ female 
revolutionaries, deciding their destinies. In these ways, the media sentimentalise the violent 
women, presenting them as fitting a virtuous and strong ‘ideal warrior’ narrative. This story 
‘explains’ the bomber’s behaviour (they are idealised women and apposite fighters, capable of 
deciding about violence) in a way that society can swiftly understand.  
 
Where female violence is temporarily allowed, therefore, suicide bombers are still separated 
from ‘normal’ women, but in a positive way. They are connected to a communal history and 
are honoured for it (‘revered’ and ‘cheered’), and they are presented through a superior 
person’s narrative (‘ideal warrior’) that makes the women and their acts straightforward for 
society to grasp. In so doing, these particular violent women are justified whilst broader 
gender norms of ‘peaceful woman’ prevail. 
 
In this section, I have explored representations of the female suicide bomber who deviates 
from the societal norm of the ‘peaceful woman’. I argued that, in order to reconcile the non-
violent female stereotype with female violence, societies that reject this behaviour and those 
that accept it, both (though in diverging ways) ‘other’ violent women. While one set of 
responses explains their actions through individual abnormalities and condemn or ‘victimise’ 
them, another set of understandings regards them with respect and commends them as ‘ideal 
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warrior’ women. Though resulting in different interpretations, both are (for society) 
intelligible constructions that ‘resolve’ the transgressions and preserve gender norms. 
 
Denial of appropriate agency 
Having contrasted these societal responses towards female suicide bombers, in the the final 
section of this chapter, I draw out repercussions of the ‘victim’ (hereafter the shorthand for 
the ‘mad-bad-victim’ view) and ‘ideal warrior’ (likewise, the ‘revered-cheered-ideal warrior’) 
framing. In particular, I consider first, the consequences of each portrayal for the bomber’s 
agency and second, the need for more complex representations of agency. I argue that both 
characterisations serve to deny violent women appropriate agency, and that nuanced accounts 
of agency that resist binaries must be generated to avoid this (and it is precisely this challenge 
that will be taken up in the remainder of this thesis).  
 
(Mis) representing agency 
To begin, I discuss the effect that first, the ‘victim’ and second, the ‘ideal warrior’, narrative 
has for the suicide bomber’s agency. I argue that both depictions, in their own way, misstate 
the women’s agency. Where they are reduced to ‘victims’, the bomber’s agency is understated 
and, where they are bolstered to ‘ideal warriors’, it is usually overstated. Both narratives, 
then, fall short of representing their agency properly.34  
 
i. ‘Victims’  
                                                           
34 This is argued in Marway, 2011. 
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Starting with the ‘victim’, this narrative underplays women’s agency by either first, excluding 
it entirely or second, diminishing it significantly. In the former case, doubt is cast on their 
agentic capacity altogether, which “exclude[s] the possibility that women can choose to be 
violent” (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, 50). The women are conveyed as disempowered 
automatons, completely devoid of abilities to navigate their options or situation. Reports on 
Palestinian female suicide bombers, for example, “encourage the reader to feel sorry for these 
women…[suggesting they] do not have agency; rather they are manipulated by men” (Eager 
2008, 193). Similarly, for Chechen bombers, “the choice to inflict violence is portrayed as a 
non-choice; a force of circumstance. These women are…preyed upon by ruthless men” (West 
2004, 7). Removing the choice to be violent and instead attributing their acts to factors and 
persons beyond their control, these women are agentless victims, coerced into the act. While 
the victimisation accounts attempt to rationalise women’s behaviour, they also preclude 
women’s choices by making “powerful appeals for sympathy…[that] undermine the strength 
and capacity of individuals” (Schneider 1993, 395) to take up violent options, and constructs 
them as non-agents. Therefore, as ‘victims’, the women in these examples are wholly denied 
agency for their actions. 
 
Second, if violent women are permitted some reasons for acting, their portrayal as ‘victims’ 
weakens their agency by limiting those explanations to the personal realm (West, 2004; 
Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007; Eager, 2008). They are, for instance, bereaved widows or socially 
disgraced women. That the impetus to bomb is routinely framed in terms of “personal, private 
turmoil” implies that “women do not make a political choice to be terrorists” (West, 2004, 7) 
in the way that men (the supposedly legitimate political actors) do. This effectively abolishes 
their political agency, since it (incorrectly) looks exclusively to the personal for reasons 
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“beyond simply that women want to fight for their respective causes” (Cunningham, 2004, 
103). It restrains agency, not because focusing on the personal is an inauthentic motivation to 
act, but because political intentions become unavailable to women (whilst a range of both 
political and personal goals are conceivable for men). In so doing, women only have personal 
extenuating excuses (and that only insofar as it compels them to act), whereas men may have 
personal biases but are inspired, in the main, by their politics too. Just as denying these 
‘victim’s’ choices altogether misconstrues agency, narrowly focusing their acts on personal 
reasons alone perpetuates the distortion of their agency. 
 
As ‘victims’, the female suicide bomber’s agency is either utterly withheld (so it is non-
existent) or substantially eroded (so it is inaccurate or nugatory). Both eventualities, however, 
misrepresent the bomber’s agency, which is unlikely to be so effectively degraded as to 
render them all non-actors.   
 
ii. ‘Ideal warriors’  
Second, when women are framed as ‘ideal warriors’, their agency is misreported in two 
respects, first (and typically), it is overstated but second, it is (superficially) downplayed. 
Though violent women are deemed to have some agency, it is inappropriately exaggerated. 
With the ‘liberated female warrior’ frame, for instance, “these women are portrayed as self-
conscious, determined women who know exactly what they are doing and for what aim” 
(Brunner, 2005, 43). They are shown to be consummately resolute and tenacious with nothing 
but political or religious goals: they are “individuals, acting alone, unconstrained by social 
forces, [and] unmediated by social structures and systemic hardship” (Schneider 1993, 395–
6). Yet, various contextual factors (such as bereavement, political ideologies, religious 
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affiliations, and economic circumstances) do exert influence on most people’s lives, and so 
they are allotted an unrealistic agency. Similarly, the ‘ideal woman’ frame presents female 
suicide bombers as exemplary individuals, almost divine, and they are portrayed as having an 
irreproachable agency with “meta-human qualities” (Schweitzer 2008, 143), enabling them to 
choose without fault or constraint. Further, by associating ‘ideal warriors’ and extraordinary 
women in history, the bombers are bestowed with an analogous (that is, remarkable) agency 
that belongs neither to women in non-violent roles nor human beings more broadly. Just as 
dismissing agency in the previous ‘victim’ classification ignores women’s real agency, so 
over-emphasising it in the ‘ideal warrior’ one makes these women unreal. 
 
Constructing violent women as ‘ideal warriors’ also belies their agency in a second 
(seemingly contradictory) way, not by making it infinite but by curbing it, though (less 
inconsistently) it is still a flawless agency in that form or at that point. For instance, as ‘ideal’ 
women, the bombers are depicted not as adults but as children. They are “mostly cited by 
their first names and treated like little girls – even 28-year-old Wafa Idris…[whilst] their male 
martyr companions are mostly named by their full name and treated as grown-ups, even if 
they are only 16 years old” (Brunner, 2005, 43). So, on the one hand, they are faultless 
heroines capable of deciding for themselves while, on the other, they are child-like, without 
the agential capacity of adults. Critically, however, even as non-adults, their agency is 
superior, since they retain a purity and innocence that enables them to choose morally. 
Though in the form of a child, then, this is still a pristine agency. Similarly, as ‘liberated 
female warriors’, suicide bombers appear to be given boundless agency, but they are actually 
attributed a pseudo-agency and cast as temporary substitutes for men (the proper fighters), 
and are restricted in the type of emancipation permitted (mute and self-sacrificing). Here, 
 69 
though such women are portrayed as ‘ideal warriors’, their agency is in fact fleeting, though it 
is perfect and surpasses male agency in that moment. Whatever it reverts back to, their agency 
is unsullied at that point. This indicates that agency is dually misrepresented; it is purportedly 
understated (as being childlike or temporary) but, in the end, is overstated (immaculate, even 
in that reduced state). Both understandings, however, misstate women’s agency.  
 
Again, on the ‘ideal warrior’ narrative, violent women are denied appropriate agency. They 
either perform services for others with limitless agency, or they are naive and innocent with 
reduced, albeit untarnished, agency. In neither case, however, is agency realistically 
represented, since these women’s ability to act upon the world is unlikely to be so unflawed. 
 
One consequence of the ‘othering’ mechanism that frames the bombers negatively or 
positively, then, is a stark contrast in their agential abilities. Female suicide bombers are cast 
as either entirely devoid of agency or full agents, and yet it is improbable that any of the 
women considered thus far has an agency so constructed. Whether it is completely 
undermined or altogether overplayed, then, I argue that both the ‘victim’ and ‘ideal warrior’ 
narratives radically warp women’s agency.  
 
Better representing agency 
In the final part of this section, I set out the worry about these polarities and a possible way 
forward. I contends that both the total non-agent and total agent views that the ‘victim’ and 
‘ideal warrior’ characterisations imply are too simplistic, and that there is a need for 
complicating and enriching this agency in order to encourage better representations of the 
female suicide bomber. 
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A particular concern about the oppositional agency that emerges from the narratives is that it 
is unhelpful for providing an adequate impression of these women’s agency. Determining 
whether the bombers are, as Miranda Alison puts it, “agents or victims, liberated or 
subjugated, emancipated or oppressed strikes [her] as an unnecessary and unsophisticated 
binary” (Alison, 2003, 52) that does not move towards a proper understanding of the agency 
that may exist. In this regard, ending up in a position where violent women either have no 
agency or full agency is misleading because neither reflects women’s agential abilities in a 
fair way. It is unlikely that the bombers exclusively fit either category since “women’s 
violence is not [purely]…an instrument of men, nor is it purely emancipating” (Skaine, 2006, 
29), and yet, in presenting it in these ways, agency is forced into two cursory extremes. Thus, 
in framing and attributing agency as a binary, it is shallow and ineffectual at representing the 
women properly.  
 
Instead of categorising women unrepresentatively (as agent-less victims or possessors of ideal 
agency), violent women’s agency can be made more accurate by properly complicating it. 
Rather than only considering that which limits or enables these women, the combination of 
restraints and powers that are more likely to exist should be acknowledged. As Elizabeth 
Schneider argues: 
  
Women’s victimisation and agency are each understood to exist as the 
absence of the other – as if one must be pure victim or pure agent – when in 
fact they are profoundly interrelated […] We must seek to understand both 
the social context of women’s oppression, which shapes women’s choices 
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and constrains women’s agency and resistance, and also recognise women’s 
agency and resistance in a more nuanced way. This means that we reject 
simple dichotomies, give up either/ors, learn to accept contradiction, 
ambiguity, and ambivalence in women’s lives, and to explore more ‘grays’ 
in our conceptions of women’s experience, rather than seeing only ‘blacks’ 
and ‘whites’ (1993, 396-7).  
 
To understand agency in a fruitful way, a graded picture that recognises that choices exist but 
that they do not exist without constraint (for example) is important. Rather than evaluating 
female suicide bombers in terms of being wholly agential or not agential at all, a more 
intricate view where “the female offender is no longer necessarily innocent or biologically 
flawed” (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, 18) or godlike or perfect is required. In short, an agency 
that reflects her as, “a complicated construct” (ibid) and that recognises that decision-making 
occurs within (sometimes severe) constraint is needed. By achieving this, a considered and 
potentially more faithful representation of the bomber and her agency may be made possible.  
 
I have outlined how ‘no agency’ and ‘full agency’ binaries are unrepresentative, and that 
nuanced, rather than dichotomised, understandings of agency could offer a more accurate and 
constructive appreciation of the bombers and the ways they act upon the world. In this 
section, more broadly, I have explored the impact of the ‘victim’ and ‘ideal warrior’ 
narratives of the suicide bomber’s agency. I have argued that such narratives serve to deny 
violent women proper agency by regarding them as either wholly agential or not agential at 
all, but it is unlikely that they can be regarded in these simplistic ways. Therefore, I contend 
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that a complex construction of agency that acknowledges decision-making within constraint 
needs to be proposed, since it may be more representative of the women and what they do.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the female suicide bomber. I have suggested that women are not 
‘supposed’ to be violent according to the ‘peaceful woman’ gender norm and that, as directly 
violent, suicide bombers clearly break with this convention. I contended that, in order to 
explain her transgressions and preserve gender norms, she is ‘othered’ from ‘normal’ women 
– either negatively as a ‘victim’, or positively as an ‘ideal warrior’. Moreover, I argued that, 
by attempting to account for the acts whilst sustaining the norm, such narratives ultimately 
mis-state the women’s agency – either she is a non-agent or a full agent, but neither 
appropriately represents her agency, which is unlikely to be so stark. Thus, better (more 
complex and accurate) understandings of the suicide bomber’s agency are required.  
 
The issue that now arises is how can these more satisfactory judgements of agency be arrived 
at – how best can we conceptualise agency such that it fits the brief of comprehensively 
representing the suicide bomber who operates within constraints and avoids the problems so 
far identified? One way in which to achieve this is by considering how well different theories 
of agency account for the bombers. The concerns raised in this chapter – about whether 
bombing is what the women wanted, whether coercion was at play, and how much they were 
driven by oppressive forces, for example – are particularly pertinent to those of autonomy (as 
will be explained). Given this, philosophical conceptions of autonomy are a sensible starting 
point from which to explore these questions.  
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Many philosophers recognise some form of autonomy as being relevant to making a life go 
well. This may be formulated in several ways. For instance, being able to devise a conception 
of the good and engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life is regarded as a 
human need (Nussbaum, 2001). Or being able to carve out and manage a sense of personal 
identity to become who one wants to be is considered admirable (Meyers, 1989). Or being 
able to utilise one’s critical faculties to resist oppression and subjection, which may interfere 
with the agent doing what she wants, is regarded as useful (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2001). 
Though each of these examples is slightly different, the connection is that they all identify 
that living a life in a manner that is acceptable to the agent is valuable and significant for a 
good life. Ascribing autonomy – and degrees of autonomy – to individuals, including the 
female suicide bombers, then, is an important task, since it reflects the extent to which agents 
govern their lives. For the bombers in particular, where their agency is often misrepresented 
and binary, attributing autonomy properly and in a more nuanced way helps to approximate 
how far they are autonomous and so recognise their agency.  
 
To explore philosophical conceptions in more detail, I will examine two possible models of 
autonomy – the liberal and the relational – over the course of the next two chapters. I will 
revisit the suicide bombers in the fourth chapter to show how suited the relational approach 
(the liberal will be discounted after chapter two using standard critiques) is to representing 
their agency. I will consider the women again in the fifth chapter to outline and demonstrate 
my spectrum view of autonomy (a new proposal for measuring and comparing the autonomy 
of the women in detail).  
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2. LIBERAL MODELS OF AUTONOMY AND THEIR 
CRITIQUES 
Introduction 
Having set out case studies of female suicide bombers, shown that their agency is currently 
not well represented, and that better ways of accounting for their decision-making in 
constraint are needed, our focus now shifts to the theoretical. In the next two chapters I 
introduce diverging models of autonomy – the liberal and the relational – which examine 
what it means to be self-ruling or self-governing, in order to describe and evaluate two of the 
dominant models in the debate, and to consider which one might be more appropriate for the 
bombers.35 It should be noted that, though these accounts differ in many ways (as will be 
shown), there is some overlap between them in places (as will also be highlighted). I will 
address liberal models of autonomy in this chapter (leaving relational ones to the next) in two 
parts. First, I will identify five unifying themes of liberal theories of autonomy: authentic 
desires, procedural independence, local and basic autonomy, consistency, and the distinction 
between autonomy and responsibility. Second, I will examine common critiques of the liberal 
model by philosophers in the relational camp and, in particular, problems with how the 
account delineates two concepts relevant to the women of the case studies: agent and 
autonomy. Drawing on now standard critiques of liberal autonomy and arguments made by 
other relational theorists (the claims presented here are not new), I will contend that liberal 
theories construct the agent and autonomy less satisfactorily than they might, and that other 
                                                           
35 In this thesis, I use terms such as ‘model(s)’, ‘account(s)’, ‘theories’, ‘approach(es)’ interchangeably to refer to 
the liberal or relational view. I use terms such as ‘theory’ when considering a specific philosopher’s position in 
either of those camps.   
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approaches  – that could more satisfactorily account for these – should be preferred for the 
bombers.  
 
To be clear, my aim in this chapter is to present one of the main models of autonomy and to 
offer a point of comparison for relational accounts in the next chapter. In so doing, my claim 
is not that the liberal model fails to offer any useful conceptualisations of the agent and 
autonomy but rather that – following standard relational critiques of liberal autonomy – there 
are alternative conceptualisations for our purposes. That is, these different interpretations are 
helpful particularly (as I will hint at here and argue for in more detail in chapter four) for the 
bombers, who are certain kinds of persons who operate within particular types of complex 
and extreme constraints. My focus, then, is not primarily about decisively rejecting liberal 
autonomy wholesale, but principally about contextualising relational accounts and portraying 
the bomber’s autonomy properly and thoroughly.36 My argument overall is that many 
standard accounts, like liberal ones, are not the most appropriate if these women are going to 
have their autonomy, however limited, recognised and perhaps, more importantly, the 
elements and extent of their autonomy distinguished and measured. Having clarified this, I 
now move on to consider the theoretical liberal account.  
 
                                                           
36 In this regard, this thesis is focussed on the relational account and how to improve it, and I discuss the liberal 
model only to give a frame of reference for the overall debate. While I could have configured chapters 2 and 3 
differently – by setting out necessary and sufficient conditions for each model and decisively analysing these in 
detail (rather than broadly characterising then critiquing them using standard arguments) – this would be its own 
project and shift the emphasis of mine. I simply seek to map the existing debate fairly but swiftly in order to go 
on to do the principal job of examining the suitability of the relational account to the bombers and, most 
importantly, developing a spectrum on which their autonomy can be measured. 
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The liberal approach 
First, although there are numerous and diverse theories that can be categorised as ‘liberal’, the 
majority of models (to some extent) share five attributes, and these can be used to characterise 
the overall approach.37 In setting out these components, my intention is not to suggest 
necessary and sufficient conditions for liberal autonomy, but rather to sketch the rough 
approach. The five features that I discuss to do this are: authentic desires, procedural 
independence, local and basic autonomy, consistent desires and, the distinction between 
autonomy and responsibility. In outlining these, I both classify the account that can be broadly 
labelled as liberal and provide a framework for analysis in the second part of this chapter.  
 
Authentic desires  
The first common element in liberal theories of self-rule is a mechanism for determining 
authenticity, or a method for differentiating legitimate and illegitimate desires, values, 
preferences, or goals.38 Here, the concept of the ‘will’ is crucial, as the concern is about 
distinguishing how someone decides between and acts upon desires emanating from ‘within’ 
and reflectively endorsed by the individual (classed as authentic) from desires originating 
from an ‘outside’, non-approved, source (non-authentic). Liberal theorists propose various 
tests to ascertain the authenticity of desire formation and endorsement, including three 
positions that I will examine here as examples. These are first, hierarchical (which are the 
                                                           
37 The term ‘liberal’ is not a general political position usually defined in opposition to conservativism, but the 
specific philosophical conception that is usually classed as distinct from (for example) communitarianism. This 
will be become clearer throughout the chapter, but this note is intended to stem any misinterpretation from the 
outset. 
38 This thesis uses terms such as ‘desires’, ‘values’, ‘preferences’, or ‘goals’ interchangeably and often ‘desires’ 
or ‘preferences’ as shorthand for all these, unless otherwise stated. It recognises that there are distinctions 
between these terms and concepts, but these are not critical for the arguments in this thesis.  
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First, hierarchical theories propose that desire authentication is achieved structurally. Desires 
are formed at the first-order (a desire to eat a cupcake or smoke a cigarette, for example) but 
are endorsed at the second-order (a desire to desire to eat cake or to smoke). Whereas the 
lower-order desires are rudimentary and belong to any person (autonomous or not), it is the 
critical faculties at the higher level that reveals evidence of authentic primary desires.39 
Several theorists have advocated this account, including Gerald Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt. 
Dworkin, for instance, proposes that “autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of 
persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and 
the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and 
values” (Dworkin, 1988, 20), such that first-order desires reflect what is really wanted.  In 
this way, the autonomous person “identifies with” (Dworkin, 1989, 61) their first-order 
preferences and “such identification is not itself  […] in some way alien to the individual” 
(Dworkin, 1989, 61); it is not unendorsed by, or external to, the agent. To illustrate, consider 
the smoker. On the one hand, the smoker may desire to smoke and identify with that desire 
                                                           
39 Frankfurt notes that first-order desires belong to non-persons (as well as all persons) and the aim of the higher 
orders is to identify self-rule in human beings. He argues, “many animals appear to have the capacity for what I 
shall call ‘first-order desires’ or ‘desires of the first order,’ which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing 
or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is 
manifested in the formation of second-order desires” (Frankfurt, 1971, 7). Similarly, Dworkin argues that 
limiting a theory of autonomy to a single level is problematic because it would not be able to distinguish the 
subtleties of human behaviour, including different attitudes in the coerced person. He contends, “I think we fail 
to capture something important about human agents if we make our distinctions solely at the first level. We need 
to distinguish not only between the person who is coerced and the person who acts, say, to obtain pleasure, but 
also between two agents who are coerced. One resents being motivated in this fashion, would not choose to enter 
situations in which threats are present. The other welcomes being motivated in this fashion, chooses (even pays) 
to be threatened. A similar contrast holds between two patients, one of whom is deceived by his doctor against 
his will and the other who has requested that his doctor lie to him if cancer is ever diagnosed. Our normative and 
conceptual theories would be deficient if the distinction between levels were not drawn” (Dworkin, 1988, 19). 
Thus, the levels are to distinguish the kinds of desires that are authentic and those that are not.  
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according to the structural requirement, in which case it is authentic and she acts 
autonomously. On the other hand, however, “one may not just desire to smoke, but also desire 
that one not have that desire” (Dworkin, 1988, 15), in which case the desire to smoke is not 
endorsed at the second-order level, and consequently it is not a desire she wishes to have (it is 
non-authentic). This is one example of a structural configuration of authenticity. 
 
In another account, Frankfurt also advocates a hierarchical theory of authentication but, unlike 
Dworkin, he differentiates higher desires and volitions. He argues that autonomy, or freedom 
of the will, ensues when first-order desires are validated by “second-order volitions” 
(Frankfurt, 1971, 10), which affirm that the person “wants a certain desire to be his will” 
(ibid).40 Such volitions are distinct from second-order desires generally, which might 
(unreflectively) move persons to act but do not indicate anything about their will or attitude 
towards the primary desire.41 Second-order volitions demand an active reflection and 
acceptance towards desires rather than adoption as a “passive bystander” (Frankfurt, 2009, 
54). While the unwilling drug-addict, for example, may have conflicting first-order desires (to 
both take and refrain from taking the drug), she – unlike the “wanton” (Frankfurt, 1971, 11) – 
is not “neutral” (12) about which of these desires she wants to be effective, since she wants 
                                                           
40 Frankfurt also clarifies that his concept of the ‘will’ distinguishes inclination and effective desires. He argues 
that merely being inclined to carry out a first-order desire does not qualify that desire to be her will, rather that 
an effective desire does. He states that “the notion of the will is not coextensive with the notion of what an agent 
intends to do. For even though someone may have a settled intention to do X, he may nontheless do something 
else instead of doing X because, despite his intention, his desire to do X proves to be weaker or less effective 
than some conflicting desire” (2009, 14). The will, then, is about effective desires that moves someone into 
action.  
41 Frankfurt refers to someone who has first-order desires and may even have second-order desires, but has no 
second-order volitions as a “wanton” (Frankfurt, 1971, 11). He goes on to say that “the essential characteristic of 
a wanton is that he does not care about his will. His desires move him to do certain things, without its being true 
of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires. The 
class of wantons includes all nonhuman animals that have desires and all very young children. Perhaps it also 
includes some adult beings as well” (ibid). 
 79 
the desire to refrain from smoking to be the desire that she acts on.42 However, it is only when 
these desires and volitions are harmonised that someone acts autonomously: “it is in securing 
the conformity of the will to his second-order volitions, then, that a person exercises freedom 
of the will” (15), and so the unwilling addict’s will is not ‘free’ and her desire is not 
autonomous. Frankfurt’s theory, then, is structured differently from Dworkin’s, but it is still 
hierarchical. 
 
In these ways, both Dworkin and Frankfurt have developed a hierarchical account – drawing 
on higher and lower desires and volitions – of distinguishing authentic preferences that are 
one’s own from non-authentic ones that cannot be described as such. These offer one way in 
which to determine the authenticity of desires in the liberal approach.   
 
ii. ‘Neohierarchical’ 
The second of the three methods to identify authentic desires are “neohierarchical” (Taylor, 
2008, 2) theories. These shift from a solely hierarchical model to include a historical 
component where authenticity focuses on how desires were formed.43 In order to differentiate 
authentic from non-authentic desires, John Christman, for example, offers a theory that 
evaluates the development of “processes of preference formation” (Christman, 1991, 10) that 
lead to the adoption of the desire. The key question is whether an individual did not resist, or 
would not have resisted (thereby permitting a hypothetical, retrospective test) the 
                                                           
42 Frankfurt subsequently clarifies the requirement for someone wanting a desire to be hers as the ‘satisfaction’ 
view of identification, where the person is autonomous if she accepts (is satisfied with) a first-order desire she 
has (she would not wish to change the desire and she sees it as indicating something about herself). Here 
‘satisfaction’ does not imply the person’s particular (positive or negative) attitude or belief towards the desire, 
merely that she does not wish to change it. Moreover, the satisfaction attitude itself does not require 
endorsement, which was included in response to the regress problem (which will be discussed in the criticisms 
section of this chapter) (Frankfurt, 1999; Taylor, 2008). 
43 The historical component is in response to various criticisms of the hierarchical theories, such as manipulation 
of desires, which will be discussed in the criticisms section of this chapter and the application chapter (chapter 
four).  
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development of certain desires when “attending to this process of development” (Christman, 
1991, 11).44 In addition, this lack of resistance must not have been due to illegitimate factors 
impeding critical self-reflection (which I will discuss more in the second characteristic 
below). Finally, the process of reflection itself must be minimally rational (so resulting in 
logical regularity) and self-aware (so not self-deceptive) (Christman, 1991). When the 
motivating reasons for a person’s formation of a desire to eat a cupcake, for example, is made 
transparent, and when in frankly questioning those causes the person does, or would, not 
reject them, then the desire is authentic. Historical theories focus on authentic desire-
formation and endorsement, rather than hierarchical affirmation alone.  
 
iii. Non-hierarchical  
A third way to distinguish authentic from non-authentic desires is to reject the structural 
approaches and opt instead for non-hierarchical models. There are several examples of these, 
but I outline just three here: Laura Waddell Ekstrom, Gary Watson, and Irving Thalberg’s 
theories.  
 
Ekstrom proposes a coherence model that moves beyond a hierarchical methodology for 
authenticity to focus on the integration of desires. Attempting to reflect the agent’s “real self” 
(Ekstrom, 2008, 151) and minimise the levels of hierarchy, Ekstrom argues that internally 
cohering ‘preferences’ – that is those desires that have “survived a process of critical 
evaluation” (148) – indicate authenticity of preferences. She argues, “one’s action is self-
                                                           
44 For Christman, this ‘attending’ to the process means that a fairly “full description of the steps of reasoning or 
the causal processes that led her to have this desire is available for her possible consideration. This reflectiveness 
assumes that an agent can become aware of the beliefs and desires that move her to act. Call this the 
‘transparency’ of her motivating reasons. What I mean by this is the ability of an agent to bring to conscious 
awareness a belief or desire – either in the form of a mental representation or a proposition – and concentrate on 
its meaning.” (Christman, 1991, 11) 
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governed when it is directed by the true self, and the true self is comprised of a cohering 
aggregate of preference and acceptance states, along with the capacity to form and re-form 
these” (155). That the smoker’s authorised preference to smoke coheres or is “well supported 
by a network of her [other] considered attitudes” (151-2) suggests her desire to smoke is from 
the ‘real self’ and authentic. It is having an integrated and cohering set of preferences and 
acting upon these that results in authenticity.  
 
In a different way, Watson also offers a non-structural account when he differentiates 
‘valuing’ and ‘desiring’ in free action rather than higher and lower order desires or volitions. 
Whereas the evaluation system enables a person to rank the worth of different states of affair 
and generates judgements like “the thing for me to do in these circumstances, all things 
considered, is a” (Watson, 1989, 116), the motivation system (or will) are those 
considerations that “move him to action” (117). For Watson, a state of unfree action is 
possible when “an agent’s valuation system and motivational system may not completely 
coincide” (ibid). Though one may value or most want to live healthily, for example, one is 
motivated by or desires to eat cupcakes or smoke, which undermines what is valued. By 
contrast, one gets what one really wants and action is free when these coincide.45 Here, the 
connection between valuing and desiring, not hierarchically or historically endorsing desires, 
determine what it is to act freely or authentically.  
 
The final example is Thalberg, who also challenges the structural account, though this time by 
arguing that the fundamental concern of inauthenticity is not with underscoring the 
                                                           
45 To clarify, for Watson, because “talk about free action and free agency can be understood in terms of the idea 
of being able to get what one wants” (Watson, 1989, 117), it is the case that “the problem of free action arises 
because what one desires may not be what one values, and what one most values may not be what one is finally 
moved to get” (Watson, 1989, 112), and in this instance the action is unfree. 
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misalignment of desires and volitions but with highlighting a problem in the resulting act. 
Citing the case of the hold-up victim who hands his money over to the highwayman, Thalberg 
asks, “what is likely to be the principal object of his aversion – that his money is gone, or that 
it was ‘for these reasons’ that he abandoned his money? Surely he ‘minds’ his action, and 
particularly its financial consequences, more than he ‘minds’ his own motivational state?” 
(Thalberg, 1989, 126-7) Accordingly, what the agent really wants is a different situation, not 
to be moved by a different desire: “although there is no deed the coerced individual really 
wants to perform, as conditions stand, his really important attitude is his preference for 
different conditions” (Thalberg, 1989, 128). Thalberg contends that it is this difference of 
wanting an alternative situation, not hierarchical harmony of desires, which reveals what it is 
the agent truly wants.  
 
Whether as coherence, desiring-valuing, or attitudinal theories, these non-hierarchical models 
are intended to introduce alternative ways in which to conceptualise authenticity of desires (or 
preferences) to the structural (hierarchical or ‘neohierarchical’) approaches. But what all 
liberal models of autonomy have in common is a method of distinguishing what one 
authentically wants from what one does not authentically want. The three different theories – 
hierarchical, ‘neohierarchical’ and non-hierarchical – that I outlined above are all examples of 
how such a distinction could be made.  
 
Procedural independence 
The second condition that many liberal theories share is that of procedural independence. This 
has two elements, first, ‘procedure’ and second, ‘independence’, and together these advocate 
that a non-interfered reflective process is necessary for autonomy. First, I will discuss 
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proceduralism by sketching the liberal political theory on which it is based and then 
describing how liberal autonomy is content-neutral about which desires count as autonomous.  
 
i. Procedural 
First, the focus on the procedural in liberal autonomy stems from modern liberal political 
theory, and while there are many accounts that fall under this banner, one of the most 
influential, that of John Rawls, will serve as our example. Rawls in a Theory of Justice (1971) 
argues that, under conditions of a hypothetical contract, the principles of justice that citizens 
adopt are commitments to basic liberties and socio-economic equalities, which enable them to 
pursue their individual conceptions of the ‘good’ (what it is that makes their lives good).46 A 
person opts for ‘neutral’ principles of justice on which most can agree because they value 
“conditions that enable him to frame a mode of life that expresses his nature as a free and 
equal rational being” (561). In other words, for Rawls, “what matters is people’s freedom to 
make their own choices, and to change their minds, not whatever it is they choose” (Mulhall 
and Swift, 1996, 6). Rawls’ account is a content-neutral, non-substantive view of justice that 
favours the individual’s capacity to choose over what that choice may be.  
 
In Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls makes this commitment to proceduralism even stronger. 
He discusses liberalism as limited to the basic structures of society, without reference to any 
                                                           
46 In a Theory of Justice, Rawls proposed ‘justice as fairness’ and used two theoretical devices of a hypothetical 
contract – the ‘original position’ that states persons in liberal societies are free and equal, and the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ where one’s life details are unknown to anyone – to argue that the principles of justice people would 
adopt in these circumstances were morally comprehensive in the form of a commitment to basic liberties and 
socio-economic equalities, which enabled them to “frame, revise and rationally to pursue” (Mulhall and Swift, 
1996, 6) their individual conceptions of what it is that makes their own life ‘good’. The commitments are first 
that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar system of liberty for all” and second that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged…and (b) attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971, 302).   
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comprehensive doctrine, and to those principles that most citizens of liberal states 
(characterised by their diversity and plurality) would endorse.47 He argues: 
 
Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, citizens cannot agree on any moral 
authority, whether a sacred text, or institution. Nor do they agree about the 
order of moral values, or the dictates of what some regard as natural law. 
We adopt, then, a constructivist view to specify the fair terms of social 
cooperation…[I]f the procedure can be correctly formulated, citizens should 
be able to accept its principles and conceptions along with their reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine (Rawls, 1993, 97).  
 
Here, Rawls advocates a position where political liberalism is wedded to the correct, non-
substantive, procedures that most citizens would endorse, rather than notions of justice that 
are content specific and that many might not accept. In this regard, Rawls considers neutrality 
in framing the structures of the state and plurality of the good to be important for liberal 
societies.  
 
Second, we can trace the influence of liberal political proceduralism in liberal conceptions of 
autonomy. Such autonomy theorists argue that rather than demand that individuals (who have 
                                                           
47 In Political Liberalism, Rawls makes the view about justice as procedural stronger by offering a general view 
about liberalism (rather than the specific form of liberalism he advocated in a Theory of Justice) as one that is: 
limited to the publicly shared, “basic structure of society” (1993, 11) (rudimentary political, economic and social 
– not religious or private educational – institutions); “freestanding and expounded apart from” (12) any wider 
comprehensive religious or political doctrine (transcends moral, religious or philosophical claims about how 
people ought to live their lives privately and publicly); and represents “fundamental ideas viewed as implicit in 
the public political culture of a democratic society” (13) (developing those ideas that citizens of a democratic 
society intuitively endorse because they are present in the basic structures of that specific society and are non-
comprehensive). Though his earlier work suggested that justice as fairness was at least a partially comprehensive 
doctrine, in Political Liberalism he makes it thoroughly non-comprehensive in an attempt to deal with the 
plurality of views in societies of a liberal-democratic persuasion. 
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diverse ends) are only autonomous if they exemplify substantive values or behaviours (which, 
given their varied ends, is likely to limit who is classed as autonomous), autonomy should be 
content-neutral. This broadens the kinds of desires and persons that can be classed as 
autonomous (it allows plurality and inclusivity). It is the fact that individuals can develop a 
wide range of reasons and preferences, whether one agrees with them or not, that is the crucial 
point for liberal autonomy. Indeed, as Christman argues: 
 
we can imagine cases where an agent would have good reason to have [any 
kind of] a desire. Hence, we can also imagine that the person is 
autonomously guided by those good reasons in formulating that desire, and 
so by that token we can imagine it as autonomously formed. So since we can 
imagine any preference as being autonomously formed, given a fantastic 
enough situation, then it cannot be the content of the preference itself that 
determines its autonomy. It is always the origin of desires that matters in 
judgements about autonomy (Christman, 1991, 22-3).  
 
Liberal autonomy theorists typically favour the procedural view articulated by Rawls’ 
contending that, because there are conflicting conceptions of the autonomous life, it is not the 
kind of desires one endorses but the endorsement process that matters for autonomy. In this 
way, the procedural account “makes no reference to constraints on the content of a person’s 
choices or the reasons he or she has for them. In a thoroughly liberal manner, this shift to 
formal, procedural conditions allows this model to accommodate a diversity of desires and 
ways of life as autonomous” (Christman and Anderson, 2005, 3). Since this requirement 
enables theorists to differentiate the ability and process of reflecting upon desires from the 
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content of those desires, an “autonomous person can be a tyrant or a slave, a saint or sinner, a 
rugged individualist or champion of fraternity, a leader or follower” (Dworkin, 1988, 29).48 
As the focus is the procedure, the actual choices the agent makes can be liberal or illiberal, 
autonomy-conferring or autonomy-reducing, good or bad.  
 
ii. Independence 
The content-neutral requirements for autonomy, then, allow a broad range of decisions to be 
classed as autonomous, but to be procedurally independent – the second element of this 
characteristic – the process of critical self-reflection itself must be free from improper 
interference. This supports the authenticity condition above – that the agent’s desire is 
genuinely hers – by “distinguishing those ways of influencing people’s reflective and critical 
faculties which subvert them from those which promote and improve them” (Dworkin, 1989, 
61).49 The concern is about weeding out malignant influences, such as brainwashing, hypnosis 
and coercion, rather than relatively benign forces, like persuasion and offers (Dworkin, 
1989).50 To be independent, the reflective process must not be hampered by interferences 
from the former category and if it is the desire is non-autonomous. The process of reflection 
associated with autonomy must be free from negative obstructions.  
 
                                                           
48 Indeed Dworkin argues that a decision to enter into slavery could be legitimately autonomous because of the 
commitment to proceduralism. He contends, “there is nothing in the idea of autonomy that precludes a person 
from saying, ‘I want to be the kind of person who acts at the command of others. I define myself as a slave and 
endorse those attitudes and preferences. My autonomy consists in being a slave.’ If this is coherent, and I think it 
is, one cannot argue against such slavery on the grounds of autonomy. The argument will have to appeal to some 
idea of what is a fitting life for a person and, thus, be a direct attempt to impose a conception of what is ‘good’ 
on another person” (Dworkin, 1988, 129).  
49 For Dworkin, the “full formula for autonomy […] is authenticity plus procedural independence” (Dworkin, 
1989, 61), not simply authenticity.  
50 To differentiate interferences, Dworkin highlights a distinction between offers and threats in the way agents 
regard them. He argues, “people resent acting merely in order to retain a status quo against the interference of 
another agent (threats). They, normally, do not mind acting for the reason that they will improve their situation 
contingent on their accepting the terms of another agent (offers)” (Dworkin, 1988, 155). 
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Thus, the second feature of liberal models is a commitment to procedural independence. This 
involves both content-neutrality and a non-tampered reflective process. Specifically, the focus 
is ascertaining whether the procedure has been interfered with or not, rather than assessing the 
substance of desires.  
 
Local and basic scope 
The third characteristic of liberal autonomy is two-fold, first, a local and second, a basic 
scope, as identified by Christman and Anderson (2005). These aspects set the parameters and 
focus for autonomy as minimal, and I consider these in turn.  
 
i. Local 
Under the first element, there is a distinction between local (act-based) and global (agent-
based) autonomy. This recognises that “the autonomy of persons can, in principle, be 
separated from local autonomy – autonomy relative to particular aspects of the person, say, 
her desires” (Christman and Anderson, 2005, 2). While a global scope is broader and deals 
with an autonomous life, the local is narrower and concerns specific autonomous desires. 
Although some liberal theorists, such as Dworkin, argue that the correct scope of autonomy is 
global, many have countered that to assert this rejects crucial features of autonomy.51 James 
Stacey Taylor, for instance, argues, “in adopting this more global approach to autonomy 
Dworkin is no longer offering an analysis of autonomy that is congruent with the discussions 
in moral philosophy in which autonomy plays a major role, for these discussions focus on the 
                                                           
51 Dworkin argues, “I am not trying to analyse the notion of autonomous acts, but of what it means to be an 
autonomous person, to have a certain capacity and exercise it” (Dworkin, 1988, 19-20). Similarly, he contends, 
“the question of freedom is decided at specific points in time […] whereas the question of autonomy is one that 
can only be assessed over extended portions of a person’s life” (60). In this way, he is taking a global view of 
autonomy.  
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more localised question of what makes a person autonomous with respect to her particular 
desires or her particular actions” (Taylor, 2008, 8). Specific acts, not the agent in general, is 
the remit of autonomy in the liberal approach. Indeed, most theorists argue that being a 
globally autonomous person is simply the aggregation of having enough locally autonomous 
acts; Christman, for instance, contends that “the property of being autonomous tout court, 
then, is parasitic on the property of autonomy for isolated preferences and values” (1991, 3).52 
By analysing autonomy at the smallest ‘unit’ – the act, desire, or preference – individuals that 
are sufficiently autonomous locally might be considered autonomous globally. So, it is the 
local that represents the appropriate scope for liberal theories of autonomy.  
 
ii. Basic 
The second aspect is basic, as opposed to ideal, autonomy. This requires that there is “a 
certain level of self-government necessary to secure one’s status as a moral agent or political 
subject” (Christman and Anderson, 2005, 2) without, as ideal autonomy demands, “the level 
or kind of self-direction that serves as a regulative idea” (ibid). In other words, some, but not 
an extensive, amount of self-rule is needed to class someone as an agent, such that she can 
govern herself.53 Following the procedural characteristic above, which was rooted in the 
political goal of inclusivity and plurality, this notion too is intended to incorporate multiple 
                                                           
52 Christman argues, “construing autonomy as an all-or-nothing property of a person’s whole life (or a whole 
person) obscures the need for an account of the autonomous formation of single (or ‘localised’) desires. 
Autonomy at the more ‘global’ level should simply amount to perhaps an aggregation of this property.” 
(Christman, 1991, 3) 
53 What is intended here – as will be discussed in the next paragraph – is that ‘basic’ is closely aligned to 
minimal competence. Though competence is a condition of the agent, it does not make liberal theories in general 
global. This is because – as will be seen in the critiques in this section – global autonomy is about living a life 
that is autonomous, and this is to distinguish the slave who might be locally autonomous (deciding which order 
to perform her chores) but might not be globally autonomous (she cannot govern herself by escaping her 
servitude even though she wishes to do so). In either instance, however, the slave, must be competent (she must 
meet the basic threshold) to be able to decide. In this regard, Christman and Anderson (2005) distinguish basic 
autonomy (this sort of minimal competence condition that entitles persons to rights or be morally responsible) 
and ideal autonomy (a more extensive set of idealised requirements, but attaining this level is not necessary to 
secure such rights or to be responsible).  
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agents into the class ‘autonomous’ (Christman, 2004). A minimal, not maximal, threshold of 
autonomy is thereby required. The basic requirement is less onerous than the ideal, since it 
stipulates a rudimentary level that must be attained (but beyond which agents can be 
autonomous to a greater or lesser extent). This minimal approach is likely to include many 
more agents than a demanding maximal one.  
 
The basic threshold is connected to competence conditions, or the minimal ability to make 
decisions, which are drawn on in political, legal, and medical fields, and can be framed in 
various ways. For instance, Christman and Anderson argue that basic autonomy includes 
“capacities for rational thought, self-control, self-understanding, and so on” (Christman and 
Anderson, 2005, 3) that enable individuals to comprehend the situation, reason and reflect on 
the issue, weigh up options, and decide what they really want. Joel Feinberg also prioritises 
“the ability to make rational choices” (Feinberg, 1989, 28) but, in addition, lists general 
‘virtues’ that someone who is competent is likely to possess in at least minimal amounts. 
These include “distinct self-identity (individuality)” (she has her own identity and is not 
defined wholly by her relations to others), “self-creation” (she generates and applies 
principles that she has endorsed), “self-legislation” (she follows her own un-coerced rules), 
and “self-control (self-discipline)” (she is in control of her self) (Feinberg, 1989, 31-42).54 
According to Feinberg, these traits and competencies are likely to facilitate decision-making 
since reasoning, knowing oneself, understanding one’s values, and applying facts and values 
                                                           
54 Feinberg’s full list is: “self-possession” (the person does not ‘belong’ to anyone but himself), “distinct self-
identity (individuality)” (she has her own identity and is not defined wholly by her relations to others), 
“authenticity” (her tastes, opinions, values and goals are genuinely her own), “self-creation” (she generates and 
applies principles she has endorsed), “self-legislation” (she follows her own un-coerced rules), “moral 
authenticity” (her moral beliefs are authentically her own), “moral independence (minimises excessive 
dependence on others for moral beliefs), “integrity (self-fidelity)” (the person is faithful to her own principles 
over time), “self-control (self-discipline)” (the person is in control of the self), “self-reliance” (she is able to 
morally depend on herself), “initiative (self-generation)” (the person actively initiates her own activities rather 
than depending on other people to provide cues for her) and, “responsibility for self” (she is responsible for the 
consequences of her actions and responsible tout court) (Feinberg, 1989, 31-42). 
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to choices (for example) all indicate a person who can self-govern. But, however devised, 
having a basic competency separates those who can be autonomous and those who cannot.  
 
Putting these points about minimal thresholds and competence together, by meeting the 
criteria for basic self-rule, even individuals who govern themselves poorly should not be 
overridden in their desires. It is the possession of the appropriate capacity, not what one does 
with it, which demands respect from others and that signifies autonomy (Dworkin, 1988).55 
Only those who fail to attain the threshold, and so are always non-autonomous, can be 
overruled.56 For either individual, the significant element is whether the basic levels have 
been attained. As Feinberg argues: 
 
The person whose relevant capacities are just above the bare threshold of 
competence that qualifies him for de jure self-government may rightfully 
rule himself, but in fact he may rule himself badly, unwisely, only partially. 
He may in fact have relatively little personal autonomy in the sense of de 
facto condition, but like a badly governed nation, he may retain his sovereign 
independence nevertheless. A genuinely incompetent being, below the 
threshold, is incapable of making even foolish, unwise, reckless, or perverse 
choices […] Being stupid, no less than being wise, is the sole prerogative of 
the threshold-competent (Feinberg, 1989, 30).57  
                                                           
55 Dworkin, here, argues that “moral respect is owed to all because all have the capacity for defining themselves” 
(Dworkin, 1988, 31).  
56 To reiterate, by failing to meet a threshold, the idea is that someone fails to be competent. If individuals are 
not competent then they cannot make locally (or globally) autonomous decisions.  
57 The idea of noninterference if someone is competent again recognises something about the agent, but it does 
not make it a global conception, which is about living a life that one wants and considers external conditions of 
the agent (see the example about the slave in footnote 53 and the critiques in this chapter). If an agant is 
competent, a particular decision may not be overruled, so long as it meets the authenticity criteria (some 
examples of which were outlined in the first characteristic of this section). It is not noninterference by default 
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The benchmark for autonomy, then, is basic. The liberal account neither stipulates that 
competencies must be possessed fully nor in equal measure, but merely that they are met to a 
minimal standard. Thus, the third characteristic of a number of liberal theories is that 
autonomy is local and basic, both of which are minimal conceptions.  
  
Broadly consistent desires 
The fourth characteristic of the liberal approach is that the individual must have substantially 
consistent or non-conflicting desires. This requirement is another check against adopting a 
desire that has been interfered with in an underhanded way by ensuring that the endorsed 
preference is synchronised, to some extent, with others already validated by the agent. Liberal 
models acknowledge that persons are rarely fully constant in their desires, so theorists 
propose different amounts of consistency.  
 
Frankfurt, for instance, emphasises a unified set of endorsed desires by advocating 
‘wholeheartedness’. To be wholehearted, one must resolve (though not necessarily eliminate) 
conflicts at the volition-to-volition level by deciding, and deciding “decisively” (Frankfurt, 
1971, 16), which of the preferences to integrate “into a single ordering” (Frankfurt, 2009, 
170) and which to detach from the ranking altogether. Here, ‘decisively’ means “without 
reservation” (ibid) and in a manner that it is “authoritative for the self” (175). By deciding this 
way, ambivalence and conflict are managed, a strategy for classifying desires is developed, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
because they are competent, then, since authenticity criteria, which are determined locally for many liberal 
theories, still need to be satisfied. In this way, as Christman and Anderson note, both competence and 
authenticity requirements are part of the debate in autonomy, and “authenticity conditions are typically built on 
the capacity to reflect on and endorse (or identify with) one’s desires” (2005, 3). One can be competent and 
authentic or non-authentic, then, but one cannot be incompetent and authentic or non-authentic.  
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and endorsed desires are largely consistent in their ordering.58 In other words, deciding one-
way or the other about the conflict is not “to ensure a certain action. Nor is it to ensure that 
one will act well […rather it] is to establish constraint by which other preferences and 
decisions are to be guided [...and] is to integrate the person both dynamically and statically” 
(Frankfurt, 2009, 174-5). Frankfurt, then, offers a view where there may be inconsistency and 
where this is not entirely evaded, but the agent is able to wholeheartedly decide between the 
conflicts such that what she intends to do (rather than actually does) is clear to her.  
 
Another account is Ekstrom’s, who argues that discord amongst preferences is probable and 
that it matters not that the self is conflicted, or that one feels ambivalent toward a desire, or 
even that one does not ‘feel good’ about certain preferences. Rather, what matters is accepting 
these desires are part of one’s ‘true self’. Cohering attitudes are, however, important to 
Ekstrom for three reasons: first, they “are abiding, relatively stable through time, because they 
support each other” second, they “are fully defensible by the agent” because they fit with her 
other preferences and finally, they “are attitudes with which the agent is for the most part 
comfortable” (Ekstrom, 2008, 154-5).59 So, one need not be satisfied at the level of 
preferences but one does require some uniformity at the level of attitudes. This offers a notion 
of consistency where though each desire is not harmonious, the overarching attitudes are.  
                                                           
58 Frankfurt suggests that inconsistency can occur at the volition-desire level (in which case someone is non-
autonomous) or at the volition-volition level (in which case one is lacking ‘wholeheartedness’ because their 
highest preferences are “not fully integrated, so that there is some inconsistency or conflict (perhaps not yet 
manifest) among them” (Frankfurt, 2009, 165).) Frankfurt argues that this latter volitional conflict is about 
wholeheatedly deciding, either between integration (ranking preferences) or separation (rejecting a preference as 
an “outlaw” – Frankfurt, 2009, 170) into or from the volitional order. In this regard, wholeheartedness involves 
the person deciding between two conflicting desires, even though the conflict is not eliminated, whereas non-
wholeheartedness arises when the person does not genuinely decide between them and there remains doubt about 
what the person intends to do (rather than actually does). 
59 The stipulation “for the most part comfortable” does not ultimately matter for Ekstrom, however. She argues, 
“a person might at some time feel estranged from a desire, for whatever reason (perhaps, out of situational 
embarrassment or in denial). But if that desire is a preference and it coheres with her character, then it is part of 
her real self, whether at any given moment she wishes to acknowledge that fact or not. A feeling of alienation or, 
conversely, a feeling of satisfaction does not by itself settle the matter of what is central to a person’s 
psychological identity.” (Ekstrom, 2008, 157-8) 
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Differently to either of these approaches, Christman, through his account of rationality, 
proposes a weaker test. His theory requires a minimal self-awareness and that desires or 
beliefs are not “manifestly inconsistent” (Christman, 1991, 15).60 They must not be “in 
obvious conflict […whereby] the agent could bring easily to consciousness and recognise 
[their preferences] as incompatible” (ibid).61 For instance, there may be contradictions 
between the ends an agent hopes to achieve and the rest of her judgements, principles and 
values, but this results in the kind of inconsistency that is conspicuous. As Christman puts it, 
“if I believe that ‘p’ and I believe that ‘if p then q,’ but I desire something X which is based 
on the belief that ‘not-q,’ then the desire for X is not autonomous” (ibid). In this weaker 
sense, consistency is not wholehearted preference ranking or cohering attitudes, but the 
absence of obviously inconsistent desires.  
 
Each view discussed requires some consistency in desires because each recognises that 
autonomous individuals are likely to be united in their overall goals and projects (and so have 
generally compatible preferences) rather than fractured (with mostly incompatible ones). In 
this regard, the self must be a broadly rational, cohesive unit since “if the ‘self’ doing the 
‘governing’ is dissociated, fragmented, or insufficiently transparent to itself, then the process 
of self-determination sought for in a concept of autonomy is absent or incomplete” 
                                                           
60 Christman rejects as too stringent both the externalist account of rationality that pins the individual’s beliefs to 
objective standards and the internalist account that requires consistency of a set of beliefs such that is true in all 
possible worlds and is complete (Christman, 1991, 13-14, f/n 22). Rather, he argues that manifest inconsistency 
enables a concept: of “normal autonomy” (Christman, 1991, 15) that is not metaphysically vague; that does not 
simply equate self-governance with the objective intelligence and consistency of a ‘reasonable person’; and that 
captures the specific way that some compulsive desires are not autonomous (only when there is a manifest 
inconsistency in the desires moving an agent can it be said that compulsive desires are a problem for autonomy) 
(Christman, 1991, 15-16). 
61 For instance, someone who believed, despite the doctor’s diagnosis, that she does not have cancer, is 
deceiving herself (and therefore not self-aware) to this degree. Likewise, someone who is delusional or paranoid 
would not be able to make reflective judgements about her beliefs (Christman, 1991, 17). 
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(Christman, 1991, 17). The important factor that consistent desires reveal, then, is a self that is 
constant; a self that desires (somewhat) predictably. In this way, the fourth aspect of liberal 
models of autonomy is broadly non-conflicting desires.  
 
Autonomy and moral responsibility 
The final feature of liberal accounts of autonomy that I discuss is the distinction and 
relationship between autonomy and moral responsibility. Early liberal models established a 
direct link between these concepts. It was generally thought, for instance, that “at the most 
fundamental level, responsibility arises when one acts to bring about changes in the world as 
opposed to letting fate or change or the decisions of other actors determine the future” 
(Dworkin, 1988, 67). Being an agent assumes that one decides for herself and this, in turn, 
implies that one is responsible for those self-made decisions. Similarly, Watson (1987) and 
Ekstrom (2008) suggest that free agency requires self-direction and alternative possibilities, 
and Nomy Arpaly points out that others assume that “the class of deeds for which we are 
morally responsible and the class of deeds that are instances of autonomous agency are 
identical, or approximate each other quite closely” (Arpaly, 2008, 163).62 These views follow 
the intuition that to be morally responsible for doing x demands that one actually decides to 
do x and really wants to do x or, in other words, that the individual was autonomous in her 
decision-making with regards to x.  
 
Yet, one can be responsible even when one is not autonomous. Someone who lives according 
to the preferences of another, for instance, “cannot evade responsibility by doing what another 
tells him to do. He is responsible precisely for doing that. Nor can he escape responsibility by 
                                                           
62 Arpaly refers to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) in particular. 
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refusing to think about or reflect on the kind of person he is and should be. ‘I didn’t think’ is 
hardly an excuse” (Dworkin, 1988, 28). So, at a superficial level, the non-reflective person is 
still ‘responsible’ for the act. On a more fundamental level, the agent can also bear moral 
responsibility. Michael McKenna, for example, distinguishes autonomous and morally 
responsible agency through control and epistemic conditions, and argues that autonomous 
agency requires a higher threshold of control but a lower threshold of epistemic conditions 
than responsible agency.63 So, “it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for 
autonomous agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding epistemic condition for 
morally responsible agency […and] it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions 
for morally responsible agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding control condition 
for autonomous agency” (McKenna, 2008, 205). On this view, there is a difference between 
these types of agency and one is not required for the other as “the relationship between them 
                                                           
63 McKenna has argued that there is a difference between autonomous and morally responsible agency. The 
difference can be seen in two steps: the control condition, which refers to whether someone had control over 
herself when carrying out a particular act and is often invoked in freedom of the will debates, and the epistemic 
condition, which refers to what knowledge the individual had in the circumstance. Taking these conditions in 
turn, control conditions are required for both autonomous and morally responsible agency but whereas the 
control condition for autonomy requires a historical component because it is about the principles, desires, values 
and goals the agent has endorsed through critical reflection over time, the control condition for moral 
responsibility only requires a time-sliced component because it depends on how an agent acts at a particular 
time, not how that responsible agency was formed (McKenna, 2008, 211, 220-21). Further, autonomous agency 
is not just a capacity in McKenna’s view, but must be exercised, unlike morally responsible agency, which need 
not be exercised (221). This account of autonomous agency is, by McKenna’s own admission, demanding, as, 
since it is understood “as both a threshold and a scalar notion admitting of degrees, then perhaps what [historical 
autonomy] captures is a fairly advanced level of autonomous agency.” (222) In this way, because “the control 
condition for autonomous agency involves more than what is required for morally responsible agency […] it is 
possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for morally responsible agency and yet fail to satisfy the 
more demanding control condition for autonomous agency.” (205) 
 
With regards to the epistemic condition, it applies to moral responsibility in its entirety, but with regards to 
autonomous agency “the condition is restricted to matters relevant to the rules (values, governing principles, 
goals, passions, whatever) that serve as the basis for an agent’s ruling herself.” (211) By this, McKenna means 
what matters for determining autonomous agency are only the rules one lives by, not the whole of autonomous 
agency. It is possible for the rules one governs oneself by to have been correctly formed with appropriate 
knowledge, but it may also be the case that such rules were incorrectly affected by an “epistemic glitch” (212) 
that “pollute the formation, evaluation, or retention of those rules.” (211) So, one could, on the epistemic 
condition, have morally responsible agency but, owing to incorrectly formed self-rules, lack autonomous agency. 
In this case, “the epistemic condition for autonomous agency involves less than what is required for morally 
responsible agency […, so] it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for autonomous agency and 
yet fail to satisfy the more demanding epistemic condition for morally responsible agency” (205).  
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is entirely contingent; while the circumstances giving rise to each might make it likely that a 
person winding up as one would also wind up as the other, she needn’t” (McKenna, 2008, 
224). In this way, many liberal autonomy theorists logically distinguish the two concepts and 
“generally seem to suggest that the set of autonomous actions is significantly smaller than the 
set of actions for which we are commonly held morally responsible” (Arpaly, 2008, 164). 
While some theories synonymise autonomous action and morally responsible action, most 
treat these as distinct concepts.  
 
However, it is more likely that one evades responsibility if they are non-autonomous because 
of undue interference. In this case the agent has not simply failed to think about what they 
really want, they have, in certain scenarios, been unduly compromised so as to make this 
critical reflection difficult or impossible. To elaborate, “what may affect responsibility is 
interference with a person’s autonomous action when the person is not in a position to realise 
this is occurring, or to do much about it if he does. If my will is overborne or undermined, 
then in suitable circumstances the responsibility for what I have done may shift to those who 
have interfered with my autonomy” (Dworkin, 1988, 28). In such a situation, autonomous 
agency is interfered with and the agent does something different to what she wants, and so 
responsibility is impaired. This, in turn, is different to situations where the agent does not 
have alternative possibilities or options but nonetheless acts in a way that they most want, in 
which case the individual is likely to be responsible. Frankfurt, for instance, presents the case 
of Jones, who has no alternative but to do what Black (who – unbeknownst to Jones – has a 
inserted a failsafe device into Jones’ brain that can be triggered to make sure he does x should 
it become clear at any stage that Jones is going to do not-x) wants (Frankfurt, 2009, 6-8). He 
suggests that Jones does what he wants despite there being no other option: “there may be 
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circumstances that make it impossible for a person to avoid performing some action without 
those circumstances in any way bringing it about that he performs that action” (Frankfurt, 
2009, 9). In such a case, Jones has moral responsibility (despite lacking alternative 
possibilities and the latent manipulation) because he acts from his own will. This implies that 
responsibility rests with the individual only when one’s will is one’s own and, by contrast, “a 
person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not 
have done otherwise” (Frankfurt, 2009, 10, emphasis added) – such that it was not the agent’s 
will too.64 Moral responsibility, then, rests on what the agent really wanted to do, not the lack 
of alternatives. Thus, in this fifth and final aspect of the liberal approach, while autonomy and 
moral responsibility can be decoupled logically in that one does not depend on the other, 
liberal theorists usually still focus on interferences with the will as potential limiters of 
responsibility. 
 
In this section, I have set out five characteristics of liberal models of autonomy: authentic 
desires, procedural independence, local and basic autonomy, consistent desires, and the 
interrelation between autonomy and moral responsibility. Though the traits appear in specific 
theories to differing extents, they are nonetheless shared in some form. This, therefore, 
describes the core features of the first of the two approaches to autonomy that we will 
consider in this thesis.  
                                                           
64 Frankfurt presents several versions of Jones, where he responds differently to the coercion, and explores how 
he may (or may not) be morally responsible in each. Jones1 is an unreasonable man and does what he wants 
irrespective of the threat, which has no effect on him. In this instance, Jones1 has the same moral responsibility 
as if there were no threat, and he is not denied any alternatives. Jones2 is so overwhelmed by the threat that he 
does not remember his earlier decision to do the same thing. Here Jones2 only performed the act because of the 
coercion, not his decision, so – though he may have responsibility for the earlier decision – he has no 
responsibility for the actual act. Jones3 is impressed (not indifferent or overwhelmed) by the threat but acts from 
the earlier decision, not the threat. Like Jones1, he is responsible for the act even though he could not have done 
otherwise because he’d already decided to do it. This suggests one is not coerced by the threat if he acts for his 
own earlier reasons despite the threat being made, and that – even if one is in fact (just the instance of being) 
coerced by a threat – he may still be morally responsible for the act (by virtue of his doing it for his own reasons) 
(Frankfurt, 2009, 3-6). These cases are to be distinguished with Jones4 – the case presented in the main text of 




Having discussed the common features of liberal autonomy, in the second half of this chapter, 
I examine standard problems with the liberal account in general (rather than with particular 
theories). The concerns that I consider here are largely drawn from mainstream relational 
theorists (for instance: Nedelsky, 1989, 1990; Code, 1991; Benhabib, 1992; Mackenzie and 
Stoljar, 2000).65 Separately, then, they are not new critiques, but drawing them together and 
showing how important they are for female suicide bombers in application is. In this section, I 
will explore concerns with how the liberal approach constructs two concepts in particular, 
first, the agent and second, autonomy. Following now established arguments, the proposition 
here will be that liberal theoretical formulations of these notions are somewhat impoverished 
when it comes to describing agents and also a little too internally and narrowly focussed when 
it comes to describing autonomy. The argument is that, though the liberal model does provide 
conceptualisations of the agent and autonomy (it is certainly not unable to offer useful 
interpretations of these), they tend to lead to a less satisfactory understanding of the agent and 
autonomy for persons in constraint than other models. And – as I will claim in chapters three 
and four – a relational approach tends to offer a more useful picture of these concepts for such 
individuals. When we are concerned to represent the autonomy of the bombers properly and 
thoroughly, the argument overall, then, is that the liberal account is less proficient at 
recognising the real but constrained way autonomy is exhibited by female bombers than other 
accounts, particularly the relational one.  
                                                           
65 Recall that my purpose is to map the existing debate fairly (see note 36). While some liberal theorists may 
disagree with some of the concerns presented here, I use standard criticisms that are considered commonplace in 
the literature. For example, Christman and Anderson, in their section on ‘Challenges to Liberalism’s Reliance on 
the Autonomous Individual’, note that “the model of the autonomous person has drawn powerful calls for 
reconsideration” (2005, 4) from a broad array communitarian, postmodern and feminist thinkers. Given the 




The first criticism regards the agent, and especially how the liberal approach first, 
overemphasises acts and underemphasises agents and second, constructs the residual agent 
somewhat implausibly. Based on standard relational critiques, I argue that the liberal focus on 
acts results in an agent that is conceptualised as more individualistic and unified than it should 
be. I contend that, though the liberal model offers a view about agents, more appropriate 
theoretical accounts of agents should be sought.    
 
i. De-emphasising agents 
The first concern is about de-emphasising the agent in questions of autonomy. To recap, the 
liberal account tends to focus on the local (act, desire, preference, for example) rather than the 
global (agent, lives, self) when assessing autonomy (with autonomous agents simply being a 
composite of multiple autonomous acts). Even though some theories (such as Dworkin, 1988) 
do consider a more global conception and some (like Watson, 1989) the agent’s values, and 
while the model in general does identify some features of the agent (like that of basic 
competence), the appraisal of authenticity is usually at the specific act level. In this regard, 
“most contemporary discussions of free agency could be described more accurately as 
discussions of free action. They do more to explain what it is to act freely than to illuminate 
what it is to be a free agent” (Benson, 1994, 650). In this task, the focus is on acts, which are 
assessed somewhat separately, rather than the agent, which could be assessed in a more 
holistic – and possibly more accurate – way. The claim, then, is not that the liberal account 
cannot consider the agent, but that the attention is more on the act.  
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Sumi Madhok labels this kind of approach “act atomism”, whereby “actions of persons are 
typically evaluated in a manner that does not take into account the acts preceding or following 
that particular act and are thus considered in isolation of all other acts. For instance, the 
particular act, say A2 is separated from other acts performed by the same person, say A1 or 
A3, and examined independently” (Madhok, 2007, 344). This general model of prioritising 
acts ahead of agents might be problematic if trying to gain a clear picture of the extent to 
which acts are autonomous given other factors – especially those of constraint – in the agent’s 
life. Though we might recognise that assessing acts is important for and a necessary part of 
autonomy, it is also imperative that the agent’s life more generally is seriously considered.   
 
While this critique does not suggest that assessments of autonomy should not focus on acts at 
all (and so the relational account is similar to the liberal insofar as some consideration of acts 
is required, as we shall see), it does propose that the act is not, and should not be, considered 
as one act in isolation from the agent’s others or her life more generally.66 The claim, then, is 
that though some liberal theories might be global and recognise the agent, by focusing 
predominately on the authenticity of single acts, the agent’s life as a whole and her other acts 
(that may clarify, and that interrelate with, the discrete act) are emphasised less in the overall 
model. For the bombers, where we want to represent their acts properly, this may be less 
beneficial than an account where her acts are contextualised and the constraints of her life are 
recognised more. 
 
ii. Implausible residual agent 
                                                           
66 See chapter 3, where relational autonomy includes acts as well as the agent (p140), and chapter 5, where 
things like the goal or plan is one, but not the only, element of how much autonomy is attributed to the bombers 
on the spectrum (see the condition starting on p243). In particular, what is key here is that external conditions are 
relevant to how much autonomy is occuring.  
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The second issue to highlight is that the agent that remains (after the act is considered) is 
somewhat trivially conceptualised such that the richness of the agent goes unnoticed. In other 
words, as relational theorists have put it, the concern is that the liberal approach “promotes a 
very stripped-down conception of agents […] a conception in which diversity and complexity 
of agents are paved away and agents are reduced down to an interchangeable sameness” 
(Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000, 6). Concentrating on acts suggests that less attention is paid to 
the particularities of the agent, which may be important when we want to account for the 
bombers as agents. This objection can be explored further by considering how such a 
construction of agents is discordant with persons on two counts, first, for being individualistic 
and second, for being too unified. This leads to an agent that is constructed less plausibly and 
accurately than it might be, and so is likely to be less representative of the bombers.   
 
Individualism 
The first concern is that the liberal approach constructs autonomous selves individualistically. 
While liberal theories certainly recognise that social factors and others influence agent’s lives, 
this criticism charges that these factors are underplayed for the purposes of autonomy. For 
example, on the one hand, some liberal theories admit that others are necessary to selves; that 
their importance is a matter of “empirically grounded or theoretically derived knowledge 
which [otherwise] makes it impossible or extremely unlikely that anybody ever has been, or 
could be, autonomous” (Dworkin, 1988, 7). Here, it seems to be acknowledged that others are 
needed for developing the self in the model. Likewise, some theories suggest that agents are 
“the product of external influences over which he has no control” (Feinberg, 1989, 34) – so 
that social factors seem to be part of the approach. On the other hand, however, the account 
does not observe the prominence of these social aspects and “ultimately assigns such 
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influences as peripheral rather than [having] a constitutive role” (Abrams, 1998, 808) in 
theorising the agent. These are considered, then, but tangential. With this framing there are 
two problems that arise, first, others are considered logically necessary but ultimately inimical 
to autonomy and second, socialisation exists but is to be transcended by ‘successful’ self-rule. 
The, now standard, relational argument is that the liberal account’s recognition of the social 
features of the self is somewhat superficial and that the agent is largely individualistic. 
 
(a) Others 
On the first point, the concern is that liberal models utilise the rhetoric of clearly demarcated, 
rights-bearing selves whose boundaries must be protected from intrusion by others (Nedelsky, 
1989, 1990) and that this is a problematic conception because it suggests that others exist but 
are somehow harmful to autonomous selves. Isaiah Berlin, for example, describes autonomy 
as preserving the “inner citadel – my reason, my soul, my ‘noumenal’ self – which, do what 
they may, neither external blind force, nor human malice, can touch. I have withdrawn into 
myself; there, and there alone, I am secure” (Berlin, 1958, 20). The self is constructed as 
one’s ‘safe haven’, whilst others are cast as trying to encroach upon it. Jennifer Nedelsky uses 
the analogy between autonomy and property to illustrate this pattern and argues that there is a 
“deeply ingrained sense that individual autonomy is to be achieved by erecting a wall (of 
rights) between the individual and those around him” (Nedelsky, 1989, 12). Autonomous 
agents are regarded as self-governing, distinct territories whose parameters must remain intact 
in the way that property is owned and defended against misappropriation.  
 
This, however, distinguishes the individual and others in society in an exclusive and hostile 
way. It is – as admitted by some liberal theorists – a “hyper-individualism” (Christman and 
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Anderson, 2005, 8), where selves are detached entities, framed with “a separateness and 
independence that is a reaction against others” who are seen as “threatening by definition” 
(Hirschmann, 1989, 1231). In other words, the type of agent that remains in the general liberal 
approach (though particular theories do try to distance themselves from this view – such as 
Christman, 2004) is an independent self, who does not need and is suspicious of others. 
Relational theorists argue that this kind of agent is the mark of the autonomous person in the 
liberal approach in general. As Lorraine Code declares, on this view, “autonomous man is – 
and should be – self-sufficient, independent, and self-reliant, a self-realising individual” 
(Code, 1991, 77). It is a self that is wholly disconnected from others. It is this type of 
individual, then, that is the paradigmatic autonomous agent in liberal theories.  
 
Such a construction, however, ignores the central importance of others to selves, and so to 
autonomous selves, and results in a flawed understanding of persons as maintained by the 
relational critique. There is, for instance, a “denial of the self’s own development out of and 
ongoing dependence on intimate personal ties, [and] a disregard for nonvolutaristic relational 
responsibilities” (Friedman, 1997a, 42) in the liberal account, such that this sovereign and 
rights-wielding self underestimates the ways in and extents to which all persons rely on 
others. This notion of the self “produces a conception of agency that abstracts individual will 
(the ability to make choices and act on them) out of the context of the social relationships 
within which it develops and within which it is exercised” (Hirschmann, 1989, 1231). The 
liberal picture of agent, so relational theorists contend, deflates how much others are required 
for agents in the first place.  
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Though the liberal approach recognises that persons are social (such as through Dworkin, 
1988 and Christman, 2004), the argument from the relational camp is that others are in fact 
cast in opposition and tension with the self in the model. There is acknowledgement of but 
also – compared to other models – less weight attached to the importance of others for the 
self. In so doing, “there has been a gradual alignment of autonomy with individualism” (Code, 
1991, 78), a position that underplays the role of others and over-emphasises the (detached and 
independent) self.  
 
(b) Socialisation 
The second worry is that the liberal model, in its conception of the agent, tends to misstate the 
significance of social factors. Though accepting the obvious import of the social, the model 
aims to overcome them, as though social influences always interfere with the autonomous 
agent. Diana Meyers, for instance, argues, “instead of addressing the question of how a person 
can live in harmony with his or her authentic self, these theories are fundamentally concerned 
with explaining how people can elude socialisation, that is, how the authentic self can 
transcend the impact of social causes” (Meyers, 1989, 40). The approach seeks to develop an 
account of the self that sheds social influence and so what it ‘really’ wants can be uncovered. 
Yet, relational theorists argue that to try to determine what agents most want by attempting to 
surmount socialisation portrays the autonomous self as “disembedded and disembodied” 
(Benhabib, 1992, 157), and underestimates how much agents’ identities, goals, principles, and 
standards are in fact socially constituted.  
 
In other words, the concern is that persons are not beings with self-generated values that exist 
before the societies of which they are a part. Rather, they are, to some extent, constituted by 
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their contexts. This is a familiar argument that has parallels in communitarian critiques of the 
liberal self. Michael Sandel (1998), for example, argues that persons “are not strictly prior 
with respect to their ends, but are embedded in and conditioned by the values and interests 
and desires from among which the…self…would take its purposes” (121). Ends are 
discovered rather than chosen, such that “agency consists less in summoning the will than in 
seeking self-understanding” (153), not in choosing values from nowhere but in asking about, 
“who I am” (59) from somewhere. It is unrealistic to extract agents from their settings in a bid 
to understand what they ‘truly’ want because the very desires they have are attributable (in 
some way) to those contexts. Similarly, Alisdair MacIntyre contends, “I inherit from the past 
of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful 
expectation and obligations. These constitute the given of life, my moral starting-point” 
(2011, 220). Socially bestowed identities form the basis of agency and cannot be brushed 
away in order to reveal the ‘true’ self in the way liberal models assume. Finally, Charles 
Taylor submits that trying to evade one’s social background is misjudged because “living 
within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, [and] that stepping 
outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we recognize as integral, 
that is, undamaged human personhood” (1989, 27). It is impossible to transcend the 
frameworks within which all persons are embedded as these ‘orientate’ selves from the very 
core. Thus, according to both the communitarian and relational critiques, though the liberal 
approach might grant that individuals live within non-chosen societies (as, for instance, 
Feinberg, 1989, did), the extent to which they are immersed in such contexts and so are 
unable to circumvent them is less appreciated on this view than others.  
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Though attachments and social factors are acknowledged in liberal models, then, relational 
theorists contend that the agent that emerges is more individualistic than necessary, and that 
this constructs the agent less well than other accounts could.  
 
Unified 
The second problem with the residual agent of liberal theories is that of the unified self. The 
liberal construction “assumes that agents are self-transparent, psychically unified, and able to 
achieve self-mastery” (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000, 10). In so doing, it alludes to a self that 
is largely synthesised, with her wants and desires clear to and knowable by the agent. While 
some integration of persons is likely to be relevant, the criticism here is that this more 
excessive than required. Relational views propose that persons are much more likely to be 
conflicted and desires much more opaque, such that the level of lucidity or cohesion expected 
in assumptions about unification are too high. Christman and Joel Anderson, for example, 
describe this contention thus:  
 
various writers focusing on the standard conception of the autonomous 
person have raised trenchant questions about the degree to which such 
conceptions problematically assume a unified, self-transparent consciousness 
lurking in all of us and representing our most settled selves. These 
commentators point to the ways in which conflict and irresolvable 
ambivalence characterise the modern personality. They emphasise that our 
motivational lives must be understood as containing various elements that 
are hidden from reflective view and disguised or distorted in consciousness 
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[…] The idea of unified, transparent selves being a mark of autonomy has 
thus come to be seen as suspect (Christman and Anderson, 2005, 7).  
 
The problem, then, is that individuals are not as consistent or harmonious in their desires, and 
what they ‘really’ want may not be as conspicuous to them, as the liberal approach supposes 
with its (residual) agent. To elaborate, consider two concerns posed by psychodynamic and 
postmodern theorists, and which some relational theorists (such as Hekman, 1991; Benhabib, 
1992) also support. On a Freudian analysis, for example, agents are “conflict-ridden, often 
self-deluded, fundamentally opaque to themselves, and driven by archaic drives and desires of 
which they may not even be aware, let alone be able to master” (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000, 
10). On a Foucauldian lens, liberal autonomy “naively ignores the fact that subjects are 
constituted within and by regimes, discourses, and micropractices of power. There is no pure, 
self-determining free will that somehow escapes the operations of power, nor is there a true 
self, there to be discovered through introspective reflection” (ibid). On either view, agents are 
much less transparent and integrated than liberal autonomy theories assume, so the relational 
critique is that the unified self postulated by the liberal account is somewhat “illusory” (ibid). 
Thus, the liberal understanding of agents as largely knowledgeable and consistent about their 
desires and wants might be a less satisfactory construction given the problems raised about 
the actual intricacies and complexities of selves.  
 
A failure often associated with the liberal approach, then, is that the agent that it leaves behind 
is overly individualistic and overly unified. Together these understandings misdescribe the 
self and so offer a less accurate picture of agents than other accounts, according to relational 
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theorists. Where the focus is to represent the bombers as agents well, a more thorough and 
plausible construction of the agent is therefore required.  
 
Thus, the first problem of liberal autonomy that I discussed was about the agent. I argued that, 
according to common relational criticisms, there are two key flaws with the approach: first, 
that the agent is prioritised lower than the act in evaluations of autonomy and second, that the 
residual agent is more individualistic and unified than it needs to be. Given this, I contend that 
better theories of autonomy (classed as those that assess the agent globally as well as the local 
act and those that present more realistic accounts of agents) should be sought for representing 
the bombers.  
 
Autonomy 
The second set of standard criticisms focus on the liberal conception of autonomy. I discuss 
two relational issues with the liberal model: first, the relationship between self-rule and the 
external and second, the construction of autonomy itself. These criticisms suggest that the 
liberal account is less adequate at recognising the interaction between context and autonomy 
and that it develops a narrower account of autonomy than other models might. Following 
some of these worries, I argue that, insofar as the bombers, who are typically in constrained 
contexts, are concerned, alternative views that could characterise and trace instances of 
autonomy in less internal and narrow ways should be considered.  
 
i. Relationship between autonomy and the external 
The first concern is that liberal theories focus predominately on the internal will and so do not 
address the connected factor of externalities as thoroughly as other approaches might. 
 109 
Deemphasising the external in this way is a weakness for two reasons, first, where there is 
negative interference, the approach describes the relationship between the will and the 
obstruction less satisfactorily than it could and second, where there is no interference of this 
sort, it underestimates positive forces outside the will when compared with other models. For 
our purposes, better recognising how the external is linked to autonomy might be relevant for 
representing the bomber’s autonomy properly. 
 
Negative influences 
The first worry regards interferences with the will. There are various types of obstructions 
that liberal models usually consider. Some theorists focus on external interferences (such as 
coercion) and internal interferences stemming from the external (such as hypnosis and 
psychosurgery) (Noggle, 2008; Ekstrom, 2008). Other theorists discuss “impediments to the 
wilful control of behaviour” (Benson, 1994, 652) such as surgical manipulation of the brain’s 
function, “and impediments to the regulation of the will in light of what matters to the agent” 
(ibid). These include brainwashing techniques, hypnosis, and drug-induced addictions. For 
our discussion, I broadly categorise these obstacles, many of which originate from outside the 
person’s will, as preference changers and preference disablers. I will contend that, in both 
cases, the liberal account is less able to adequately describe the crux of the negative influence 
because it is more focussed on the internal than other approaches.  
 
(a) Preference changers 
The first kind of influence is when the external situation is coercive or oppressive such that it 
causes a preference change in the agent. Here, the claim is that neither the dominant 
hierarchical theories specifically (according even to some liberal theorists) nor liberal 
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approach more generally (according to relational theorists) offer the most appropriate 
characterisation of these respective hindrances.  
 
(a.i) Hierarchical theories 
First, as liberal historical autonomy proponents have argued, hierarchical positions cannot 
adequately diagnose instances of coercion because the internal will is ahistorical or time-
sliced, and so, at that particular moment, higher and lower order desires are (counter-
intuitively) in alignment despite there being an interference (Christman, 1989). To illustrate, 
imagine Christman’s example of the bank teller who hands over cash to the armed bank 
robber. Non-historical theories would suggest that the bank teller’s higher-order desire (not to 
be heroic in dangerous circumstances) does not conflict with her lower-order desire (handing 
over the money). However, “on this theory, she seems to have acted autonomously, a verdict 
that runs counter to our usual judgement in such cases (after all, coercion situations seem like 
paradigm cases of the loss of autonomy)” (Christman, 1989, 8). In this case, ahistorical, 
hierarchical models, such as Frankfurt and Dworkin’s theories, fail to differentiate coercive 
from noncoercive cases. As Christman argues, the bank teller actually has two active desires – 
“not to be heroic in threatening situations,” formed before the present situation and “to give 
over the money to the robber in this particular case” (1989, 8). Though both desires have the 
same outcome (the money is exchanged), the difference is that the agent does not approve of 
the second desire because, following Christman’s historical model, “the conditions of its 
formation” (1989, 8) were coercive owing to the robber’s threat of violence, and so it is non-
autonomous. Yet, on the ahistorical approach, it is (dubiously) deemed autonomous. So, to 
properly identify coercion, one cannot look only for corresponding higher volitions and lower 
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order desires, and there must be a historical dimension too. The hierarchical theory, then, does 
not identify coercion properly.  
 
In order to avoid this charge and better capture instances of undue interference, the procedural 
independence requirement (Dworkin, 1989) could be added to hierarchical theories. Recall 
from part one of this chapter that, for Dworkin, the “full formula for autonomy […] is 
authenticity plus procedural independence” (Dworkin, 1989, 61) precisely to capture undue 
interference such as the kind being discussed here. If the theory is supplemented in this way, 
then, the gun-wielding robber sullies the teller’s reflective endorsement process, and handing 
over the money is recognised as not being an autonomous act, despite the aligned levels. But, 
even with this addendum, some liberal theorists have argued that the structural account still 
falls short because it does not explain the impetus of the duress (what it is that makes r, but 
not s, an obstruction). Taylor, for instance, argues that procedural independence may 
distinguish coercive and non-coercive cases, but that:  
 
it only does so by fiat, by simply ruling ex cathedra that a person is not 
autonomous with respect to those desires that he has been manipulated into 
possessing. And this is not enough for [Dworkin’s] analysis of autonomy to 
be theoretically satisfactory. This is because an acceptable analysis of 
autonomy should not merely list the ways in which it is intuitively plausible 
that a person will suffer from a lack of autonomy with respect to her 
effective first-order desires, but must also provide an account of why a 
person’s autonomy would be thus undermined, so that influences on a 
person’s behaviour that do not seem to undermine her autonomy (e.g., 
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advice) can be differentiated from those that do (e.g., deception) (Taylor, 
2008, 5-6).  
 
Structural theories are less able than historical theories to ascertain why the robber with the 
gun appears on the negative side of divide while the teller’s boss giving her financial 
incentives to perform better at work does not. The hierarchical model, even with a procedural 
independence criterion, then, is not the most appropriate way to distinguish and account for 
passable (noncoercive) and non-passable (coercive) types of interference. 
 
(a.ii) Other theories 
According to the relational critique, however, it is not just hierarchal theories that suffer this 
sort of problem. The broader liberal (hierarchical, ‘neohierarchical’, and non-hierarchical) 
approach also struggles to interpret oppressive (rather than coercive) influences on the agent’s 
preferences. This is because the account tends to prioritise the integrity of the internal will and 
this propensity is more likely to downplay external circumstances that are pervasive yet 
perhaps subtle, such as the effects of various forms of oppression, than other views. As 
relational theorists have argued, to underrate such details undermines the “externalist’s 
intuition” (Oshana, 1998, 86) that contexts matter, and that situations of repression can affect 
the will differently than those of non-repression, so much so that this should be part of the 
account of autonomy. The relational concern is that it is precisely this connection between 
context and the will that the liberal approach does not make as well as others.  
 
Take the classic case of the ‘voluntary slave’, for example, who has willingly given up all 
authority over and about her life to the slave owner because she believes this will make her 
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more free (Oshana, 1998). The slave’s desire may be (internally) autonomous according to the 
liberal view because it passes one of the stipulated (hierarchical, ‘neohierarchical’, or non-
hierarchical) tests and there is an absence of coercion (like that of the robber’s gun). 
However, there are also pressures (externally) from slavery that can impinge upon her will 
and change her desires nonetheless but that liberal models ignore. So, as far as this criticism 
goes, even if the slave feels content in her preference – she is not necessarily autonomous and 
– even if she is treated well – she is not necessarily free, since her desire, in effect, suspends 
her autonomy and freedom (ibid).67 In other words, internally desiring to be non-autonomous 
does not make that preference autonomous since the external oppressive context of slavery in 
which it is formed (and which may affect what is desired) needs to be taken into account too. 
The position, in other words, is that a satisfactory assessment of autonomy requires not just 
the internal but also the external to be considered.68 Liberal models, which primarily focus on 
the internal (though this is not to say the external is never considered – problems of coercion 
and manipulation, for instance, often are discussed as acknowledged above), are more likely 
to find this difficult than an account that typically discusses both together.  
 
A different example used in the literature might be a pregnant woman whose desire to become 
a mother is (depending on the particular liberal approach adopted) structurally, historically, or 
coherently sound, but is based on internalised “false” (Stoljar, 2000, 109) gender norms about 
a woman’s worth being tied to the role of motherhood. In this instance, “it is the content of 
these norms that can be criticised from a feminist point of view” (ibid), not the internal 
                                                           
67 Similarly the monk, who can reassess his autonomous decision to subject himself entirely to the authority of a 
religious order on a yearly basis (which is different to the slave who has permanently given up any such right), 
would still be ruled daily by others for a substantial period of time, thereby eroding what it means to be 
autonomous even if he was not coerced (Oshana, 1998). 
68 The thesis aims to bring together the internal and external and so the concept of autonomy being discussed and 
advocated is one that can deal with both these elements. This will be explored further in the remaining chapters 
on relational autonomy and its application and on the spectrum.  
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procedure of critical reflection or lack of an integrated will, since the woman endorses 
external norms that subordinate her.69 It is this oppressive feature of the environment (which 
is unlike the threat of a loaded gun but is an ominous force nonetheless) that liberal models 
struggle to capture as well as other accounts because of the predominately internal focus, 
according to this critique.  
 
These examples indicate that individuals may have their internal will intact, and so would be 
deemed autonomous on the liberal approach, yet may be impacted externally and 
disconcertingly (though not coercively) such that preferences are being changed and 
autonomy is being eroded. The account, however, less appropriately pinpoints or describes 
these subtler interferences (of, say, sexism or racism) than an account that is more attuned to 
these kinds of everyday constraint. Though clearly able to recognise the impact of 
interferences such as coercion, the general liberal approach, however, is not the most 
satisfactory for dealing with external situations of oppression, as maintained by relational 
theorists.  
 
Based on standard critiques, I have contended that, because the focus tends to be the inner 
constitution of the will, both the structural theory specifically and the liberal approach overall 
are less effective at properly accounting for interferences that arise from outside of the will, 
such as oppression, than a model that considers the internal and external together. That is, 
                                                           
69 Stoljar’s reflection is based on a study she cites by Kristin Luker (1975), which involved interviews with 
young women who were about to abort their pregnancy and who had not used contraception (despite having free 
access to it) for reasons including the perceived ‘benefits’ of being a mother. Stoljar argues, “women who accept 
the norm that pregnancy and motherhood increase their worthiness accept something false. And because of the 
internalisation of the norm, they do not have the capacity to perceive it as false. […] It is the content of these 
norms that can be criticised from a feminist point of view, not the way in which Luker’s subjects engage in the 
bargaining process” (Stoljar, 2000, 109). In cases such as these, the problem is with the kinds of norms adopted. 
This idea will be revisited in the next chapter on relational autonomy.  
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there is not as extensive a relationship between the internal will and the external context set 
out in the liberal account as there might be in other approaches. 
 
(b) Preference disablers 
The second category involves circumstances that inhibit, rather than change, the agent’s 
preference. The relational concern is that liberal theories are not the most suited to account for 
instances where there is neither outright coercion nor underhanded oppression that alters 
desires, but rather obstructions that disable forged ones. The approach is less sensitive to 
properly characterising autonomous preferences that are formed but where the external 
situation prohibits the execution of those preferences. This is because of the tendency to 
predominately focus on “inner obstacles to a person’s autonomous existence” (Madhok, 2007, 
345), and much less so on outer ones (ibid). Liberal approaches do recognise autonomy as an 
internal capacity and external condition (so there is some discussion of the external), and 
regard them as separate in order to distinguish two different kinds of autonomy. However, it 
is less attuned than other approaches at deciphering the relationship between external factors 
limiting autonomy, such as oppression – where the situation is not necessarily brought about 
by coercion, sinister devices lodged into the brain, or compulsions (impediments that the 
liberal account tends to debate), but neither is it unconstrained or unhampered by it (problems 
that it tends to shy away from) (Benson, 1994) – and autonomy enactment.  
 
For instance, there may be cases where the external situation may be repressive enough that, 
though the individual generates internal preferences (that may well contradict dominant 
norms), the situation does not allow the individual the opportunity or possibility to carry out 
their will. Consider some examples used by relational theorists: women living in patriarchal 
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societies who may genuinely want to be heads of societies or work in factories, but who 
cannot do so because of the oppressive contexts of which they are a part (Madhok, 2007), or 
men who authentically do not want to undergo a risky operation, but who agree to do so 
because refusing the procedure would make them dependent on others in a society that prizes 
self-reliance (Dodds, 2000). In these instances, there may be endorsed preferences but the 
circumstances constrain the execution of those preferences, and this is different to the way 
heroin-addiction or brainwashing internally alters their preferences because the issue is about 
exercising those wants not whether they are authentic desires. In other words, as Sarah Buss 
argues, “an agent's authority over her actions is no guarantee that she has the power to 
determine how she exercises this authority” (Buss, 2008, 1) because this is more to do with 
her context. Though liberal approaches acknowledge some of these features (in general it can 
identify that something external can prevent an agent acting on her desires), the claim is that 
the connection between the internal abilities and external hindrances, such as these, are made 
more central in other models.  
 
In these examples, then, autonomy is not unrestricted because there is preference disablement. 
There are situational oppressions that forestall agents getting what they really want, even if 
there are no coercive hindrances or preference modifications. Yet, the relational critique is 
that liberal theories do not analyse autonomy within these contexts of “reduced freedom” 
(Benson, 1994) as well as they could, partly because they do not pay proper attention to the 
relationship between the internal and external. As such, I argue that other approaches are 
more suited to describing the association between the internal and external.  
 
 117 
In this section I have considered interferences with the will. Though the liberal approach 
recognises that the external has a bearing on what an agent does, it looks primarily at the 
integrity of the internal will such that it is less able to characterise negative external 
influences than an account where the external and internal link is given more weight. It has 
more trouble with adequately differentiating coercive and non-coercive forces on desires, or 
properly appreciating the way oppressive contexts impact desire development or desire 
enactment than other models might. Whether preferences are changed or disabled, therefore, 
following some of the standard relational criticisms, I argued that different accounts could 
more appropriately conceptualise the relationship between the external and internal for the 
women of this thesis, who may be constrained by the external.  
 
Positive influences 
The second element of the unsatisfactory will-to-external link is not about negative 
interferences but rather about not perceiving the extent of positive influences. Building upon 
the criticisms of individualistic agents discussed earlier, this concern highlights that liberal 
autonomy tends to be less social when compared to other theories. In particular, in the 
preoccupation with protecting the “inner citadel” (Berlin, 1958, 20), liberal models less 
satisfactorily heed how nurturing relationships and circumstances are conducive for autonomy 
acquisition and development than other accounts might.  
 
To take autonomy inception, for instance, Linda Barclay argues, “the capacity and aspiration 
for autonomy is not something we are born with but something we develop only in 
society…[It] is a debt that we owe others” (Barclay, 2000, 57). To assume that autonomy is 
an individualistic capacity, as the liberal account does according to the standard relational 
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critique, is to downplay its social features, since autonomy is ascribed importance by, and 
thereby the ambition to attain it is through, interaction with others not in isolation.70 Similarly, 
with autonomy maturation, raising individuals in an environment where they are able to 
develop and flex their self-governing proficiencies – such as by practicing introspection, 
communication, memory, imagination, self-nurturing, volitional, and interpersonal skills 
(Meyers, 2002, 20-21) – increases the likelihood that they can live autonomously. Learning 
how to be autonomous is highly dependent upon an agent’s surroundings. Though the liberal 
model would acknowledge some of these social elements, given the liberal characterisation of 
autonomy as less social and more internal, other accounts with a stronger social and external 
focus might be more useful for recognising the gravity of this.71 Whilst neither obtaining nor 
training in autonomy is sufficient for achieving self-rule – an agent may still fail to reflect in 
the relevant ways – they are important external enablers of autonomy. External factors, such 
as others and contexts, then, should not be regarded as significant facilitators for autonomy. 
Though liberal models would not deny that the external matters in these respects, a more 
social account might appreciate this more.   
 
The first concern about liberally conceived autonomy has been the flawed relationship 
between autonomy and the external. In particular, I discussed the mis-description of the 
effects of undue interference on the changing and disabling of preferences, as well as the 
under-appreciation of the favourable impact of the external for autonomy acquisition and 
development. I argued that though liberal models can recognise negative and positive 
influences for autonomy, other accounts that are more social might more satisfactorily do so.  
                                                           
70 This would be true of many abilities, such as for language or for building friendships. 
71 Moreover, as will be discussed in the next chapter, an acknowledgement of the importance of others for 
autonomy (which liberal theorists might make) is not the same as recognising the fundamental importance of 
others to autonomy (which relational theorists argue for).  
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ii. Construction of autonomy 
The second problem I consider is about how liberal accounts construct autonomy more 
generally. I explore two sub-issues, first, the narrowly conceived approach to autonomy, 
which misses wider-ranging instances of self-governance according to relational accounts and 
second, the infinite regress and ab initio charges levied at hierarchical theories, which identify 
shortfalls in the dominant theory as stated by some liberal autonomy advocates. As the female 
suicide bombers are likely to be making decisions in constraint, together these indicate that 
the liberal approach is more limited than other accounts for representing their autonomy.  
 
Narrow 
First, I discuss how liberal models have a more constricted view about autonomy – about 
what it is, where it is located, and how it is devised. This is evident in a number of ways, 
including four interrelated elements that are identified by the relational critique and that I will 
briefly set out here: first, rational and psychological competencies, second, unequivocal 
desires, third, overt actions, and fourth, as a minimal and binary notion. I contend that, though 
some liberal theories might be better at describing these than others, the account overall tends 
to formulate autonomy in a narrow way, and that an alternative approach that develops 
broader characterisations of these in general could be more useful for discerning instances of 
autonomy in constraint.  
 
(a) Rationality 
To start, one relational criticism is that the liberal approach tends to be framed around mental 
cognition and competencies in a way that is less sensitive to the non-formal components of 
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‘what one most wants’ and potentially limits those who can attain autonomy. As relational 
theorists have argued, liberal accounts gravitate – sometimes almost exclusively – towards 
rational or psychological processes, such as cerebral reflective reasoning, as indicators of self-
rule. One concern, for example, is that the focus is on the “unitary self” that is “independent, 
self-monitoring, self-controlling” (Meyers, 2005, 29), which prioritises rationality and “the 
role of reflective self-definition in autonomy” (43-44). Reasoned self-direction is important 
and key for the approach (and, no doubt, it is relevant for other accounts of autonomy too), 
but it is also the (overwhelmingly) presiding method, which makes it too rational. Put 
differently, the theories “in their insistence on the role of reflection appear to take too 
narrowly cognitivist a view of the way in which a commitment to certain wantings may be 
clarified” (Young, 1989, 80) as it deemphasises other indicators (as will be discussed below). 
This foremost leaning towards analytical thinking has not only prompted “the charge that 
autonomy is the province of dull plodders and hyper-rationalists” (Meyers, 2005, 43-44), but 
– as I suggest here – that the liberal approach restricts evidence, and thereby the notion, of 
autonomy.  
 
The insistence on this type of reflection, for instance, may well downplay other dependable 
methods of determining self-rule. Indeed, stopping at rational decision-making as the best 
source of autonomy may be too premature:  
 
The opinions about their own motivations which people form, even after the 
most careful introspection, are not always the most reliable indicator of their 
deepest preferences. […] my inclination is to think of the formation of 
second-order […] desires as indicators of a person’s deepest preferences and 
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ultimately of what desires are to be identified with. At the same time it must 
not be forgotten that there are other indicators, too, which can satisfactorily 
be taken as supporting a claim that a particular individual does identify with 
certain of his desires (Young, 1989, 80).  
 
Reflecting upon desires may well connote that the agent’s preferences are her own, but this is 
not the sole, or even most reliable, signifier of autonomous preferences. For Robert Young, 
for example, emotions such as “remorse” or “admiration” (1989, 85) suggest other equally 
plausible and revealing barometers of what one most wants. Though some liberal theorists, 
such as Frankfurt (2009) do argue for the importance of emotions, the account in general, so 
the relational model charges, tends to be more focussed on the rational. Alternatively, for 
Meyers, “the role of self-discovery” (2005, 43) is an intelligence realised through the body or 
relationships (not the mind) and emerges through unexpected experiences or responses (not 
pre-reasoned judgements) (40).72 These different motivational springs offered by Young and 
Meyers (as well as Frankfurt) of an agent’s sentiments, the body, and affinity to others are 
alternative and supplementary ways in which to identify autonomous desires. The relational 
concern, however, is that they are not considered enough by many liberal theories, which rely 
primarily on psychological and rational reflection.  
 
Not only is the focus on rationality limiting because it minimises other competencies (such as 
those relating to emotion or the body), but also because it skews who is deemed to have 
autonomous desires. Several relational theorists have argued that constructing autonomy as 
                                                           
72 Meyers, for instance, suggests that “autonomy often emerges in unexpected places: the unexpected smashing 
of dishes in the sink, the body’s refusal to relinquish its hold on life, or even a revealing slip of the tongue” 
(Christman and Anderson, 2005, 10). In this regard, these other non-cerebral focuses on autonomy are important 
for revealing autonomy.  
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mainly an intellectual process has turned out to problematically favour particular individuals 
over others. It is, for instance, “autonomous man” (Code, 1991, 77) or “rational economic 
man” (Held, 1997, 635) or the “rugged male […] rational maximising chooser” (Mackenzie 
and Stoljar, 2000, 5) that is the archetypal self-ruling individual in liberal theories. Yet, in the 
very language utilised, this interpretation benefits some more than others: specifically, 
“middle- and upper-class white men” (Friedman, 2003, 45) seem to fit this mould more 
readily than those outside this category according to this critique. This is not because such a 
group are more rational than those not in the group, but because the characteristics of 
rationality and autonomy have been defined by the privileged few. In this picture, 
rational/autonomous persons are “presumed to be secular, individualist and with weak cultural 
conventions” whereas the non-rational/non-autonomous ones are “presumed to be religious, 
family oriented and culturally driven or defined” (Phillips, 2010, 136).73 If we accept these 
relational criticisms, it transpires that, in the liberal account, white, Western, men fair better 
than black, Southern, women (in other words, our female bombers) – not because the men 
actually are secular, individualist, and non-cultural (and thus more rational and autonomous), 
but because they venerate and regard themselves as epitomising this particular conception. In 
other words, “autonomy [has] been unfairly denied historically to subordinated or oppressed 
social groups” (Friedman, 2003, 53), on account of ‘failing’ to meet the standard set by the 
oppressors. Those in this group, then, are considered to have more rationality and, so, 
autonomy competencies than those outside it, and it is contended by relational theorists that 
this wrongly restricts autonomy to the privileged and excludes the non-privileged.  
 
                                                           
73 Referring to the case of SA (2005) where a judge considered ‘coercion’ or ‘undue influence’ to include 
religion and cultural influence. Non-white Western men are presumed to ‘suffer’ from such interference whereas 
white Western men perceived to evade it (Phillips, 2010, 136).  
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In attending to the logical capacities of persons, the relational critique is that the liberal 
approach is unnecessarily limiting in how it conceives of autonomy. Following this, I suggest 
that a model with a less  confined conception would be more useful for the bombers. 
 
(b) Inflexible will, unequivocal desires 
The second sense in which liberal theories are narrow is related, and is that an excessively 
rational focus leads to an overly systematised construction of autonomy. The paradigmatic 
autonomous self is taken to be the individual who is generally consistent in her desires and 
preferences, usually because rational persons are thought to choose in line with, and to 
achieve, a pre-endorsed life plan. Having wholehearted volitions in hierarchical theories 
(Frankfurt, 2009), minimally consistent and enduring desires in the past and present in 
historical ones (Christman, 1991), or congruent attitudes in coherence models (Ekstrom, 
2008), all indicate a requirement for the largely organised uniformity of the will. Though the 
liberal account concedes that persons will make legitimate decisions that depart from this 
order and that decision-making is not always a consistent affair (individuals may falter or be 
torn between competing desires or volitions, for instance) (Frankfurt, 2009), the overarching 
trend in the approach is that there is a clear system of endorsed preferences.  
 
However, according to the relational critique, this is likely to be too curtailing because it less 
accurately reflects the architecture of autonomy, especially for persons in situations of 
oppression (rather than coercion), such as the bombers, who might find their desires 
destabilised a great deal more than the liberal view, which is less social than other accounts, 
might allow.74 Where contexts are strained and the demands on individuals are high, desires 
                                                           
74 Where outright coercion (a gun to the head) happens, it is thought to be problematic when the hierarchy of 
desires changes (it is clear that this is an unarguable case of coercion even if the bank teller in the end voluntarily 
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are likely to be re-arranged and re-prioritised more often, and existing endorsed desires may 
be willingly set aside in favour of contradictory ones (Barvosa-Carter, 2007; Meyers, 2000; 
Lugones, 1987).75 Instead of devaluing this highly flexible will or the inconsistent shift as not 
what the person ‘really wants’ (thereby needlessly truncating autonomy), it may be more 
prudent to pay attention to the decision-making that it does uncover given the context, so 
some relational theorists argue. In other words, to recognise that the agent is able, in some 
ways, to manage her hostile settings effectively and in so doing is displaying some evidence 
of autonomy, even if it turns out to be a limited amount given the oppression. In this respect, a 
more fluid will with “endorsements not being rigidly set […] but instead flexibly ordered and 
plied as may best fit different contexts” (Barvosa-Carter, 2007, 17), would be a preferential 
notion of autonomy. Though liberal approaches recognise that the will may be fluid and 
inconsistent to some extent (whether through stipulations about wholeheartedness or 
minimally consistency, for example) they tend to be more static than other accounts that are 
social in construction and identify complex repressive circumstances as the norm for many 
people. There are different models that are less restrictive and pay more attention to this more 
malleable sort of will, then.  
 
(c) Overt acts 
The third way in which the liberal view is too narrow links to oppressive contexts and 
discrepant preferences, and concerns overt acts as indicators of autonomy. As I have already 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
– the levels of her desires are aligned – hands over the cash). But in some cases of oppression (racist or sexist 
societies) the shift to the structure may reveal skills in navigating the situation, showing resilience, and some 
level of autonomy that ought to be recognised. This will be discussed more in the next chapter on relational 
autonomy.  
75 For instance, Maria Lugones (1987) discusses the Latina and lesbian communities she belongs to and how she 
resists racial/ethnic and sexual subordination associated to either group. These views are not usually expressed or 
identified with together and at once, but are dependent on the social context because of the hostility of belonging 
to each group holds to the other. This may require inconsistency in what she identifies with, but she strongly 
identifies with both (Barvosa-Carter, 2007, 16-17). This will be discussed more in the next chapter on relational 
autonomy.  
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discussed in the agent section, acts are the (problematic) primary assessment point for many 
liberal theories, but the act-bias also poses a concern for the present issue of constricting 
autonomy. In particular, the focus on enacted desires in conditions of constraint can hamper a 
proper evaluation of autonomy because the performed outcome may not reflect the desires of 
the agent faithfully (as evident in the second point in this section about re-structuring desires 
in oppression). Conversely (as is argued here), there might be activity that attests to autonomy 
occurring broadly in the agent’s reflection irrespective of what is, in the end, expressly 
preferred by them and how autonomy-undermining this seems to be (Madhok, 2007; Khader, 
2011).76 If this is so, the relational critique is that confining evidence of autonomy 
predominately to the act in contexts where it is difficult to execute that which is desired is 
gratuitously restrictive and undermines other indicators that may uncover the autonomy of 
persons. Madhok, for instance, argues that looking at the agent, not mainly the act, in 
constraint is preferable since this may “reveal many of the ideas or desires that [the oppressed 
group’s] actions do not fully reflect [as] it is only rarely that the motivations or desires are 
reflected accurately in their final acts” (350).77 While some liberal theories do focus on the 
agent and so could make these kinds of expansive assessments, in general the account is 
primarily about the act, which is likely to be restrictive when trying to identify and properly 
evaluate instances of autonomy in constraint. Other models that could consider more than the 
                                                           
76 Madhok (2007), for instance, uses the example of the sathins – a group of female development workers in 
Rajasthan, Northern India, whose agency fluctuates in complex ways in their interactions with a range of groups 
including feminist scholars, NGOs, and the state – to suggest that autonomy should not be measured by the act 
alone since this misses other manifestations of autonomy at the level of the agent (such as her feeling like she 
must be a good Indian woman and so not stand for local elections. Though this decision appeared to be 
autonomy-undermining by many of the agencies involved with the women, Madhok suggests this reveals 
evidence of good amount of reflection). Differently, Serene Khader (2011) contends that there may be women 
who selectively demand less in certain contexts or domains because this bolsters their flourishing in others 
(sacrificing leisure time to attend to their husbands, for instance). She regards this judgement as an indication of 
agency (since it reveals what is important to them in their worlds, even if this assessment seems to thwart their 
autonomy according to some NGOs) that ought to be recognised.  
77 Madhok (2007, 2013) argues that speech practices more broadly that indicate autonomous reflection might 
provide such sites for autonomy. This will be mentioned again in the next chapter on relational autonomy.  
 126 
overt act, then, may be helpful for discerning autonomy in oppressive conditions for the 
bombers.  
 
(d) Binary autonomy 
The fourth and final example of the narrowness of the liberal account is in its minimal 
(largely political, legal, medical) goal of determining whether desires are autonomous or non-
autonomous, and where this stops short of the wider task of exploring the extent of autonomy. 
Though the approach concedes that autonomy is theoretically on a range (some preferences 
are likely to be more autonomous than others), the focus for practical (political, legal, 
medical) purposes tends to be on whether a threshold was crossed or not. This has led to 
acceptance of but less attention paid to developing a spectrum; the account being more 
concerned to distinguish when desires can be paternalistically overridden in medicine (for 
instance) or not. Though an important endeavour, in constricting the remit of autonomy to 
making this binary pronouncement and not generating a spectrum, the usefulness of autonomy 
in oppressive conditions specifically becomes unnecessarily restricted. In cases of domestic 
violence, for example, having an autonomous-or-not approach to the question of whether a 
woman ‘really wanted’ to stay in an abusive relationship, leads to an outcome where “subjects 
are expected to be unambivalently assertive or thoroughgoingly submissive, wholly 
compromised or fully resilient” (Abrams, 1998, 845-846).78 The binary, according to this 
criticism, either unreservedly labels the women’s desire as autonomous (‘they willingly chose 
to stay’) or withholds it altogether (‘they absolutely had no choice’). In so doing, however, it 
fails to grapple the broader question of how much autonomy might exist when compared to an 
account that more seriously develops a non-threshold view. By limiting the role of autonomy 
to an all-or-nothing, either/or notion, the possibility of exploring the ways in which autonomy 
                                                           
78 Abrams is referring here to liberal theories of autonomy and their influence on the legal system. 
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contracts and expands to varying degrees or in all its complexity – a task that is especially 
important in instances where autonomy is particularly constrained, such as for the bombers – 
is prematurely terminated.79 In this regard, I argue that, though the liberal approach recognises 
that autonomy is in degrees, the propensity is for it to focus on when the threshold is crossed, 
and this limits the usefulness of the concept of autonomy for the bombers, whose autonomy 
we want to represent in a more nuanced way.    
 
In this part, I have examined the narrow construction of autonomy in liberal models. I argued, 
drawing on standard relational criticisms, that by concentrating on rationality, a less flexible 
will, chiefly overt acts, and mainly binaries, the liberal approach constricts autonomy in an 
unwarranted way. A less restrictive account, then, should be sought for the women.    
 
Structural concerns 
The second predicament for the liberal construction of autonomy that I discuss relates to 
hierarchical accounts (the dominant view) in particular, and how these are unable to resolve, 
first, the infinite regress and second, the ab initio problem, which are the standard charges that 
are lodged against them in the literature and usually by those in the liberal camp. These 
ongoing difficulties suggest that this most influential of liberal accounts remains deficient in 
its formulation of autonomy.     
 
(a) Infinite regress 
With the regress problem, for example, the concern is that in a structural theory there is no 
cut-off for conclusively settling whether a desire is authentic. Second-order desires or 
                                                           
79 This problem of a binary in particular will be important for properly understanding the autonomy of the 
suicide bombers, as will be explored in chapters four and five.  
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volitions do not ascertain that a first-order desire is ‘one’s own’ since it is always plausible to 
ask of the higher desire whether it has been autonomously chosen, ad infinitum. Indeed, as 
Thalberg argues, “why not go on to the third-story or higher desires and volitions?” (1989, 
130) To whichever level of hierarchy one regresses, these theories cannot satisfactorily 
answer the question of why the endorsement should stop at that point. Even if, as Frankfurt 
contends, the regress can be halted through ‘decisiveness’ – such that “when a person 
identifies himself decisively with one of his first-order desires, this commitment ‘resounds’ 
throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders” (Frankfurt, 2009, 21) and thereby 
categorically ends the regress – the rejoinder is not adequate. Watson, for example, argues, 
“either this reply is lame or it reveals that the notion of a higher-order volition is not a 
fundamental one. […That is,] it is unhelpful to answer that one makes a ‘decisive 
commitment,’ where this just means that an interminable ascent to higher orders is not going 
to be permitted. This is arbitrary” (Watson, 1989, 119). So, Frankfurt’s appeal to resoluteness 
does not block the infinite regress because such a move is theoretically capricious.  
 
Further, there is no sufficient reason for why higher order desires or volitions are more ‘one’s 
own’ than lower ones. To elaborate, “why grant that a second-order attitude must always be 
more genuinely his, more representative of what he genuinely wants, than those you run into 
at ground level? Perhaps his higher attitude is only a cowardly second thought which gnaws at 
him” (Thalberg, 1989, 130). The second-order is no guarantee of an effective desire or 
volition anymore than infinitely higher, or alternatively lower, ones are. Given this, there 
seem to be fewer and fewer inducements to prefer a hierarchy at all. Watson, for instance, 
argues that first-order desires suffice for autonomy and that second levels ought to be 
abandoned. He contends: “it is unclear why these acts of identification cannot be themselves 
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of the first order – that is, identification with or commitment to courses of action (rather than 
with or to desires) – in which case, no ascent is necessary, and the notion of higher-order 
volitions becomes superfluous or at least secondary” (Watson, 1989, 119). The foundering to 
solve the regress and the suggestion that a single-order of desires would be just as efficacious, 
then, makes the need for a structural approach less compelling. This criticism, then, is that the 
hierarchical approach has failed to resolve the regress problem without arbitrarily placing a 
cap on it or returning to some other non-hierarchical method of determining what one ‘really 
wants’.  
 
(b) Ab initio 
Differently, the ab initio charge is that, though one might gloss over the regress – by fudging 
that if the immediately preceding higher-order desire or volition endorses the lower one, the 
affirming level need not itself be autonomously endorsed by a superior one still – this leaves 
hierarchical theories open to the ‘problem of authority’. This asks, “what gives these volitions 
any special relation to ‘oneself’?” (Watson, 1989, 119) The second tier does not reveal that 
the want is specifically agent x’s and, without agential authority, lower-level desires are 
simply “without foundations” (Christman, 1989, 9). The concern is that there is no conceptual 
tie between higher volitions and the self (and so no licence for lower desires either).  
 
The main attempt to quell this worry has come from Michael Bratman, who has argued for 
‘planning agency’ to supplement the hierarchical model. Here ‘plan-type attitudes’, those that 
give the agent “a self-governing policy” (Bratman, 2008, 43), are both structural and involve 
“the organisation of practical thought and action over time” (Bratman, 2008, 42) – so they are 
temporally stable, non-conflicting, higher-order plans. These are authoritative for the self 
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because one “decides to treat it as being reason-giving (in the sense of being end-setting) in 
the relevant circumstances” (Taylor, 2008, 12), and the reason is one with which the agent is 
“satisfied” (Bratman, 2008, 44). In essence, the attitudes have a sanctioning status because 
they are hierarchically affirmed, stable over time, and the justifications for them are 
satisfactory to the agent.  
 
However, this invites the question about how these attitudes are in turn endorsed, and so, 
despite brushing aside the infinite regress, the challenge emerges yet again. Bratman counters 
that this can be dealt with through an “appeal to reflexivity: The self governing policies that 
are central to the model of autonomy that we are constructing will be in part about their own 
functioning. Such a policy will favour treating certain desires as reason-providing as a matter 
of this very policy” (Bratman, 2008, 44). In short, these policies are self-governing because 
these policies are self-governing. Even if the attitudes or policies are based on stable, justified 
and hierarchically confirmed plans of the agent, put like this and in a manner reminiscent of 
Watson’s dispute with Frankfurt, this proposal can be undermined as an “arbitrary” (Watson, 
1989, 119) explanation or stop of the regress.80 Thus, the ab initio complication for 
hierarchical theories remains and has not been acceptably allayed.  
 
Both the infinite regress and ab initio issues, which are usually identified by non-hierarchical 
liberal autonomy theorists, demonstrate there are flaws in some of the most widely adopted 
liberal theories. This, in turn, suggests that the way that such theories formulate autonomy is 
problematic. In addition, the relational critique is that the approach more generally has a 
narrower (in terms of emphases on rationality, a more static will, enacted desires, and a 
                                                           
80 Further still, it would allow manipulated desires to pass because such preferences would meet the reasons-
giving part of Bratman’s test (if the agent is thoroughly controlled, she would be able to justify and be satisfied 
with her desires, and treat them as ends for her) (Taylor, 2008). 
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binary) interpretation of autonomy than it could do. This unnecessarily limits autonomy, 
especially for those in oppressive circumstances. I have argued that together these points 
indicate that other models that construct autonomy more broadly would better suit individuals 
in constraint, such as the bombers, and better represent their autonomy.    
 
The second relational criticism of liberal models, then, has been about autonomy. I have 
claimed has been that the liberal account tends to misjudge the relationship between the 
internal and external, since it gives primacy to the will and underestimates the significance of 
contexts. I have also argued that, even when it does theorise the internal will, the construction 
of self-rule that it offers is somewhat wanting as it is usually too narrow and structurally 
unsound. Though the liberal account does provide an interpretation of autonomy, then, I 
contend that these are shortcomings that make the aim of representing the autonomy of those 
in constraint more difficult, and the need to alternative approaches more pressing.  
  
In this section I explored two problems with liberal autonomy. First, concerning the agent, 
where I argued that the primary focus was on acts and that the residual agent tended to be too 
individualistic and unified when compared to different accounts. Second, about autonomy, 
where I claimed that the relationship between external influences and the will was less 
satisfactorily described, and that the account was more narrowly and improperly constructed, 
than in other models. I argue that these criticisms, either alone or together, expose conceptual 
issues of the liberal approach for those in constrained contexts. A different account of 
autonomy, therefore, is needed in the quest to represent the female suicide bomber’s agency 




This chapter on liberal autonomy had two principal aims. First, to characterise the liberal 
approach, which I described as, authentic desires, procedural independence, local and basic, 
consistency, and the separation of autonomy and responsibility. Second, to examine standard 
relational criticisms of the overall liberal approach to map the debate, which centred on the 
agent and autonomy. My claim has not been that the liberal model cannot offer useful 
conceptualisations of the agent and autonomy, but rather that – given its characteristics and 
mainstream critiques – there are potentially preferable conceptualisations available for those 
in conditions of constraint. In other words, a different approach that can properly develop an 
agent focus, advocate less individualistic and unified notions of persons, describe the 
relationship between the will and the external more accurately, and allow broader 
constructions of autonomy, should be explored for the female suicide bombers. Though the 
liberal approach has strengths, and some liberal theories may be more favourable than others, 
I argue that alternative models more generally may be helpful for the bombers.  
 
With this in mind, from here on in, I leave the liberal approach behind and focus on the 
relational account and what it can do for representing the bombers as agents and their 
autonomy. I will also explore what deficiencies the relational model has that need to be 
overcome to ensure a detailed and nuanced assessment of their autonomy. Once again, in 
doing this, the claim is not that the relational model can theorise agents and autonomy and the 
liberal one cannot; it is that the relational one might do this more satisfactorily for persons 
that are highly constrained, like the bombers. To embark upon this task, in the next chapter, I 
investigate the relational account, leaving chapters four and five to demonstrate and expand 
the model. 
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3. RELATIONAL MODELS OF AUTONOMY AND 
THEIR CRITIQUES 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the second of the two principal models of autonomy – the relational 
– in order to present a potentially viable theoretical alternative to the liberal approach. Just as 
with the previous chapter, I split the present undertaking into two parts, first, I outline five 
elements that many relational theories share and second, I discuss two sets of criticisms that 
might pose a problem for this conception, focussing (in parallel to the discussion of liberal 
models) on the agent and autonomy. I will argue two points. First, that by framing the agent 
as relational, factoring in context and constraints, and capturing degrees of autonomy, the 
relational approach offers a promising construction of agents and autonomy. Second, because 
socialised agents can challenge oppressive norms and substantive autonomy recognises 
contextual constraints some of the concerns around relational autonomy are dampened. 
Together, this offers a suitable foundation on which to develop a spectrum (as I will go on to 
show). In sum, I will contend that relational models are more conceptually encouraging than 
liberal ones for representing the female suicide bombers as agents and their autonomy.  
 
Again, to be clear, I do not suggest that the liberal account does not have conceptual merit or 
cannot do some of what the relational one can, or that the relational approach does not have 
flaws of its own to fix. Rather I argue that, taken together, the relational model is more helpful 
for those who are constrained, as agents and autonomy are constructed to be more social and 
external notions, and so limitations of various sorts are assumed within it. Where we wish to 
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not just recognise but distinguish and allot autonomy, even if in restricted amounts, to these 
women – who are highly constrained – the relational account is an apt base from which to 
help us achieve this. I will explore these suggestions in greater detail in chapter four when I 
apply the account delineated here to the bombers, and chapter five when I propose and apply 
a supplement to the model (in the form of a new spectrum) to the women. However, now I 
examine the relational theory.  
 
The relational approach 
In the first section, I characterise the relational account by outlining five attributes. As was 
noted for liberal models in the previous chapter, particular relational theories are diverse and 
do not share these traits in equal measure, but they do exemplify them to some degree, and 
these characteristics are not necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather outline the general 
approach. Bearing this in mind, the five common features I discuss in this section are the 
relational agent, socialised autonomy, a spectrum of autonomy, broad motivations, and 
complex self-identities. In so doing, I will provide an overview of the model for analysis in 
the second part of the chapter.  
 
Social agent  
First, relational models adopt a socialised conception of the agent. The unique qualities of this 
agent are twofold, first, the relational understanding of self and second, the prioritisation of 
agents as well as a consideration of acts when assessing autonomous agency. Taken together, 
I argue these develop a discernibly distinct agent to that of liberal theories.  
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i. Relational agent 
To start, I outline the relational aspect of the agent, the origins of which lie in developmental 
and normative ethics of care theories. In this section I discuss, first, the developmental and 
second, the ethical roots of this kind of agent, and then third, I describe more fully the 
relational agent that emerges from this body of work and that is the staple of these models.  
 
First, I set out the influence of the ethics of care as a psychological developmental theory. The 
research into care was pioneered in 1982 by Carol Gilligan in response to Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s cognitive development studies, where Kohlberg tested his hypothesis that there 
were six stages of moral development (ranging from the first – obedience – to the last – 
applying universal rules).81 He presented subjects with various moral problems, including 
‘Heinz’s Dilemma’, and investigated how they responded and where this placed them on the 
scale.82 Gilligan challenged Kohlberg’s finding that “sizable portions of [girls] are remaining 
at Stage 3, while their male age mates are dropping Stage 3 in favour of the stages above it” 
(Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969, 108), and its implication that girls were less morally developed 
than boys. To this end, she conducted her own series of experiments that sought to investigate 
actual moral experience rather than solving fictional problems (Gilligan, 1982, 1986). 
                                                           
81 Kohlberg hypothesised that there were three levels – each comprising two types – of moral thinking: the 
“preconventional” (including, “heteronomous morality” and “individualism, instrumental purpose, and 
exchange”), “conventional” (“mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and interpersonal conformity” 
and “social system and conscience”) and, “postconventional” (“social contract or utility and individual rights” 
and “universal ethical principles”) (Kohlberg, 1976; Colby, Kohlberg et al., 1983, 3-4). Moral maturity was 
attained at the “universal ethical principles” level (stage six), which was characterised by thinking in terms of 
“self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency” (Kohlberg 
and Kramer, 1969, 101, original emphasis). For Kohlberg, “these principles are abstract and ethical rules (the 
Golden Rule, the categorical imperative) they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At 
heart, these are universal principles of justice of the reciprocity and equality of human rights and of respect for 
the dignity of human beings as individual persons” (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969, 101, original emphasis). In this 
regard, Kohlberg’s approach is deemed to focus on ‘justice’ based moral reasoning, which is framed in terms of 
abstractness, principles, universality, and individuality – as will be discussed more in this section. 
82 Heinz’s Dilemma was, “should Heinz steal a drug to save his dying wife if the only druggist able to provide 
the drug insists on a high price that Heinz cannot afford to pay?” (Colby, Kohlberg et al., 1983, 9) After 
presenting this dilemma, the children were asked a series of probing questions to clarify and justify their 
answers, the responses to which indicated their place on the moral development scale.   
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Gilligan concluded that, though boys did achieve higher scores on Kohlberg’s criteria, which 
valued abstract rules of fairness, these omitted the concerns and experience of girls, who 
perceived dilemmas (such as Heinz’s) “not [as] a math problem with humans but [as] a 
narrative of relationships that extends over time” (28).83 This interpretation of the problem 
stunted the girls’ moral maturity on Kohlberg’s scale, but – as Gilligan argued – this was the 
fault of the model, not of the girls.84 Given this inadequacy, Gilligan proposed a new 
approach, an ‘ethic of care’, which could encapsulate the different moral experiences that 
were being revealed: 
 
In this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities 
rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of 
                                                           
83 For example, Gilligan cites examples of two 11-year-old children, Jake and Amy, taking part in her study. 
Both are described as intelligent and independent children, and they both offered different types of responses to 
Heinz’s dilemma, which placed them at different levels on Kohlberg’s model of moral maturity. Jake was 
adamant that Heinz should steal the drug: “For one thing, a human life is worth more than money, and if the 
druggist only makes $1,000, he is still going to live, but if Heinz doesn’t steal the drug, his wife is going to die. 
(Why is life worth more than money?) Because the druggist can get a thousand dollars later from rich people 
with cancer, but Heinz can’t get his wife again. (Why not?) Because people are all different and so you couldn’t 
get Heinz’ wife again” (Jake in Gilligan, 1982, 26).   
 
In contrast, when Amy was asked whether Heinz should steal the drug, she responded in a less forthright way: 
“Well, I don’t think so. I think there might be other ways besides stealing it, like if he could borrow the money 
or make a loan or something, but he really shouldn’t steal the drug – but his wife shouldn’t die either…If he stole 
the drug, he might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again, and he couldn’t get more of the 
drug, and it might not be good. So, they should really just talk it out and find some other way to make the 
money” (Amy in Gilligan, 28). 
 
Jake’s response, according to Kohlberg’s scale, would place him at the conventional level (stage three and four) 
of moral development, whereas Amy’s response would put her a stage lower than Jake at the pre-conventional 
and conventional levels (stages two and three).  
84 Gilligan argued the difference in the moral development levels of Jake and Amy was due to a failure in 
Kohlberg’s model, which could capture Jake’s experience but not Amy’s: “To the question, ‘What does he see 
that she does not?’ Kohlberg’s theory provides a ready response, manifest in the scoring of Jake’s judgements a 
full stage higher than Amy’s in moral maturity; to the question, ‘What does she see that he does not?’ 
Kohlberg’s theory has nothing to say” (Gilligan, 31). In essence, Gilligan contended that the results of 
Kohlberg’s experiments were flawed because the questions posed and the model designed was biased towards 
male experience and the ‘justice’ account of universals and abstract rules, while it could not capture Amy’s more 
relational, contextual way of moralising. Jake’s view is more justice based because, for instance, though Jake 
discusses the people involved, he principally appeals to abstract principles, such as life being worth more than 
money, to justify his answer. Whereas, Amy’s view is more relational as, though Amy mentions abstract ideas, 
such as not stealing, her answer is more about the specific relationship, what might happen within it if Heinz 
steals, and how she might go about preserving it.  
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thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. 
This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centres 
moral development around the understanding of responsibility and 
relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral 
development to the understanding of rights and rules (19). 
 
The ethic of care reflected, rather than ignored, the moral encounters. Instead of women 
failing to meet the standards of the “formal logic of fairness” (73) established by Kohlberg’s 
model (which valued rights, the abstract, principles, competition), this alternative approach 
enabled the concrete “logic of relationships” (ibid) that framed these women’s thinking 
(responsibilities, context, activities of care, connections) to be acknowledged and 
appropriately mapped. It is this distinction between rules and relationships that is the 
psychological theory’s contribution to the relational agent.  
 
Having outlined the influence of developmental research on care, in the second part I consider 
its ethical parallel. Normative proponents have drawn on Gilligan’s insights to propose a 
comprehensive moral agent. This is an agent that values relationships and particularity, rather 
than individualism and abstractness. Taking relationships first, for example, the “self-and-
other together” (Held, 2006, 12) and “the moral relationship between [such] persons” (Card, 
1997, 657) is the ambit of moral concern.85 The theoretical structure of the agent involves 
both self and other and the connection between them because all agents exist in these kinds of 
                                                           
85 In the past, the Ethics of Care has been deemed limited to the mother-child dyadic and the private realm, but 
care theorists have explicitly broadened the relationship such that it includes a range of other actors and spheres. 
For example, some theorists have argued that it can accommodate a “commitment to a specific person, such as a 
lover, child, or friend” (Friedman, 1997b, 673) or to “citizens[…]” (Held, 2006, 34), and even wider still to 
global others and international affairs (for instance, Ruddick, 1990; Hutchings, 2000; Held, 2006; Robinson, 
2013).  
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relations. As Virginia Held argues, “agents are fundamentally ‘encumbered’ and ‘embedded’ 
in relations with actual other persons” (2006, 84) and that this is the starting point for any 
moral agent. These are “connection[s] which exists before beliefs about what is right or 
wrong or which principles to accept” (Blum, 1988, 476) and these links can and should not be 
severed or detached from moral reasoning.86 According to this view, relationships and 
attachments form part of the agent and are part of moral decision-making. Second, on 
particularity, care ethics takes morality to be “tied to concrete circumstances rather than being 
formal and abstract” (Tronto, 1987, 648). As such, a morally flourishing agent looks for the 
complexity each scenario presents and the unique response it requires, rather than reducing 
the dilemma to its constituent parts and applying predefined rules of fairness. Nel Noddings, 
for example, contends that “A and B, struggling with a moral decision, are two different 
persons with different factual histories, different projects and aspirations, and different ideals. 
It may indeed be right, morally right, for A to do X and B to do not-X” (1984, 85).87 Seeking 
out distinctiveness permits a more perceptive comprehension of moral quandaries and 
responses than abstract thinking allows.88 Thus, relationships and particularity are the 
scaffolding of the moral agent in a normative ethic of care.  
                                                           
86 Care theories have often been criticised for being too other-focused at the cost of neglecting the self (the 
carer’s own needs and being subservient). But, a proper conception of care suggests that, “because care-givers 
are equally deserving of care, caregivers must include themselves in the orbit of care” (Meyers, 1998, 376) and 
must not become overly engrossed in the other. Similarly Virginia Held argues, “persons in caring relations are 
acting for self-and-other together. Their characteristic stance is neither egoistic nor altruistic; these are the 
options in a conflictual situation, but the well-being of a caring relation involves the cooperative well-being of 
those in the relation and the well-being of the relation itself” (Held, 2006, 12). The self, then, is not subordinated 
to the other but just as important in a proper relationship of care. 
87 This particularist view is not a move from universalism into relativism. It does not contend that the moral is 
different for culture x or religion y, such that the ethical worth of practices in that culture or religion cannot be 
appraised from those outside it. Rather, the position is that morality demands paying careful attention to the 
particularities (not the generalities) of the other; her as a relational self, her context, her needs (Meyers, 1998; 
Hutchings, 2000; Held, 2006). The morally sagacious person responds in the appropriate ways to these features; 
she does not ignore them in the way relativism proposes.   
88 On a particularist view, details about and that surround the specific moral problem and person must be 
addressed as part of the caring process. Lawrence Blum illustrates particularity (and the perceptiveness it 
requires) with the following example: “suppose a father has to decide whether and how to deal with a situation in 
which his daughter has hit her younger brother. He must take into account what various actions, coming from 
himself in particular, would mean to each of them. Would his intervention serve to undermine (either of) his 
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Third, the agent of psychological and moral theories of care described so far directly informs 
the agent of relational models of autonomy. As Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar argue, 
relational perspectives share “the conviction that persons are socially embedded and that 
agents’ identities are formed within the context of social relationships” (2000, 4). Following 
care ethics, this agent is a particular person (with a unique history and social identity) 
immersed in relationships that are not necessarily chosen (such as the families and 
communities one is born into) but that constitute (not just influence) the agent.89 This account 
acknowledges the constitutive, not merely causal (as liberal theorists admit), nature of 
sociality and relations for all agents (Meyers 1989; Nedelsky 1989; Benson 1990; Oshana 
1998; Mackenzie 2008; Westlund 2009). The very composition of agents is relational and 
individuals are “bound up with others, in ways that resist clear-cut divisions between self and 
other” (Lloyd, 2000, 117). This, then, is a radically, not just superficially, distinct model of 
the agent to the liberal one. Indeed, as Code argues, this type of autonomy (and agent) is 
“entirely remodelled: disindividuated, decentered, and reconfigured along patterns of mutual 
and crisscrossing recognitions and responsibilities […]; it is multiply, relationally structured 
all the way down” (2000, 196).90 Thus, drawing on developmental and normative care ethics, 
the agent of the relational account of autonomy is socially constituted.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
children’s ability to work out problems between themselves? Would punishing his daughter contribute to a 
pattern of seeming favouritism toward the son which she has complained recently? How might each of the 
children’s self-esteem and moral development be affected by the various options of action open to him?” (Blum, 
1988, 486) In this regard, the complexity is not removed but delved into. Similarly, Seyla Benhabib argues that it 
is not the generalised, abstract other that is part of moral analysis, but the “concrete, individual being with 
specific needs, talents, and capacities” (Benhabib, 1997, 744). Deciphering the particular other is key for 
morality.  
89 Persons are embedded in these relationships within contexts. Donna Haraway, for instance, argues, “I have a 
body and mind as much constructed by the post-World War II arms race and cold war as by the women’s 
movements” (1997, 519). Note, however, that being relationally comprised (or constituted) does not mean that 
one is determined – more will be discussed on this in the criticisms section of this chapter.  
90 What is intended to be conveyed here is that agents always stand in relation, and that there is no element of the 
self that can escape this, as though this part is ‘me’ and relationally untainted (and is the part from which I 
decide) and that part is the social self. Rather, the agent is relationally saturated. Even if, as will be suggested 
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ii. Agents, as well as acts 
The second aspect I emphasise about the agent is the priority that relational models give to 
persons. Some relational (like most liberal) theorists are primarily concerned with the 
autonomy of local (or single) acts (Westlund, 2009; Friedman, 2003), others with self-rule in 
a global (or life) sense (Oshana, 2003), and others still heed both conceptions (Meyers, 
1989).91 There are differences amongst these theorists, but where they all concur is that acts 
must be contextualised and historicised before a proper judgement about them can be made. 
While discrete acts or complete lives may (or may not) be autonomous, agents are relational 
and so who she is and why she decides (and not just the desires themselves) must be 
considered more fully. Susan Brison, for instance, argues, “to determine whether or not 
someone is autonomous or is choosing autonomously now, we need to know how that person 
came to have her preferences, including those leading her to the present choice” (2000, 284). 
Understanding an agent’s history and wider narrative is indispensible for relational autonomy.  
 
This can be illustrated with two examples (that I alluded to in the criticisms of liberal 
theories): adaptive preferences (for local autonomy) and agential practices (for global self-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
later, the relational account requires some justification of one’s desires to others, the claim is not that this is a 
non-relational self doing the justifying; it is that it is a relational self doing so. In other words, she cannot stand 
apart from her social self when deciding (which is an extension of the discussion of some of the communitarian 
and relational theorists in chapter two). Also, Code here draws similarities with and adopts the ecological 
approach that “reconceives human locations and relocations all the way down” (Code, 2000, 198) in her 
understanding of relational autonomy. 
91 Westlund, for instance, argues, “my focus is, in the first instance, on autonomous choice or action, as opposed 
to autonomy as a feature of persons or as a global feature of an entire life” (2009, 27) and similarly Friedman is 
interested in “a conception of what it is for choices and actions in particular to be autonomous” (Friedman, 2003, 
4). Likewise, Meyers notes a distinction between “episodic”, “programmatic” and “narrowly programmatic” 
autonomy (1989, 48). For Oshana, on the other hand, personal autonomy “is a ‘global’ phenomenon, a property 
of a person’s life that expresses and unifies the will and choices of the person” (2003, 100). Further, she 
challenges those (such as Christman and Friedman) who suggest that one can simply aggregate autonomous 
preferences to make an autonomous person professing, “there is no natural transition from a conception of 
autonomy that focuses on psychological states, or capacities, to an account of the autonomy of persons” 
(Oshana, 1998, 85) and arguing that (global) “autonomy is a stable property of an autonomous person rather than 
a transient characteristic” (Oshana, 1998, 95) attributable at the local level alone.  
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rule). First, adaptive preferences – desires resulting from what persons expect to be or do (Sen 
1995; Nussbaum 2000) – indicate that wants can be assessed separately but do not tell the 
whole picture. These sorts of preferences emerge from a “quiet acceptance” (Sen, 1997, 309) 
that something one cannot get is not something one wants anyway. Take, for instance, Jon 
Elster’s use of the ‘sour grapes’ fable, where the fox who initially desired grapes but could 
not reach them in the end judges them to be sour (1989). More realistically, consider Amartya 
Sen’s finding that widows in Calcutta in 1944, who were in poor health, did not judge 
themselves to be so because they did not expect good health (1997). Or Martha Nussbaum’s 
example that Vashanti, a sufferer of domestic abuse in India, did not consider herself wronged 
because she could not conceive that she was owed freedom from abuse (2000). All of these 
desires, founded upon expectations of what to be or do, are the agent’s ‘own’ (none of them 
resist these views) but they originate in a particular context and history, which illuminates 
how and why these come to pass. Without acknowledging the agent’s wider framework, 
including that of extreme constraint, one distorts or misunderstands these specific desires or 
acts. Second, some agent’s global lives may be non-autonomous because of social or 
economic oppression, but focussing on the whole agent helps to identify the ability for, and 
even instances of, autonomy where none were thought to exist.92 In extremely repressive 
contexts, for instance, agents may not act out their autonomous desires but they may 
demonstrate autonomous capacities in other ways that should be taken into account. For 
example, Madhok’s sathins (2007, 2013) – a group of development workers in India – who 
exhibit autonomous faculties in utterances (though seemingly not in what they ultimately do) 
or Benson’s slaves (1990) who engender self-respect in care practices (though they cannot 
                                                           
92 This point relates to degrees of autonomy too, which will be discussed in the third characteristic.  
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direct their lives) are illustrations of this.93 Though their lives appear to preclude autonomy, 
closer inspection of the whole agent (their histories and narratives) suggests signs of self-
governance, which is important if the aim is to recognise instances of autonomy in constraint. 
Whether for local acts or global lives, it is the agent, not only her isolated act, which needs to 
be considered.  
 
The relational agent, then, forms the first feature of relational models. The relational self is 
connected and embedded (rather than individualistic), and the relational account considers the 
whole person (rather than just the act) in autonomy.  
 
Socialised autonomy 
The second characteristic of relational theories is socialised autonomy. There are two 
elements to discuss, first, a constitutively relational notion of self-rule (autonomy is not 
purely an introspective capacity but also about relating to others) and second, a weak 
substantive method for self-governance (autonomy is not just about formally choosing but 
concerns the content of those choices too).  
 
                                                           
93 Madhok (2007) uses the example of one of her interviewees, Mohini, who wanted to contest a local election 
but who did not in the end because of disillusionment (346) and a veil-wearer who felt she must observe the 
tradition whether she wanted to or not (345). Though in oppressive contexts, their speech practices indicate their 
desires (35) and so some agency. Likewise Benson uses the example of the slaves who were oppressed in many 
ways but who gained encouragement and worth from care practices (1990) and so had space for agency. These 
two examples will be expanded upon in other parts of this chapter.  
 
Note also that Meyers thinks that an act must be carried out. In relation to self-definition, she argues, “it is 
ultimately by acting on an option (perhaps, repeated trials or variations will be necessary) that people confirm its 
advisability or decide they have erred…Unless people are able to carry out the plans they elect, their inquiries 
will be nugatory” (Meyers, 1989, 83). For her, executing acts are important. This is problematic, however, in 
situations of oppression, where individuals may not be able to carry out the plans they so wish (Madhok, 2007). 
This can be addressed by suggesting there is still room for agency in these contexts, as Madhok suggests with 
her work with the sathins and Kathyrn Abrams (1998) does in her consideration of domestic violence. This point 
will also be revisited in the spectrum section.   
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i. Constitutively relational autonomy 
The first component follows on from the relational agent just discussed and is a relationally 
constituted account of autonomy.94 This moves away from the view that self-rule is an 
internal reflective process alone and towards a model that encompasses the external (contexts 
and others) too. In this regard, being autonomous includes how persons relate to others and 
the world around them. Some relational theorists do not accept the external as constitutive of 
autonomy (Friedman, 2003; Holroyd, 2009). Marilyn Friedman, for instance, who takes such 
a requirement to exclusively mean reporting to others, argues, “on my account, there is no 
being, rational or otherwise, to whom one must give, or be able to give, an account of that 
nomos in order to count as autonomous. Autonomy competency might involve such an 
accounting ability as a coincidental side effect, but it is not constitutively a part of autonomy 
as such” (Friedman, 2003, 44-45). This dismisses the view that an agent needs to describe her 
endorsed desires to others as a necessary part of autonomy (though this might be a 
consequence of it). However, several other theorists do endorse a version of the constitutive 
relational position.  
 
One such advocate is Marina Oshana, who takes a strong (perfectionist) relationally 
constitutive stance.95 She argues that, for autonomy to exist in any meaningful sense, “the 
environment must be free of whatever variety of factors destroy the psychological integrity of 
the person, and disable the person in her relations with others” (1998, 93-94), and one way 
                                                           
94 Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) suggest that relational autonomy is an “umbrella term” (4) and though this 
includes a commitment to various features, the socially constitutive nature of autonomy is not one of them (22). 
The term, then, is open to those advocating either a causally or constitutively relational account (and indeed 
some theorists do not indicate which side of the divide they fall). Yet many liberal models would not deny the 
causal importance of the social to autonomy (Dworkin, 1988; Christman, 2004) and it seems that the relational 
account – which is rooted in a socially constituted agent – wants to be stronger than this. Thus, for this thesis, the 
relational approach is characterised as intrinsically social. 
95 Though not all strong views are perfectionist, Oshana’s position discounts the possibility of autonomy if 
certain conditions do not transpire (see footnote 96 for these conditions).  
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this is fleshed out is by assessing the actual “social-relational” (94) conditions that must exist 
for autonomy to transpire. In her theory, the agent must, for instance, be able to pursue her 
projects in the confidence that she is free from (or at least has recourse against) psychological 
or physical assault, have civil and economic rights, and have independent goals and values 
from those with authority over her (ibid).96 Autonomy, for Oshana, includes internal 
capacities of self-reflection but also depends on these external aspects, without which 
appropriate relations with others are incapacitated and autonomy is not possible.97 A different 
subscriber is Andrea Westlund, who also adopts an external focus through her ‘answerability’ 
condition but not to the (ideal) extent that Oshana does. She claims that “the disposition to 
hold oneself answerable to others is, after all, a feature of the agent’s psychology, and thus 
internal to the agent. But it is nonetheless a disposition to be engaged by what is external to 
the agent, that is, by points of view other than her own” (Westlund, 2009, 33). This approach 
requires relating to others by responding to them, and not simply self-reflection and 
endorsement of preferences (important though this still is, as it is with liberal theories). This 
inclusion of external factors results in a socially constitutive notion of autonomy. The final of 
the many supporters to consider is Paul Benson, who stipulates a “sense of worthiness to act” 
(Benson, 1994, 660) or emotional element (Stoljar, 2014) to self-rule. This focuses on the 
agent’s attitude towards herself as a responsible agent, an attitude which is contingent on 
others’ attitudes towards her as someone capable and worthy of responsibility for herself in 
                                                           
96 Oshana’s four sufficiency conditions for autonomy are: (1) critical reflection (to determine authenticity in a 
similar way to most ‘internalists’, such as Dworkin or Christman); (2) procedural independence (where this 
requires non-coercion or non-manipulation, but also demands certain substantive standards to actually meet the 
formality stipulation); (3) access to a range of relevant options (the condition is not met by having an endless 
supply of non-autonomous options or where the options only satisfy brute desires); (4) social-relational 
properties (the individual must be in a society that allows her to pursue her goals in social and psychological 
security) (1998, 94-5). 
97 In this, Oshana thinks that autonomy is both a capacity and about the condition in which one lives. What is 
key for her is that, though separate, the external matters for getting a full picture of autonomy too, In this thesis, 
the proposal is that we need to assess both the internal and external together to get a proper reading of how much 
autonomy exists.  
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the first place. By recognising that worthiness, to which autonomy is attached, is realised not 
in isolation but in relation, this represents another constitutive theory.     
 
All these accounts share the proposition that, though autonomy is an internal activity, the 
external matters for autonomy both causally – in that the social can impede or enhance 
autonomy (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000, 22) – but, more important, constitutively – in that 
autonomy is partly about the social too (Baumann, 2008).98 To clarify, the social is causal in 
the way a conducive environment might allow for a high development of autonomy skills or a 
non-conducive one might increase the chances of coercion, and it is constitutive in how 
autonomy achievement is fulfilled in relation to others. To expand the constitutive aspect, 
autonomy is realisable by, or with the ability for, engagement with others in the world, not 
solely as an individualistic reflective activity. Relational models, thereby, recognise how 
relations to persons and circumstances more broadly (the external) are intertwined with 
reflection (the internal), and how these do not come apart easily (as though one could ignore 
the external and limit autonomy to the internal). Accordingly, relationally constitutive 
theories centralise the connection between the internal capacity for self-reflection (that liberal 
views tend to focus on) and the external ways agents relate to others in the world (and that is 
deeply tied to the internal) in autonomy. In other words, autonomy is partly about persons 
self-reflecting and partly about persons relating to others and the world around them.  
 
ii. Weak substantive method 
                                                           
98 Holger Baumann classifies these variations in this way: “causally relational accounts hold that certain 
relationships and social environments play a causal role for the development and ongoing exercise of autonomy. 
Constitutively relational accounts, by contrast, claim that autonomy is at least partly constituted by a person’s 
social environment or standing” (Baumann, 2008, 445). 
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The second aspect of socialised autonomy is a weak substantive method to self-rule. Whilst in 
the previous chapter I described how liberal theories unanimously adopted a procedural 
technique, relational models differ more significantly about whether formal or substantive 
frameworks for decision-making should prevail. There are three options that are often 
tendered, first, content-neutrality (which, given the relational agent, is not the strict 
proceduralism of the liberal account, but has some parallels), second, strong and third, weak 
substantivism. Though all these proposals factor in the external, I claim that the weak 
substantive method is most satisfactory for relational autonomy.99  
 
Procedural 
First, some relational theories adopt a formal approach, which starts with a social agent who 
is embedded in certain relationships and contexts, and proposes that the agent is autonomous 
if she reflects in the right kinds of ways, not if she adopts particular desires. Meyers, for 
instance, argues, “what makes the difference between autonomous and heteronomous 
decisions is the way in which people arrive at them – the procedures they follow or fail to 
follow” (1989, 52). Similarly, Friedman contends an agent “might still be choosing 
autonomously even if she chooses subservience to others for its own sake, so long as she 
made her choice in the right way” (2003, 19).100 Likewise, Westlund favours a method that is 
                                                           
99 The commonality between formal and strong and weak substantive theories is that there is (to varying degrees) 
a link to the external. Though the internal is significant (questions about autonomy do, in part, concern the 
individual’s decision-making after all), the external matters in part too. Westlund (on a formal account – as she 
describes it), for example, emphasises being engaged with what is external to the agent through her condition of 
answerability (2009, 33), whereas Oshana (on a strong substantive method) focuses on “what goes on in the 
world around” (1998, 81) the agent, and Benson (on a weak substantive view) prefers to check the agent’s self-
worth and attitude towards herself (1994, 660) which is comprised by that which is outside the agent. The 
relational view, then, takes very seriously the external world and the role it plays in autonomous decision-
making. 
100 Friedman prefers the procedural approach for several reasons, including that it recognises a “major qualitative 
difference” (Friedman, 2003, 21) between two persons who are both oppressed but where one is able to self-
reflect and the other is not. She suggests that the higher threshold of substantive accounts, which would render 
both non-autonomous, cannot capture this difference. While, for her, both methods can assess whether expressed 
preferences are autonomous, only the procedural view can offer an answer to “how others should respond to 
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“formal rather than substantive in nature [and which] carries with it no specific value 
commitments” (2009, 28). Such theories favour content-neutrality (they do not assess the 
substance of desires, only the process of decision-making) but, through the relational agent, 
they are socially rooted and thereby acknowledge the external. For Westlund, for instance, it 
is not simply the non-coerced, non-manipulated endorsement of preferences but whether, in 
addition, the agent “has a dialogical disposition to hold herself answerable for elements of 
that hierarchy in the face of critical challenges posed by other agents” (2009, 33) that means 
she passes a procedural and relational test for autonomy whatever her desire. Differently, 
Friedman contends that the relational agent achieves autonomy through a “two-way process 
of integration” (1986, 32) of her desires and principles (in short, her whole socialised self), 
and this accommodates a social self but, at the same time, does not prescribe the substance of 
her choice. None of these views restrict the content of desires, and so are formal methods, but 




The second means for autonomous decision-making is strong substantive and arises from the 
criticism that formal methods are unable to capture why an agent’s desire might not be 
autonomous owing to its content even though the right process has been followed (Stoljar, 
2000). In response to this concern, strong substantive theories focus on the agent’s ability to 
identify and reason according to the correct standards and norms. If the content of an agent’s 
desires fall short of this benchmark, despite passing the procedural test, they are deemed non-
autonomous. Susan Wolf, for instance, argues that desires and selves must be “sane” (2008, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
someone once the question has been settled of just what her genuine preferences are” (23) even though they do 
not correspond with a broader view of what autonomous persons should choose.  
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270), where sanity is to relate to the world in a particular way and has two conditions: it is 
cognitive and normative, in that it tracks “the True and the Good” (1990, 71). Beliefs and 
values (the True and the Good respectively) about the world must be accurate and reason 
based, reflecting actual cognitive and normative standards, to count as free (or 
autonomous).101 Wolf’s example of JoJo, the son of a dictator who – given his upbringing – 
believes that ruling well is to be cruel, or Benson’s illustration of a woman who – given her 
socialisation in a patriarchal culture – expends a disproportionate amount of energy on her 
appearance as the source of her value, are persons who fail to track the True and the Good in 
their reasoning. They lack freedom or have a “diminished autonomy” (Benson, 1991, 388), 
irrespective of whether ruling sadistically or engaging in beauty practices is what they ‘really 
want’.102 These strong substantive accounts “place restrictions on the contents of agents’ 
preferences” (Stoljar, 2000, 95) in order to filter out desires based on the incorrect (factual 
and moral) norms, ruling them out as non-autonomous.  
 
Weak substantive 
The third method is weak substantive, which falls somewhere between the stipulations of 
content-neutral and strong substantive positions. Weak views require agents to possess certain 
traits (a substantive demand) but, if the agent has these, the content of the desire itself is not 
automatically limited (which honours part of the formal condition). There has been growing 
                                                           
101 As cognitive/truth, “one’s desire to be sane involves a desire to know what one’s doing – or more generally, a 
desire to live in the Real World – it is a desire to be controlled – to have, in this case, one’s beliefs controlled – 
by perceptions and sound reasoning that produce an accurate conception of the world rather than by blind or 
distorted forms of response” (Wolf, 1989, 145). To clarify, an agent’s beliefs must reflect the world accurately as 
it actually is. As normative/good, the sanity requirement is that “one’s values” (Wolf, 1989, 145) be similarly 
controlled by normative standards of the real world. Wolf makes these arguments in relation to responsibility 
and freedom, but they have applicability to autonomy (which she also discusses).  
102 Similarly to Wolf, Benson arguments rely on accurate normative standards (in his earlier papers). He 
contends, “one’s action is fully free only to the extent that one has the ability to appreciate normative standards 
governing one’s conduct and to make competent critical evaluations, in light of those norms, of open courses of 
action” (Benson, 1987, 475). In later papers, however, he refines this into a slightly weaker version, as will be 
discussed in the next paragraph.   
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support for this view. Some theorists, such as Benson, for example, are clear advocates for it, 
arguing for a self-worth condition (as mentioned earlier) or “normative-competence” 
(Benson, 1994, 660).103 Here, “normative standards for agents’ authority to construct and 
potentially answer for their reasons for acting enter into autonomy by way of the attitudes 
toward their own competence and worth through which agents claim such authority” (Benson, 
2008, 136). Rather than the substance of the choice being evaluated, it is the agent’s stance 
towards herself, as contingent on her relational experiences (such as whether others engender 
a sense of self-worth in her), which is key.104 Other theorists, in particular Meyers, who 
originally favoured a procedural method (in opposition to strong substantivism), has 
subsequently conceded that hers is a weaker substantive theory, but that it avoids the 
problems of the stronger view to which she was resistant. She argues for those “positions that 
presuppose certain values [including skills such as ‘self-nurturing’, which involve self-worth 
and self-respect] but that do not prevent autonomous people from living highly individualised 
and vastly different lives” (Meyers, 2008, 206).105 Substantive attitudes or values (self-
respect, self-worth, self-nurturing) are required on Meyers’ account but, if individuals possess 
                                                           
103 Normative competence is “a complex set of capacities” (Benson, 1990, 48), including self-worth and self-
esteem belonging to the agent (Benson, 1990). 
104 This is similar to Westlund’s (2009) account of answerability and responsibility for the self (that was 
discussed earlier in this section). However, it is distinguished because Benson states his is a weak substantive 
notion that features self-worth, whereas Westlund argues hers is a procedural account and that the agent “may 
even manifest a lack of self-respect” (37) and yet still be able to answer for herself. Further, Khader argues that 
self-worth may occur in some parts of the agent’s life but not others (that a woman may be a confident business 
woman but unconfident about her body image, for instance – 2009, 181) and that persons belong to and 
participate in multiple communities that allow for different kinds of self-worth (2011, 20). This is accurate, and 
one that Benson recognises in his example of the slaves (which will be discussed in this chapter). 
105 Meyers initially rejected substantive theories as “restrictive, value-saturated accounts” (Meyers, 2002, 13), 
which lead to the position that it is permissible for a woman to challenge repressive norms (as this is more 
authentically her) but not to endorse them (as this is not authentically her). Further, she argues that they overly-
exaggerate the threat of socialisation as always inimical to autonomy when it is clear in cases of oppressive 
socialisation that “some people become oppositional activists, and […] Other people carve out lives that enact 
‘inappropriate’ values in the interstices of society’s constraints […and] Still others endorse at least some of the 
values upon which oppressive constraints are based and on balance accept the constraints and conform their lives 
to them” (15). She claims that it would be erroneous to automatically assume there is no autonomy in these cases 
since people have openly challenged or covertly subverted the norms. Later, however, Meyers agrees with 
Benson’s analysis (Benson; 2008) that her criticism is targeted at strong substantive but evades weak substantive 
theories. Thus she concedes, “however different our views are in some respects, [Benson] and I are currently 
advocates of ‘weak substantive’ positions” (Meyers, 2008, 206). 
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these, they may still endorse a variety of preferences (that allow for plurality in how to live 
one’s life). Other theorists still might be harbouring similar weak substantive traces in their 
models. Benson, for instance, contends that, though she denies it, Westlund’s procedural 
position might not be as content-neutral as she claims since, “to act autonomously in any 
actual circumstance is, by Westlund’s own account, to be disposed to apply in that situation 
some normative expectation [of answerability] to oneself. And this is not a purely formal 
expectation” (Benson, 2011, 3).106 In Westlund’s theory, there are undertones of a non-
procedural approach because the normative expectation towards the self is contingent on 
substantive conditions holding. Being answerable means that suitable background factors (for 
example, civil and political freedoms that allow the agent a ‘voice’ or educational and 
employment opportunities that permit a realistic ‘exit’ option – Phillips, 2010; Okin, 2002) 
are relevant – though not exhaustive – for developing appropriate levels of (say) self-esteem, 
                                                           
106 Benson argues that Westlund’s procedural position might not be content-neutral since, “to hold oneself 
answerable, in any concrete situation, is to hold oneself to an expectation that one answer for one’s choices or 
actions; it is to apply to oneself a standard that calls for one to answer potential criticisms (under certain 
circumstances). Hence, to act autonomously in any actual circumstance is, by Westlund’s own account, to be 
disposed to apply in that situation some normative expectation to oneself. And this is not a purely formal 
expectation” (Benson, 2011, 3). Westlund’s view of answerability, then, has substantive leanings. Benson also 
argues that her conditions for deeming critical challenges to an agent’s action legitimate “brings to light the fact 
that the disposition to hold ourselves answerable carries with it an implicit, substantive commitment to norms of 
legitimate challenge. In this respect, Westlund’s theory cannot remain wholly neutral on the character of the 
application justificatory practices” (Benson, 2011, 4). Again, it is a substantive approach.   
 
Westlund, however, attempts to defend against this, suggesting that while her conditions of ‘legitimate 
challenge’ may be substantive and normative, it is not a particular problem for her account anymore than it is for 
other formal accounts. She argues: “while my account does seem to imply a commitment to some standard 
governing legitimate challenge, the shape of that norms is as much up for grabs (and as much the subject of 
justificatory discourse) as anything else…I submit that, in this respect, the requirement I defend is no more 
substantive than the conditions given by other defenders of ‘formal’ views. Reflective endorsement theorists, for 
example, do not require that the autonomous agent actually endorse the criterion of reflective endorsement itself; 
reflective endorsement is held to be constitutive of autonomy, regardless of whether the agent would, at some 
level, fail to reflectively endorse that very requirement” (Westlund, 2011, 3). In this regard, she does not 
consider her account to be at fault. Equally, however, she does not consider there to be a vast difference between 
weak substantive and procedural accounts at all: “the formal views might all involve more of substance than we 
have thought, and there might be nothing at all worrisome about that” (Westlund, 2011, 4). 
 
In short, though Westlund denies any substantivism, her theory is, in fact, value-laden and so not purely 
procedural. 
 151 
upon which answerability depends.107 Although this debate is still in flow, the weak 
substantive approach both values diverse conceptions of the good and filters out intuitive 
instances of non-autonomy (stemming from – socially imbued – attitudes towards the self). 
This view, then, is gathering support generally, and it forms part of the relational account I 
characterise here.    
 
Yet another account that could be labelled as ‘weak substantive’ is a capability approach to 
autonomy, which takes influence from Nussbaum (2000), Susan Brison (2000) and James 
Rocha’s (2011) work. I briefly set out the relevant features of each to describe the position. 
Starting with Nussbaum, her theory separates capabilities, on the one hand, and their 
exercising or functioning, on the other. One can have a capability (to bodily health, for 
instance), whilst choosing (a good in itself) not to be functional in it (by partaking in 
fasting).108 Nussbaum dictates the capabilities (it is substantive and they must be available to 
persons), but acknowledges that the agent might not choose them (it is not strongly 
substantive). Second, Brison adopts a version of the capability approach for matters of 
autonomy.109 Her view is that “one has to be capable of achieving some – yet to be specified – 
set of functionings in order to be autonomous…It is the capability, rather than the achieved 
functionings, that is necessary for autonomy…[and] A person’s capability set…is determined 
in large part by her relations to others and the functionings they enable or prevent her from 
                                                           
107 The non-exhaustive aspect of the substantive conditions is what differentiates it from more perfectionist 
accounts that categorically deny autonomy if those background conditions do not exist. Here the claim is that 
external conditions are weighty factors (and inform how much autonomy can be exercised) but not the only ones 
in determining the amount of autonomy. This will be discussed more in the spectrum characteristic below and in 
the final chapter. 
108 Nussbaum argues that the capabilities theory asks not “about people’s satisfactions, or how much in the way 
of resources they are able to command, we ask, instead, about that they are actually able to do or to be” 
(Nussbaum, 2000, 12). In so doing, it focuses on the fact that persons are entitled to a minimum, “interlocking 
set” (294) of capabilities and that “the failure of a person to have various basic human capabilities is important in 
itself, not just because the person minds it or complains about it” (144).  
109 Brison subsequently uses this capability theory of autonomy to consider whether unrestricted hate speech (to 
both speak and have access to the speech) should be defended on autonomy grounds (which is an argument that 
is often mounted to allow unfettered hate speech in the USA) (2000). 
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achieving” (2000, 283). Though the capabilities are not fleshed out, it is a relational account 
of autonomy that focuses on capabilities as significant indicators of self-rule.110 Finally, 
Rocha, though not directly referring to capabilities, claims that one can distinguish (1) the 
ability for autonomy whilst (2) reserving the title of ‘autonomous’ to those who are not 
hindered by oppressive norms. This encompasses a substantive view that subordinating 
contexts can obstruct autonomy but also that the (social) capacity for autonomy ought to be 
distinctly recognised in discerning whether an agent is self-ruling. Taking these three 
positions together, this kind of approach would demarcate the capability for self-governance 
(which in turn allows respect for persons), functioning (which is what persons choose), and 
flourishing (which is how well or fully the agent achieves a highly functioning life).111 In 
other words, it distinguishes the ability to be self-directed, the exercising of that self-
directedness, and the most self-directed life. However, what is key is that various elements 
need to be considered together for a fuller assessment of autonomy.112 This capability-
influenced proposal, then, provides the outline of another weak substantive theory.  
 
The second feature of relational models of autonomy, then, is more contentious, with different 
theorists offering procedural, strong substantive, and weak substantive positions. I endorse a 
weak substantive method, which is gathering support, for the purposes of characterising 
relational autonomy and favour a hybrid approach, with elements of self-worth (Benson), the 
social achievement of self-rule – such as responsibility or answerability for self (Benson; 
Westlund) – and capabilities (drawing on Nussbaum, Brison, and Rocha).  
                                                           
110 Though the content of Brison’s capability set is not specified (so she aligns herself more to Amartya Sen than 
Martha Nussbaum), she claims hers is a substantive position (that the set just needs to be defined).  
111 The benefits of this proposition will be discussed more in the criticisms section of this chapter, but – in brief – 
these distinctions allow for both respect for persons and that the external can limit the agent’s flourishing in 
autonomy. In other words, an agent’s desire, formed in oppressive conditions and itself subordinating, can be 
deemed not conducive to a flourishing life and labelled as such, but where the agent is respected and engaged 
with nonetheless. 




The third element of the relational account is two-fold and comprises minimal and degrees of 
self-rule, which complements socialised autonomy above. The minimal and degree aspects 
overlap, to some extent, with liberal theories, and though relational models have attempted to 
develop the idea of the spectrum more, there is still room for expanding it.  
 
i. Minimal 
First, some relational theories advocate an ideal level of autonomy. Oshana, for instance, 
concedes that her four-part sufficiency criteria sets the bar very high for who can, in fact, 
achieve autonomy, but defends this result: “whatever the case, I believe the conception of 
autonomy I describe is most plausible” (1998, 98). Most models, however, reject the 
restrictiveness of perfectionist standards like Oshana’s and propose instead a minimal 
conception.113 For example: Friedman, in a similar vein to some liberal theorists, argues that 
“a self that is at all minimally self-reflective” (2003, 7) is important to distinguish from a self 
that is not; likewise, Meyers (1989) recognises minimal skills, including those of reflection, 
which are significant markers of some autonomy; and differently, with a more relational tone, 
Benson (2000) employs the self-worth condition as a minimum for autonomous persons. 
These are less onerous levels than Oshana’s ideal notion, and emphasise that self-governance 
is possible (to some extent – as the next part will discuss) for many persons because it is a 
minimal rather than maximal conception. 
 
ii. Spectrum 
                                                           
113 Meyers (2008), Westlund (2009) and Benson (2011) explicitly reject Oshana’s perfectionist account.  
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Second, the notion of the minimal just discussed is not the totality of autonomy for most 
relational theories since they also regard autonomy to be chartable on a spectrum. While this 
is not distinct to relational models (the liberal account also recognises a range of autonomy, as 
discussed in chapter two), various relational theorists have sought to embed the spectrum in 
the mainstream relational model. The approach, in other words, moves away from a view that 
“conflates personal autonomy with political autonomy” (Oshana, 2006, 102) or with medical 
or legal autonomy, and which tends to lead to a binary notion of autonomy, and instead moves 
towards autonomy being a “social phenomenon” (ibid), which tends to be more nuanced. 
Though having a minimal conception is important (for practical purposes), then, there is also 
value in plotting autonomy on a spectrum when autonomy is discussed in this broader way.  
 
Relational theorists (of either ‘thin’ or ‘thick’ varieties) make an autonomy scale explicit. 
Meyers and Friedman (in the thin, procedural camp) both acknowledge the spectrum. Meyers, 
for instance, argues, “people do not live entirely autonomously or entirely heteronomously. 
Autonomy is a matter of degree” (Meyers, 1989, 205) which, for her, depends on how well 
they exercise the “autonomy competency” (53) – a set of skills for “self-discovery, self-
definition, and self-direction” (20).114 Similarly, Friedman (though acknowledging the need 
for a threshold) contends that “when women affirm contra-autonomy norms, such as those of 
traditional femininity, this diminishes the degree of autonomy such women can attain but it 
does not absolutely preclude it” (2003, 24).115 These are procedural admissions of the 
spectrum. Likewise (in the thick, substantive camp) Benson’s pronouncement that agents can 
                                                           
114 The skills that make-up the autonomy competency are not purely minimal, as will be discussed in the next 
characteristic. They are: self-discovery (identifying what the agent wants, values, etc.), self-definition (acting on 
those wants, values, etc.), and self-direction (correcting her actions or understanding of her wants, values etc. if 
they are mistaken) (Meyers, 1989; Dodds, 2000) 
115 Friedman’s claim is that content-neutral and substantive accounts differ only in where they fall on the 
autonomy scale, with the latter exhibiting more autonomy than the former.  
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have a “diminished autonomy” (Benson, 1991, 388), as mentioned earlier, indicates that a 
gradation exists. These views attest to a range of autonomy.  
 
The spectrum is significant because it permits a more accurate representation of autonomy. 
Though liberal models rarely consider autonomy to be an either/or binary (even if, for the 
practical purposes to which judgements about autonomy are put, it tends to be discussed in 
this way), degrees of autonomy are interwoven into relational accounts. In other words, the 
understanding of autonomy as degree-based is made “explicit and central through [the] 
elaboration of partial autonomy” (Abrams, 1998, 817) in the relational approach. This is not 
to suggest that liberal models could not develop a spectrum by moving beyond the practical 
aims, but that it is already part of the goal of and so fused into the relational model. As 
Abrams argues, by incorporating a scale:  
 
the designation of autonomy is not a patronising or empty gesture; it is an 
alternative conception that reveals autonomy to be capable of more 
complex, varied definition than previously has been thought. It takes partial 
or qualified forms of autonomy not simply as deficient – though they are 
clearly deficient in some respects – but as illustrative of the continuum on 
which autonomy and heteronomy can be found (1998, 816).  
 
As a result, a conceptual space for individuals to be more or less autonomous exists in 
relational models.116  
 
                                                           
116 Moreover, all the other features of relational autonomy that the first part of this chapter outlines (the social 
agent, social autonomy, broad motivations and complex identities) accompanies the spectrum. 
 156 
However, though most relational theorists endorse a spectrum as part of the fabric of the 
account, little theorising about what the spectrum might look like or how autonomy might be 
measured along it has been done. Meyers does distinguish minimal, medial and full 
autonomy, where full self-governance is rare, medial achievable by many, and minimal by 
most.117 Yet, this stops at plotting autonomy along such a spectrum, and so there is a need to 
theorise and demonstrate this further. As a way in which to redress this, my proposal for 
conceptualising this space and gauging the autonomy of the female suicide bombers will be 
set out in chapter five of this thesis.  
 
The autonomy spectrum is the third aspect that relational models of autonomy tend to share. 
Here, autonomy is not an onerous requirement, and the exercise of autonomy is a degree-
based notion. The spectrum, then, allows the possibility of a more detailed mapping of 
autonomy. 
 
Broad motivations  
The fourth trait of the relational approach is a broader motivational awareness in self-
governance. Though rationality is required for autonomy (for being able to weigh up options 
or consequences, for example), the relational account denies that these alone are significant. 
                                                           
117 Meyers’ characterisation of the levels of autonomy are: “I shall say someone is minimally autonomous when 
this person possesses at least some disposition to consult his or her self and at least some ability to act on his or 
her own beliefs, desires, and so forth, but when this person lacks some of the other skills from the repertory of 
autonomy skills, when the autonomy skills the person possesses are poorly developed and poorly coordinated, 
and when this person possesses few independent competencies that could promote the exercise of available 
autonomy skills. I shall say that someone is fully autonomous when this person possesses a compete repertory of 
well developed and well coordinated autonomy skills coupled with many and varied independent competencies. 
Medially autonomous people range along a spectrum between these two poles” (Meyers, 1989, 170). Meyers’s 
framework relates to her notions of “episodic”, “programmatic” and “narrowly programmatic” autonomy (1989, 
48) that were mentioned earlier. She illustrates that in oppressive situations (such as feminine socialisation) high 
degrees of episodic autonomy can be achieved (doing what one most wants in a particular situation), and 
narrowly programmatic autonomy can be achieved (decisions on a life partner for instance), but programmatic 
autonomy (whether to marry at all or whether to be a mother) are compromised (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). 
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For instance, Meyers argues that, in addition to rational skills that give pre-eminence to 
psychological processes, there are other skills pertinent to autonomy – including those 
originating in the “self-as-social, as-relational, as-divided, and as-embodied” (Meyers, 2005, 
40) – that ought to be analysed too. Similarly, Dodds contends that “choices made on the 
basis of principles of rationality, display some of the skills of autonomy competency but do 
not constitute autonomy” (Dodds, 2000, 227-8), where autonomy competency refers to 
Meyers’ conception earlier.118 Being autonomous involves rational decision-making, but 
autonomy is by no means synonymous with, or especially exemplified through, rationality. 
Rather, varied forms of reasoning are given credence in relational models, particularly – 
following the emphasis on relationships in the care-influenced agent – emotions and concrete 
connections. Agents reason in multiple ways, and sentiments and character-based intentions 
are just as significant as rational justifications (Hursthouse, 1991).119 These broader 
motivations, often downplayed but certainly not absent in the liberal approach (as discussed in 
relation to Frankfurt, 2009, in chapter two), are part of the suite of valid reasons that agents 
may hold in relational theories.  
                                                           
118 Dodds continues, “being able to make rational choices does not necessarily reflect full autonomy; rational 
choosers can make rational choices if they have developed their capacity for rational deliberation in light of 
rational principles, even if they lack skills in self-direction” (Dodds, 2000, 228). In this regard, an agent that is 
rationally savvy and chooses to best suit her plans may not yet be an accomplished self-director; she may be 
logical but poor at correcting her life or values if mistaken (which, for Meyers and Dodds, are part of the 
autonomy competencies and so relevant for autonomy). 
119 Hursthouse discusses, for instance, arational desires (that do not have a desire-belief correlation), such as Jane 
tearing at a photograph of Joan and gouging out the eyes in hatred (1991, 59-60). She argues this action does not 
involve a belief of actually causing Joan harm, nor is it for the purpose of relieving the emotion, nor for causing 
pleasure (which are ‘reasons’) but it is done arationally (without reason) (66). Other examples include tearing 
one’s hair in grief, posturing in the mirror in pride or hiding one’s face in the dark in shame (58). She argues of 
such desires that “we value ourselves and each other as emotional creatures – not as rational-emotional in the 
way pinpointed by Aristotle, but as just plain emotional – and do not believe that the perfect human being would 
never act arationally” (68). (Note, however, that she also argues that passions need proper training, which might 
not be misaligned to reason). In a similar way of recognising the breadth of human experience, Friedman argues 
that “emotions, desires, passions, inclinations, or volitions – in short, any mental state involving any motivation 
or attitude at all – would all constitute reasons” (2003, 10) in autonomous decision-making. This is reminiscent 
of Nussbaum’s claim that there are no clear distinctions between choices (where these are considered to be 
rational) and desires (deemed irrational): “emotions, desires, and even appetites of a human being are all 
humanely significant parts of her personality, deserving of respect as such” (2000, 155). In this way, a broader 
understanding of reasons is important for relational autonomy.  
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Moreover, the emotional might serve as a better way of deciphering what one ‘really wants’ 
or can be the more appropriate response in a particular situation.120 Friedman argues that, in 
patriarchal contexts, women can develop higher-order desires that perpetuate oppressive 
norms. While a rational view might continue to endorse these subordinating values (because it 
reduces conflict in her social world, for instance), it may well be that it is her emotions that 
uncover her preferences. To expand, “her frustration, grief, and depression, and the 
motivations to change her life which spring from these sources, may be her only reliable 
guides” (1986, 31) that the norms of patriarchy are not what she ‘truly wants’.121 Likewise, 
Meyers argues that ‘excessively’ emotional reactions might, in some instances, owe more to 
an acute perceptiveness of unfairness than a failure of rationality, and so is the proper (not the 
improper) motivation. If a man behaves in an unwanted sexually aggressive manner, for 
example, this might result in anger, bitterness, and resentment on the part of the woman, but 
these are not ‘illegitimate’ or ‘irrational’ feelings.122 Rather, “such perception is heterodox 
relative to traditional patriarchal norms and values, but it is not heterodox relative to feminist 
norms and values…It is dissident moral perception” (Meyers, 1997, 210).123 The emotional, 
rather than purely rational, then, can be a more befitting response.   
                                                           
120 Frankfurt (2009) argues that this can be the case, as discussed in chapter two.  
121 This is why Friedman wishes to eliminate the ‘top-down’ authenticity approach of the ‘split-level self’ of 
hierarchical models (such as Frankfurt and Dworkin’s). She instead advocates an integration theory that is based 
on a ‘two-way integration’ between the agent’s principles and motivations, thereby enabling not only desires 
(typically the lower-level) but also more importantly values (usually the higher-level) to be tested for 
authenticity (1986). 
122 Meyers notes that the woman’s response of anger or resentment is often dismissed as her being ‘over-
sensitive’ and not an acknowledgement that the harasser has done wrong (1997). 
123 To explain, ‘heterodox moral perception’ involves seeing situations that go unchallenged (such as 
discrimination) in a non-orthodox way, such that the emotion (often deemed heterodox) that can accompany it 
(anger, bitterness, resentment) is not only a more appropriate response but also a way to effect change. In this 
way, rather than assuming that feeling resentful after suffering racial abuse is a disproportionate response, it is an 
insightful one. Meyers argues, “when people have become hypersensitive, paranoid, angry, or bitter as a result of 
being subjected to a devastating injustice (or series of injustices) or to disabling systemic oppression, they 
become preternaturally sensitive to unjust practices and oppressive conditions” (1997, 209) and these responses 
are not illegitimate or unreasoned, but rather perceptive.  
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Broader motivations are the fourth feature of relational accounts. Rationality at a basic level 
may be one important form of reasoning, but other motivations (including emotions or 
passions) can also be valid self-directing reasons.  
 
Complex self-identity 
The final characteristic of the relational approach is the complexity of agent identity. As 
already discussed in the first trait, the relational agent is shaped by “intersecting social 
determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity” (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000, 4) and 
these features move away from an interchangeable agent to one that is fundamentally unique. 
Shifting to this kind of agent, however, has an impact on expectations around the consistency 
of desires. The relational understanding of this can be examined by, first, contrasting 
intersectional and schizophrenic agents and second, discussing the structure of autonomy that 
follows.  
 
First, relational agents are complex and distinctive. This is evident in agents with multiple 
aspects to their identities, and I examine two examples – intersectionality (which is common 
in agents) and schizophrenia (which is less so). Starting with ‘intersectional identity’, this 
refers not to identity per se but to those “specific relations of class, ethnicity, race, gender, 
sexuality, nationality, religion, region, language community and subculture” (Barvosa-Carter, 
2007, 6) that exist within societies of privileged and non-privileged social groups. In addition, 
intersectionality is where “these multiple ascriptions interact – sometimes compounding one 
another’s effects and sometimes creating inner divisions and conflicts” (Meyers, 2000, 153) in 
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the agent.124 Such identities are complex, resulting in varied and diverse preferences that 
occasionally collide, and the internalisation of socially assigned roles. On the one hand, then, 
intersections are part of the fabric of one’s make up and “these identities influence what 
[agents] believe, how they deliberate, and how they conduct their lives” (157) and, on the 
other, they are also likely to result in mismatched preferences and loyalties because of their 
convoluted nature (158). Further, though the characterisation of these identities imply that 
they only apply to specific marginalised groups, many persons would, in fact, count as 
intersectional to some extent as few wholly escape being classified and, so, subordinated in 
the diverse ways intimated. The second example is the schizophrenic and, though more 
limited in its applicability, is still an instance of complex identities. Individuals suffering from 
schizophrenic episodes will have lucid moments, and while the former onset is not thought 
typically to be the ‘real’ agent, the latter is (Mackenzie and Poltera, 2010). Yet, collectively, 
this identity is also one that is intricate, with different, often conflicting and some alienated, 
parts of the self but which are not always easily distinguishable. Both the intersectional 
identity and schizophrenic identity, then, are complex.  
 
Second, these identities, and the desires emanating from them, must be addressed in the 
relational approach (indeed accounting for conflict and complexity in autonomy given this 
kind of self is a concern of relational models).125  The emphasis placed on the relational agent 
has led some to argue that a “failure to own up to and to own one’s intersectional identity – 
undermines autonomy” (Meyers, 2000, 159) and that one should pay attention to the 
                                                           
124 Intersectional identities have been discussed by various theorists (Anzaldứa, 1987, 1999; Lugones, 1987; 
Meyers, 2000; Barvosa-Cater, 2007). 
125 Recall from the previous chapter that liberal theorists also recognise that there will be conflicts (for instance, 
Ekstrom and Frankfurt). Relational theorists usually aim to take into account the social/relational self and what 
kinds of conflicts this might entail in particular, such as about identity or in order to preserve specific 
relationships.  
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multifarious whole she is, including any inevitable discord in desires, since these are a 
genuine part of her (Anzaldứa, 1999). Such conflicts and complexity of identity must be 
acknowledged in relational autonomy. In a different way, with the schizophrenic, Mackenzie 
and Poltera (2010) argue that there is a difference between authenticity in ‘narrative identity’ 
(which they suggest is wide in scope) and authenticity in autonomy (which is narrower). They 
claim to “see no inconsistency between accepting an aspect of one’s practical identity as 
‘one’s own’ in the first sense while feeling alienated from it” (2011, 5) in the second sense.126 
Further they argue that, even if the schizophrenic does feel alienated from her illness, it does 
not mean that the condition is inauthentic. Rather, “to be authentic is to be true to oneself, and 
being true to oneself may sometimes require acknowledging that aspects of oneself from 
which one feels affectively alienated are nevertheless central to one’s practical identity” 
(ibid). There is a need to admit of the friction between (schizophrenic and lucid) identities, 
and even to accept (the schizophrenic) one as a facet of the (narrative) self though it is also 
                                                           
126 Mackenzie and Poltera (2010) argue that autonomy and authenticity can be pulled apart and that authenticity 
can relate to identity too. They separate a narrative self-constitution (comprised of – synchronic and diachronic – 
agency or identity) as having a wide scope and something most individuals (including schizophrenics) are able to 
develop, and autonomy (comprised of competency and authenticity) as having a narrow scope that fewer agents 
can achieve (the schizophrenic falls short of this). 
 
Mackenzie and Poltera argue that agents connect their past, present and future in a diachronic way through 
narrative identities and this constitutes the person’s self-understanding and a flourishing life. They use this to 
critique Galen Strawson (who argues that such accounts of narrative identity are false because they exclude those 
who define themselves in an episodic or time-sliced way) by drawing on the example of Elyn Saks (a college 
professor who has schizophrenia). They claim that Saks is unable to attain narrative identity while suffering from 
schizophrenic episodes, but she can incorporate this as part of her wider self-narrative and authentically part of 
her when not suffering her delusions. Further, they argue that though Saks can do this and so the illness is 
authentically her (in a narrative – identity – sense), she is unable to achieve the greater degree of authenticity 
(and competence) required for autonomy suggesting that she would feel alienated from her illness and so it is not 
authentically her (in an autonomous sense). Thus, Saks can achieve a narrative identity but falls short of 
autonomy.  
 
In this regard, the relevance of authenticity is much broader than to just autonomous desires and extends to 
identity and agency too. As Westlund argues, “the notion of authenticity is more naturally and more clearly 
associated with the question of integrated identity than it is with autonomy. If this is so, then one upshot of my 
argument (like Mackenzie and Poltera’s) would be that autonomy and authenticity can come apart” (2011, 2). 
These views suggest, therefore, that authenticity can relate to identities or agency as well as desires. 
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detrimental and inauthentic to the (autonomous) self. These views suggest that complex 
identities may conflict but are still a part of the whole person.  
 
The similarities in the examples of intersectionality and schizophrenia (with whether the 
conflicted desires and identities are suitably authentic), however, end when autonomy is 
considered. While Mackenzie and Poltera argue that the narrower scope of authenticity in 
autonomy (over narrative identity) means schizophrenic agents in moments of psychosis fall 
short of the standard required in autonomy, intersectional theorists claim authenticity for 
autonomy remains possible with intersectional identities. In this regard, Meyers insists that 
“autonomy is best advanced by placing minimal strictures on the ordering of the autonomous 
personality” (Meyers, 1989, 62) since intersectionality precludes stringent structuring and 
consistency of desires where these deny aspects of one’s identity. In other words, to integrate 
or rank desires by favouring one conflicted identity over another in a static way “would be to 
betray one’s authentic self” (Meyers, 2000, 170), if one endorses both (Barvosa-Carter, 
2007).127 Rather, structures of autonomy should be flexible so that different conflicting 
(though endorsed) desires can take priority in different situations, thereby retaining 
authenticity of the self in self-rule by embracing, not rejecting, her complexity.  
 
                                                           
127 These points recognise the importance of the flexible will. Meyers, for instance, argues, “there are no desires 
or characteristics that should always take precedence in any individual’s life. Insofar as intersectional subjects 
are subordinated, they need to be on the qui vive for unanticipated opportunities…If integration is understood as 
a wholehearted and lasting commitment to a self-chosen hierarchy of desires, personal traits, values, interests, 
and goals, and if an integrated self is an authentic self, integration and authenticity are often inimical to 
autonomy” (2000, 171). In this regard, such consistency and integration can be problematic for intersectional 
(most) selves. In addition, Barvosa-Carter (2007) argues that intersectional selves are likely to be ambivalent 
towards social identity (but not necessarily towards self-chosen endorsements), and this only when the agent’s 
hierarchy is flexible and can accommodate different preferences in different situations. Likewise, following 
Aristotle, Friedman (2003) notes that an individual’s life can only be fully assessed once she dies; selves evolve 
over time and circumstances change and demand different responses from the autonomous person. Though being 
minimally consistent or having cohering attitudes, such as were discussed in the previous chapter on liberal 
theories, can manage conflicts and disintegration, these attempts do not primarily do so to reflect and capture the 
complexity of intersectional agents, which is the relational concern here.  
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We can illustrate this using Kristeva Luker’s work (1975). Luker studied pregnant girls and 
women, who chose to undergo an abortion after refusing to use contraception, despite it being 
freely available from their physicians. Analysing the research, Stoljar (2000) distinguishes 
two types of agent. On the one hand, is an individual who risks sexual intercourse without 
contraception because of “paralyzing ambivalence” (104). On the other hand, are Luker’s 
subjects, who have conflicts between equally endorsed first-order desires (refusing to take 
contraception might be a way of not choosing between a strong desire to have sex and a 
strong desire not to reveal her sexual life to her father, who will be informed if she asks for 
contraception). For Stoljar, the former is a clear case of lack of autonomy since there is failure 
to ‘own up to’ the incoherent conflict, whereas the latter is simply a conflict of endorsed 
desires and is not entirely autonomy-undermining. She argues:  
 
the ambivalence experienced by Luker’s subjects is often a product of an 
attempt to liberate themselves from the oppressive norms of sexual agency 
that are applied to the group of women [to maintain norms of chastity on the 
one hand but also, through different norms, to be sexually active on the 
other]. It does not constitute a manifest breakdown in the capacity for 
critical reflection, which would be incompatible with autonomy. Rather, a 
proper exercise of critical reflection requires acknowledgement of the 
incoherence inherent in one’s circumstances (105).  
 
On this reading, the complexity of the self and inconsistencies of one’s desires requires proper 
recognition and conflict is neither symptomatic of non-autonomy nor necessarily inimical to 
autonomy. With intersectional identities, relational models suggest that, though ever-fleeting 
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selves are not the mark of autonomous persons and some integration and consistency is 
required, it is also a significant feature of relationally autonomous agents that they are 
sensitive to the complexity of who they are. As Benson puts it, “if one is genuinely torn 
between competing commitments in such a way that to reconcile one’s concerns would be to 
repress what one stands for and who one is, then the freedom one wants is a freedom that can 
preserve some motivational disunity” (1994, 667).128 In this regard authenticity of identity, 
not simply authenticity of desires, is significant for complex selves. As Gloria Anzaldứa 
argues, characterising self-rule in this way is a move away “from convergent thinking, [and] 
analytical reasoning that tends to use rationality to move toward a single goal (a Western 
mode), to divergent thinking, characterised by movement away from set patterns and goals 
and toward a more whole perspective, one that includes rather than excludes” (1999, 101). In 
aiming for this expansive approach to identity and desires, there is some degree of flexibility 
in the consistency required of the autonomous self, and an authentic identity, not just an 
authentic desire, is valuable.  
 
Here, I have considered complex self-identity, intersectionality, schizophrenia, and the 
conflicts these may cause for autonomous persons. The relational account tends to favour a 
consistency approach that preserves the authenticity of the agent’s identity, while recognising 
that autonomy does require a stronger type of authenticity (that the schizophrenic fails to 
attain).  
 
In the first part of this chapter, I have discussed five characteristics of the relational account: 
the socialised agent, socialised autonomy, degrees of autonomy, broad motivations, and 
                                                           
128 Here, Benson argues that, properly understood, “free agency tolerates far more ambivalence and unresolvable 
motivational conflict than [the] picture of freedom’s value is willing to allow” (Benson, 1994, 667).  
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complex identities. Though I have indicated that in places there is some overlap, these 
features generally distinguish theories of a relational sort from those of the liberal kind 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Critiques 
Having discussed the core features of relational theories, in this section I explore two sets of 
conceptual criticisms that are raised about the model: first, problems about the agent and 
second, difficulties about autonomy. I will argue that these critiques are either 
misinterpretations, and that a proper reading of the account avoids the problems, or that they 
can be addressed, and so are not debilitating in the end. I will claim that, given that these 
theoretical worries are neither devastating nor insurmountable, the relational account offers a 
helpful way in which to represent the female suicide bombers, a suggestion that will be 
further illustrated in the next chapter.  
 
Agent 
The first criticism regards the agent and, in particular, that the thoroughly social agent of the 
account is socially determined.129 If the agent is determined, the problem is she cannot 
                                                           
129 This is a variation of the criticism that agents are powerless to define themselves that is often levelled at 
communitarian theories of the self. Barclay and Friedman have tried to make a distinction between a strong 
communitarian view and a relational one about the socially constituted agent, claiming that the former suffers 
from the criticism of a determined self while the latter does not. Barclay, for instance, renounces a strong reading 
of the communitarian view of a (descriptively) constitutively social self, where “the self is so constituted by her 
social ends that she is unable to reconsider or reject them” as “very implausible” (2000, 63). She is, however, 
sympathetic to a weaker communitarian interpretation: “our starting point will always affect where we end up, so 
that even if some particular shared values are rejected by the individual, she will continue nonetheless to bear as 
part of her identity some marking of her original communities of family, nation, and tribe…Nobody makes 
radical choices from an empty starting point” (64). In this way, individuals are socially constituted and, at the 
same time, those social constituents do not determine them – though they remain a part of them to some extent 
and intensity, even if not endorsed.   
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challenge (particularly oppressive) social norms or change (especially subordinating) 
prescribed values to which she is subjected. However, the fact is that agents do dispute these, 
as those who subvert norms and values demonstrate (Friedman, 2000). In addition, if 
determined, individuals with the same influences would think and behave identically and yet 
they do not, as the plurality of values and beliefs in societies indicates (Christman, 2004, 
145). Moreover, if determined, the implication for us is that the bombers could not decide 
differently, which is problematic when we wish to consider them agential, and attribute them 
with degrees of autonomy. Given that agents are not determined, the constitutively social 
agent of relational models is incorrect (it does not reflect individuals) and, further, unhelpful 
(to emancipatory, including feminist, movements to inspire resistance). I address this concern 
by first, clarifying that the relational agent is socially rooted, but non-determined and second, 
by discussing examples of how relational agents can confront repressive norms or values.130 I 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Friedman, on the other hand, suggests that identity is tied to the surroundings and communities an agent is born 
into (such as family, race, nation, gender) and distinguishes “perspectival identity” and “trait-based identity” 
(2003, 10). Whereas perspectival identity – the relational self – is where the agent is constituted by only those 
aspects she cares about or values through critical reflection (the attitudes she adopts about her identity), trait 
identity – the communitarian self – is where the agent is constituted by these very categories (irrespective of her 
attitude towards them). She argues that “communitarians are right to think it implausible that someone would 
have no concern for any of the humankind categories ascribed to her, but wrong to ignore how she might easily 
be indifferent to some of them” (12), and since her interpretation of autonomy is “based on someone’s 
perspective and not on the humankind categories that fit or are ascribed to her, community membership and 
other humankind traits are inessential to, and may well be occluded by, the ideal of personal autonomy” (ibid). 
In this way, she claims individuals are socially embedded but that she can still choose their attitudes and values 
towards the (voluntary and involuntary) desires and preferences she comes to have by reflecting on them. Yet, 
this appears, on closer inspection, to be a causally social agent, since Friedman acknowledges the significance of 
“humankind traits” (ibid) to the agent, but not a constitutive one, since she thinks that some can ultimately, even 
“easily” (ibid), be unimportant, and it is also one that seems to consider trait-identity and autonomy to be 
incompatible. While this might allow for a non-determined view of the agent (the particular criticism with which 
this section is concerned), it is less clear that this remains an agent that is relational “all the way down” (Code, 
2000, 196). 
130 Hutchings questions how far procedural or substantive relational models are successful in moving beyond the 
either “choosers or losers” (Hutchings, 2013, 18) – that is, autonomous-or-not – binary precisely because of their 
“nostalgia for a feminist revolutionary subject” (2013, 14) that regards resistance as the primary indicator of 
autonomy. She calls for understandings of agency where ends are plural and there is humility in recognising ends 
to avoid this preoccupation with resistance (25). The resistance point is addressed here because it is often a 
concern of feminists, but this thesis argues that resistance is one – but not the only – way of demonstrating self-
governance and broader manifestations of agency exist. It also contends, however, that a proper interpretation of 
agency must consider both the internal and external; these factors together are plotted on the spectrum that, as a 
whole, captures the limitations and breadth of autonomy. Both of these points will be elaborated more over the 
remainder of the thesis.   
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will argue that the critique is not damning to the theory because it is a misreading; the 
relational agent can and does act upon and affect the world.  
 
i. The relational agent re-stated 
First, I reiterate and elucidate the agent of the relational approach. I do this by setting out first, 
the social elements of the agent then second, that such individuals are not non-agential and 
third, that rejecting or revising values does not make them asocial. Using standard relational 
responses, I will contend that the relational self is fully social, but not socially driven (in a 
strong sense where driven equates to determined).  
 
In the first part, I reemphasise the deeply social dimensions of the relational agent; that they 
are selves rooted by and within contexts and relationships that form their foundations – not 
only who they are (as seems indisputable), but also how they choose and what they do. 
Barclay, for instance, argues, “our starting point will always affect where we end 
up…Nobody makes radical choices from an empty starting point” (2000, 64). Individuals are 
not detached entities deciding disinterestedly, but rather firmly socially embedded. Likewise, 
Mackenzie contends that individuals discover (they do not choose or self-generate) what is 
important to them: 
 
what we are and what matters to us are not simple matters of choice. […] to 
a certain degree, we just find certain things mattering to us. This may be 
because we are disposed in certain ways by the manner in which different 
aspects of our identities, for example, our temperament and talents, 
reinforce one another; what matters to us may be connected with 
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commitments to others, for example parents, that are not entirely of our 
choosing or, what matters may be the result of the significant events in our 
particular histories or of decisions we made in the past that are now no 
longer a matter of choices (2000, 135). 
 
The things that matter to persons, then, are often uncovered by virtue of their histories and 
connections, and are not selected dispassionately or created outside of this framework. In 
short, the things that are valued emerge; we do not invent them. Accordingly, the relational 
agent is unreservedly social. 
 
Second, this said, it is not the case that agents are socially determined. The suggestion that 
“the self is so constituted by her social ends that she is unable to reconsider or reject them” is 
“very implausible” (Barclay, 2000, 63) and not one many relational theorists would wish to 
defend. Rather, the relational claim is that, individuals are social beings, but this does not 
preclude them questioning their social makeup for “each of us, whatever our cultural heritage, 
is shaped in some way by our culture. To be shaped, however, is not to be determined […] 
We are all shaped, but not many of us are driven” (Phillips, 2010, 67). The deeply ingrained 
social starting point does not leave anyone unaffected, but neither does it render many pawns, 
unable to confront unjust standards or alter values or beliefs.  Indeed, Held, argues: 
 
thinking of persons as relational does not mean that we cannot make 
autonomous choices to resist various of the social ties we grew up with or 
find ourselves in and to reshape any relations we maintain. On the contrary, 
it often requires that we do so…Moral agents guided by the Ethics of Care 
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are ‘encumbered’ and ‘embedded’ in relations with actual other persons, but 
they can still be free moral agents (Held, 2006, 84). 
 
There is no contradiction, then, in being socially constituted and being able to revise values, 
ends, goals, ties, and backgrounds (for example) deriving from these conditions.131  
 
To achieve this balance, in the relational account, active reflection (from the agent’s 
relationally constituted starting point) is required. To elaborate, “both the autonomous and the 
nonautonomous are conditioned by the forces of society. The difference is that the 
autonomous person is not a passive receptacle of these forces but reflectively engages with 
them to participate in shaping a life for herself” (Barclay, 2000, 55). There must be evaluation 
of social norms, but this assessment is never from a detached or objective point of view, 
rather it is always embedded, as persons are fundamentally relational. Indeed, Held argues, 
“we can conceptualise these choices as taking place within social relations that partially 
constitute us as what we are. We maintain some relations, revise others, and create new ones, 
but we do not see these as choices of independent individuals acting in the world as though 
social ties did not exist prior to our creating them” (Held, 2006, 84). Agents are thoroughly 
social, but they are not automatons unable to make self-governing decisions. In this way, 
(socially rooted) agency is possible, and it is (relational) persons – not communities or groups 
or cultures – who act upon the world (Phillips, 2010, 126). Thus, relational selves are not 
determined but rather are capable actors.  
 
                                                           
131 Being able to revise such reshape these values and ends is still social in conception because the self doing this 
always stands in relation to others, as the next few paragraphs will make clear.  
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Third, it is not the case that agents who have autonomously rejected or revised some of their 
ends thereby escape or circumvent their social or relational origins. Rather, they retain those 
impressions because they run “all the way down” (Code, 2000, 198). In this way, “even if 
some particular shared values are rejected by the individual, she will continue nonetheless to 
bear as part of her identity some marking of her original communities of family, nation, and 
tribe” (Barclay, 2000, 64). Though certain aspects of the social self may not be endorsed, this 
neither means that all traces of that feature are removed (it remains a part of the agent to some 
extent and intensity) nor, more importantly, that the agent is closer to being less social (she is 
always a relational being). Similarly, Mackenzie contends, “we cannot simply choose to 
abandon our cares or to give up what matters to us. Or rather, we cannot do so without forfeit 
or loss. Certainly what matters to a person may change…But something that has mattered 
usually cannot simply cease to matter. It can only do so, or come to matter in a different way, 
as a result of a process of readjustment of the elements of the self” (Mackenzie, 2000, 135). 
Some components of the social agent can be de-emphasised, but selves are unrelentingly 
social. In other words, if the social world were shed, there simply would not be a self that 
remains, since such a self does not exist. I contend, then, that it is impossible to remove the 
social self (since there would be no self left), even if the importance of certain socially 
prescribed values can be reduced.  
 
In this part, I have clarified the theoretical underpinnings of the relational agent. I argued that 
the agent is social, but not determined by that sociality, and is always relationally constituted 
despite revisions to her ends. This is the relational approach’s understanding of the self as 
unreservedly social.   
 
 171 
ii. The relational agent illustrated 
I now demonstrate the points raised so far in this second section using three examples – a 
nauseous nurse, an Indian woman with adaptive preferences, and persons with intersectional 
identities. These cases illustrate how the relational agent can evolve and reshape her social 
construction without escaping it, and so ultimately how she can affect the world around her. 
 
First, using the example of Ellen, a woman who wishes to become a nurse but who is 
squeamish, Meyers defends a view of the socially constituted agent who is able to indirectly 
amend some of her discovered ends after careful work. She explains:  
 
having enrolled in nursing school with the aim of becoming a surgical nurse, 
Ellen realises that she is more squeamish about gore than most of the other 
students. She has not chosen to become fainthearted in this way. Socialisation 
into femininity with the premium this gender norm places on fragility and 
helplessness has imparted this quality to her, and so her squeamishness is 
constitutive…Still, in order to achieve her career goal, Ellen might choose to 
overcome her squeamishness by witnessing additional operations. If her 
desensitisation program is successful – that is, if she reaches a point where 
she could only fake being upset by the sight of an open wound – Ellen will 
have eradicated a constitutive quality, and she will have replaced one 
constitutive quality with a chosen, yet equally constitutive one (1989, 95). 
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This example affirms that the agent can recast some of her socially derived ends and values 
and remain relational. She does not acquire a space for critical reflection outside her socially 
constituted self, but rather from within.  
 
A second example is the modification of adaptive preferences, and here Nussbaum’s case 
study of Vashanti (2000) is instructive. Vashanti is from a ‘good’ Hindu caste, so she expects 
to take on the role of a domestic caretaker (rather than financial contributor) after marriage. 
However, she separated from her drunken and unsupportive husband after he became 
physically abusive, returned to her brothers for a short period, and then took a loan from the 
Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) to make a living for herself. In this instance, 
the constitutive values and ends are of a certain type (to marry young, to be a homemaker, to 
raise children) and Vashanti does not reject these, but her encounters have transmuted these 
ends and she chooses differently to how she was raised to be. She is now someone who 
“look[s Nussbaum] straight in the eye, and her voice is strong and clear” (17), when such 
directness is not part of her custom, and she is someone who aims to work within SEWA to 
assist other women, when this is not a role she is expected to hold.132 Still, these revamped 
goals are not selected by an individualistic self, deliberating in an unencumbered fashion, but 
rather by the social self and the very concrete circumstances she faces. Relational selves then 
are socially constituted, and ends can be dampened, amplified, or overwritten, but their 
relational origins are  never bypassed.  
 
The third and final example are intersectional identities, where being a constitutively social 
agent does not preclude critical evaluation of her various identities, but nor is this relational 
                                                           
132 Nussbaum notes that women who work with SEWA are taught to look the people with whom they speak in 
the eye, rather than, as custom dictates, looking down or away in deference (2000, 17, footnote 20). 
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rootedness ‘overcome’ (since this is an impossibility). Though bearers of such identities 
suffer multiple oppressions (as outlined earlier), Meyers adopts Maria Lugones’ (1987) 
analysis that intersectional selves are on the cusp of different worlds; that they are “border 
dwellers [that] occupy an epistemically favourable vantage point, for the virtues and the 
defects of each community are easier to spot from the border” (Meyers, 2000, 155). These 
agents can critically assess their constitutive identities from a unique standpoint, though one 
that is still firmly embedded (the ‘vantage point’ is never neutral or detached).133 An even 
more repressive situation is that cited by Benson of female slaves who were doubly 
subordinated first, by slavery and capitalism, where black women, like black men, were 
forced into demeaning work by their white owners, and second, by patriarchy, where black 
women, unlike black men, were also expected to function as housewives and homemakers 
too. Using Angela Davis’ work, he argues: 
 
that very domestic labor which marked the peculiar extremity of the slave 
woman’s bondage also became a fundamental means of resistance to slavery 
(as well as to sexism). It gave women responsibility for virtually the only 
meaningful labor available to slaves – the work of caring for one another – 
and for activities that were most difficult for overseers to monitor. It also 
assigned to slave women responsibility for that task which is always most 
basic for resistance against extreme oppression, the task of securing the 
survival of the oppressed. The norms embedded in the domestic care 
practices by slave women produced a vantage point from which these women 
                                                           
133 Similarly, consider Uma Narayan’s (1997) experience of both a traditional Indian upbringing where she was 
taught to be subservient to men, on the one hand, and her mother’s protests at such treatment, on the other. These 
are both constitutively part of her and she is able to draw on these different ‘worlds’ to challenge subordinating 
norms. 
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could achieve some measure of self-revelation to fellow slaves and to 
themselves…At a minimum, these women’s domestic practice provided them 
with signs of their own power, a power that slaveholders and slaves alike 
counted on. It also provided constant reminders of what was so wrong about 
the values undergirding the institution of slavery (1990, 61).  
 
Though these women were socially conditioned to hold a particular view of themselves (as 
inferior to whites and men), this is not a stance that cannot be disputed, reappraised or 
repudiated. Indeed the ‘other world’ that these women occupied provided a way in which to 
detect injustices as well as the mechanisms and self-worth necessary to resist them. 
Accordingly, relational selves can critically reflect from a thoroughly socially submerged 
starting point, even about that very genesis itself and even in oppressive contexts.  
 
The agents in these three examples from the relational literature are socially constituted, but 
can still question, endorse, re-evaluate or moderate their ends, and this does not means that 
they somehow evade or transcend their social roots. Further, they are not precluded from 
being able to identify oppressive norms from this embedded place. In short, the claim is that 
they are not non-agential, determined beings, but rather can act upon the world, in these 
theories. This is positive for the female bombers and the aims of this thesis, as it is plausible 
that we can recognise them as (social) agents, even if they are constrained in many ways.  
 
In this section, I have examined the criticism that the relational agent is socially fixed in her 
desires. I argued that agents are indeed socially ingrained, but can challenge or change their 
ends without this moving to a non-social notion of self. The relational agent is not socially 
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determined since she can choose differently to her society and resist subordinating norms, but 
she is inherently social nonetheless.  
 
Autonomy 
The second conceptual problem that the relational approach might encounter regards the 
construction of autonomy, first, in terms of the link to the external and substantivism (broadly 
non-will related issues) and second, concerning ambivalence (will related worries). Both 
criticisms charge that relational theorists have formulated autonomy in ways too far removed 
from autonomy’s remit of self-government. This is by either veering away from the 
individual’s will (so the self is tangential) or by permitting an unstable will (so governance 
becomes perplexing), and these are mistaken conceptions of autonomy. I will argue that 
neither objection besets the relational approach because its task is to properly represent – 
encompass as many relevant factors in mapping – the extent and quality of autonomy. Where 
the goal is to allot the bombers with appropriate amounts of autonomy, this is a strength of the 
account as it identifies how much autonomy may be occurring overall (internally and 
externally).  
 
i. Non-will issues 
The first problem is the relational preoccupation with the domain outside the will and, in 
particular, that concentrating on these features is misguided for self-governance. I explore this 
in three parts, first, by discussing the external, second, by considering the substantive and 
third, by exploring both together through the spectrum as an example of how, contrary to the 
criticism, the relational account is about autonomy. I will argue that focusing on the external 
and substantive is not problematic because the relational approach is concerned to correlate 
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theory to actual states of affairs and to attribute the appropriate amounts of autonomy to 
agents given this.  
 
External 
The first issue is about the inclusion of the external. When assessing self-rule, constitutively 
social theories incorporate relations and contexts (by having, for instance, an answerability or 
self-worth condition). According to the concern, however, this shifts the nucleus of autonomy, 
which in essence is an internal capacity entailing the authentication of desires by competent 
persons, too much to the external (Christman, 2004). In so doing, the linchpin for autonomy is 
not the will – as this criticism contends it should be – but these other, distinctly non-will-like, 
components. Friedman, for example, argues, “if the self’s determination of itself is subject to 
the approval or recognition of others, then the self is no longer the reference point for its own 
determination; recognition by others becomes the governing standard for what constitutes 
autonomy” (2003, 43-44). This leads to the bizarre result that, if others do not recognise the 
agent as worthy of autonomy (as Benson – 1994 – proposes) or she cannot answer for her self 
(Westlund, 2009) or she is not situated in the appropriate socio-relational surroundings 
(Oshana, 1998) then, whatever her internal state of reflection, she is not autonomous. 
According to this criticism, whilst looking to the external may be a valuable endeavour 
causally (such as how it improves or disrupts the acquisition of autonomy skills), the 
constitutively relational account moves the locus of autonomy away from the self and so is 
not an explication of autonomy proper.  
 
To allay this concern, I explore how the relational account moulds itself to actual agents and 
circumstances in order to better reflect and represent their autonomy. I consider, first, the 
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merit of an inner and outer, degree-based, approach and second, the responsiveness of an 
externally theorised approach to instances of autonomy in oppressive contexts. 
 
(a) Capturing the external on the spectrum 
First, I discuss the advantages of representing autonomy on a spectrum. The concept of 
autonomy in relational accounts has been reframed for the relational agent (who is thoroughly 
social), such that recognising external features complements and thereby more satisfactorily 
maps her autonomy. Autonomy, undeniably, involves internal self-reflection, but the utility of 
a constitutively relational theory is that the external is an integral element of self-rule and 
factoring it in better indicates the degree of autonomy the agent has in reality. Benson, as 
described in chapter two, for instance, argues that internal coherence and consistency alone 
does not reveal that the will suffers undue interference (owing to oppressive norms) and that 
this affects the agent’s autonomy (Benson, 1991). Being able to capture this constraint via an 
external focus attests to the extent of autonomy. Moreover, it is not that the internally 
coherent or aligned agent fails entirely to be autonomous because of the external hurdles (a 
perfectionist view), but that the degree to which she can be so is diminished because these 
impact one another. For instance, a slave can be aligned in her preferences, but it is 
nonsensical to regard her act as autonomous without also taking stock of the degree to which 
it is limited by her contextual lack of freedom. Or, one can (internally) decide to sell a kidney, 
but the actual plotting of autonomy is mitigated (externally) by a circumstance of poverty 
(Widdows, 2011). The external oppressions in these examples do not entirely preclude self-
rule, but it ought to be part of the discussion of how much autonomy is possible, despite a 
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perfectly structured internal psychology.134 Further, if autonomy is about governing oneself, 
then the various elements, including external ones, that contribute to or thwart this endeavour 
should be included in assessing the extent of the agent’s autonomy. The relational account, 
that is, factors in the internal and external in a bid to encompass the complexity of the agent 
and situation, and properly represent the amount of autonomy being exercised. 
 
A constitutively relational autonomy does not erroneously move the focus for autonomy away 
from the internal, then. Rather, I argue that, both the internal and external are relevant since, 
in conjunction, these better reflect the extent of autonomy that is realisable. If the concern is 
to accurately represent the amount of autonomy for the bombers, the relational approach does 
not fail on this count. 
 
(b) Broad manifestations of autonomy in the external  
Second, because the socially constitutive approach is sensitised to how the external can limit 
autonomy, it has a broader conception of how autonomy can manifest itself in adversity, and 
so is most appropriate for tracking autonomy in oppressive contexts. It widens autonomy by 
including a range of ways in which to demonstrate it; in which agents can engage with others, 
justify themselves, or engender self-worth. Both Westlund (2011) and Benson (1994; 2011), 
for instance, advance the answerability expectation, but argue it is a normative disposition 
that can be evinced in various ways (critical where the agent is, say, a “Taliban woman” – 
Oshana, 2006, 60 – or slave and so limited in how she can interact).135 It does not require 
                                                           
134 In doing this, the relational approach is not aiming to conflate the internal and external, but rather the 
suggestion is that both together are needed to provide an accurate assessment of autonomy overall. The spectrum 
in the final chapter indicates one way in which this might be realised.  
135 Responding to Westlund, Christman (2011) argues that answerability cannot be a constitutively relational 
concept because Westlund’s view is an inner dialogue, which can occur in the absence of others. Westlund, 
however, argues that answerability is normative and relational: “answerability…is normative in the sense that 
the autonomous agent holds herself to an expectation or demand, and relational in the sense that an expectation 
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actual dialogical engagement (articulating and justifying a desire to another), but answering 
attuned to “context-sensitivity” (Westlund, 2009, 40). Such sensitivity could consist of 
recounting stories that uphold her view, seeking information to rethink desires, changing the 
dynamic of relationships (Westlund, 2009), or of practicing general speech (Madhok, 2007, 
2013), or of carrying out preparatory acts, though not the end goal (Abrams, 1998).136 We 
might add to these examples those of using metaphors to explain, pointing out features of 
stories, and sharing salient experiences. All of these indicate a normative expectation to be 
‘responsible for self’ without executing reasons-based discourse, which is but one narrowly 
prescribed manifestation of this (Westlund, 2009). In so doing, this understanding expands 
ways in which autonomy can be demonstrated. Of course, to remain faithful to the spectrum, 
the limitations to this expansive notion must also be borne in mind. For, though these 
instances of answerability occur, the external context is extreme and thereby reduces the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
or demand is something that one party is subjected to by another, or by one party to herself when she manifests 
sensitivity to what others can legitimately ask of her” (2011, 2). In this regard, answerability is about the agent 
having an expectation to respond and others having that expectation too. It is constitutively relational in this 
regard. This will be considered again in chapter four on the application of theory to practice.  
136 Westlund notes that answerability to legitimate challenges involves “relational situatedness” (2009, 39) (it 
must be clear why it is important that the agent must answer the critic) and, more importantly, “context-
sensitivity” (40) (a broad range of responses are permissible). In terms of the types of response, she argues, “the 
direct citation of reasons in response to questioning may, for some otherwise competent agents, be an alien 
practice in which they do not know quite how to engage. (For others, it may feel alien only in some contexts, 
such as the more personal ones.) But there are certainly other ways of demonstrating that one holds oneself 
answerable to appropriately situated critical challenges. Within the realm of the broadly conversational, one 
might do any of the following: provide a life-narrative that manifests one’s reasons; provide an interpretation of 
relevant experiences, putting them in the context of a wider pattern of meaning; describe the actions of an 
admired other in a similar situation; tell parables or other stories that are chosen and recounted in a way that 
demonstrates responsiveness to the question; and probably much more besides. Outside the realm of the 
conversational, an agent may give explicit or implicit signals that she intends to reflect on what has been said, 
signs that she has re-deliberated in relevant ways or sought more information as a result of the challenge, or that 
she is attempting to repair, restructure, or terminate a relationship or practice that has come into question. This 
list is not meant to be exhaustive, but merely to give a sampling of the array of possible responses that manifest a 
disposition to hold oneself answerable to external critical perspectives” (40). Thus, these are diverse ways in 
which to engage with and answer to others.  
 
Differently, Madhok (2007) argues that though the sathins are not able to put into effect certain desires, they 
indicate autonomy through their speech practices with one another. Alternatively, Abrams (1998) contends that a 
woman who suffers domestic violence may stay in an abusive relationship whilst having made the decision and 
then slowly making preparations to leave (such as, over time, gathering enough funds without arousing the 
suspicion of her partner or rebuilding enough support with others so she has somewhere to go), which also 
suggests self-direction. These are different ways of manifesting autonomy, all of which suggest that there must 
be sensitivity to agency within oppressive conditions.  
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amount of autonomy achievable. Still, the account opens up the possibility that some degree 
of autonomy could be achievable and demonstrable even in very repressive situations. 
 
In some oppressive circumstances, an agent may not be able to answer in a specific way or 
carry out a certain act, but she might be able to signal her normative-competence in other 
ways. By being responsive to the agent, the skills she has, and her surroundings, it is 
suggested that this is a broader understanding of self-rule, since hitherto unrecognised 
instances of autonomy may be made visible. Persons who may not initially be thought to be 
autonomous, in other words, may turn out to be so to some extent. This is particularly 
valuable under restrictive conditions, such as the ones the bombers are likely to be in, since 
the opportunities to indicate autonomy may be sparse. Further, it is relevant where the overall 
aim is to attribute autonomy, however limited, to these women. 
 
In this part, I have discussed the criticism that the relational approach is too focussed on the 
external and so too removed from understandings of autonomy as an internal notion. I argued 
that, though the account does include the external, it does so unapologetically as this both 
better reflects the degree of autonomy exercisable and theorises signs of autonomy in 
oppressive contexts. These tendencies are useful for the bombers of the case studies, who are 




The second problem relates to the first and is that relational autonomy, with its weak 
substantive construction, shifts too much from the processes to the content of decision-
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making. This is disconcerting because the goal of autonomy – in procedural theories – is to 
respect persons who are capable of deciding for themselves, which includes accepting, though 
not necessarily agreeing with, the substance of their decisions (Dworkin, 1989; Christman 
1991; Friedman, 2003; Westlund, 2009).137 The weak substantive account is perturbing – 
according to this criticism – because focusing on content undermines the fact that a competent 
agent made an explicit (procedurally compliant) decision, which is an affront to self-
governance. Put differently, autonomy is about self-rule not “ideal or right rule, or 
‘orthonomy’” (Benson, 2008, 132) and agents should be able to rule themselves and rule 
themselves badly if they so wish.138 The relational approach, with its substantivism, is 
unsuitable because autonomy is about determining the authenticity, not the excellent calibre, 
of desires, and by prioritising the latter it neglects to identify instances of the former. With the 
bombers in particular, we may end up dismissing their desire to bomb because we disagree 
with its substance, and this would eliminate rather than facilitate our goal of recognising their 
autonomy. I will counter, however, that substantive accounts do not sidestep the purpose of 
autonomy or fail to identify authentic desires. On the contrary, they are more discerning at 
sifting out and weighting such desires based on the totality of the agent’s experience.  
 
Relational approaches accept the procedural intuition that respect is owed to competent 
persons and that agents are likely to endorse a multitude of desires, and they also concur that 
strong substantive and perfectionist theories (that decisively reject certain desires) are to be 
                                                           
137 Relational procedural theorists also hold this view. Friedman, for instance, notes that, desires must be 
respected if persons cross an autonomy threshold, even if the degree to which they can be autonomous varies if 
they endorse “contra-autonomy norms” (2003, 24). Likewise, Westlund argues that the dialogical abilities of 
servile women must be recognised and respected so that they can be engaged in a discussion or “argued with” 
(2009, 43) over adopting certain norms. 
138 Though Benson is an advocate of weak substantive theories, this criticism (2008) is part of his rejection of 
strong substantive relational views (such as Oshana’s). He argues that the strong substantive method ignores that 
autonomy sometimes involves making mistaken decisions, oppressive situations can sometimes enable 
possibilities for autonomous agency despite the circumstances, and that self-rule cannot be conflated with right-
rule. 
 182 
avoided (though for the different reason of potentially falling foul of the spectrum).139 I argue 
that weak substantive accounts, however, are superior to content-neutral ones because 
assessing the content of desires (insofar as this reveals attitudes towards the self) offers 
another tool for distinguishing multiple kinds of preferences. It is because the model 
recognises the subtleties of some forms of oppressions, which procedures alone do not 
capture, that it stipulates that the content of desires illuminate autonomy too. Instead of 
ignoring the substance, then, it is better to incorporate it into the assessment. In this regard, 
despite an agent’s process of reflection passing the procedural test, the content (that exposes 
beliefs and principles of a diminished self-worth, for instance) is also important.140 The 
subject matter unveils a stance towards her self (from the oppressions she suffers) – that the 
process of reflection does not – and that must be acknowledged, if the aim is an accurate 
assessment of autonomy for those in constrained contexts.141 To fail to make these 
correlations between the substance of desires and autonomy, as the procedural approaches (of 
either the liberal or relational variety) tend to do, undermines a proper representation of how 
much autonomy is being exercised, and so is likely to be problematic when it comes to 
appropriately recognising the bombers’ autonomy.  
                                                           
139 Stronger models are to be avoided because they undermine the principle that autonomy is on a spectrum, not 
an either/or concept. If relational theorists are committed to a degree-based characteristic of autonomy, which 
many are, then it is problematic to disregard desires altogether (as stronger theories do), and it is much more 
efficacious to claim (like weaker theories) that these may result in a partially (in some cases a manifestly) 
diminished autonomy. While the strong theories disregard the spectrum by dismissing desires outright, the 
weaker ones do not.  
140 More strongly, Rocha considers the agent who endorses sexist or racist views about herself. He argues, 
“surely it is central to feminism and anti-racism that we can accept the wrongs of sexism and racism as objective 
facts. In particular, it makes sense to think there is something wrong with a putatively autonomous agent whose 
actions derive from values that undermine her very self-worth…I believe…as feminists and anti-racism theorists, 
we need more convincing that we should be happy with a formal account…[and] I wonder whether some of our 
reasons for preferring relational accounts may have been lost in the process” (2011, 5) of trying to formulate a 
content-neutral theory. 
141 Suggesting contrariwise that self-worth is not a relevant consideration – as Westlund does when she claims 
that an agent’s desires “may even manifest a lack of self-respect” (Westlund, 2009, 37) – radically misconstrues 
what it means to be self-governing. For instance, even Westlund’s own proposal of autonomy (reflecting on 
desires and answering to others who challenge that desire) is not disconnected from having sufficient levels of 




The claim, then, is that the competent and their desires ought to be respected, but that this is 
not the sum of autonomy. There must also be weight given to the ways in which values or 
attitudes affect the substance of desires, as this proves more useful in accounting for the 
overall amount of autonomy that agents, including highly constrained ones, have. Relational 
models, therefore, do not misdescribe, but rather more accurately represent autonomy.  
 
External and substance: spectrum 
In the third part, I bring together the observations made about the external and substantive in 
the preceding two parts and (briefly) consider how they might be encompassed through a 
spectrum. I will suggest that a relational spectrum allows us to factor in the internal reflective 
states, look to the external as a constitutive part of autonomy, and regard (attitudes behind) 
the substance of desires, in order to gauge autonomy properly. This view will be explored in 
greater detail in chapter five, but, here, when trying to identify and plot autonomy, however 
restricted, for persons such as the bombers, I argue that this model is encouraging.  
 
From what has thus far been discussed, it is possible that the relational approach allows a 
spectrum that takes into account internal and external states of affairs. For example, we might 
imagine that external norms (of, say, sexism) are oppressive and may engender subjugating 
sets of attitudes or values in an agent, which results in her desiring (for argument’s sake) 
plastic surgery. In this picture, the external state of affairs reduces her autonomy, despite an 
internally aligned will (though this need not diminish respect towards her).142 Indeed, what is 
                                                           
142 Rocha, for instance, argues that respect for persons is a separate concern, achievable by a plethora of 
individuals and thereby as maximally inclusive a notion as possible. Though it is unnecessary to accept his 
account for this thesis, Rocha’s view is that “Substantive accounts of autonomy need not reserve respect only for 
the autonomous, for whom they set a high bar. A simple fix is available: assign respect to the capability for 
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relevant here is that “the severity of the harm done to [such] agents lies precisely in the fact 
that their deeply internalized values prevent the full achievement of their autonomy” (Rocha, 
2011, 4), and it is this hindrance that must be acknowledged. Whatever ‘full’ autonomy is (the 
final chapter will suggest that reaching this state is not a likely possibility), such a proposal 
allows space to recognise the ability to be self-reflective (so distinguishes, say, the comatose 
and the non-comatose person) and withholds some degree of autonomy from those who are 
amid repressive norms and suffer attitudinally (thereby separating the endorsement of sexist 
from non-sexist norms where this affects self-worth, for instance).143 Further, it neither 
disallows the decision nor labels a person non-autonomous altogether. In this regard, this 
envelops the agent’s internal states and the external situation and together better depicts the 
degree of autonomy that she realises. Where the focus is to recognise and attribute some 
autonomy, no matter how limited it might be, to those in constrained settings, this approach is 
promising for the bombers. The spectrum will be explored further in chapter five. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
autonomy and don’t count as autonomous those agents whose core values are turned against them from 
without…It is only those that cannot achieve autonomy on their own, such as the comatose, that we can 
acceptably treat differently. Making respectful treatment conditional on the capability shows we must treat the 
non-autonomous, who remain capable of change, in respectful ways: that is the only way to help them change 
autonomously” (2011, 4). For Rocha, most people (including deeply subservient agents) have the autonomy 
capability (it is only individuals like the comatose, who “cannot achieve autonomy” (ibid), who do not). 
Accordingly, the subservient agent is deserving of the respect that comes with autonomy (she cannot be 
paternalistically overridden) in a way the comatose person (incapable of achieving autonomy) is not. This leads 
to a situation where the subservient and non-subservient agent are both treated with respect but, according to 
Rocha, the former still may be regarded as non-autonomous (owing to the content of her desires) whilst the latter 
may not. The subservient agent is treated with the respect relating to the autonomy capability and so may only be 
‘argued with’ in the hope she will be persuaded about alternatives to her desires. By contrast, the comatose 
person, who does not have the equivalent respect (because she cannot change), can, as maintained by Rocha, 
have paternalistic choices made for her.  
 
Though there may be concerns with Rocha’s proposal – it would be prudent, for instance, to add: that the 
comatose person is still owed respect in a general sense by virtue of being a human being (irrespective of 
whether she has the autonomy capability or not, so she should not be abused in any way while in the comatose 
state, for example); that it is not possible for anyone, comatose or non-comatose, to achieve autonomy “on their 
own” (ibid) (in a socially constitutive notion of autonomy or where this implies the non-relational self); and that 
casual attribution of the label ‘non-autonomous’ can be debated (especially if the spectrum is to be taken 
seriously) – this is an attempt to conceptually distinguish respect for persons and the content of desires in a 
substantive theory. That is, individuals deciding substantively non-autonomously (in Rocha’s terminology) can 
still be respected. Again, this need not be accepted for this thesis, but it is a way to bring in concerns about 
respect into substantive accounts.  
143 Here the concern is not to ‘blame’ the endorsers but to properly recognise the circumstances, as will be 
explained more in the final chapter.  
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Thus, such an approach includes both the benefits of the external and substantive focus of 
relational autonomy and thereby permits a better, not worse, representation of the self-
governance that actually exists for agents. This is a strength for individuals, like the bombers, 
whose autonomy, even if restricted, we are concerned to represent appropriately.  
 
ii. Disunity and ambivalence 
The second problem I discuss is the ambivalence of intersectional selves and, in particular, the 
criticism that a discordant will does not typify the autonomous agent. Ambivalent agents are 
assumed to have ‘unstable’ foundations and so are uncertain and indecisive about their 
desires, whereas token autonomous agents are thought to be stable and know what they want 
and so hold authentic and coherent desires. The concern might be that the intersectional self, 
more akin to an agent with a dichotomous will, is qualitatively incomparable to an agent with 
a consistent will. To treat a non-consistent and consistent will as equivalent in autonomy is 
false and misunderstands the way the former fails, whilst the latter succeeds, at being 
autonomous, so the criticism goes. I address this by first, embracing the non-static will and, 
second, making plain the boundaries of adaptability in the intersectional will. I will contend 
that though a flexible will is important to relational models, this does not extend to 
countenancing a disparate will for autonomy. If the concern is to identify autonomy for those 
in constraint, like the bombers, this kind of flexibility is a helpful approach.  
 
First, then, I discuss the constantly evolving will (and, for clarity, recall that the will discussed 
here is a social notion) in relational models. The relational structure of the will reflects the 
fluidity of self-development and self-realisation of relational selves and which, following an 
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Aristotelian view, is never static or fully complete until death. Mackenzie, for instance, 
argues, that integration is an “ongoing and dynamic process precisely because of inevitable 
tensions and inconsistencies within the self and because the different elements of the self are 
constantly undergoing transformation” (2000, 135). Such a will is likely to be in conflict 
when it is in flux (which is probably often on the relational reading). Requiring a condition of 
a stable and consistent will for desires to be authentic, then, is too demanding. Indeed Meyers 
argues, “it is a mistake to conflate authenticity with personal integration and to regard 
integration as a state persons must achieve as a precondition for autonomy. Instead, we should 
understand personal integration as the emergent intelligibility of an individual’s autonomous 
self-discovery and self-definition” (2000, 172). A unified will or self might surface 
eventually, but a fully unified will or self is not a prerequisite for autonomous decision-
making. Thus, selves develop over time, and a fixed will, from which one picks and chooses, 
is less representative of autonomy.  
 
At the same time, and second, relational theorists do acknowledge that some constancy from 
which to decide is essential. This recognises that “an agent who is persistently internally 
divided or whose sense of self is seriously fragmented cannot achieve the kind of reflective 
equilibrium necessary for unified agency. By unified agency I mean the kind of practical 
unity necessary to deliberate, make decisions and choices, and act” (Mackenzie, 2000, 135). 
A stable or non-disparate will is still part of the relational conception of autonomy, but so too 
is the fluid and complex will, since this reflects relational selves. Such a broad view is 
captured in part by Mackenzie and Poltera (2010) when they detach authenticity from 
autonomy and extend it to narrative identity (as I described in the first section of this 
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chapter).144 This permits a clearer delineation of the kind of will required in relational 
autonomy. For instance, intersectional selves may have authentic identities and ‘practically 
unified’ wills (even if there is ambivalence in either identities or the will).145 However, the 
person who suffers schizophrenic episodes may have an authentic identity but may not 
achieve authenticity for autonomy (because while she accepts schizophrenia as part of herself, 
her will is not stable enough to decide, and so to count as autonomous). Here, there is a two-
pronged notion of authenticity (one for identity, the other for autonomy) that allows for a 
better understanding of the amount of flexibility in the will that is permissible for these 
different purposes. For the relational account, authenticity of identity and a stable (enough) 
will – not just authenticity of desires – is key for agents. At the same time, the latter – where 
this is understood as emanating from the social self – is still a part of autonomy.146 This sets 
out a fuller conception of authenticity that simultaneously complements the complex 
constructions of wills, desires and identities.      
 
Accordingly, I argue that relational accounts tolerate an ambivalent will (such as the 
intersectional agent may experience) to a certain (practically unified) extent, but also accept 
that a radically disunified will (such as the schizophrenic in the midst of psychosis may 
present) is too far removed from the autonomous agent. Further, the level of stability in the 
will is less demanding for determining the authenticity of narrative identity than it is for 
autonomy. In making these distinctions, I contend that the relational approach comprehends, 
and so can more accurately map, the bomber’s (as a relational agent, who is likely to be 
                                                           
144 The point here, recall, was that authenticity does not belong exclusively to understandings of autonomy but to 
narrative identity too.  
145 For instance, intersectional identities might allow persons in, say, homophobic, sexist and ethnic minority 
groups (such as Anzaldúa’s (1987) Mestiza women who are – Latino lesbians and – part of a group that typically 
hold anti-gay sentiments and value conservative female roles) to decide fluidly between which aspects of their 
identity they wish to amplify and which to reduce, given the context, and in order to retain authentic identities 
(Meyers, 2000; Barvosa-Carter, 2007). 
146 In this regard, both kinds of authenticity are important for relational autonomy.  
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restricted as the intersectional self is) flexible (but not unstable, like the schizophrenic self’s) 
will.  
 
In this part, I have examined critiques about autonomy, relationally conceptualised. I have 
argued that taking account of the external and ambivalence in the will certainly reframes 
autonomy, but it does not shift it so drastically that it is not identifiable as self-rule, and the 
reason it does do it is to better reflect the agent’s autonomy. If the goal is to represent the 
bomber’s autonomy properly, the account offers a useful method for doing this. In this way, 
relational models do not fall victim to the charge that they are no longer about self-rule; on 
the contrary, they are conceptually encouraging for those in constrained contexts.  
 
Two criticisms have been examined in this section, that relational agents are determined, and 
that relational autonomy is too far removed from common notions of self-rule. I have argued 
that these concerns stem from misunderstandings (a social self does not mean a determined 
self) of the approach or that they can be overcome (the conception of autonomy is certainly 
different but it is a more accurate account of autonomy). As such, they are not insurmountable 
problems for relational models and, as such, I contend that these conceptualisations of the 
agent and autonomy are preferable for the women of the case studies.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the relational account of autonomy. I characterised this approach 
as having five core features: a relational agent, social autonomy, a spectrum of autonomy, 
broad motivations, and complex identities. I outlined some common concerns with the 
relational model in order to map the existing debate and argued that there were responses to 
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criticisms concerning the agent and autonomy, since socialised agents are not precluded from 
challenging norms, and a spectrum permits a nuanced allotment of the exercise of autonomy. 
By conceptualising the agent and autonomy as relational, we can appreciate the social 
constitution of persons, and how internal and external factors together allow for a more 
detailed picture of autonomy functioning. In this regard, and where the aim is to recognise 
autonomy and distinguish degrees of it, and to do so in a representative way, I contend that 
the approach offers useful foundations in its theorisation of the agent and autonomy for the 
bombers. Again, this is not to say that liberal autonomy could not offer a conceptualisation of 
the agent or autonomy. Rather my claim is that – given the main features and critiques of both 
accounts – that the relational account offers more beneficial conceptualisations for our 
purposes. In conclusion, then, I argue that relational theories are a preferable approach to 
autonomy (though some areas – in particular, the spectrum – have been under theorised and 
require more attention) for the bombers. The next chapter will build on this and demonstrate 
further how adept the conceptual relational account is at representing the concrete cases of the 
bombers (leaving the final chapter to expand the approach with a spectrum). 
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4. APPLICATION OF THE RELATIONAL MODEL TO 
THE CASE STUDIES 
Introduction 
Having argued that the relational approach is likely to be more helpful for our purpose of 
representing and measuring the autonomy of the women, my aim in this chapter is to illustrate 
the first part of this in more detail. Specifically, I bring together the theoretical and practical 
facets of the thesis by applying the relational account (discussed in chapter three) to the case 
studies of female suicide bombers (presented in chapter one) in order to indicate their ‘fit’. I 
explore the suitability of two elements of the account – first, the agent and second, autonomy 
– to the bombers so that the relevance of the approach overall can be examined. In so doing, 
the precise task here is not to estimate the amount of autonomy the bombers have (which will 
be investigated more fully in chapter five), but rather to show how well the characteristics of 
the relational model complement the characteristics of the women as agents and their 
autonomy (as a first step to the primary task of gauging their autonomy properly).147 In other 
words, my aim here is to demonstrate how successfully the theory recognises various features 
in the case studies (so that it might be able to map and compare these – a possibility that will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter). In a final third part, and as an addendum, I 
move beyond the suicide bombers and consider whether the relational account might be 
suitable for other kinds of agents and their autonomy too.  
 
                                                           
147 To clarify, my aim is not to apply necessary and sufficient conditions (as has already been stipulated for both 
the liberal and relational model – see pages 76 and 134 respectively) but to explore the characteristics of the 
relational approach further.   
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To do this, I draw on information from two places. First, I use particulars from the case 
studies, but in doing this I recognise that the ‘facts’ I describe about them are from secondary 
sources (such as interviews with friends and family, and interpretations by academics and 
journalists), and so are likely to be problematic in several ways (including in how far they are 
reliable testimony and how much is selective reporting). However, these sources are the ones 
most available and so, while being aware of their limitations, form the basis of the analysis for 
this project. Second, because sometimes the details are sparse, I also employ imaginings about 
the women and their autonomy. I do this because the goal is not to set up a wholly factual 
view but to examine possible and plausible pictures of different women who embody different 
elements and extents of autonomy. Of course, other imaginings are possible but this would 
not make the exercise futile so long as the constructions presented here are reasonable and 
they go on to show why the features identified within them (and which individuals in similar 
circumstances could have) make relational autonomy appropriate. It should also be noted that, 
in this chapter, I aim to use most of the cases from chapter one, and owing to space 
constraints this means that I will only be able to go into so much depth for each. However, the 
next chapter will narrow the cases down so that a more detailed interpretation using a handful 
of the examples (to illustrate the spectrum) will be offered.  
 
Having clarified the nature of the case studies, I can outline the three-fold argument of the 
chapter. First, with regard to the agent, I will contend that relational model recognises these 
bombers to be particular, complex, and social persons, which reflects the kind of selves we 
can imagine them to be. Second, in terms of autonomy, I will argue that relational theories 
grasp the connections and significance between the internal and external factors in these 
women’s lives and to seek out evidence of autonomy in less conventional forms, and this 
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represents the type of autonomy we can expect the bombers to have. Again, to reiterate from 
chapters two and three, though some liberal theories could offer readings that identify some of 
these aspects and on both of these counts for the bombers, I argue – based on the 
characteristics and standard critiques already discussed – that the relational account overall is 
well placed to recognise the extent of the social and constraint for the women. Third and 
finally, I will signify that these conclusions about agents, autonomy, and the applicability of 
the relational model could be extended to all persons, because we might suppose that agents 
and their autonomy more broadly are relational. However, this is but a possible expansion of 
the argument presented here and not one that must be endorsed for the view about the 
bombers to hold. What is key, then, is that we can be convinced of this for the women of the 
case studies in particular, irrespective of how far the conclusions might stretch to others in 
general. In the final analysis, I will argue that, because of its social foundations, the relational 
account offers a befitting interpretation of these women as agents and of their autonomy.  
 
Agent 
To start, I examine the bombers as agents in two parts, first, with regards to the construction 
of agents and second, with regards to how agents operate. In each part, the agent focus of 
relational accounts is applied to the case studies to draw out their compatibility. I argue that as 
the approach prioritises the socially embedded agent, it identifies the bombers as persons who 
are connected and complex well. Further, as the account has a rich conception of the whole 
agent, the specific framework and trajectory of their acts is discernible, so that how and why 
they operate as they do can be appreciated. In sum, I contend that, since the bombers are 
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thoroughly social selves functioning in a particular structure, the agent-focused relational 
account is well suited to reflecting them and their acts.  
 
Construction of agents 
In the first part I explore the appropriateness of the approach, which makes the fundamental 
assumption that persons are social, for the bombers.148 I consider, first, the construction of the 
self and second (and related), the construction of the autonomous self. I argue that the 
relational agent offers a credible notion of the self and an achievable conception of the 
autonomous self for the women, who we can suppose are socially embedded individuals and 
capable of autonomy nonetheless. In this regard, the relational construction matches, and is a 
realistic characterisation of, the bombers. Consequently, the relational model is apt for the 
bombers as agents. 
 
i. Construction of selves 
The first element I consider is the effectiveness of the relational account when it comes to 
accurately reflecting the kinds of selves that the bombers are. I do this by discussing, first 
conceptions of self and second, identity. I contend that the relational approach, which emerges 
from an embedded and connected self, is well placed to represent the women’s inherently 
social features and complex identities.  
 
Selves 
                                                           
148 Recall from the characteristics and critiques of chapter 3 that theorists in the relational camp do 
fundamentally accept the social self as the kind of self that autonomous persons are and as the starting point of 
the debate. As this thesis focuses on the relational model (and gaps within it), this leaning is explored in general 
terms (rather than in any necessary and sufficient sense – as has already been stipulated in note 147) here. 
Criteria for measuring autonomy that falls out my spectrum is, however, set out in chapter 5.  
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First, I compare the conception of the relational self to the kind of selves we can suppose the 
bombers to be. The model takes individuals to be something like the ‘self and other’ together, 
rather than the ‘self’ as separate from ‘other’. In this picture, persons are deeply attached and 
intertwined with others to the extent that they are constitutively, not trivially, social beings. In 
this way, persons are relational “all the way down” (Code, 2000, 196) and this underscores 
that there is not a categorical distinction between ‘self and other’.  
 
When applied to the bombers, we can imagine that Idris and al-Riyashi, for instance, are the 
sorts of individuals who do stand in relation to others, and that these relations hold without 
the women choosing for them to transpire. To elaborate, we can easily suppose that they are 
connected to others in a fundamental (not marginal or detached) way, since the (family, 
religious, ethnic, cultural, national) ties are the origins of the selves these women are. 
Moreover, given this starting point, we can envisage how this social constitution is not 
formally desired but that it inherently affects them and their values. With Idris, for example, it 
can be suggested that she has intense bonds with her family and nation that form her and that 
certain ends matter to her because of this. Reports indicate that she is someone who “didn’t 
care if the Israelis killed her, she would always try to see [her imprisoned brother] on visiting 
day” (Itimad Abu Lidbeh in Victor, 2003, 38) and she “wanted to help her people” (Malbrook 
Idris in BBC News, 2002, 1) whose plight, her mother asserts, she felt “very deeply” 
(Malbrook Idris in Victor, 2003, 40). It appears that she is attached to others such as her 
brother and community deeply and, while these could be subsequently self-affirmed bonds, 
they exist from the very beginning without her first choosing them to be significant. In this 
regard, it is likely that various ends, such as about helping her fellow Palestinians, may well 
‘just’ seem to have weight for her because of her connections. Similarly, we can suppose that 
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al-Riyashi is embedded within a number of social relationships (with her immediate family, 
but also the community, and wider still her country and even globally). These relations occur 
without her agreeing to be associated with such persons or groups, and before she can assess 
them. We can identify these as constitutive relational ties that do not suddenly manifest 
themselves after al-Riyashi decides they are important but prevail, and are inescapable, from 
the outset. It can be imagined, too, that such roots form the basis of al-Riyashi’s values. It is 
not difficult to claim that others are needed and matter to these women, but more than this the 
relational claim is that Idris and al-Riyashi are, from the start, relational selves, and that this 
relationality and sociality permeates them. In this regard, a clear line between Idris and al-
Riyashi and others – as well as their social expectations (about the acceptable behaviour and 
role of women), moral duties (voluntary and involuntary obligations to her family, husband, 
nation), or cultural mores (about the interaction between men and women) – is not easily 
discernible. There is no separable ‘them’ to others, or to these mere peripheral influences.  
 
To grasp just how relational these women might be, imagine for a moment that the women 
rebuff their connections; that Idris and al-Riyashi, for example, came to regard their ties as 
unimportant (they wished them to be insignificant, as some individuals might – more about 
this in later sections of the chapter). It can easily be imagined that Idris may not want to care 
about those around her or that al-Riyashi perhaps wants to disassociate herself from others. 
Yet, we can also suppose that these discovered relationships would not cease to mark these 
women altogether, and that the imprints of the connections and social roots endure as part of 
their histories, whether they regard them as important or not. More importantly, however, we 
can suggest that even if the bombers wanted to spurn their connections that, quite aside from 
not leaving them completely, this would not transform them to being selves who no longer 
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stand in relation or only do so marginally. As the women are always social selves, such a 
disentangling of ‘self’ and ‘other’ is not possible. Instead of the suicide bombers being asocial 
or tangentially social, the relational model regards them as integrally relational and that they 
remain so even if they wish to disregard those bonds. Since it is not implausible to suppose 
that the women are these kinds of social selves, a relational approach that assumes that the 
agent is thoroughly social is a model that fits them well. 
 
I have argued that it is conceivable that the bombers are relational selves, have connections 
and ends that they discover (rather than detachedly choose), and that ties to others and their 
social roots persist (and are not escapable). These, then, are strong social features of the 
bombers. The relational agent emphasises social interrelations as integral to any picture of the 
self and makes no clear division between the ‘self and other’. In this regard, the relational 




Next, I illustrate how apt the model’s conception of the self is at accounting for the identities 
of the bombers. I discuss how compatible the theory that relational selves are likely to first, 
have complex identities that may be confounded further still by second, being intersectional, 
is with the case studies of the bombers. I will argue that the account recognises, expects and 
mirrors the complexities of self and so offers a richer representation of the women who fit this 
model closely.  
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First, I assess whether the women do have a set of complex identities that characterise them. 
From what we know from media reports and academic research, we can put together 
reasonable pictures of the bombers as having particular identities. Dhanu, for instance, is a 
Tamil, Sri Lankan, soldier, while Daraghmeh is a student, devout Muslim, Palestinian, and 
Degauque is a Belgian convert to Islam, and widow twice over. From these documented 
features it is clear that these women have multiple identities. In addition to this we can 
imagine some of the distinct and varied ‘pulls’ that these women are likely to experience. For 
instance, we can suppose that Degauque has certain obligations owing to her identity as a 
Belgian and others from her commitment to Islam. Likewise, Dhanu could have duties 
stemming from being a soldier and different ones arising from being a daughter. Regardless 
of how the women might feel about these labels and burdens, it seems that these manifold 
identities not only signify these particular women descriptively (who they are) but they are 
also likely have a tangible effect on their lives normatively (through associated expectations 
of how to be who they are). In short, these identities are not likely to be inessential facts about 
the bombers but significant ones that frame their lives both for how they see themselves and 
how others do (and even if they later go on to denounce these identities). Of course, these 
specific pictures might be inaccurate of these particular women – as we are extrapolating from 
limited evidence – but that does not mean, for the purposes of this study, that the relational 
account is not valid. The aim here is to show that these women do have mixed identities and 
related ‘pulls’, irrespective of the content of them. I argue, then, that the relational account, 
based on the constitutively social self, recognises and presumes that the bombers have 
complex identities (which, as has been indicated, they are likely to) of this general sort.  
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More particularly, and second, we can consider whether there is evidence of intersectional 
identities. Again, the background facts about these women suggest that there may be 
crosscutting factors at play relating to their identities. We know, for instance, that the context 
for bombers such as Muzhakhoyeva and Dhanu is (typically) not only one of patriarchy, 
where women are often considered inferior to men (as women in many societies are), but also 
one of war, where the groups involved are subordinated by the other side because of their 
(nation, racial, ethnic, religious) identities (and to a much greater extent than in non-war 
zones). It is not difficult to suppose that these factors alone mean that these women have 
intersectional identities. We know, for instance, that Muzhakhoyeva lives in a society where 
Russians are intolerant of her people’s demands for sovereignty, where there is a perception 
of Muslims as inferior, and where Chechens are prejudiced against widows (Eager, 2008; 
Groskop, 2004). Given this, it can be imagined that Muzhakhoyeva’s social experience 
generates an intersectional identity along the lines of nationality/religion/gender (as a 
Chechen/Muslim/woman). Equally, we know that Dhanu is part of a society where Sinhalese 
marginalise Tamils, and where both Sinhalese and Tamils have conservative views towards 
women (Reuter, 2004; Alison, 2003). So it can be envisaged that Dhanu’s social experiences 
engender an intersectional identity across ethnicity/gender lines (a Tamil/woman). In other 
words, I contend that it is plausible that these women have intersectional identities because of 
the various ways in which they are marginalised along social strata.149  
 
Moreover, it is not difficult to see that the various identities can interrelate in complex ways 
for the women.150 For example, if it is assumed that Aishen has an intersectional identity 
along the lines of nationality/gender, it can be imagined that these, at some point, will interact 
                                                           
149 Internalising norms relating to identity will be explored in the autonomy section of this chapter. 
150 More will be discussed on conflicts and disunity in the will in the autonomy part of this chapter.  
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with each other and lead to further complexity in identity. This can be seen when, on 
nationality, Aishen’s friend Nano Abdul describes her as a staunch Palestinian and claims she 
said, “within the limits of my ability…and in the conditions in which I was raised, I will try to 
do everything possible to contribute to the liberation of Palestine, and in turn that will liberate 
me” (Nano Abdul in Victor, 2003, 104). This hints at a deep connection between Aishen and 
her land and a strong affinity between her and other Palestinians. At the same time, however, 
on gender, from interviews with others, it is also evident that she felt aspects of her identity to 
be a burden. Her sister, Muna Abu Aishen, recalls, “[Dareen] always said that in our society, 
human relationships were like a steel form into which we are poured by our family and which 
don’t allow us to liberate ourselves from it and from the rules, dictated by tradition, which are 
so strict” (Muna Abu Aishen in Victor, 2003, 105). This statement reveals Aishen’s unease at 
the way her family and Palestinian society treated her as a woman. When these interact, it can 
be imagined that Aishen is someone that considers these identities both as defining her (in the 
way she closely connects the liberation of Palestine and herself) and restraining her (not 
allowing her to liberate herself as a woman). These, then, are the bombers with intersecting 
identities, multiple and interrelated in elaborate ways. The relational model presumes these 
types of (typically non-chosen) identities exist and pays particular attention to the demands 
they are likely to have on (thoroughly social) agents. This kind of complex self is reflected 
and expected in the relational construction of the agent, and so, I argue, fits the bombers well.  
 
Intricacies of identity exist, either in a general or intersectional form or indeed both together, 
for the suicide bombers. I argue that the relational agent, which is connected and complex, 
can go a long way to correspond with the bombers’ social and multiple identities since such 
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intricacies are assumed to fundamentally characterise the self in this model. The relational 
approach, thus, complements these women well.  
 
ii. Construction of autonomous selves 
The second (and parallel) point I consider is the suitability of the account’s construction of the 
autonomous self, based on its construction of the self (just discussed), to the bombers. I will 
argue that, as the relational conception of the self is connected, and appropriately so, the 
autonomous self rooted in this agent is suitable for the bombers.  
 
The relational account proposes that agents decide what they want by looking to the social 
self, as this is the only self there is. Agents decide (and, so, can potentially decide 
autonomously) because being inherently social does not preclude this. When applied to the 
cases, the bombers are plausibly social (as has already been discussed) and (as will be 
explored here) likely to able to consider what they want from such a self. It is true that Idris, 
for example, needs to appraise her wants and desires and that this is relevant to a proper 
conception of autonomous persons (it is doubtful that Idris could be autonomous without 
some process, however defined, of reflection).151 However, no amount of self-reflection can 
prise apart or sift her non-social self and autonomous wants on the one hand and her social 
self and non-autonomous desires on the other, since such a separation is unintelligible. It is 
possible to accept that Idris is not asocial and, certainly, that self-reflection is necessary, but 
the relational model insists that such appraisals only occur from a thoroughly social self. Idris 
can assess her desires and do so (potentially) autonomously from the relational self. In this 
way, Idris can be a (relational) autonomous self.  
                                                           
151 As stated in note 148, my aim here is to explore how the social tendencies of relational model might apply to 
the bombers rather than set out autonomy conditions.  
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More concretely, we can imagine that Dhanu might ponder over her decision to become a 
suicide bomber or (let us suppose) a doctor for the LTTE, but – if she does so – it is from a 
constitutively interdependent self (since, as has been argued above, this is all there is). 
Similarly, we can suggest that al-Riyashi may agonise over whether turning to suicide 
bombing or (say) remaining alive to raise her two children is what she wants, but this is 
contemplated from the only self she has; the intrinsically connected self. In these instances, 
Dhanu and al-Riyashi’s decision-making is initiated from the relational self because any other 
(notably the individualistic) kind cannot materialise. As long as Dhanu and al-Riyashi meet 
relationally compatible reflective criteria (however that is contoured), they are able to decide 
autonomously. Having a relationally composed self, then, still allows for decision-making 
about what these bombers want, and moreover these are the types of autonomous selves we 
can suppose the women, who we argued are social selves, to be. 
 
Further, the relational self neither means that the bombers are not authors of their desires nor 
that they could not decide differently. On the first point, the absence of a non-social self and 
presence of a social self does not imply that the women are somehow not the architects of 
those decisions (and so they cannot really be autonomous after all). For instance, it can be 
imagined that Dhanu comes to have certain preferences because of the deeply embedded 
agent she is, such as about becoming a soldier in the LTTE or about exacting revenge for 
being (allegedly) raped by Indian peacekeeping troops. These are not in any sense less her 
desires because of her socially constituted self. They simply are Dhanu’s desires, and 
moreover the only type of desires available. On the second point, the bombers are not fixed by 
their social constitutions. Indeed, there are plenty of women who have markedly similar social 
 202 
connections and identities that do not opt to do what Daraghmeh, Barayev, and Dhanu did.152 
All these women decide differently but to recognise relational selves is not to say they are 
determined. Their social origins contribute deeply to those desires, but they are factors, not 
determinants. Though Barayev, for instance, is intrinsically relational and the connections and 
identities she has moves her toward becoming a bomber, she can desire not to do this (just as 
non-bombers do) without making this decision from, or thereby becoming, a less social self. 
Barayev, then, is undeniably socially constituted and, though this may conspire to lead to a 
particular outcome, it does not determine her decision but rather the context, influences and 
constraints of her decision. In these regards, I contend that the relational autonomous self 
matches and is possible for the socially rooted bombers to achieve.  
 
I argued that the women are likely to be social selves and could potentially be relational 
autonomous selves. Such a construction accepts that persons are always social and connected, 
but that this does not prevent them being the authors, as well as challengers, of desires. In 
other words, autonomous decision-making by the bombers is possible from this relational and 
embedded self. The relational view, then, offers a compatible and plausible account of the 
bombers as autonomous selves.  
 
The first part of the agent section considered selves. I argued that the bombers were social 
selves and able to be autonomous selves too from this starting point, and that the relational 
agent – theorised upon the connected self – is able to reflect both of these understandings of 
                                                           
152 For instance, there are women who do not consider becoming bombers at all (countless Palestinian or 
Chechen or Tamil women), and women who aim to carry out an attack but then renege (Tauriya Hamamra, a 25-
year-old woman who withdrew from an attack in Israel, for example – Skaine, 2006) despite an analogous 
sociality to the bombers. 
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the bombers. In this way, the relational account represents the female bombers as agents and 
(potentially) autonomous agents well.  
 
Operating agents 
In the second part of the agent section, I illustrate the suitability of the relational approach for 
the bombers as operating agents. I discuss, first, how agents decide and second, why they do 
so. Owing to the emphasis it places on agents, I contend, that the particularities of the 
women’s lives, including the genesis and trajectory of suicide bombing act, are revealed 
under the relational lens. In so doing, the account enables not only a convincing depiction of 
how the women as agents decide but also illuminates why they do so. I will claim, then, that 
the relational model is appropriate for accounting for how and why these women act.  
 
i. How agents operate 
First, I explore how satisfactorily the account describes how agents operate and decide. For 
the relational account, the agent as a whole is an important and dominant assessment point for 
autonomy. The relational approach recognises that single decisions of agents are best 
understood not only in relation to other decisions but contexts more broadly, such that they 
must be analysed in a holistic way. When applying this to the bombers, of course it is possible 
to think about evaluating the act of bombing alone. For instance, one could inspect Idris 
detonating the ten-kilo bomb in her rucksack, or Mehaydali driving a Peugeot filled with 
explosives into military vehicles, or Dhanu kowtowing and triggering a bomb before her 
target (all of which actually transpired) and ask whether making that decision was 
autonomous. However, focussing on the single act is less helpful than considering the whole 
agent because these women do not act in isolation – either internally (acts disconnected from 
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other acts) or externally (acts disconnected from contexts) – and so this is less conducive to an 
accurate interpretation of how they act. To expand, we can imagine that Dhanu’s act is part of 
her careful preparation as a Black Tigress, which connects to her desire for a free Tamil Nadu. 
Likewise, we can suppose that Kaplan’s bombing in front of Adana Police Force headquarters 
is linked to her other acts during the political conflict and also to the death of her comrade. 
Dhanu and Kaplan’s acts are better appraised and more representative of how agents decide 
when we factor in these other acts and contexts. Prioritising the agent – and so these links – to 
this extent is the norm in relational models. In this regard, Kaplan’s desire – to bomb – is 
more meaningfully assessed with her preceding acts. Equally contextualising Dhanu’s act – of 
bombing – allows for a proper understanding of it. Single acts are connected to other acts 
(and those to others still) and to contexts, and looking at the bombers as a whole better reveals 
this, and so how they act. 
 
Of course, not all the bombers may think about specific decisions in an extensive way. In fact, 
some may actively try to distinguish one act from others when ascertaining what they want. 
Take Degauque, for instance, a recent convert to Islam and someone who, let us suppose for a 
moment for the purposes of argument, attempts to reject all other considerations of her pre-
religious life to focus on whether bombing is a path she wants to take now. In this fabricated 
example, she is purposely separating a preference (about bombing) from other preferences 
(such as pre-religious views about not committing suicide or being a pacifist) so deliberately 
does not connect her prior desires to her current ones. Yet, given all of the analysis of the 
types of persons these women are, it is argued that these agents cannot sever their other 
desires or preferences from present ones, since histories and contexts remain. Degauque’s aim 
of not consciously considering her earlier desires are in vain since they ultimately do affect 
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what she ends up deciding (even if it is in opposition) in this specific case. So, even if the 
content of desires change, the bombers cannot evade the influence of prior acts or contexts in 
their lives. These features are part of the whole package that is the agent and which, no doubt, 
impact their future decision-making, whether they know it or not. Thus, I argue that both the 
bombers approach to deciding and the relational, agent-based, model are aligned.  
 
The suicide bombers, then, operate by reference to other acts and contexts, so an account of 
the agent that encompasses these elements is necessary to reflect how agents actually operate. 
I contend that relational theories consider the bombers broadly, including previous acts and 
background, and this closely reflects and fits how these women decide.  
 
ii. Why agents operate 
Second, I consider how well the relational approach illuminates why agents operate. A local 
(act) focus has certain benefits if trying to attribute some autonomy to the women as it does 
not deny anyone, even extremely unfree or globally non-autonomous persons, the possibility 
of autonomy since a single act of such a person could still meet autonomy criteria. However, 
the global (agent) notion, where this includes recognising the particularities of the bombers 
and their contexts, allows a better understanding of the act and it’s trajectory, which is likely 
to help make sense of what they do. Applying this to the bombers, it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that the particular people these women are – the backgrounds, biographies, characters, 
duties, obligations they have – and desires they have – to be a fighter or mother or pacifist 
(for example) – is significant in grasping why they decide to bomb. From what we know 
about the women, it can be imagined that these factors had some relevance to their decision-
making. It matters, for instance, that Idris and Barayev were born into or raised in a climate of 
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political violence, that Israeli and Russian authorities respectively humiliated their 
communities, and that they had certain obligations to others as women (Victor, 2003).153 It 
matters that Degauque was a Muslim convert from Belgium, that she had two deceased 
husbands, that she was bereaved, angry and politicised (Smith, 2005). It matters that 
Daraghmeh was deeply religious, that she was frustrated by the war and her prospects, that 
she was resentful towards the IDF (Ghazali, 2003). These facts and subsequent suppositions 
about the women are likely to contribute to why these women became bombers, and these 
particularities cannot be overlooked without concealing or warping their reason(s). This is 
true of any act and any agent, but is especially obvious in the case of suicide bombing as this 
act – owing to its extremity – can be best unravelled with reference to the broader agent and 
the contexts in which it occurs. Clearly such a radical act is the end point in a long trajectory 
of the particular bomber’s life, such that understanding the specific bomber and her 
circumstances is pivotal if a comprehension of why she acts and what this means for her 
autonomy is important. By encompassing the particularities of these women, a more accurate 
and complete picture about why the act happened is discernible. The relational approach, with 
its agent-focus, routinely judges the broader agent and so can potentially satisfactorily 
interpret and illuminate the bomber’s act. In this regard, I argue the model is a suitable fit for 
determining why they decide. 
 
I have discussed the efficacy of the relational account for representing how and why agents 
act. I argued that the primarily agent-based, relational model recognised that the bomber’s 
decision-making occurs in a connected way within a framework, and that other acts, contexts 
and specifics about the self are important for appreciating the trajectory of the bombing. 
                                                           
153 More will be discussed about constraints and their affect on autonomy in the next section and the next 
chapter. 
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Accordingly, I submit that the relational approach works well for reflecting how and why the 
bombers operate.  
 
In this section, I have explored the agent, and in particular the construction of agents and how 
agents operate, in order to demonstrate the suitability of relational autonomy to the bombers. I 
claimed that the bombers were social, complex selves who decide in a connected way, and 
that the model is social and comprehensive and so adept at representing the bombers and how 
and why they operate. Therefore, I argue that the relational approach is a good fit for these 
women as agents.  
 
Autonomy 
In the second section of this chapter, I apply the relational conception of autonomy to the 
suicide bombers in order to demonstrate their compatibility further. I explore how accurately 
the account represents the bombers in three respects: first, their internal will and external 
constraints, second, their inner constitution and third, their experiences of self-rule. For the 
purposes of this section, I assume that the women are competent (that they have minimal 
rationality to assess options and consequences, for example), and so the relevant 
characteristics of the model I will discuss here are socialised autonomy, authentic identities 
and a spectrum. I argue that the relational approach, with tendencies towards a social and 
extensive autonomy, is a parallel notion for the bombers who are social selves, and that it is 
well placed to recognise the breadth of concerns (internal and external) that feed into the 
women’s autonomy. For the suicide bombers, this has two advantages. First, in addition to the 
internal activity relating to self-reflection, the external constraints of oppression that they face 
are a constitutive part of their autonomy. Second, the inclusion of broader factors, which 
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affect these women, licences a (potentially) comprehensive account of their autonomy (a 
suggestion that will be merely alluded to here but that I will explicitly explore in the final 
chapter in my spectrum view). These benefits, I contend, indicate that the relational model is 
suitable for representing the bomber’s autonomy.  
 
Relationship between the internal and external 
First, I consider how proficiently the approach recognises the interconnections between the 
internal will and external constraints of the bombers. I examine first, inherently social 
autonomy, second, the social agent to autonomy fit and third, examples of interaction that is 
compliant with social autonomy. I will argue that, together, these demonstrate that the 
approach goes beyond the internal will and includes the external when assessing autonomy, 
and that this is relevant for the women who are constrained, often in extreme ways, by their 
contexts. In so doing, I will claim that it is a befitting and realistic model for representing the 
relationship between the internal and external in autonomy for the women.  
 
First, recall that the relational conception of autonomy is intrinsically and primarily social, 
whereby the external is part of the characterisation of self-rule. Autonomy is a thoroughly 
relational (causally and constitutively) concept. When this is applied to bombers, it is possible 
to imagine that their autonomy is part of both of these categories; causally and, more 
importantly, constitutively social. Take Degauque, for instance, whose autonomy skills, we 
can suppose, were learned from others in the relatively secure environment of Belgium (here 
we can suggest that autonomy may be instrumentally social since it is enhanced because of 
these positive social factors – Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000). Yet we can also recognise that 
(for argument’s sake, and as one way in which the relational conception could interpret 
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autonomy) how she interacts with others and how others see her as someone capable of 
answering for herself is a deeper conception. It is this latter component that is the, at least, 
partially socially intrinsic feature of autonomy (Baumann, 2008). For example, we could 
momentarily suppose that Degauque could reflect on her desires internally while we accept 
that social influences will affect her causally. But it does not seem that autonomy is this sort 
of skill, capacity or concept. Rather, I suggest that we could imagine more readily that 
Degauque engages with others and the external world constantly when deciding about what 
she wants, such that the internal and external are perpetually interlinked. That is, of course the 
initial and ongoing autonomy development cannot be detached from the external world for 
Degauque (a causal notion), but autonomy is also a social practice for her (a constitutive 
notion) in this model and this, I argue, complements Degauque well.   
 
Using the example of interaction to illustrate this point further, we can imagine that Degauque 
must participate with others and, in this regard, the socially constitutive feature involves (let 
us suggest here) justifying or answering, not merely separately deciding, for her self. 
Likewise, using another bomber, we can suppose that Barayev’s autonomy abilities that lay 
behind her decision to become a bomber were inseparable from her social context (of ongoing 
war that resulted in a relatively unstable setting for, and impediments to, the cultivation of 
autonomy skills). Yet, we can also identify that her autonomy also is, at root, a social feature, 
as it inherently requires (for instance) ‘responsibility for self’ such that Barayev must regard 
herself as someone who can be accountable to others and that others must hold her to this 
standard too. Degauque and Barayev, then, both superficially and deeply depend on others for 
autonomy, and this mirrors how relational autonomy is constructed. In other words, relational 
autonomy is not only dependent on others for the acquisition and development of autonomy 
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skills (causally) but is social in a more fundamental way, as autonomy is a social capacity and 
practice (constitutively). By including this constitutive social element, I argue that the 
approach pays attention to the external and internal link and (as will be indicated 
momentarily) can match the type of autonomy these bombers exercise.  
 
Second, I discuss how appropriate the relational account is for the kind of agents these women 
are. Since, as I have already argued, Degauque and Barayev are selves that are fundamentally 
related to their worlds (intrinsically social), we can infer that any capacity they have for 
autonomy is also likely to be equally social. In this regard, the external element (the socially 
constitutive characteristic) of autonomy suits the (inherently social) selves the bombers are 
more convincingly than an internal-only (a socially casual) account of self-governance that 
regards them as (incidentally social) selves. For instance, to be autonomous to some extent 
Degauque and Barayev’s desires must (in a relationally compatible manner) be internally 
reflected upon and endorsed but, as social selves and continuing the example above, we can 
suggest that these women must also regard themselves as being able to externally justify their 
desires or hold themselves answerable to others. These bombers are agents that are thoroughly 
social so a conception of autonomy that is likewise thoroughly social, like the relational, is 
suited to them. In this regard, relational autonomy has been reconceptualised for the relational 
self; the internal will and the external world are intrinsically and intentionally connected (such 
that the division between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ is much more fluid). The tie between the 
internal and external is strong, therefore, in the relational account since it is not only 
underpinned but also infused by a social characteristic, and this, I contend, complements 
Degauque and Barayev as agents.  
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Third, I consider how attuned the model is to how these women might demonstrate autonomy. 
Running again with the examples above, ‘responsibility for self’ is contingent on justification 
to others, but this need not be narrowly construed. Indeed, given the sensitivity to the external 
in the relational account, the ways in which the bombers can interact with others in their 
repressive circumstances, and so satisfy the socially constitutive notion of autonomy, is 
manifold. The bombers, for instance, need not first, have others to whom to respond to (in 
general) nor second, engage with others through dialogue (in particular). First, oppressive 
contexts, such as those that the bombers are in, do not always lend themselves to allowing 
access to appropriate others for justification to occur. Recognising this, the answerability 
condition is a deliberately normative expectation of ‘responsibility for self’, even if it is never 
actualised (Benson, 2011; Westlund, 2011).154 Compare, for instance, Degauque and Barayev, 
neither of whom (let us imagine) account for themselves to others. Suppose that Degauque 
regards herself (by virtue of the beliefs she holds about her place in the world and her 
standing as a moral agent) as someone who could so justify herself. By contrast, assume that 
Barayev has never thought of herself as answerable for who she is or what she does (partly 
because others refuse to see her as such). In this example, though neither woman overtly 
exercises this justificatory requirement (so the extent of her autonomy is still up for debate, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter), Degauque holds this disposition about herself to some 
extent, whereas Barayev we have suggested does not. The relational approach recognises the 
significance of the external on the internal, and so the lack of others to answer to (which is 
likely in oppression) does not automatically eliminate autonomy since the expectation of 
                                                           
154 The degree to which these women exercise their autonomy given their inability to actualise it is a separate 
question that will be addressed in the final chapter on the spectrum of autonomy.  
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justification is the key.155 This appears to work for the bombers who are in extremely difficult 
situations, not least because of the war, and who we can suppose are likely to have few people 
with whom to engage. Second, the women need not articulate an answer to a question about 
what she does since the ‘responsibility for self’ condition is open to an array of interaction 
methods (Westlund, 2009).156 For example, it can be imagined that Magomadova does not 
formally converse in justificatory dialogue with others, but that she could exhibit 
answerability about herself through informal story telling, emulating the lives of those she 
admires, expressing (either verbally or by embodying) pertinent features of metaphors, or 
changing her behaviour following tests to her way of thinking. These are not direct answers to 
specific questions about wanting to become a bomber, but it indicates the kind of decision-
making and relation to others that is appropriate to a relationally constitutive autonomy. The 
relational approach, then, appreciates the relationship between the external and the internal 
and how dialogue (as one form of interaction with others) is not always possible in oppression 
such that the kinds of interaction can be broader in type. This seems to suit the bombers who, 
we might imagine, are likely to exercise justification in diverse ways given their extreme 
circumstances. Relational theories weave the significance of the external into the model and 
are more sensitive to how autonomy might be exercised in difficult circumstances because of 
it. The relational account, then, does depend on engagement with others – it is socially 
constitutive – but – since the importance of context is equally recognised – this is both 
dispositional and extensive. Thus, I claim that the external and internal interconnections 
permeate the relational account, and are taken seriously through the various (social) possible 
                                                           
155 Though the absence of others could lead to other problems (it is unlikely that these women would develop 
sufficient autonomy skills in the first place – since others are instrumentally important for autonomy – for 
example). 
156 Footnote 136 in chapter three, recall, listed a variety of ‘context-sensitive’ ways in which to respond to 
critical challenges, including modifying behaviour, telling stories that emphasised the point the narrator 
endorses, and emulating the lives of those they admire (Westlund, 2009). The relational account would indeed be 
flawed if it implied that lacking communication skills or suffering a health condition that prevents speech makes 
the bombers non-autonomous, but it does not make this demand. 
 213 
ways the bombers might manifest their autonomy, even in their difficult situations. This, I 
propose, fits the bombers who are likely to be highly constrained.  
 
By being constitutively social, congruent with the social agent, and broad in expected 
interactions with others, the relational conception of autonomy intrinsically captures the 
gravity of the external in self-rule. Since the bombers are social selves and depend on others 
for autonomy, and as their circumstances make engagement difficult, I contend that the 
relational account – that appreciates the extent of the external-internal relationship – is well 
suited to representing their autonomy.  
 
Inner constitution 
In the second part, I examine how appropriately the account reflects the level of certainty in 
the bomber’s will. In particular, I consider whether expectations about the constitution of the 
will (given the kinds of settings the women are in and the types of agents they are) are 
reasonable and representative in the relational approach. I discuss this, with reference to the 
bombers, in two parts, first, authentic identities and conflicting desires and second, reflective 
endorsement given disunity. I will argue that, since the bombers are thoroughly social and in 
oppressive contexts, the architecture of their wills is likely to be complex (conflicting and 
ambivalent, perhaps to a great extent), but that reflective endorsement from a stable self can 
occur nonetheless. Further, I will contend that the relational conception offers a flexible 
though stable constitution of the will and (since it develops a useful characterisation of 




i. Authentic identity and conflicting desires 
First, I discuss conflict of desires, owing to authentic identities, and the suicide bombers. The 
relational approach acknowledges the inherent complexity of relational selves (as described in 
the agent section above) and thereby the disparate and sometimes discordant desires that may 
follow (as will be discussed here). The approach advocates that these kinds of clashes are not 
necessarily the sign of a failure of the will – indeed the conflict is not necessarily one that 
agents that value authentic intersectional identities would wish to escape – but symptomatic 
of the social selves that persons are. When this is applied to the bombers, it is not difficult to 
envision that they hold many competing desires because of who they are. Recall from the 
agent section above that we supposed that Aishen, for example, had an intersectional identity 
(we suggested, using reports from her family and friends, that she had an unbreakable bond 
with her nation while also being cautious of the traditional role of women as wives and 
homemakers within it). It can be imagined, that this identity leads to a range of desires, some 
of which conflict. For instance, we can conceive that she de-values and feels alienated by 
elements of her identity and harbours desires that run contrary to it (not wanting to be a 
homemaker because she is a woman), and that she simultaneously values much of her identity 
and has desires that are compatible with it (wanting to be a good Palestinian). At the same 
time, we might suppose that she values and holds corresponding desires to conflicting 
elements of her identity (wanting to dress conservatively as a Muslim woman while rejecting 
traditional roles of womanhood, or wanting to liberate Palestine while being somewhat 
religious and favouring non-violence). In this example, if she does not wish to reject parts of 
her identity outright, which – by valuing some aspects that are intertwined with those she de-
values – we might be inclined to believe she is unlikely to do, then without heeding and 
acknowledging these conflicted desires, there is a danger that Aishen is not being ‘true to her 
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(relational) self’ (Meyers, 2000; Anzaldúa, 1987). The relational approach is able to 
appreciate how the social dimensions of self might intensify inconsistency in the will. The 
relational account, I contend, accepts (diversity in identity and the resultant) discordant 
desires as a legitimate or authentic part of the intersectional, relational, complex, self that 
Aishen is.  
 
Likewise, with Daraghmeh, it can be postulated that she was both angry at the plight of her 
people as a Palestinian (so, let us imagine, held a preference to take a symbolic political 
stand) and also hesitant to carry out violence given her faith (so, let us assume that, while 
peacefully protesting may be more in line with her religious views, carrying out a suicide 
bomb attack is appealing to her given its perceived effectiveness and the pressing needs of her 
country). Though her identity leads Daraghmeh to these supposed clashing desires, arbitrarily 
harmonising these desires would risk disregarding elements of her identities and undermining 
the goal of being ‘true to her (relational) self’.157 Instead, in differing ways, these may both be 
what she wants (with one desire applying in one context and the other in a different situation 
while both are commitments she does not want to give up, for example), so to adopt one over 
the other from the outset prematurely limits her and might not reflect the complexity of 
Daraghmeh’s identity. The relational model is adept at recognising how the social and 
relationships in particular can magnify these complexities. The relational approach, then, 
takes conflict to be common because maintaining authentic intersectional identities – the kind 
of identity we have argued that Daraghmeh has – is likely to be important for relational 
selves. The notion of high uncertainty of desires given the social selves agents are is one that 
                                                           
157 Though her desires need to be reflected on to count as ones she endorses. This is considered further in the part 
below. 
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is prevalent in the relational model and one that appears to mould itself quite closely to the 
bombers.  
 
My claim, then, is that since relational approaches are rooted in the relational agent, they are 
able to recognise why women like Aishen and Daraghmeh may well be very ambivalent or in 
conflict. A relational approach, therefore, that is sensitive to this complexity of agents, and 
accordingly the constitution of their wills, is well suited to representing the women.  
 
ii. Reflective endorsement 
Second, I demonstrate how relevant the concepts of reflection and endorsement in the 
relational account are for the bombers. While, for the relational approach, autonomy is not 
solely about the internal will (there is the external aspect too), some reflection and 
endorsement of desires is still required (as has been hinted at in various places so far). This is 
often balanced in the form of acknowledging flexibility of the will, and the need for “practical 
unity” (Mackenzie, 2000, 135) of the will for reflective endorsement. These distinct 
components can be applied to the women of the case studies in turn to assess their fit.  
 
First, on the flexibility of will, it is easy to imagine that the bombers change with experiences 
and over time, and do not possess a permanently static or non-social will from which to 
reflect and endorse. Take, for instance, Jamil Qassas, a neighbour of the bomber al-Akhras, 
who recalls how, after seeing Qassas’ brother being shot by Israeli soldiers, her motivations 
were very different to what they once were. He states:  
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At the funeral, Ayat came up to me and said that the death of my brother had 
changed everything for her. She believed it was a sign from Allah that she 
had to do something […] I knew then that she was destined for great things. 
She had too much emotion and hatred inside her to just sit quietly while our 
people were being massacred like that (Qassas in Victor, 2003, 209).  
 
We can discern that this incident changed al-Akhras’ life from, what we can suppose was, a 
promising student with firm career aspirations to be a journalist to that of becoming a bomber 
for the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade with other goals (Victor, 2003). We can suggest that these 
altered desires are not something she reflected on from a fixed will or endorsed by surveying 
all the facts about her situation from an individualistic point of view. Rather, it is perhaps 
more accurate to propose that al-Akhras’ will emerges and develops in different directions 
over time (it is flexible) and is socially rooted (not non-social nor marginally social). The 
relational account identifies that the will is thoroughly social and that this may bring more 
fluidity. Given this, I contend that the relational model that acknowledges, as the norm, the 
non-fixed and social constitution of the will is suited to describing the autonomy of these 
women.    
 
Yet, and second, recognising this does not imply the non-existence of a stable enough base 
from which to reflectively endorse. For instance, we have already suggested that al-Akhras 
has a self (and thereby a will) that is relationally embedded, complex, and flexible (and we 
can state that this obtains quite aside from determining how much autonomy she has). 
Thereafter, however, the self (and will) may or may not be constant enough or have “the kind 
of practical unity necessary to deliberate, make decisions and choices, and act” (Mackenzie, 
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2000, 135) (and so enable her to be autonomous to some extent).158 Relational autonomy does 
not permit an unlimited level of fluidity in the will, as this would leave al-Akhras too 
disparate, with no basis from which to decide at all. In this regard, it is argued that though one 
can accept a conflicting authentic identity (discussed in this section under ‘authentic identity 
and conflicting desires’) and an adaptable will given this (the point immediately above), al-
Akhras’ desires must not emanate from too fragmented a self or too malleable a will since this 
precludes the ‘practical unity’ necessary for reflecting and endorsing. It can be supposed, for 
example, that al-Akhras may have an intersectional identity, conflicting desires, and an 
inconsistent will. If, amongst this, we imagine that she is unable to hold some (relationally 
embedded) perspective about her self, then we can propose that she fails to achieve the 
practical unity for the purposes of reflective endorsement in relational autonomy. By contrast, 
if we assume that she does secure this unity then the likely outcome would be that there is a 
stable enough basis from which to decide, despite those other states holding.159 Though some 
stability of the will is of course required, the concern that relational accounts have is in 
recognising the extent of this stability for intersectional, social selves. In short, al-Akhras’ 
relational self (and will) cannot be more in flux than it is stable because she would not be able 
to reflectively endorse any of her desires. The relational model presumes that individuals are 
social and accordingly acknowledges this more flexible base. In this regard it is a good fit 
with the bombers.   
 
                                                           
158 The extent of autonomy is a separate question that will be dealt with in the final chapter.  
159 The aim in stipulating this is less to set out necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomy but to 
distinguish intersectional agents and schizophrenic ones, both of whom, we have imagined in chapter three, have 
high levels of conflict in authenticity of identities and the will. Further to this, the point about ‘practical 
unification’ will be discussed again in relation to measuring autonomy in chapter five (although, again, this will 
not be in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions).  
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Accordingly, the female suicide bombers must reflect on and endorse desires from a 
(relationally connected and) sufficiently stable will. If, for example, we suppose that 
Degauque does not reflect and endorse a desire to carry out an attack (that may well conflict 
with others given the disunity or ambivalence in the will) at all from this relational base, then 
it does not meet the requirements for relational self-rule. If we imagine, on the other hand, 
that she does reflect and endorse the desire then it goes some way to it.160 A flexible but 
sufficiently stable constitution of the will, then, is key for relational accounts, and given the 
nature of persons as relational with sometimes conflicting desires, I argue that this view of 
‘practical unity’ of the will is a comparable model for the bombers.161 The relational account, 
thus, is suited to the structure of the bomber’s will. 
 
In this section, I have considered the inner constitution of the will. I argued that the relational 
approach recognised that reflective endorsement occurs from a practically unified, connected 
will, which – owing to its social roots – is complex, sometimes conflicting and ambivalent. I 
demonstrated that this reflects the kinds of agents the bombers are and the type of inner 
constitution they can be expected to have in social complexity well, and thus the relational 
account is appropriate for representing their autonomy.  
 
Experiences of self-rule 
In the final part of this section, I consider the women’s experience of autonomy and how 
adept the approach is at representing it as a whole. I will argue that the relational model, 
                                                           
160 It only goes some way because the question of autonomy, recall, does not end with the internal reflective 
endorsement of single desires (since – as the first part of the autonomy section argued – there are other external 
requirements and – as the next chapter will expand – an assessment of just how autonomous she is pending) but 
it is an important component nonetheless. 
161 Though a precise theory for reflectively endorsing is out of the scope of this thesis, recognising how the will 
is constituted is within its remit. In this regard, it stipulates a flexible, but sufficiently stable, will from which to 
reflectively endorse.  
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which advocates a spectrum, offers a helpful way in which to reflect the women’s overall 
experience of autonomy.  
 
The relational account recognises the importance of moving beyond a binary view (important 
though this might be for practical – legal, medical or political – purposes) to a more nuanced 
spectrum one (that can represent the social nature of autonomy and as much of the women’s 
experiences as possible). When this is applied to the bombers, we can easily imagine that the 
bombers go about their affairs not to satisfy minimal legal or political thresholds but for 
broader moral and social reasons. When thinking about bombing, for instance, we can 
suppose that Idris may well be competent, have reflected in specified ways and has not been 
interfered with. However, we can also suggest that Idris’ decision-making probably wavers a 
great deal, is of a particular quality, or is linked to her feelings of worth, and that these kinds 
of subtleties characterise her autonomy. It is these details that a binary-only position misses 
but that is made more visible through a spectrum. Further, by moving beyond a binary, it is 
easier to detect different, even very small, degrees of autonomy, that Idris might have given 
these various factors. Where the aim is to attribute some autonomy to the bombers this type of 
approach is likely to be beneficial. In these ways, a more extensive assessment – which could 
include (as we shall see in the next chapter) how reflection was impacted by low self-worth or 
that she was constrained by war, both of which colour Idris’ overall experience of autonomy – 
makes it possible to better discern and measure the grade of her autonomy, even if it is 
limited. Relational theories have leaned towards a spectrum in order to facilitate an in-depth 
understanding of autonomy, though (as has already been discussed in chapter three) this still 
requires some expansion (a proposal for which will be discussed in the next chapter). Such an 
approach is an important aid for more completely capturing the totality of the bomber’s 
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experience, but the spectrum itself must also be part of a model that recognises how the 
internal and external interrelate for the social selves we have already submitted that these 
women are. I argue that the relational approach – in advocating a spectrum and a relational 
basis for autonomy – offers a method for illuminating and representing as much of the 
bomber’s social autonomy as possible and so is a befitting model for them.  
 
I have argued that a binary is less suited to reflecting the women’s decision-making in detail 
or to alloting even limited amounts of autonomy to them, whereas a spectrum is more attuned 
to this task. The relational approach, which offers a spectrum that is socially rooted, then, is 
well placed for representing the bombers’ autonomy in its complexity.  
 
In this section, I applied the relational conception of autonomy to the suicide bombers to 
ascertain whether it is a befitting account. I demonstrated that it was a constitutively social 
concept so could decipher the connections between the external and internal and that this was 
relevant to the bombers decision-making. In addition, it developed a flexible but stable 
constitution of the will that suited the bomber’s complex identities and oppressive contexts. 
Finally, I indicated that it included a spectrum that was social in conception and that could 
reflect the whole of the women’s experiences well. As such, I submitted that the relational 
approach is compatible with the bombers.  
 
Beyond the female suicide bombers 
So far, I have sought to demonstrate how well the characteristics of the relational approach fit 
the bombers. In the final part, I briefly expand this focus by discussing whether the model has 
broader applicability by being relevant to all persons, not just the women of the case studies. 
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Such a question, however, is ancillary rather than core to this thesis and, here, I am simply 
exploring (rather than making a firm judgement about) the potential and prospects of the 
relational account. In this regard, we need not accept the outcomes of this section for other 
persons to endorse those in preceding sections about the bombers. Having made this clear, I 
will investigate the possible expansion by employing the fictional example of the New York 
banker to discuss whether she first, is a relational agent and second, has a relational notion of 
autonomy. I will contend that since the banker, bomber and, by extension, every individual is 
likely to be social and autonomy is likely to happen to some extent and within constraint for 
everyone, it might be that the relational account applies to all, not just the bombers that are 
the primary focus of this project. In other words, while the relational approach works 
especially well for the bombers (because they are constrained to a great extent and the model 
is designed to discern such limitations) it is potentially apt for others (because, though they 
may be less restrained, the account can also recognise this). Again, this is a tentative and 
possible conclusion, and not one that need be adopted for this thesis.  
 
All agents  
To start with agents, I consider whether the banker from New York is just as socially 
embedded and complex as any of the bombers of this thesis. It is not difficult to suppose that 
the banker is some sort of social self. We might recognise that she is someone who is 
immersed in and cannot stand apart from her identities (as, let us imagine, a daughter, sister, 
worker, Christian, Republican), social roots (an impoverished upbringing, for instance), or 
ends (say, to be wealthy or to provide for her parents). Though the details are different, these 
social features are similar in type to those we discussed for al-Riyashi (for example) in that 
they seem to be socially significant for both women. In this respect, neither the banker nor al-
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Riyashi are individualistic selves but rather are relationally suffused “all the way down” 
(Code, 2000, 198) (not only at the outskirts or superficially). Further, we can imagine – just as 
we did for al-Riyashi – that these social elements are linked in various ways. We can suppose 
that they interrelate (her origins propelling her desire to be a banker and her motivation to be 
generous to her parents prompted by her religion, for instance) and also intersect (the drive to 
succeed as a banker cutting short the time she can spend with her parents and her political 
leanings jarring with the charity of her religion, for example) in a multitude of ways. In a 
similar fashion to al-Riyashi, it appears that a connected self that embraces this kind of 
complexity of relations and identity is an apt concept. We can propose, then, that the banker, 
bomber and, by extension, every agent may well be a connected and complex self.  
 
Given this presumed social understanding of the banker, it is also plausible that she, like al-
Riyashi, has a social will. We can suggest, that the banker’s relational constitution just 
discussed cannot be shed to reveal a will that is the core of al-Riyashi because, as she is 
profoundly relational, this socially devoid component of the self is not likely to exist. We can 
also suppose, however, that the potency of her sociality does not imply that the banker lacks 
self-directive abilities anymore than we thought it did for al-Riyashi. It is possible to imagine 
that she acts upon the world and make decisions about her life (about progressing in her 
career, moving city, having a child, for instance) from her relational origins, as this is the only 
self there is, and that such decisions are attributable to her. Equally, it is feasible to suppose 
that these decisions are undeniably constrained (the norms of banking life – to work long 
hours, to attend networking events in her free time, to compete for promotion – coupled with 
the demands of parenthood limits her in her decision to have a child, for example), but that 
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they are hers nonetheless.162 Just as with al-Riyashi, there is no automatic presumption of an 
absence of agency because the banker is socially constituted and constrained. In these ways, it 
is likely that the banker and bomber – and so potentially all persons – are both thoroughly 
social and able to be agential.  
 
It is possible to suggest, then, that neither banker, bomber nor, by deduction, any person is the 
kind of agent that is (at worst) asocial or (at best) causally social, but rather is socially 
saturated, with a rich and complex inner life, and acts upon the world nonetheless. A suitable 
autonomy approach should be able to mirror this inherent sociality, and I argue that the 
relational account, with its theoretically but thoroughly social self, meets this criterion. Thus, 
since all persons (not only the banker and bombers) are plausibly social, I contend that a 
relational account is potentially well suited to representing every agent. 
 
Autonomy of all agents 
Second, I explore the autonomy of the banker and in particular whether her autonomy is first, 
linked to the external and second, a degree-based notion. With regard to the former (whether 
there is a social autonomy at play), we can suppose that the banker from New York, just like 
al-Riyashi, is likely to be dependent on others to learn skills of and to practice autonomy. The 
banker, we can imagine, does not self-generate her self-reflective, self-sufficiency, self-
defining skills anymore than al-Riyashi, but rather acquires, develops and practices them 
through social experiences, relationships and interactions. In this way, we can suggest that her 
upbringing (in poverty and with authoritarian parents, for example) and ongoing life (in a 
mixture of superficial and meaningful relationships, for instance) affect attaining and thriving 
                                                           
162 Constraints will be discussed again in the part on all agents’ autonomy below.  
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in these skills differently. Likewise, we can suppose that her self-esteem (engendered from, 
say, her religion, work and friends) enables her to reflect and engage with others in the world, 
and her (what we might imagine secure but stressful) environment means that she fulfills 
some of her desires at the expense of others. These interdependencies draw attention to the 
banker’s autonomy as causally and constitutively social. We can propose, then, that it is likely 
that the social matters for the banker, just as it does for the bomber and perhaps for any 
individual. This makes an approach to autonomy that recognises these various social aspects 
of autonomy important. I argue that the relational account is inherently social, and so can 
possibly offer an accurate representation of the banker’s and any person’s autonomy.  
 
With regards to the second point on the relevance of a spectrum for the banker, we can 
suppose that the banker, like al-Riyashi, has many influences that affect the quality of her 
autonomy. While the bomber has restrictions that include a climate of war and patriarchy, we 
can imagine that the banker is restrained by a culture of capitalism (and, within that, the 
financial sector) and patriarchy (and so what is expected of her as a woman). The banker’s 
autonomy occurs within and is permeated by these realities (her reflections about applying for 
a promotion are situated in and saturated by patriarchy where she feels she must work harder 
for recognition and make time to care for her elderly parents, for instance). We can suggest 
that the internal and external are interlinked for the banker and, in this regard, the banker, 
bomber and, by inference, every individual is likely to experience autonomy in this complex, 
rather than a binary, way. The relational account, with its spectrum that attempts to capture 
these kinds of details (more about which will be discussed in the next chapter), is, I argue, 
potentially well placed to account for every person’s autonomy.  
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In these ways, I suggest that it is likely that all agents’ – not just the bomber’s and banker’s – 
autonomy is linked to the external and on a spectrum. As these social features are part of the 
relational conception, I submit that a relational approach is possibly a suitable way of 
characterising the autonomy of all persons.  
 
Using the example of the New York banker, I explored whether a potential expansion of the 
argument so far is that the relational account might be suitable for persons other than suicide 
bombers. I argued that the banker, and by extension every person, is likely to be a social self 
with a social autonomy. Given this, a plausible conclusion is that a relational approach, with 
its social roots, could aptly describe and appraise everybody’s agency and autonomy. In other 
words, the relational view can recognise (and, as will be explored in the next chapter, 
measure) the extreme restrictions that the bombers face and so it is possible that it can pick up 
(and gauge) moderate or slight constraints that frame most people’s lives too. However, 
expanding the argument to all persons (with fewer constraints) in general is merely suggestive 
and we need not adopt this conclusion to accept that the relational account is appropriate for 
the bombers (with higher constraints) in particular.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I applied the relational account to the suicide bombers in order to show how 
appropriate it is for representing the women as agents and their autonomy. I have argued that 
since the relational account is social, comprehensive and realistic, and because the bombers 
are thoroughly social selves with complex decision-making, the model matches the women 
well. Further, I considered whether this argument could be expanded by applying the 
approach to the New York banker. I argued that since the banker and by extension all persons 
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and their autonomy are likely to be social, the relational model might be suitable for 
everyone. However, this is but a possible conclusion and not one that needs to be endorsed for 
it to be the case that the account is appropriate for the bombers. Consequently, I claim that the 
relational approach is a good fit for the female suicide bombers of the case studies (and 
potentially for all individuals), since it not only offers a proper picture of the women as 
persons and their autonomy, but also promises a more robust way to track the degree of their 
autonomy (a proposition we shall explore further momentarily). I have demonstrated, 
therefore, that the relational approach is a befitting model for the bombers.  
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5. A SPECTRUM OF AUTONOMY  
 
Introduction 
In this thesis, I have set out the case studies of female suicide bombers and examined the 
ways in which their agency is either under- or over- stated and, so in both instances, distorted. 
I have considered the liberal and relational accounts of autonomy and argued that the 
relational is better at representing the kind of agents the bombers are and their autonomy. In 
this final chapter, I will interrogate the relational approach still further by developing the 
spectrum in some detail as, while relational models offers the foundations from which to do 
this, exactly how the spectrum is to be framed and what this means is under-theorised (as was 
highlighted in chapters three and four). I aim to show that a relational spectrum offers a new 
way to measure the autonomy of the female suicide bombers since it can indicate the extent to 
which they are autonomous in some approximation and it can differentiate between and 
compare degrees of autonomy.  
 
In other words, so far I have suggested that relational autonomy promises a more 
comprehensive way in which to capture the complexity of the bombers’ autonomy through 
the spectrum, and suggested that this model could better show degrees of autonomy and 
distinguish between amounts of autonomy. In this part of the thesis I aim to make good on 
such a claim by setting out the details of my view of autonomy on a spectrum. I will propose 
that this account deciphers various features of autonomy and so gauges the amount of 
autonomy the bombers have in an approximate and comparative way. In order to do this, I 
 229 
first, present the theoretical components of my view, second, assess how successful it is by 
applying it to some of the bombers, before I third, consider the implications of the approach 
for narratives of the women. My aim is to demonstrate how the spectrum approximates 
degrees of autonomy and to indicate who, using the earlier case studies of the female 
bombers, is more or less autonomous on it.  
 
I argue that this new proposal enables us to plot constraints (external elements) as well as self-
regard (external and internal) and reflection from a stable enough relational self (internal). 
Charting these three variables together then allows an estimation of the degree of autonomy 
that is being exercised overall. While such a plotting is suggestive rather than absolute, this 
approach not only shows that autonomy is a complex concept where varying extents and types 
are possible, but, moreover, that by isolating features and evaluating and mapping these first 
separately and then together, that a mechanism to estimate this extent in a detailed way is 
possible. While approximate, then, it does offer the ability to estimate autonomy, differentiate 
between levels and types of autonomy, and compare and distinguish extents of autonomy. 
Accordingly, my spectrum view measures (elements and the totality of) autonomy for 
individual persons and enables us to compare cases against each other in a nuanced fashion. 
In so doing, I argue that my spectrum meets the aims of the thesis of avoiding the victim or 
agent dichotomy (discussed in chapter one). It provides a concrete way of understanding 
agents as operating in constrained circumstances, where autonomy is limited by many 
features and yet practiced to varying degrees by particular individuals, and importantly makes 
an attempt to approximate the extent of the exercise of this autonomy by such persons in a 
given situation.  
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Before we proceed, it is important to note two caveats regarding the aims and scope of this 
chapter. The first is that I intend to describe clear criteria for the spectrum view as a whole 
and to assess the bombers against it in order to outline how my proposal might work. To this 
end, my goal is not to delineate necessary and sufficient conditions (for instance, on how the 
reflection element might be satisfied) but rather to reveal how my view measures autonomy 
and captures differences in these women’s lives. The aim is to show that this view permits a 
refined picture of the elements of autonomy, which allows us to estimate levels of autonomy 
and types of autonomy and so to approximate how much autonomy is being exercised overall. 
The second proviso is that the estimate of autonomy for a particular bomber is illustrative and 
indicative. The aim is to show how such estimation is possible and that it is useful in 
understanding different women’s autonomy in different circumstances. It is not a claim of an 
absolute or exact plotting for any particular individual. Accordingly, I am creating 
provisional, rather than definitive, pictures and offering examples of how to estimate 
autonomy. For this purpose, and similarly to the previous chapter, I will draw on a range of 
sources – including the case studies from chapter one, newspaper articles, background facts, 
and conjecture – to support my conclusions. I recognise this method has its defects and that 
the ‘truth’ about such women in ‘real life’ may be different from the picture we are able to 
construct from the evidence available. These are, then, speculative judgements about the 
women and their autonomy, drawn from the available evidence and reasonable, given what 
we know, or can plausible imagine, about them. Accordingly, even if such assessments turn 
out to be flawed and empirically disputed, this does not undermine this exercise in terms of 
both showing that points along the spectrum can be identified and in testing the parameters of 
my position. It would simply mean we were wrong about the details of some elements and we 
would need to revise our estimates. My intention, then, is simply to explore how autonomy 
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viewed on a spectrum might differentiate between degrees of autonomy and so take seriously 
the notion of being autonomous to certain extents and in certain ways, and to show how the 
bombers’ autonomy might be ranked relative to each other. With these provisos out of the 
way, we can now begin with the conceptual account.  
 
The spectrum view of autonomy in principle 
To start, I discuss the theoretical elements of my spectrum view of autonomy. I set out, and 
underscore, how the account I propose is different from other relational theories in the 
literature, after which I will show the criteria for autonomy that emerge from my view. In the 
second section of this chapter, this conceptual account will be applied to the bombers to 
demonstrate how estimates of autonomy can be derived. 
 
Situating my account of relational autonomy 
In this part, I locate my approach amongst current relational theories and also distinguish it 
from them. The model that I offer in this thesis is distinct in three principal ways, each of 
which manifest separate concerns about the external and internal understandings of 
autonomy: constraints, self-regard, and reflection. Though present relational theories discuss 
some of these individual elements of autonomy, my view differs in a number of ways and 
more importantly differs in its aim as a whole, and I will consider these variances in turn here. 
My hybrid approach aims to build on the strengths of existing views and plug gaps in them 
and so produce a valuable contribution. The details of my spectrum view, which can measure 
various features relevant to autonomy and so estimate autonomy, will be considered in more 
detail in the next part.   
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First, though (by appealing to constraints) my view, like some other strong relational 
accounts, focuses on external dimensions to autonomy, I do not take these to eliminate the 
possibility of autonomy in the way some of those theories do. To expand, I am concerned 
with extrinsic factors and take these as seriously mattering for autonomy in a similar manner 
to strong substantive accounts. But, I do not deny autonomy simply because external 
conditions are oppressive: a criticism that strong views often suffer from (as discussed in 
chapter three). Rather, by adopting a weak substantive account, I claim that external 
constraints reduce (or enhance) autonomy, but that autonomy is still achievable to some 
degree. Accordingly, while oppressive conditions unquestionably curtail autonomy, this is 
different in different circumstances. My suggestion is that the extent to which autonomy is 
possible can be considered and estimated in such contexts. In this way, my view is distinct 
from that of objective theorists (like Wolf, 1990, who thinks the content of desires are 
nonautonomous if they do not map onto the world in the right ways) and socio-relational 
theorists (like Oshana, 2006, who thinks certain de facto conditions must transpire for 
autonomy to exist). My account makes neither of these claims but rather I seek to utilise the 
external to make factors that are significant for decreasing and increasing autonomy explicit. 
Further, I then take these features with other relevant factors and provide a mechanism by 
which to approximate the degree of autonomy on the spectrum. This enables me to both 
estimate levels of autonomy, to distinguish between degrees and types of autonomy and to 
make comparisons between individuals regarding their autonomy.  
 
Second, my view encompasses the external and internal notions of self-worth and 
responsibility for self (together I take these to symbolise self-regard). While some relational 
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positions incorporate these concepts too, my aim is to identify the extent of self-regard, which 
these other views do not typically describe. To elaborate, some existing weak substantive and 
procedural theories require a normative stance of self-worth or responsibility towards the self 
(that depends on others too) and state that autonomy is possible where this exists because, 
unlike strong substantive views, they remain silent on the content of desires (as discussed in 
chapter three). My theory is somewhat similar in recognising this stance towards the self but I 
mean it to be a more substantive notion (though not strongly substantive) so that we can 
gauge the degree of self-worth. It is different, then, to dialogical accounts (Westlund, 2009, 
thinks answerability is a disposition toward the self and the content of desires can allow 
subservience as self-worth is not necessary) and emotional accounts (Benson, 1994, 2008, 
thinks there must be ‘proper’ notions of self-worth and the content of desires could allow 
subservience because normative competence does not require perfection or orthonomy). I 
claim that self-worth is a thicker notion (it is ‘proper’ in the way Benson describes) and this 
means we must take seriously how much self-worth actually exists (thereby extending 
Benson’s view by aiming to acknowledge and judge the rough impact of subservience to the 
amount of autonomy functioning). In short, my position is that the content of some desires 
(such as those to be subservient) may be instances of a radically diminished autonomy where 
this brings into question the stance towards oneself as worthy. This distinction between other 
relational positions and my spectrum view allows me to identify the quality and quantity of 
self-regard as one aspect of thinking about the complexity of autonomy, and to weigh up this 
feature with other features, and against different agents. Again the aim is to be able to 
distinguish, however approximately and tentatively, between different degrees of autonomy. 
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Third is the requirement of critical reflection, where the agent thinks about and decides on 
preferences from a stable enough relational self, which is more of an internal notion. Other 
relational theories of course discuss critical reflection from an embedded self, so to draw out 
similarities and differences with my approach, I split this into three sub-parts: critical 
reflection, the stable enough relational self, and the will. First, as with other relational 
approaches, in my view there does need to be some critical reflection insofar as this connects 
certain goals or ways of living to the agent. This is similar to other theorists (like Westlund, 
2009, who thinks reflective endorsement is needed to link a desire to an agent, and Stoljar,  
2000, who thinks that critical faculties of some description are required for autonomy). I 
argue for some reflection for autonomy and again this can be understood as a continuum and 
plotted on a spectrum. Further, I echo the thought that self-worth matters for the agent’s 
judgements (to weigh up options from one’s values, ends, and goals, for instance). This is a 
similar claim to other relational theorists (like Benson, 1994, and Meyers’, 2008, views about 
reflection from a position of self-worth, and Stoljar’s, 2000, idea that oppressive forces can 
damage reflection insofar as it affects aspirations for oneself). However, while similar in these 
ways, my view also recognises that the agent’s evaluation or assessment of what she wants is 
itself saturated (by the external, by values, and by relationships, for instance) that are not 
necessarily chosen such that it is only one part of the whole picture of how much autonomy is 
occurring. I aim, then, to explicitly highlight the impact of the external on internal reflective 
processes, including by recognising under what conditions preferences were formed and what 
this reveals about the agent’s stance towards herself and how far this exhibits a sense of self-
worth. I suggest the extent of these must be evaluated in analysing and estimating autonomy 
in theoretical terms (it is not a stipulation that the agent practically does this) as part of critical 
reflection. The critical reflection requirement is one component of autonomy and, alongside 
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other criteria, allows us to estimate, or perhaps guesstimate, higher or lower degrees of 
autonomy across and between agents. Second, in terms of the stable enough relational self 
(from which critical reflection happens), my view is similar to other relational ones (such as 
Mackenzie’s, 2000). I recognise the complexity of the self – including the evolution of the 
self through different experiences such that integration is likely to happen over time rather 
than be the base from which we start – but that ‘practical unity’ (to use Mackenzie’s, 2000, 
phrase) for judgment, evaluation, and action is also required. I do not intend to differentiate 
myself on this ground. Finally, as intimated at the beginning of this chapter, my account is 
silent on the precise ways in which internal psychology of the agent is to be framed. I am not 
concerned with satisfying myself that a desire passes something like the ‘authenticity’ criteria 
synonymous with liberal accounts and with some relational views (it neither adopts an 
integration approach, like Friedman, 1986, nor a competency approach, like Meyers, 1989, for 
instance). Rather, (and as with any theory under the “umbrella term” – Mackenzie and Stoljar, 
2000, 4 – of relational autonomy) what is important is to be attuned to instances of reflection 
by the relational agent in oppressive conditions (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Stoljar, 2014) 
not the strict architecture of their psychology. I follow this broad relational approach but 
notably deviate in that I take the nature and amount of this reflection into account to plot the 
degree of autonomy overall. My focus, then, is to discern how much the agent judges that 
goals or desires are better or worse for her given her particularity (of self, context, 
relationships, for instance) rather than show that they fit a pre-defined internal arrangement. I 
identify how much reflection is taking place in these terms, and moreover, my spectrum view 
places this measurement next to the outcomes of other criteria to gauge autonomy as a whole 
for that agent. In so doing, not only do I aim to offer an appraisal of that agent’s autonomy, 
but also to compare this with approximations of other agents’ autonomy. The overarching 
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way in which my view is different from other relational positions with regards to critical 
reflection, then, is being able to evaluate and contrast higher and lower degrees of autonomy.  
 
The focus on external constraints and the interrelation between the external and internal for 
self-regard and self-reflection and the way all this contributes to a proper understanding of 
how much autonomy there is distinguishes my account from other relational ones. In short, I 
aim to identify how much autonomy is possible using a range: I propose that autonomy, 
correctly viewed, is on a spectrum. I now go on to set out the three criteria that make up my 
approach more clearly and in detail before applying these to the female bombers in order to 
illustrate how the approach might be applied.  
 
Three axes for relational autonomy on a spectrum  
The three points of divergence outlined above feed into my criteria for relational autonomy 
viewed on a spectrum. The elements that emerge for my conception, and which I capture on 
three separate axes, are: (1) effects of constraints, (2) self-regard, and (3) reflection from a 
relational self. These axes individually measure each respective feature and, more 
importantly, collectively gauge an approximate degree of autonomy.163 My view can be 
depicted in the following way: 
 
                                                           
163 I use the terms ‘feature’, ‘criterion’, ‘element’, ‘component’ and the like interchangably with ‘axis’ in this 




Before explaining each axis in more detail, in order to ensure clarity it should be highlighted 
that the three components are always relational notions: constraints recognise the socially 
immersed self; self-regard the significance of others in forming self-perceptions; and self-
reflection that deliberation and judgement only happens from and by a connected self. 
Moreover, given the relational undertones, these three features are likely to impact one 
another, and though – again for purposes of analysis – they will be discussed separately, I 
recognise the somewhat artificial delineation and endeavour to draw out the links where 
relevant here too (and I will do this explicitly in the application section of this chapter). 
Having explained the intrinsically relational and connected character of these axes, I now 
consider each in more depth as well as how they work together and set out a rough scale.  
 
The first element is appreciating the constraints that the agent faces. To elaborate, it is 
recognising the external constraints (where this includes identifying contextual features, such 
as the physical environment, institutional frameworks, socio-economic and political policies, 
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and communal, familial and dyadic dynamics) in which the agent is immersed. This ascertains 
the kinds of restrictions that surround and saturate the social agent and the impact of this on 
autonomy, and so it is a constitutively relational view. The constraint element of my account, 
then, foregrounds the ways in which these external aspects affect the relational agent. This 
feature can be summarised as:  
(1) Recognition of constraints in which the agent is immersed.  
 
In order to capture constraints on the first axis on my account, I offer an estimated scale, 
which I take to be inversed. Here, at one end, ‘10’ indicates no constraints (a position that is 
extremely unlikely for anyone to attain on my view given that the relational conception of 
persons is partly that they always embedded in contexts). At the other end, ‘0’ represents 
maximal constraints (which I take to mean the condition of absolute restraint, which again I 
suggest is unlikely for the vast majority of persons since one’s context must completely 
paralyse the agent. However, it will no doubt include some, such as the person who is 
kidnapped and confined to a cramped cellar forever or someone who is perpetually sedated 
for the entirety of her life). The range is inversed because greater constraints will generate a 
lower score of functioning.164 In other words, I envisage that events such as war, famine and 
extreme poverty are likely to be on the lower end of this axis (so more constraining), and 
everyday pressures that relate to the kinds of selves we are (where we have grown up, 
expectations of who we are to be, factors about intersectionality) are in the middle range (so 
                                                           
164 The aim of the spectrum is to measure the amount of autonomy overall, and constraints is but one element of 
this, as I explain later in this section. The goal is to capture and represent the totality of the bomber’s experience, 
and in this regard I seek to plot the level of constraint that the bombers can be supposed to face on this axis 
(while different elements are recorded on the other two axes). Where the suggestion has been that some 
constraints enhance autonomy, I mean that some constraints will be less impeding of autonomy. For instance, 
most persons have the constraint of family relationships, but in some cases those relationships will be very 
suppportive (this would be when constraints might, depending on the scores on the other axes too, enhance 
autonomy) and in others much less supportive (this would be when constraints might restrain autonomy). These 
sorts of examples are fleshed out for the bombers in the application section of this chapter (from page 248).    
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less constraining but constraining nonetheless). The grades on my first axis, then, look 




Of course, as we will see when we come to the cases, constraints may not fall out this way. 
For example, in some ways individuals may be protected from the effects of their contexts 
and in some instances social and family pressures may be extremely strong. In such instances, 
estimates for each person based on their circumstances would need adjusting accordingly. 
However, while this needs to be case-by-case and will always be rough (the aim, recall, is to 
indicate degrees not to provide an exact account), such varieties merely indicate that this is 
complex and suggestive. However, even if tentative this does not make it an unimportant 
exercise as it does allow approximate measurement, differentiation and comparison. Given 
my goal is a more graded account that allows autonomy in constraints, any ability to provide 
nuances and recognise autonomy variances and differences is useful. Thus, the first axis seeks 
to capture varying levels of constraint that surround the agent and the ways they limit or 
enhance her. 
 
It should also be noted that I do not take the maximum to be the ‘best’ possibility and so a 
prescriptive notion, rather it simply fleshes out the higher extreme of the scale and so is a 
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descriptive notion. For instance, having absolutely no constraint should not be considered the 
optimal case where the implication is that this is the level to which all agents should strive 
and that this is a ‘good’ end. Not only is this impossible on the relational account of 
autonomy I endorse (which always sees human beings operating within constrained contexts 
of varying intensity) but it is different to the purpose of the axis which is to record degrees of 
constraint. In this sense, the upper limit of the scale is not directive (it is not stating what 
should be aimed at) but expressive (it outlines a boundary at the other end and so a set of 
states between which agents may fall).  
 
The second element is about self-regard. This requires that the agent hold self-regard (where 
this is about seeing oneself as valued and as someone that matters in moral considerations to 
some extent). Ways in which self-regard might be indicated include the level to which the 
agent feels she can allow for her needs in her deliberations or how far she thinks she will be 
listened to when justifying (understood broadly, as has already been discussed in chapter three 
and four of this thesis) herself to others. Self-regard is, in part, derived from others and 
practiced in relation in how one interacts with others, and so is a constitutively relational 
account. Put differently, this requirement recognises the social dimensions and intricacies at 
play in self-regard: even if others don’t treat the agent this way, the agent may still think of 
herself as having self-worth (and vice versa, so even if she considers her self as worthy, others 
may not share this conviction). Decoding these interconnections is important for my account 
since it recognises that self-regard is not purely self-generated but rather a relational notion. 
In short, then, this element is about appreciating that one has some worth as a human being. 
This feature can be set out as: 
(2) To hold self-regard.  
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The scale for this axis will start at ‘0’, where this suggests that the agent does not deem 
herself worthy of consideration at all, and where this may be manifested by lack of 
responsibility for self (as seen by oneself and others). It will end at ‘10’, where this records 
that she is worthy of absolute consideration, where this might be manifested by being fully 
responsible for self (as seen by oneself and others). In between these positions is the agent 
thinking of herself as worthy of some consideration and responsible to some extent (by both 
self and others). It is presumed that the extreme scores will be difficult for anyone to attain 
(an absence of consideration of worth implies there is no-one who considers the agent worthy, 
and a total consideration of worth implies there is no-one who does not consider the agent 
unworthy, where these eventualities affect the agent’s self-regard). Differently, it is thought 
that the middle positions are more likely to be attainable. However, even within these limits, 
where it is prima facie thought most people will end up, there is still gradation, as others 
could recognise that the agent is owed some consideration but she herself feels worthless, and 




It is prudent to highlight here that this axis aims to determine the amount of self-regard that 
genuinely exists for the agent, so it is a substantive view in its goal of paying attention to the 
detail and composition of self-regard rather than a formal view that is satisfied that self-regard 
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is evident. In other words, this component of autonomy, like all these in my account, is a 
continuum and not a threshold concept. More substantive accounts of relational autonomy 
than mine may demand a stronger notion of self-worth (such that it encompasses a bolder 
normative claim, like a commitment to feminist values – however that is cashed out – before 
even getting onto this axis), but this is not a stipulation of the model I am proposing. Rather, 
my account is about measuring, and so it aims to capture fine distinctions between (for 
instance) low and lower still self-regard, which is why the scale is set out as it is to include a 
wholly eroded and preserved disposition. In this way, the focus is to indicate degrees of self-
regard and as it actually is for the agent in order to respect and account for limited and partial 
understandings; something which is crucial if those who are lacking in some elements are not 
to be automatically deemed lacking in all. 
 
In addition, and slightly differently to axis one where the higher score of removing all 
constraints was neither possible nor desirable, the upper extreme of the self-regard scale 
recognises that a world in which selves and others regard themselves as fully worthy should 
be theoretically possible (and desirable). But, more like axis one and as already been alluded 
to above, it also appreciates that, in the real world that is full of complex interactions, it is 
highly improbable that an agent and others will see her as a complete equal let alone fully 
worthy.165 This means that, once again, the purpose here is to report the degree of self-regard 
in current non-ideal conditions rather than demanding that it meet a non-existing ideal level or 
threshold.  
 
                                                           
165 Even someone who regards themselves as fully worthy would still need to have their score adjusted with how 
much others regard them as such. 
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Thus, this range covers the self-regard element of my account and captures how much worth 
the agent has, as recognised by her self and others, and as may be manifested in various ways. 
For instance, it may be demonstrated by justification, or dispositions of answerability or 
responsibility for self (where this may in turn be evinced by divulging certain features of her 
experience that give away her attitude, by using metaphors that convey her view, or by 
sharing stories that reveal her values). 
  
The third and final element is reflection, understood relationally. This requires the agent to 
reflect (from a relational, stable enough, self) and critically evaluate goals or plans (from a 
position of self-regard such that she sees herself as worthy or answerable to some extent), and 
affirm that she wants those goals or plans to be hers (where ‘her’ is a relational her). 
Examples of such reflection include when an agent finds herself valuing an end she already 
has and appraises it (from a relational self) as one she likes having. Or when she judges 
(based on a sense of self-regard) that this goal is better for her than another. Or when she 
assesses and reaffirms her plans (within and from an ever-evolving though practically unified 
self) as ones she wants. So, reflection or evaluation is rooted in a complex relational agent, 
with a sufficiently stable (practically unified) self – and such reflective evaluation is also 
practiced in relation, such as through justification (which is part of the second axis) – making 
this a constitutively relational view. In essence, it is about some engagement with one’s 
commitments from a connected self and endorsement of those commitments.  The feature, 
then is: 
(3) To reflect, and evaluate one’s goals or plans, in a relational way.  
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I suggest that this axis starts from ‘0’, where there is no reflection whatsoever or the self is 
too unstable to know who (the relational) she is against which to do the reflecting, such that 
the commitments espoused are not hers (relationally understood). The range ends at ‘10’, 
where there is absolute reflection from a fully stable self and the commitments are entirely 
hers (relationally understood). Between these two ends is where we record some reflection 
(there is some engagement with the agent’s goals) from a stable enough self (the complex self 
is somewhat unified), whereby the commitments can be recognised as hers. Again, it is 
unlikely that the extremes will be attained (since all relational selves fluctuate and only reach 
a fully static position when life ends and rarely are so conflicted that there is no practical 
unity. Further, it is plausible that there will be some reflection and evaluation from this kind 
of self ranging from a cursory acceptance of goals to in-depth meditation on and discussion 
with others about one’s goals). In this regard, it is much more likely that agents operate within 
these points. Crucially, though most agents seem to fall within this intermediate space, such a 
scale captures varying degrees of critical reflection, including the very low. An agent, for 
instance, could assess her goals but do so from an intensely wavering intersectional self, such 
that what she wants constantly changes depending on to whom she talks and their aims for 
her. This would place her lower on the scale than if she were evaluating from a more stable 
self (where this still accepts that selves do alter over time and in differing relationships and 





To avoid confusion, what I mean by the goal and the goal being the agent’s should be made 
clear. First, though I focus on a goal or plan, and so it may initially appear that I favour a 
local conception of autonomy, this is but one feature of overall autonomy functioning and is 
to be balanced with other axes, which means that my spectrum view is broadly global. In 
other words, the goal or plan it is not the only site for determining the question of autonomy 
and, in this respect, it is never assessed in isolation from the agent as a whole. Second, though 
my view is based on identifying which goals or plans are the agent’s, this is only insofar as 
recognising that the agent judges them as ones she wants, not about them being self-generated 
or socially untainted (the very possibility of which has already been discounted in this thesis). 
 
Further, and similarly to the first and second axes, the upper end of this scale does not aim to 
stipulate the optimum position, but rather to indicate an extreme and to plot reflection along 
these points. It is not the case that absolute contemplation about one’s goals from a fully 
stable self is the end towards which agents should move. Not only is this impossible (given 
the kind of selves we are and as already discussed) it is also undesirable (as the relational 
conception is rooted in the actual world). Someone who thinks about what she wants all day 
long but is unable to put this into practice because this is her sole activity or because her 
circumstances constrain her seems to be lacking somewhat in living a life that is her own 
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(relationally understood). In other words, while contemplation is an important skill to 
cultivate, the purpose of the scale is to record differing degrees of reflection, not to suggest 
that total reflection (at the expense of being in the world) is the best state.  
 
The final element, then, assesses the amount of reflection that occurs from a relational self 
and how stable the complex the self from which reflection takes place is. This captures and 
measures one part of autonomy.   
 
Three features of autonomy viewed on a spectrum therefore emerge: constraints, self-regard, 
and reflection. As has already been noted, all of these aspects themselves are degree-based 
concepts: there can be more or less constraints (axis one), there can be more or less self-
regard (axis two) and there can be more or less reflection from a relational self (axis three). 
 
Having set these elements out separately, I now briefly discuss how they function 
collectively. Individually, each axis provides a reading for the core features of my view, and 
together they provide an estimate of overall autonomy. Though there may be various ways in 
which to calculate this total amount, I use a simple method of averaging the scores of the 
three axes out in order to generate a rough number. Of course, there may be other and more 
complex ways to do this, and I would be open to alternatives and improvements. My claim is 
not that this method is the method, but merely that degrees of autonomy can be estimated and 
ascribed to individuals and so individuals distinguished and compared. Accordingly, the 
purpose is less what the number is and more that it allows a consistent and so comparative 
measurement. Though the figure will always be approximate and can be argued over, 
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averaging the three scores out meets this aim. The scale for measuring overall autonomy can 




Let me clarify again that this is not a threshold view. It is very unlikely that someone will 
have ‘0’ autonomy. Nor at this juncture am I proposing that a particular amount of autonomy 
is needed to qualify for anything like medical consent or legal responsibility, although it may 
be possible that the view could be developed to be used in this way. For now, the aim is to 
show that the autonomy of an array of persons, both agent-by-agent and across agents, can be 
estimated and differentiated in a nuanced way. Of course, if someone did score ‘0’ on all three 
of the axes, and so a ‘0’ overall, it could be supposed that they would not be autonomous.166 
In this way, one could develop this view into a threshold account for various decisions for 
medical or legal purposes – by requiring that consent only be deemed possible if an individual 
reached a given number on the scale, for instance. However, more work would need to be 
done using evidence from the medical and legal contexts to determine what this point would 
be and in what cases. Therefore, while more practical applications are possible – and it is 
hoped this understanding of autonomy will have such practical applications – this is not part 
of the remit of this thesis. Here the goal is simply to show that a spectrum view can represent 
various features relevant to autonomy, to measure autonomy such that it reflects this 
                                                           
166 A related point will be addressed again in the next section of this chapter. 
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complexity for individual persons so that degrees of autonomy can be differentiated, and to 
contrast one person’s autonomy with another.  
 
My view of autonomy as a spectrum, then, is thoroughly graded and interrelated: it can allow 
for a combination of variable inputs (constraints, self-regard, and reflection) and result in a 
specific output (the amount of autonomy in this particular case). That is, I argue that these 
three axes in turn identify and gauge elements of autonomy and inform how autonomous the 
bombers are on the spectrum overall. Together, this enables us to distinguish degrees of 
autonomy, describe the cases of female suicide bombers in detail, and to compare these 
women’s autonomy. 
 
The spectrum view of autonomy in action 
Having described the ways in which my account differs from current theories of relational 
autonomy and set out the three axes, I now apply the view to the cases of the female suicide 
bombers. As already discussed, but is worth reiterating, these case studies are limited. There 
is little primary data, such as first-person interviews (because most of the women died in the 
attacks), so the cases presented here are from what we do know; the women’s back-stories, 
interviews with family and friends and case histories, as well as imagined scenarios developed 
and extrapolated from the information available. As we have already noted, relying on these 
restricted sources has some drawbacks – for instance, they are necessarily interpretative, 
require conjecture and, as such, may well be inaccurate in some regards (such as about the 
women’s motivations and thoughts). Yet, as the aim is to show the possibilities of the 
spectrum view, this in itself is not problematic for demonstrating the way the view works. 
What is key is not that these particular women’s autonomy is pinpointed with precision, but 
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that women like these – constrained and curtailed – can have their autonomy (however 
limited) estimated. The important result is that some consistent assessment about their 
autonomy can be generated. In this regard, the cases I use will show the spectrum in operation 
rather than make definitive claims about these individuals per se. In short, if the facts or 
imaginings about these women were changed, the result may be different but this would still 
serve to show that the degree of autonomy could be approximated and measured.  
 
In this section, then, I use four cases from chapter one to illustrate different and relative 
extents of autonomy. I consider Dhanu (as someone who exercises high degrees of 
autonomy), Zina (as someone who indicates medium ranging degrees of autonomy), 
Muzhakhoyeva (as someone who has lower degrees of autonomy), and Kaplan (as someone 
who is severely restricted in her autonomy), before I finally discuss the women together in 
order to compare them explicitly. These examples will put different pressures on the 
individual axes and will demonstrate the view as a whole and claims associated with it, such 
as being able to describe the bombers in detail and to contrast them. Following this 
discussion, I will end this section by addressing a worry about who should be on the 
spectrum. Thus, here, I intend to show how my spectrum view of autonomy can be applied. 
 
Case 1 
The first case is Dhanu and I will take the three axes in turn and then assess them together to 
indicate how much autonomy she exercises on the spectrum view.  
 
We start with the first axis of constraints. Particularly relevant for Dhanu are the restrictions 
emerging from the context of the war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. 
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This specific war started in July 1983, when Dhanu would have been in her early teens, and 
involved the LTTE seeking a separate homeland for the Tamils in the north and east of Sri 
Lanka following years of discrimination by the majority Sinhalese government. Part of this 
unfairness included reduced opportunities for Tamils before the war (because Sinhalese was 
the official language and the best jobs were reserved for those who could speak it, for 
instance). It also involved the deeply patriarchal nature of the society more generally (where 
women were expected to hold roles as homemakers and child bearers, no matter which ethnic 
group they came from) (Alison 2003; Reuter 2004). Such a background, where there is 
prejudice toward a group of people and bias towards another set within it, is already a 
restrictive one for Dhanu (and other Tamil women). However, we can recognise that the war 
itself introduced further constraints. There was, for instance, the lack of opportunities because 
of the disruption caused by the conflict, such as maintaining regular occupations and the 
normalcy of everyday life (since many individuals were diverted to the war effort, including 
by transferring munitions, delivering messages, and enlisting as combatants). In addition, 
there was the more serious instability given the likelihood of loss of life due to the fighting 
(indeed some 100,000 people were estimated to die during the – almost – 26 year war, most 
of whom were civilian women and children) (Kanagasabapathipillai, 2014; Alison, 2004). 
Dhanu, then, faces stronger restrictions because of the war in the form of the probability of a 
shortened and radically disordered life. These add to the difficulties of more general ethnic 
and gender intolerance in the non-war setting of which she is part too. For Dhanu, the armed 
struggle is another constraint that adds to all the other ways she is constrained because of the 
social agent she is (her role as a woman and Tamil, for instance). 
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Moreover, these various factors are not separate but are likely to interconnect and exacerbate 
each other in different ways. For instance, being a woman and living in a civil war affects 
Dhanu’s security and bodily integrity. That this is the case is evidenced by the widely held 
belief (it has never been conclusively ascertained – Rajan, 2011) that she was raped by Indian 
Peacekeeping Forces, who were brought in as a regional peacekeeping force between 1987 
and 1990, after which it emerged they were guilty of various human rights violations 
(Amnesty International, 1990; Skaine, 2006; Pape, 2006). If this is true, it indicates that 
Dhanu experienced a great deal of harm because of who she is (a Tamil woman) and this 
particular context of war (involving the use of this abusive peacekeeping force). Differently, 
being a woman in a war impacts what types of roles she can play. As has already been 
discussed in chapter one, the predominant role for women has been one of non-violence or 
indirect violence, but the LTTE was one of the first insurgencies to systematically use women 
in their ranks (Reuter, 2004). This might generate a different kind of expectation where 
violent involvement becomes a viable option for some women. Indeed, it could be imagined 
that this could be the case either if Dhanu became politicised to fight for the cause or if, as 
some of the reports have asserted (as discussed in chapter one), that she wanted vengeance or 
to redeem herself because of the alleged rape (Beyler, 2003b; Skaine, 2006; Pape, 2006). 
Either way, it can be suggested that this might become a course of action deemed appropriate 
by her in her context. Here, Dhanu has restrictions on her because of the specific overarching 
climate of conflict in Sri Lanka for a free Tamil Nadu, which curbs and shapes what she as a 
woman can do in that society. These, then, are examples of a multitude of constraints on 
Dhanu that are complexly connected. 
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Thus, the war limits Dhanu (in what she can do or become) in a more apparent way than the 
comparatively more muted, though still hampering, forces of gender, ethnicity, and social 
status that otherwise contextualise her life in a non-war setting. However, these other 
pressures are not absent in war but interlink in various ways, and together constitute Dhanu’s 
particular restraints. The first axis, then, indicates that Dhanu experiences many constraints, 
the severest of which is the civil war but where this intersects with other limitations, which 
suggests that she faces extreme curtailments. 
 
On the second axis of self-regard, the facts around this are less certain, but – like most 
persons – it can be posited that Dhanu had numerous (positive and negative) influences in her 
life that affect how she and others see her. For instance, though little is known, we can 
speculate that, on the one hand, Dhanu has grown up in a familial and communal setting 
where those around her value her as a person. Perhaps for the discussion we can suppose that: 
she is regarded by her parents as being of comparable worth to her siblings and cousins, she is 
encouraged to express herself amongst her peers, she is recognised as a high-achiever in 
school, and she is commended for her political beliefs for a Tamil homeland. However 
formulated, such examples are likely to fall in the category of positive social experiences, 
where Dhanu has accumulated feedback from a young age that has contributed to her self-
perception that she is someone significant amongst, and whose views matter to, her family 
and community. On the other hand, we can equally imagine (and assuming for a moment that 
we accept the reports about her rape) that she has suffered a sexual violence. This – as many 
women who have undergone such abuse relay (Brison, 2002; Burgess-Jackson 1996) – might 
cause her to feel degraded as a woman and might shake her belief that she is a person with 
inherent dignity – a conviction (given her suggested supportive upbringing) we can suppose 
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that she held for a long time.167  We can propose, then, that this sensation of self-doubt and 
the ordeal of rape that she underwent erodes her self-worth greatly, and that others (in a 
society that prizes chastity for unmarried women – Alison, 2004) see her as ‘tainted’ (as 
described in some of the responses in chapter one) and less worthy too. Together this may 
move to undermine the regard she once had for herself.  
 
Of course, we could easily suggest that Dhanu never recovers from this damaged position of 
self-regard, and that this leads to a very low reading on the axis. However, it can also be 
imagined (for the purposes of this case) that Dhanu’s self-regard may well improve.  Suppose 
that some others (like her family) recognise that she was mistreated and, over an extended 
time, encourage her to build up her fragile sense of self (indeed, this is similar to Brison’s 
experience since she is supported by her loved ones to regain her self-confidence in time). In 
this kind of scenario, through her relationships, she may come to view herself, once again, as 
worthy of consideration, as entitled to hold a dissenting opinion that will be acknowledged 
and responded to seriously, and as someone that is important too, even though she has 
suffered adversity that is likely to affect her for a long while. Here, though of course there 
could be different readings, we could hypothesise that, it is this renewed self-belief that 
enables her to see things in a particular way. That she can identify that the offensive led by 
the Sri Lanka army is an affront to her personal dignity, for example, and that this reignites 
her previous political stance that it is an injustice against her fellow Tamils (who, due to their 
ethnicity, are regarded as inferior). In this instance, Dhanu may well have a lower self-regard 
than before, but overall we can speculate that it is still relatively high because of her 
(imagined) subsequent and generally positive interactions with others and, from this, her 
                                                           
167 Regarding the effects of rape, for instance, Susan Brison (2002) indicates that she went through a form of 
post-traumatic stress disorder including feelings of anxiety, and Keith Burgess-Jackson (1996) describes how the 
fear of rape can inhibit women’s self-respect and self-esteem.  
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recognition that she is worthy of respect. Overall, we can suggest, this enables her to see that 
she is someone who deserves moral consideration. As far as the second condition for 
autonomy on the spectrum goes, then, this indicates that Dhanu has a high self-regard. Again, 
other readings are possible and with more evidence this could be more accurately 
approximated. However, the point is to show how estimates for this type of woman can be 
made. Thus, even if this proved to be a misunderstanding of Dhanu, it would still show how 
autonomy can be measured for women like Dhanu as constructed here.  
 
The third axis measures reflection from a relational self. As will be the case with most of the 
women, very little is known about Dhanu’s process of critical reflection, so much of this 
analysis here will be conjecture simply to demonstrate how the spectrum works to estimate 
different degrees. It can be suggested that – as is likely with all persons – Dhanu holds various 
conflicting goals because of the relational self she is, and that it is possible for her to decide 
between and about them from this connected and complex self. We could accept somewhat 
trivially that Dhanu, for instance, has a diverse intersectional identity (as a woman, daughter, 
pro-LTTE nationalist, and war victim). We could also imagine, less trivially but not 
necessarily unrealistically, that she wants to ‘stay true’ to this identity because it is important 
to her. In addition, it is conceivable that she can critically reflect and endorse her desires from 
a somewhat unified self (parts of her identity and desires might conflict, but we can suppose – 
at least for argument’s sake here – that her self is not so severely disparate as to preclude 
decision-making). This is a situation where there are conflicts that lead to some uncertainty 
because of the complex identity that Dhanu embraces (since, it can be imagined that she both 
wants to die for her cause as a Tamil and look after her parents as a daughter in a culture that 
values family). Yet, we can still suggest that she has some ‘practical unity’ (it can be 
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supposed that she is not pulled in so many directions or torn between being a Tamil and 
daughter to such an extent that she has no stable base from which to reflectively endorse).  
 
In this scenario, then, the assumption is that she contemplates and assesses these different 
positions, evaluating whether being a suicide bomber matches up to who (the relational) she is 
and how (the relational) she wants to live, while always remaining connected. By reflecting in 
this way and endorsing the goal to bomb, we can propose that she is affirming that that desire 
is hers (relationally understood). So, though in the midst of hostilities between the LTTE and 
Sri Lanka, limited in her opportunities, and with an identity that makes conflicting demands 
of her, there is critical reflection. In other words, in this kind of setup, Dhanu still decides 
(from a relationally embedded perspective) about whether she wants to bomb from a 
sufficiently unified self, irrespective of the ambivalence she experiences, and this confirms 
the desire as hers. By reflectively endorsing about her goal to bomb from a practically stable 
and relational self, as we have inferred here, Dhanu scores highly on this axis so far.  
 
Further, based on the discussion in the second axis, we can imagine that she can appraise the 
aim to take a stand against the Sri Lankan army from a position of strong self-regard. Since, 
as was speculated above, she (through others) has built up her self-worth after her abuse, it is 
likely that she holds the background judgement that she herself is owed freedom from 
maltreatment and her people are owed freedom from persecution. Given this, we can suppose 
that her reflection occurs from a sense that she is someone that is worthy of some 
consideration. In sum, these thoughts allow us to suggest a high level of reflection from a 
relational self on the third feature of my view. 
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Collectively, the individual axes present a clearer picture of Dhanu’s autonomy. So far, for 
instance, we have imagined that Dhanu both has fairly high levels of self-regard and can 
reflect upon and endorse her decision to be a bomber to a significant extent, and so we can 
suggest that she exhibits a good amount of autonomy functioning in these respects. Yet, we 
have also supposed that her background conditions – of war, and gender and ethnic inequity – 
limit her to a great extent, and so we can propose that the practicing of autonomy is also 
affected negatively by the severity of her situation. On my spectrum, then, we can represent 
this since the reflective endorsement (the third axis) and self-regard (the second axis) 
elements assess how much autonomy Dhanu has by these sets of measures. However, these 
must be counterbalanced by another set of measures of the constraining forces (the first axis) 
she experiences too. In conjunction these gauge the degree of autonomy being exercised by 





In short, our construction of this case suggests that though Dhanu (1) is in a situation that is 
characterised by excessive violence and conflict, she is also someone who demonstrates (2) 
advanced levels of self-regard and (3) evidence of a good deal of reflection from a relational 
self. Together these indicate that autonomy is being exercised (relative to some of the other 
bombers – as we shall see) to a high degree (where, recall, this is estimated by finding the 
average) on the spectrum view.  
 
This, then, is a case of relatively strong autonomy functioning. In the next two cases, we will 
explore examples where the constraints are high (as they have been suggested to be here), but 




The second example I consider is Zina and, again, I discuss where she is on each of the axes 
before putting them together to indicate her overall level of autonomy.  
 
With regards to the first axis of constraints, Zina, just like Dhanu, lives in a situation of 
political and military hostilities, but in her case the specific conflict is in the Palestinian 
territories. Zina was born in approximately 1983 into an environment where there has been 
constant fighting between the Israeli government and various Palestinian insurgents.168 For 
her, the immediate events that contextualised her life include those of general unrest involving 
the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon (1983), the killing of Israeli civilians on a yacht off 
Cyprus by the PLO and reprisals by the Israeli army (1985), and hijackings of the Achille 
                                                           
168 Though the exact date of her birth is unknown, the assumption here is that it was at least 1983 given that in 
2001 she enrolled into Bir Zeit University (Victor, 2003), so had to be 18 at that time. 
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Lauro cruise ship in Syria by the PLO and El Jet airplanes in Rome and Vienna by Fatah 
(1985). The bulk of Zina’s childhood was during the First Intifada (in 1987, when she would 
have been at least 4-years-old) and, despite ending with the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993, 
there continued to be fighting between the two sides after it. For example, there were suicide 
and bus bombings by Hamas in 1995, ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’ by the IDF against 
Lebanon and retaliation by Hezbollah in 1996, and, of course, the Second Intifada, set in 
motion after Ariel Sharon’s controversial visit to the al-Aqsa Mosque when Zina was at least 
17, started in 2000. Though her life has not been beset with constant official wars, because of 
the ongoing fighting there has been plenty of unofficial conflict, such that Zina has never 
known a time of peace with neighbouring Israel. This suggests that the context in which she is 
immersed is one of extreme instability and difficulty. For instance, her circumstances include 
that she has been limited in her daily movements through security checks (though, because 
she carried a Jordanian passport, these checks were not as cumbersome as for other 
Palestinians – Victor, 2003), and thwarted in her efforts to find proper work in Palestine 
(partly because of delays by Israel in transferring money to Palestine which has harmed the 
economy and job creation – Al Jazeera, 2013). Further, she has been bombarded by routine 
attacks by the IDF and reprisals by various Arab fighters, which have affected her outlook 
(Zina states “I could study…But I also realised how difficult life was under occupation. A lot 
of people I knew were injured, and several had even been killed” – in Victor, 2003, 135). 
These forces combine to lead to an environment that is highly restrictive to Zina, both in the 
positive activities she can perform (continuing her education or finding employment) and the 
negative ones she is forbidden from engaging in (free movement between Israel and the 
Palestinian territories). We can imagine that such externalities impose on Zina’s life and what 
she can do, and these are hindrances from which she cannot easily escape.  
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Moreover, the constraint of war is also one that adds to the other restrictions she faces 
because of who she is (a woman, Muslim, daughter, mother). For instance, it seems as though 
she felt that she was not allowed a political voice (after her involvement in Hamas, she states 
“I was free and doing something meaningful for myself and for a political cause” – in Victor, 
2003, 135 – indicating that she was not free or could not align herself politically before). It 
also appears that she felt pressure to be a good daughter from her family (as suggested by her 
being confined to her father’s home because she fell pregnant and because she had to give up 
the child, which she sees as a punishment for failing at this role: “What did I have to lose [by 
becoming an insurgent]? I already lost my baby” – in Victor, 2003, 136). We can infer that 
the belief that she cannot hold a political view or that she is her father’s responsibility if 
unmarried are some of the boundaries of being a woman in her society and from her kind of 
family. They frame her life in very real and tangible ways, such that we can assume that they 
restrict what she can and cannot do in actuality (she cannot keep her baby, for instance). 
These factors, then, already limit her and they add to and intersect with the bigger constraint 
of the conflict (since it is an overarching and constant threat to her life, as discussed above). 
One such complex interconnection is that between Zina as a woman and the war. On the one 
hand, Zina believes the war has opened up opportunities for her in an otherwise patriarchal 
society. She, for instance, discusses how she fell in love with Hassan, an operative in Hamas, 
and this gave her options: “He opened my eyes to life and to the possibilities that a woman 
could take advantage of, even within a religious environment. It was something my father 
never gave me. Suddenly, I had choices” (in Victor, 2003, 137-138). Of course, such 
‘opportunities’ are likely to be temporary (recall from chapter one that female bombers are 
regarded as non-permanent aberrations) but this indicates that she felt the war provided 
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women with more of a role than usual. On the other hand, getting involved with Hamas and 
the war was a way to redeem herself for her pregnancy and not being a ‘good’ woman in her 
society in the first place (again a narrative we explored in chapter one). She states, “Everyone 
knew about me and my baby and they understood why I had been sent to live with my 
cousins. I just wanted to be able to prove to him [Hassan] that I was better than his wife or 
any other woman he ever met” (in Victor, 2003, 142) by becoming a bomber. Here, one 
interpretation of Zina might be that she joined Hamas because she did not meet expectations 
of being a ‘good’ woman and this role provided a way for her to do so. Though other 
understandings of Zina’s words are possible, the aim here is purely to highlight examples of 
conceivable complex pressures on her (or women like her). These intersecting pressures of 
Zina as a woman and the war indicate some strong and credible constraints and ones that 
affect what she does.  
 
In all these ways, then, Zina experiences constraints, including because of the war and who 
she is. Just like Dhanu, we can infer that the war for Zina is the most repressive constraint, 
though there are links across these various restrictions. Unlike Dhanu, however, because there 
is no indication or reports that Zina was raped, it is possible to suggest that she may suffer 
slightly less constraint, though she has other pressures as an unmarried mother. Though the 
details of the case could be framed differently (perhaps the constraints are equivalent or more 
than Dhanu’s), what is important is that the particular details set out here can be recorded. We 
can imagine, then, that using the example as it is, this is a case a high constraints, though 
perhaps slightly less than Dhanu.  
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The second axis concerns self-regard. Again, just as with most people, it is plausible to 
suggest that Zina has both fruitful and problematic forces in her life that have a bearing on her 
self-regard (in how she and others see her). From a number of her statements, for example, we 
can see that she has some positive influences. She feels valued by her partner (she states “He 
told me that he was organising a bombing operation that would include me” and since this 
was an admired role, she asks “How much more proof did I need?” that he loved her – in 
Victor, 2003, 138). She gets worth from her role as a facilitator (she claims of her 
involvement that “It was an honour and I understood that from the beginning” – in Victor, 
2003, 136). She is more esteemed in the eyes of some others when she takes on more violent 
activities on behalf of Hamas (reflecting on a meeting in Hassan’s apartment in Ramallah, 
Zina recalls “I understood that evening that my job was to kill civilians because I could pass 
by security. I also understood that killing civilians affected Israelis more than anything else” 
and so it was an important job – in Victor, 2003, 138). Taking all this into account, it is not 
improbable, then, to suggest that these experiences lead her to have a strong sense of self-
worth and to think of herself as someone that is somewhat important in moral considerations, 
such that this is a substantial amount of self-regard. One way in which this might be seen 
more clearly is with how Zina relates to the world and reveals a strong sense of answerability 
(broadly construed) to others. Although Zina lives in a conflict zone and gave birth to a child 
out of wedlock and had an affair with her operator (and so is portrayed as easily manipulated 
in our analysis in chapter one, and so not necessarily responsible for self), she exhibits fair 
amounts of the accountability disposition. When asked whether she regrets that her victims 
died, for instance, she lacks remorse and instead affirms her belief that she did the right thing. 
In her words, “They [the victims] should go back to Poland or Russia or America where their 
parents came from…If they hadn’t come here to take our land, they would be alive today” (in 
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Victor, 2003, 152). This defence suggests that she sees herself as accountable, and we might 
be able to infer from this that others see her as answerable too. Similarly, in an interview 
conducted by Schweitzer in 2006 (when she was serving her prison sentence) Zina showed 
herself not to be a woman short on responsibility for self. His impression of her is of “an 
educated and opinionated young woman who, in the spirit of Islam and its decrees, clearly 
articulates the reasons that justify committing violence […with] self-control […and] 
interpersonal skills […that] makes it difficult to perceive her as ‘damaged goods’” 
(Schweitzer, 2008, 140-141). Though this is Schweitzer’s opinion and so it may be less 
reliable, this corroborates her lack of regret and justification above. We can provisionally 
suggest, then, that by responding to questions from others, such as Schweitzer, about the path 
that led her to work for Hamas, Zina indicates a high degree of self-regard since she was 
expected and able to explain herself.  
 
However, there are other factors to bear in mind, and particularly about how these negatively 
affect the quality of Zina’s self-regard. Since what matters for self-regard is not just what Zina 
thinks of herself but also what others think of her (since these are connected), we might think 
that it would be worrying if the worth she experiences is deceptive or manipulative. To 
expand this idea, we have already seen above that Hamas and her role within it gives Zina a 
sense of esteem, but now let us imagine a scenario where Hamas and Hassan regard her as 
strategically useful but ultimately dispensable. Here, the supposition is she is somewhat or 
trivially, but not especially, respected. The basis for this thought might be gleaned from 
Zina’s disclosure that Hassan “told me that if the attack was a success, which means that more 
than twenty people were killed, he would finally consider me a valuable part of the 
organisation” (in Victor, 2003, 142). This may indicate that Zina was not important until she 
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killed enough people and her worth from others in the group was contingent on following its 
aims. If this is the case, we could question the integrity of the admiration she gets from 
Hamas, which in turn implies that in reality she is worthy of much less consideration than she 
otherwise thinks. It could be suggested, in other words, that the portion of her self-regard that 
comes from Hamas and Hassan is skewed to some extent and though she feels worthy of 
consideration because of it, it is a suspect kind of esteem that erodes some of the quality of 
self-regard. Of course, this must be balanced with the value that we can imagine that Hassan 
might genuinely see in her as someone who is important and irreplaceable as a partner, and 
Zina’s own interpretation that she is worthy of some consideration (as discussed above). 
Relying on all of this, we can propose that Zina has a mixed source of self-regard: though 
some of her worth might emerge from problematic roots (Hamas and Hassan) much of it does 
not (Hassan and her beliefs), so she measures highly overall on the axis of self-regard. This is 
but one way in which to interpret the facts and imaginings presented here, and others are 
possible. The point is that the alternative readings can still be gauged on this axis. Taking the 
case as it is, however, when compared with Dhanu’s experiences (which have also been both 
positive and negative), we can suggest Zina’s position is somewhat on a par, and so it is a 
good amount of self-worth.  
 
The third axis I discuss is reflection from a relational self. Again, here it is difficult (for the 
most part) to point to evidence of critical reflection, so here I will offer various scenarios and 
examples building on the judgements made so far. Starting with the self from where reflection 
emerges, it can be imagined that Zina has and accepts her conflicting intersectional identities 
and desires to a high degree. She wants to be a good Palestinian (recall from above that she 
identifies with her people’s suffering under occupation), but does not want to adopt traditional 
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Palestinian female roles (again, above, she describes herself as being free for the first time to 
pursue a political cause rather than being a homemaker). However, she may end up enduring 
some of the conventional norms because she wants to subscribe to being a ‘good’ Palestinian 
woman (recall that she complies with her confinement, first at her father’s home and then at 
her cousin’s, following the birth of her baby to uphold norms about women being chaste in 
her society. Further, she suggests she has something to prove to Hassan because of her 
‘misdemeanour’). Here, it could be feasible to submit that Zina is a relational self that is 
complex and with diverging preferences, some of which are difficult to reconcile, others of 
which are more easily compatible. In addition, reflection from such a self may occur. Indeed, 
Zina claims “There was no doubt in my mind that I wanted to join and kill my occupiers and 
even, some day, if circumstances called for it, to blow myself up in an attack as well” (in 
Victor, 2003, 136), and this suggests a firm goal and one that may well have been reflected on 
to a significant extent from her stable enough relational self. This, then, is one way to 
construct Zina’s reflection.  
 
We can, however, picture a different scenario too. In this case, we might imagine Zina’s sense 
of self or will is too pliable (so she changes her desires on a whim with no overall unity about 
who she – as a relational agent – is) such that she cannot reflectively endorse her desires from 
an anchored (enough) base. It has already been suggested, for instance, that (at the time of the 
interview with Schweitzer and with Victor above) Zina is adamant about why she wants to 
bomb. Yet, we might also believe that this stance, as firm as it appears, might be less critically 
reflective and from a less stable sense of self. Zina, for instance, says about Hassan that “He 
inspired me…and soon I came to believe in everything he believed in and everything he did” 
(in Victor, 2003, 137) such that this may cast some doubt on the extent of her reflection 
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despite her forthright responses to interviewers. Further, suppose that her desire to please (or, 
as she put it above, to prove herself to) Hassan becomes the overwhelming focus of who she 
is or her sense of self, such that being a staunch Palestinian or good woman (which are 
important to her above) become lesser concerns. Given that Hassan later became problematic 
– he allegedly “denounced her when he was arrested [and…] also implicated her in the attack 
when she placed a beer can in a supermarket in Jerusalem” (Victor, 2003, 156) – it is possible 
to suggest that this might destabilise Zina’s sense of self. We can imagine her darting around 
her commitments because she now has a poor sense of her relational self from which to 
reflect, and this could be an instance of some instability of the self. In this case, it can be 
suggested that Zina’s intersectional self is not as reconciled as we originally thought. So, in 
either of these alternative understandings, Zina could be unsure about who she (understood 
relationally) is and/or whether the goal to bomb is a commitment she evaluates and makes 
hers (again a relational ‘hers’). Whether or not we accept the possibility of this more unstable 
self, it seems that we could infer, at the very least, that there might have been less critical 
reflection than we supposed given the obsequiousness to Hassan, suggesting a lower score on 
this axis.  
 
All this, of course, must be balanced with the view that the reflection that does occur happens 
from a state of quite high self-worth (which was the proposed outcome of the discussion of 
the second axis). Though we have hypothesised here that the decisions Zina makes may not 
always be reflected on to a high degree (and/or they are from a very flexible a relational base), 
there is some reflection and that from a good position of self-regard. In Zina’s case, then, we 
can suggest there is a lower degree of reflection from a relational self occurring than with 
Dhanu, but it is a fair amount nonetheless.  
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Bringing the three axes and all these observations together enables us to record Zina’s overall 
autonomy. We can measure the high constraints that frame Zina’s life, with the war playing a 
dominant force but also her pregnancy outside of marriage and feelings of being trapped 
contributing to the difficult circumstances she faces. It also allows us to plot Zina’s quite 
strong sense of self-regard since she is able to answer for herself and she expects others to 
listen, though others (such as the leaders of the cell at Hamas) may see her as someone who is 
instrumentally worthy (for the goal of bombing). In addition, it permits us to map Zina’s 
complex relational self that is somewhat stable and from which some lower levels of critical 
reflection to make her commitments hers occurs. This can be represented on the spectrum in 
the following way: 
 
 
Here, we can see there are (1) very high constraints, (2) high self-regard, but (3) lower 
reflection from a relational self. When compared with Dhanu, she scores less well on axis 
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three and this gives her an overall lower degree when exercising her autonomy on the 
spectrum view, but this is still mid-ranging as a whole.  
 
Zina, then, provides an example of someone with a fairly good amount of autonomy though it 
is not as high as Dhanu because her reading on the third axis is lower. This brings us to the 
next case, where the agent scores lower on the second axis too.  
 
Case 3 
The third bomber we will consider is Muzhakhoyeva. Once again, each axis of the spectrum 
will be discussed in turn before they are assessed together.  
 
The first axis of constraints is not dissimilar to Dhanu and Zina, in that there is an overarching 
climate of war, but here the conflict is between the Chechen rebels and the Russian state. 
Muzhakhoyeva, along with her fellow Chechens, is amidst a longstanding territorial and 
political dispute for sovereignty, running from at least the 1850s to the present day. The most 
recent phase of fighting, which took place when Muzhakhoyeva was around 10-years-old, 
intensified with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, after which Dzhokhar Dudayev (the 
presidential leader) declared the autonomous region of Chechnya independent (in 1993). 
Since then there has been constant conflict, both official declarations of war (such as the First 
and Second Chechen Wars) and unofficial fighting (including Russian and insurgent 
perpetrated violence) (Eager, 2008; BBC News, 2011). As we have seen with the conflicts in 
Sri Lanka and Palestine, over the years the war in general leads to many hardships for 
ordinary people, and this is similar in Chechnya. Muzhakhoyeva, for instance, has seen 
economic instability (though Chechnya is located close to the Black Sea and is oil rich, the 
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ongoing dispute has meant Chechens cannot control or benefit from this resource, and GDP 
per capita corresponds to that of Ghana – Adomanis, 2012; UNC, 2014. Muzhakhoyeva 
herself is classed as someone in extreme “poverty” – Groskop, 2004, 32 – with not very many 
prospects for work – The Scotsman, 2004). She has experienced violence perpetrated by both 
sides (Muzhakhoyeva’s husband died in 1997 in an attack by the Russians, and she herself 
was affiliated with the rebels who target the Russian state). She has lived in a climate of 
upheaval and displacement (around a third to a half of Chechnya’s 1.3 million population 
have fled their homes since the first conflict – Shah, 2004 – and Muzhakhoyeva’s home 
region of Achkoi-Martan was destroyed in it too – Groskop, 2004). Grave violence, economic 
discontent, and daily volatility; such is the context that surrounds Muzhakhoyeva and 
underpins the basis of her everyday experience. From this, we can suggest that the war is a 
severe constraint to her person, since it forestalls a life of security (to her person and to the 
kind of life she can live).  
 
In addition, we can imagine that Muzhakhoyeva faces constraints simply by virtue of who she 
is and her particular circumstances. Though the veracity of her testimony and interviews may 
be problematic because she was caught by the Russian authorities and there may have been 
duress or plea-bargaining involved (Rajan, 2011), there are some facts in her reports that hint 
at the kinds of limitations she faced.169 Muzhakhoyeva, for instance, is a young widow in a 
society that regards this as a lowly status (some reports suggest that “according to Chechen 
                                                           
169 There is some suggestion that Muzhakhoyeva changed her story. During her police testimony, she claimed 
she was drugged but during an interview in 2004 she said she actively participated in preparing for and 
organising her attack (Rajan, 2011). This change may be because of plea-bargaining – it is possible she gave the 
police the story they wanted (see footnote 170) in the hope of a reduced sentence of 5-6 years, but when she was 
given a hefty custodial sentence of 20 years decided to tell a different story. After hearing her sentence in court, 
she reportedly said: "I trusted you. I thought you were good. I hate Russians. I did not want to blow up anyone. 
But now I will serve 20, 25 years. Then I will return and blow you all up" (in Strauss, 2004). This suggests 
perhaps she was not drugged at all, or that she genuinely did not want to bomb, or that she has become 
radicalised because of her treatment (which are amongst several possibilities).  
 269 
tradition, she and her baby daughter, [after her husband’s death] ‘belonged’ to her husband’s 
family” – Groskop, 2004, 32 – whereas others claim she was rejected by them – The 
Scotsman, 2004). She owes money to her in-laws (she supposedly stole and borrowed money 
as well as jewellery while trying to runaway – Groskop, 2004; Strauss, 2004). She has a child, 
Rashana, whom she cannot afford to raise herself (and apparently there is no way the family 
would allow her custody anyway – The Scotsman, 2004). If these self-disclosed reports are 
accurate then they are very real restrictions based on the specific person she is (a Chechen 
widow and mother) and they are likely to matter to and frame her life, since this is the context 
in which she is immersed. Further, just as with Dhanu and Zina, it is not farfetched to suggest 
that these factors may well intersect with the broader constraint of war that we have already 
discussed. This can be seen in how, for Muzhakhoyeva, suicide bombing is a possible option 
for her to undertake precisely because she is a widow and there are precedents from the recent 
conflict for such women in particular to become bombers (at least 6 attackers before her, for 
instance, met this criterion – CPOST, 2011). There are other more controversial allegations 
about the pressures Muzhakhoyeva was under (for instance, she claims that she was drugged 
regularly and had the threat of ‘Black Fatima’ – the woman charged to look after her – 
remotely detonating the bomb if she backtracked. Both of these, however, seem inconsistent 
with her statement that she attempted to activate the bomb numerous times. Julie Rajan, 2011, 
asks if she was drugged could she be so composed to travel to 4 cafés and press the button 20 
times, and if the device was faulty, which it was not because a bomb disposal expert died 
when deactivating it, then why did ‘Black Fatima’ not trigger it?) Irrespective of whether 
elements of Muzhakhoyeva’s testimony, such as these, are true, such a background of war and 
her particular circumstances are constraining factors nonetheless.170 Based on this, we can 
                                                           
170 Speckhard suggests that reports of ‘Black Fatima’ and being drugged may have been fabricated by 
Muzhakhoyeva in order to play up to the Russian stereotype that women are coerced into becoming bombers 
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propose that a group – like the Chechen rebels – that expects widows to be suicide bombers is 
more pressurising for Muzhakhoyeva than an insurgency that prohibits the use of women 
altogether. Together these are strong constraints, and the conflict especially, is extremely 
limiting for Muzhakhoyeva, but the fact that she is a widow compound these difficult 
circumstances too.  
 
So, on the first axis, we can suggest that she is highly constrained, perhaps even more so than 
Zina (who suffers from the war and is an unmarried mother) and about the same as Dhanu 
(who experiences war and is an alleged rape victim).  
 
The second axis we consider is that of self-regard. With Muzhakhoyeva, as with the other 
women discussed, it is plausible to assume that there are various influences in her life that 
frame how she and others see her. From what we know, for instance, though her parents did 
not raise her (her father died when she was 7 and her mother did not have contact with her), 
her grandparents cared for her a great deal (The Scotsman, 2004). Further, we can suppose 
that though she stopped her education young (some reports put this at 15 – Groskop, 2004) 
because she fell pregnant and so she could marry her partner (other reports put this at 19 – 
The Scotsman, 2004), she felt significant in her role as a mother (she said she “love[d] 
Rashana very much” – in The Scotsman, 2004). We might also imagine without difficulty that 
she gained some self-worth as wife and that she looked forward to raising a family with her 
husband before he died. These are likely to be positive forces in generating a good level of 
self-regard, and based on these experiences we can suggest that she sees herself as worthy of 
consideration to some extent.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Rajan, 2011) and Andrezej Zaucha makes a similar claim about drugs, brainwashing and blackmailing being 
excuses that suit the Russian authorities because they overlook that the women might be ‘desparate enough’ 
because of the war to act of their own accord (Groskop, 2003).   
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However, it is easy to suppose that these sentiments are hampered by other factors, especially 
with the death of her husband. Since, as mentioned above, being a widow and single mother is 
a disvalued position in her society, we can imagine that Muzkhakyeova’s sense of self-regard 
may be eroded because others do not expect her to answer for herself given her status. 
Remember that she was essentially a “household slave” (Groskop, 2004, 32) after he died, so 
was there to assume the life of a servant, not to have a life of her own. In such circumstances, 
and given that self-regard is connected to the way others sees the self, it is not difficult to 
claim that her own belief that she should answer for herself is also reduced. We may accept 
her story that she ran away to repay her debts and hypothesise that the rebels see her more 
positively (which is not impossible given that she supposedly formed a close bond with one of 
them – The Scotsman, 2004). However, staying with the insurgents may not have revived this 
belief in herself to the same extent given the negativity of worth associated with a position of 
servitude. For instance, imagine that Muzhakhoyeva had the opportunity to engage with 
others (like the Chechen rebels around her) about what she wanted, which is likely to have 
been a positive experience for self-regard. But, as a widow who still feels her role in life, 
according to Chechen tradition, was to serve and that she has no entitlement to her daughter, 
she is also likely to retain a diminished self-worth, and we can surmise that this affects her 
answerability disposition. In other words, thinking of herself as a slave and as someone to 
whom no-one will or should listen, she is less likely to regard herself as someone of moral 
consideration. Though we could interpret Muzhakhoyeva differently, if we base our 
judgement on this particular scenario, then we can plot where she falls on this axis. We can 
suppose that she exercises a much lower degree of self-regard than Dhanu (who, though 
experiencing rape, we supposed did manage to regain her self-worth to a relatively high 
 272 
level). Likewise, she scores far less than Zina (who, though we suggested did not receive 
much from Hamas insurgents, still has a good deal of self-regard from other parts of her life). 
This is because Muzhakhoyeva started with some worth but ended up with very little, and this 
former state was not satisfactorily replenished. Thus, the proposal is that, when balancing the 
positive and negative influences, Muzhakhoyeva scores quite low on the self-regard axis.  
 
The final axis is that of reflection from a stable enough relational self. Based on some of the 
evidence we have, we might suppose that Muzhakhoyeva is an intersectional self with various 
conflicting identities and desires. We know that she is a Chechen widow and could imagine 
that she feels a mixture of emotions and preferences (she grieves for her dead husband and her 
role in society, and wants retribution – Groskop, 2004). At the same time, she appears to hold 
a commitment to non-violence (she could not bring herself to activate a suicide belt on a bus 
on a previous mission, she pulled faces at men in the various cafés in which she was to 
detonate her bomb to attract attention and thwart the attack, and at her trial, she says “I did not 
want to blow up anyone” – in Strauss, 2004). Further, she feels she has responsibilities to her 
child (she tries to escape from her in-laws with her daughter so she can take care of her – 
Strauss, 2004). Though some of these desires and identities might be compatible and others 
might clash, she could nonetheless have a sturdy sense of herself from which to decide about 
bombing. If she critically reflects on this aim, from this base, then this may score well on the 
third axis.  
 
However, given the concerns that have already been raised about Muzhakhoyeva’s testimony, 
it seems she may have trouble with evaluating her goals from a stable self. We can suggest 
that a different way to interpret the evidence above is that she is deeply conflicted. She both 
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seems to want non-violence and wants violent revenge (at her court trial, she followed up her 
statement about not wanting to kill people with “I will return [after her sentence] and blow 
you all up” – in Strauss, 2004 – though this may well have been in anger). Further, she wants 
to repay her debts and be a good mother while killing herself (a position that she claims the 
Chechen commander allegedly dismissed as not a reason to die – Strauss, 2004). Here, we 
might suppose that though she has a clashing intersectional self because of her various 
identities, which is not necessarily problematic, her sense of who she is for functional 
decision-making might also be very unsteady, which is more worrying. Given this precarious 
state, we may imagine her to be too wavering and with limited practical unity from which to 
critically reflect. The reflection (thinking and valuing) itself, then, may be too uncertain since 
it cannot be pinned to who (the relational) she is (her values, for instance, may be somewhat 
erratic) and so it is less clear whether various commitments are more hers (relationally 
understood) than others. We might read these kinds of reports and imaginings differently, but 
from this standpoint, Muzhakhoyeva signifies a very low kind of reflective endorsement.  
 
Moreover, this assessment of her reflection is consolidated when we consider that it is not 
from a place of high self-regard (as pointed out in the discussion of the second axis). There 
we judged that she feels a low worth and disposition to answer for herself. Here we can 
follow that her reflection is not particularly critical since she feels the need to justify herself to 
others (and others only expect it from her) in small amounts. We can intuit, in other words, 
that her reflection about whether to bomb is done in a cursory and not meaningful way (which 
fits her testimony of changing her mind constantly about detonating the bomb, for instance) 
partly because her responsibility for self is diminished.  
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In this respect, we can suggest that Muzhakhoyeva may have done some, but not very much, 
reflection to make the commitment (relationally) hers, and that this is to a lesser extent than 
either Dhanu (who scores highly here) or Zina (who does less well, but better than 
Muzhakhoyeva). Muzhakhoyeva, then, has a low score on the reflection axis. 
 
Bringing the three axes, evidence and assumptions together, I propose that it is plausible that 
Muzhakhoyeva is quite low on the spectrum of autonomy. We can gauge, for instance, that 
she is highly constrained because of her context of war as well as being widowed and in debt. 
We can weigh up that she holds little self-regard because she and others see her as a servant 
and not responsible in any serious way for herself. We can calculate that she reflects 
somewhat poorly from a shaky relational self, as she is conflicted in lots of ways and is 






This shows that Muzhakhoyeva (1) experiences high constraints, (2) has limited self-regard, 
and (3) can reflect somewhat but her relational self fluctuates a great deal. Together this 
indicates a low degree of autonomy on the spectrum, and certainly much lower than either 
Dhanu or Zina.    
 
So far, the cases have suggested that Dhanu, Zina and Muzhakhoyeva appear at different 
points at the spectrum relative to each other, whereby such a measurement represents the 
complexity of their external circumstances as well as their internal reflection and the 
interconnections between them through self-regard. This leaves us with the case of acutely 
low scores on the spectrum (lower, even, than Muzhakhoyeva) and the question of what my 
spectrum view has to say about someone who scores so minimally across the axes that they 
effectively exercise negligible autonomy overall. It is to this final example that we now turn.  
 
Case 4 
The last case is that of Kaplan, about whom little is known, but whom I will suppose is 
severely restricted in her autonomy, so that we can test the parameters of the spectrum.  To do 
this, I suggest Kaplan (a) is coerced (which, based on the evidence, is likely to have 
transpired), and then tweak the actual scenario to assume she (b) falls into a comatose state 
(there is no evidence that this occurred – the move is purely conjectural to explore the view). 
The latter supposition (b) is admittedly extreme and not one that I imagine will transpire very 
often or will be best use of my view, which is instead to measure the autonomy of (conscious) 
persons in conditions of high constraint. However, while I recognise these limitations, (b) is 
also deliberately extreme in order to examine the lower end of the scale and to clarify the 
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view; this is the only reason for its inclusion.171 I will claim that a key benefit of my approach 
is that even low-ranking people can be represented on (they do not fall outside) the spectrum.  
 
We start, then, with axis one and constraints. Just as with the other women, we know that 
Kaplan lives in a context of a war for independence. For her, though, the struggle is between 
the PKK, who (since 1984 to the present day) have demanded an independent Kurdistan, and 
the Turkish authorities, who have denied them their goal. Being situated in a war can lead to 
several problems, some of which should now be familiar. Take, for instance, harm to persons: 
in this war, both sides have caused some 30,000 deaths in total, mainly civilians of Kurdish 
ethnicity (Watson and Comert, 2012), which indicates an increased risk of death. There are 
restricted opportunities due to discrimination, such as the banning of the Kurdish language as 
well as Kurdish schools by the Turks (Watson and Comert, 2012), suggesting fewer prospects 
for this group. There has been some $88million spent on the war instead of infrastructure and 
jobs (Todays Zaman, 2011), implying greater poverty all round than without the war. We can 
imagine that Kaplan was constrained by the conflict in various ways because of these factors. 
Given the statistics, for instance, it is probable that she lost family members due to the war 
and that she potentially underwent prejudice because of her ethnicity, which is part of the 
reason for military action. These, then, we can assume, are high constraints for Kaplan. In 
addition to this, and again as with the other women, it is not unreasonable to recognise that 
Kaplan is a relational self and that this brings other limitations. At 17-years-old, for instance, 
she is a young Kurdish woman, and this is likely to bring certain expectations from others, 
(such as around her ethnicity and what being a woman within it means), and commitments she 
finds herself holding (including having some sympathies with the PKK and for wanting an 
independent homeland). We can suggest that these details contextualise her life, but more 
                                                           
171 See this part but also the part on ‘A Concern’ (page 284) for how the comatose example clarifies my view.  
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importantly that, just like the other bombers, the particularities of who she is intersect with 
those of war. We might imagine, for instance, that being a young woman and Kurdish in the 
conflict brings other problems, such as the probability of even greater poverty or a heightened 
risk of sexual violence (since women routinely suffer more of these kinds of harms in such 
circumstances – Jaggar, 2013). Both the war and the person she is, then, are part of the fabric 
of her life and constrain her greatly.  
 
These constraints may not be the only ones that Kaplan faces, however, and I will outline two 
further possibilities of (factual) coercion and (fictional) falling into a coma. There are, for 
instance, reports that Kaplan was subject to some form of (a) coercion. In particular, and as 
discussed in chapter one, following PKK custom, it is believed that Kaplan met, and had an 
opulent dinner, with the leader Abdullah Ocalan before her mission, and moreover that she 
saw her former colleague, Turkan Adiyaman, shot dead in front of her for refusing to carry 
out her assignment (Reuter, 2004). If true, it is not difficult to imagine that both the lavish 
dinner and the execution could be seen as a coercive threat, since it can be interpreted as 
grooming Kaplan and as an ultimatum, thereby making it extremely difficult for her to say 
‘no’ (the formal option to decline is there, but substantively it is not). This is a heavy burden 
that places her very high on the axis of constraint on the spectrum. Now, in addition to this, 
suppose that Kaplan (b) accidentally gets hit on the head and falls into a deep coma the night 
before her attack. So far, our scenario has taken us to the point where, owing to her context 
and the coercion she faced, we suggested that there was a great deal of constraint, but now we 
can conceive of another set of factors that compound her limitations. These are that something 
struck her head (an external object induced her condition), she is confined her to a bed (she 
cannot move), and she has to be drip-fed (she cannot eat or drink), for example. Since she was 
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harmed by an outside force, cannot voluntarily move, and is obstructed in her daily 
endeavours, we can envisage that these impediments are even higher for Kaplan than those 
that have thus far been imagined for her.  
 
Of course, some of this is conjecture and so alternative speculation is possible, and this could 
lead to a different score. Yet, if all of these pressures (about who she is, the war, coercion, and 
being in a coma) are attributed to Kaplan’s life, then, it is not unreasonable to submit that she 
undergoes grave constraints, which are certainly more limiting than Dhanu, Zina and 
Muzhakhoyeva’s situations.   
 
The second axis if that of self-regard, and we might suspect that this is not as straightforward 
in Kaplan’s case as some of the others. We could imagine – for argument’s sake – that in her 
pre-comatose state, Kaplan had ‘average’ levels of self-regard (that she had a range of both 
positive and negative influences in her life and she and other people saw her as answerable to 
varying degrees right up to the moment of the bump to the head and onset of her condition). 
However, our concocted comatose state suggests that her level of self-regard is now minimal 
and she definitely cannot engage with others around her in the way this notion, relationally 
understood, requires. In other words, while in the coma, we can presume that she does not 
remember how she and others see her pre-coma, and that she does not have the level of 
awareness to form a new judgement about the extent to which she is morally considerable 
now. In this setup, she does not exercise the disposition to answer or be responsible for self, 
which are signs of self-regard in my view.  
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We might add to this picture yet another complexity: suppose, as would be consistent with the 
actual symptoms of some comatose patients (NHS, 2013c), that Kaplan hears the voices of 
loved ones around her. These voices remind her of her worth to them, that they expect her to 
pull through, and that they intend to contribute to making her life go well when she does. If 
we assume that she can discern the positive tone of the voices, there may be some sense of 
value and importance being conveyed to her by others (on waking some coma patients report 
this feeling of reassurance – ibid), such that it indicates some self-regard (since others play a 
role in generating this too). However, it can also be suggested that, given her fragile state, 
Kaplan cannot properly interact with these messages (we can imagine their content not being 
entirely decipherable or that she cannot fully interpret their meaning because of her lack of 
awareness, for instance). Indeed being sensitive to others is usually a sign that patients are in 
the process of emerging from a coma (more on this in the next section) rather than being in 
the depths of one (ibid), as we presently imagine Kaplan to be. Here, her sense that she is 
someone of moral consideration is not likely to be apparent to her (given that she is not 
conscious) though others may see her as such. If we accept this, we can propose that her score 
is incredibly low on this axis and this is different to all three of the women considered so far 
who achieve a higher reading.  
 
The final axis is that of reflection and, in Kaplan’s case, we might foresee some difficulties 
given the states we have presumed for her. If we imagine Kaplan in a pre-coercive, pre-
comatose condition, we can tentatively suggest that she may well have engaged in some 
critical reflection because there was some evaluation, from a stable enough relational base, of 
her desire to bomb. When she experiences coercion in the form of the murder of Adiyaman 
and the dinner with Ocalan, however, this suggests there are strong constraints on her and her 
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decision-making. If she agreed to carry out the attack in this scenario, we might have cause to 
think that her judgement was not very robust because of these factors. Some reflection may 
have occurred – we can imagine her making assessments from a stable relational self related 
to the bombing, including about her life and the political cause – but in this instance it does 
not seem like it is a commitment she wants to make hers. She would score some amount for 
critical reflection but it could not be very high as far as endorsing this goal is concerned.   
 
This can be contrasted with the comatose position, where it is not difficult to accept that 
reflecting from a stable enough relational base is an incredibly difficult feat. Here, let us 
assume, for example, that Kaplan does not have even hazy memories of her relationships, 
identities and other commitments while in her condition. It can be imagined that this would 
leave her with a meagre, perhaps no, sense of self (since she is unaware of who she is) so that 
reflection is not possible (since the baseline against which all her judgements are made cannot 
be discerned and reflection itself is frustrated because of her condition). Similarly, even 
though she has very low levels of self-regard because of how others see her (the output of the 
second axis) from which to reflect, the process of reflection itself is impossible owing to her 
lack of consciousness. In this instance, we can suggest that Kaplan measures so low on this 
axis that there is scant exercise of critical reflection from a stable enough relational self, and 
this is distinct from Dhanu, Zina and Muzhakhoyeva, who all do exercise reflection from such 
a self to varying but, relatively, significantly more degrees.  
 
Again, though the example could be set up differently and lead to a different result, we have 
imagined it in a particular way for the purposes of discussion. We have suggested that, even 
though the amount of reflection from a stable self was low in the coercion scenario, there was 
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at least some functioning on this axis. However, in the comatose state, there is likely to be 
very little, if any, exercise of critical reflection.  
 
All these axes can be drawn together on the spectrum view to estimate the overall level of 
autonomy. We can plot how, before the inducement of the coma, Kaplan exercised autonomy 
in a limited way on the spectrum (she had strong constraints in the form of war and coercion, 
she had ‘average’ self-regard, and she reflected in small amounts from a broadly stable self). 
However, we can also gauge how, while in the coma, her autonomy reduces much more 
significantly. We can measure that she experiences higher constraints still (because she is hit 
on the head and in a coma), she holds a imperceptible self-regard (since there is some positive 
influence of others but little engagement with her self or others about her moral worth), and 
she practices undetectable degrees of critical reflection (because the self is extremely limited 
in its practical unity for reflection, making it difficult to ascertain who she is or what she 
wants). This reading of Kaplan’s case is deliberately extraordinary and entirely hypothetical 
in order to show one extreme of the spectrum. Undoubtedly, in practice, such cases are rare. 
But having a spectrum view does enable us to plot Kaplan’s self-regard (which is very 
limited) against her constraints (which remain incredibly high) and her reflection (which is 
the lowest of all). This allows the painting of a fuller picture of Kaplan’s autonomy than 
solely relying on any one measure.  
 






Here, we can surmise that there are (1) seriously high constraints, (2) highly reduced self-
regard, and (3) a strongly fluctuating relational self with no reflection. Together this indicates 
that Kaplan scores so poorly across the three axes that, in effect, she exercises a severely 
depleted autonomy overall, though it is still more than someone who scores ‘0’ across the 
board. In short, the fictitious example of Kaplan in a comatose condition is an illustration of a 
radically curbed, though perhaps still existent, autonomy on the spectrum view.   
 
All the cases 
So far I have, in the main, presented the four cases individually and plotted each bomber’s 
autonomy on the spectrum separately. Here I will briefly bring the cases together and suggest 
that a key benefit of my view is that the women’s autonomy can be measured against each 
other too. A side-by-side comparison of the women based on the discussion in this chapter 





In this graph, and to précis the analysis thus far, we can see that all the women have high 
constraints (such that they score very low on the first axis) as all of them have lived through 
their particular wars. Zina, however, has the least restrictions (she had a child out of wedlock 
but we suggested that she had not been raped like Dhanu or regarded as a slave like 
Muzhakhoyeva) and Kaplan the most (she is both coerced and, we imagined, in a coma). The 
women all have some self-regard, with Dhanu and Zina (who, we supposed, think of 
themselves as worthy of some consideration) scoring higher than Muzhakhoyeva (who we 
suggested thinks of herself as less worthy), though these three do better than Kaplan (who we 
proposed does not recognise herself as such, though others might). Finally, Dhanu, Zina and 
Muzhakhoyeva reflect from a stable enough relational self to some extent so are between the 
mid and lower ranges of the scale whereas we imagined that Kaplan struggles to do this, and 
so she gets zero. Taking all of these assumptions, facts, interpretations and axes together one 
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last time, we can submit that the overall picture of autonomy (recall that this is estimated as 
an average for illustrative purposes) for the women can be summarised as follows: Dhanu 
(5.0) has more autonomy functioning than Zina (3.7) who has more than Muzhakhoyeva (2.0) 
who, in turn, has more than Kaplan (0.2). In sum and relatively, we can propose that Dhanu 
exercises greater, and Kaplan lower, degrees of autonomy. This thereby enables a nuanced 
(factoring in constraints, self-regard, and reflection) assessment of the autonomy of the four 
bombers individually and comparatively. 
 
A concern 
In this part, I conclude the exploration of my spectrum view by outlining a possible concern. I 
stated earlier that my view is not a threshold one and that while others may take ‘0’ across the 
board or a certain number to indicate something like non-autonomy or minimal competency 
respectively, this was not my goal, which was rather to estimate the autonomy of the bombers. 
I have also suggested that someone like Kaplan, who is in a comatose state, still scores on the 
spectrum though this is at negligible levels. All of this implies some underlying tension with 
the idea of who should be on the spectrum; is it meaningful to advance that Kaplan scores on 
it at all given her condition? I address this worry here. 
 
There are two things to say about this. The first thing is that moving beyond a nil rating is 
very easy to do; scoring 0.01 (or an equivalently low number) on any of the axes does this. I 
have already illustrated this using the example of Kaplan in her coma (who scores marginally 
on two of the axes). We might also imagine other individuals who would appear towards the 
lower end of the spectrum overall, such as if Kaplan awoke from her coma and fell into a 
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minimally conscious state so she fluctuates in and out of awareness – KaplanM (where M = 
minimally conscious).172 We can suppose that she is someone who is (1) highly constrained 
(since she is limited in and cannot control her movements consistently, but she can do so to 
some extent from time to time,). We can also suggest that she (2) has some self-regard (as 
others may regard her with a great deal of worth and she may recognise and respond to this, 
but her perception varies intensely depending on what state she is in). We could also imagine 
that she (3) has some reflection (since she does hold a sense of self when conscious, but it is 
not a stable enough one because of her condition, and though she might be able to form or 
endorse commitments, this is also done in a haphazard way). All of these suppositions are 
similar to others in this kind of condition (NHS, 2013b). We can suppose that KaplanM makes 
it beyond a zero on the spectrum because she scores on each of the axes but that this allotment 
of autonomy is minuscule. Such a measurement, though small, fits my aim, which is to plot 
how much autonomy is occurring, and it would not be inaccurate to suggest that, according to 
the axes of my spectrum, traces of some of the relevant features may be evident. Many 
persons will get more than a nil score because the goal is to gauge the exercise of various 
elements of and overall autonomy.  
 
The second related thing to say is I do not draw a line for where concepts like ‘competence’ 
or ‘responsibility’ can be identified, as my hope – as just stated – is that the spectrum can 
properly represent the overall extent of the bomber’s autonomy. Let us imagine the 
hypothetical example of KaplanP who has stabilised and is now conscious but, as a result of 
her trauma, is severely disabled (where P = profound learning disabilities). She might be (1) 
                                                           
172 Such a minimally conscious person is expected to be higher on the spectrum than both someone in a coma 
(who is neither awake nor aware) and someone in a persistent vegetative state (who is awake but not aware), but 
lower than someone who has locked-in syndrome (who is both awake and aware but completely paralysed) 
(NHS, 2013b; Highfield, 2014). 
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very constrained in terms of her physical movements but empowered through support services 
on which she is nonetheless reliant. She might (2) have limited self-regard since she is not 
considered by others but she does consider herself to be responsible. She might (3) have tiny 
amounts of reflection since she can identify what kinds of things she wants to eat or wear but 
cannot make life plans (NHS, 2013a). This is someone who scores higher than KaplanM, 
given the relatively (and more stable) lower constraints and higher self-regard and self-
reflection, even though these may in turn be relatively lower scores than someone with 
moderate or no learning difficulties. While some could question whether anyone in KaplanP‘s 
condition should be on the spectrum, my intention is to better portray the bombers’ overall 
autonomy, not to label her competent or responsible. While a threshold for these sorts of 
capacities might be drawn for medical or legal purposes somewhere, my goal is to map 
functioning even if such levels are not reached. That I do not propose where such a threshold 
falls is not to say that determining this is not an important endeavour, merely that I do not 
intend to explore it here since this would require further empirical work and this is not the 
goal of this thesis. Rather, my aim is to measure the women’s autonomy in detail and to 
distinguish amounts of autonomy for the bombers individually and to compare the bombers’ 
autonomy.  
 
Thus, if we can take our imagined examples of Kaplan in the comatose state (case four) and 
the ones presented here one final time, we can see that a better representation (and 
comparison) of the women is possible. To illustrate, we can plot that Kaplan’s score of ‘0’ on 
reflection puts her on a similar level with KaplanM and lower than KaplanP. In addition, we 
can map that Kaplan may be more restricted than both on axis one (constraints) and have less 
worth than KaplanM and KaplanP on axis two (self-regard). Finally, we can gauge that all 
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these cases score higher than someone with ‘0’ across all three axes. It is these differences 
that the spectrum hopes to not just pick up but also to measure. The benefit of my view, then, 
is that even low-ranking people, such as Kaplan (and KaplanM and KaplanP) can be 
represented on the spectrum. 
 
In this part, I sought to put my spectrum view into action by applying it to the bombers in 
order to make good on the claim that my view allows for a detailed interpretation of the 
women’s autonomy. Using a mix of background facts, secondary sources (such as newspaper 
interviews with family or with the women themselves), and hypotheses relating to four 
bombers, I devised a set of scenarios to test my view. I argued that my spectrum view could 
measure constraints, self-regard, and critical reflection, and generate an overall estimate of 
autonomy for Dhanu, Zina, Muzhakhoyeva and Kaplan individually, and it could compare the 
bombers against each other on any of these elements or indeed their autonomy as a whole. 
The scenarios I presented here could be modified and this would affect the outcome (Dhanu 
may end up having the least autonomy and Kaplan the most on an alternative reading, for 
instance), but the point is less about establishing an absolute score for particular women and 
more that such changes could still be mapped on the spectrum and their autonomy 
approximated. Though the precise result may be different, then, what is key is that the details 
remain measurable. Thus, I contend that my view is able to characterise the bomber’s 
autonomy appropriately and to grade their autonomy in a nuanced way, both in theory and in 
practice.   
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Implications of a relational spectrum for narratives about bombers 
Having discussed my spectrum view, in this final section, I briefly consider the possible 
consequences of such an approach for portrayals of the bombers. In particular, I explore 
implications for societal and media narratives of the women as either ‘victim’ or ‘ideal 
woman’ (the two extremes into which they fell, as presented in chapter one) in terms of first, 
the agent and second, autonomy. I will argue that adopting the relational account on the whole 
with a spectrum view implies that mainstream representations of bombers can shift from 
being simplistic and cursory to more intricate and detailed. In other words, I contend that the 
relational model undermines these binaries and serves to complicate them instead.  
 
Agent 
To start, I consider the implications of the broad relational view for portrayals of agency. 
Specifically, I ask what consequences adopting the relational agent – which includes 
understanding the trajectory of acts and the particular agent as well as recognising selves as 
social and complex – has for narratives of the bombers first, as ‘victims’ and second, as ‘ideal 
warriors’. I will argue that it allows for more convincing representations of these women. 
 
First, then, I discuss the ‘victim’ archetype that is common in societies that reject the use of 
bombers. It might initially seem that the relational conception of agents – which, through its 
focus on contributing factors to the act or construing the agent, searches for reasons behind 
suicide bombing – falls into the trap of victimising the bombers. However, endorsing this 
view of the agent is not to suggest, as the ‘victim’ frame does, that if previous acts or the 
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particular person and why she acted are assessed that agency is being eliminated or eroded by 
‘explaining away’ the bomber’s action. To expand, some of the empirical evidence relating to 
the ‘victim’ frame seems to suggest that references to why she acted – she was bereaved, 
angry, damaged, suffered state brutality – are excuses for why her acts were not agential. Yet, 
the relational account takes these experiences as part of who she is – this is the (non-chosen) 
starting point from which she makes (non-detached) decisions – so it aims to give a more 
accurate account of her, and why she did what she did. The relational view does not consider 
this history and particularity as mitigating factors that automatically deny her agency (as the 
‘victim’ narrative implies). Rather it recognises, more appropriately, that these women are 
socially embedded and encumbered, and that by acknowledging these details, a better 
understanding of her and her act is possible. In this regard, while relational theories look for 
the impetus for the act and to the particular agent, this does not preclude the possibility of 
agency by excusing the act in the way the ‘victim’ responses tend to do. On the contrary, I 
argue that it more accurately represents the way the bombers go about deciding within their 
social and contextual framework. 
 
Second, I consider the ‘fully agential’ trope of societies that permit the bombers. This societal 
response is more communal than it is individualistic in how it assumes persons are 
constructed and how they operate. The narrative emphasises, for instance, the women’s wider 
reasons and specific obligations to the community, religion, and family as positive and typical 
(rather than tainted) reasons for their involvement, and this echoes the relational view of the 
socially constitutive nature of agents. At the same time, however, such responses are 
(contradictorily) more individualistic than in societies that disallow the bombers. They hint, 
for instance, that these women can transcend, and are ‘unblemished’ by, social problems and 
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that they remain ‘pure’ and even apotheosised, thereby seemingly asocial. Accepting the 
relational agent would move beyond regarding selves both as always positively constrained 
by their constitutions and as able to stand apart from their social world in the way the ‘ideal 
warrior’ frame insinuates. It would recognise that selves are usually constrained by who they 
are in a variety of ways (not just favourably as these representations suggest) and they can 
never be detached (as the ‘ideal’ narrative partly implies). The relational approach, I contend, 
aims to complicate the narrative by recognising the connectedness, restrictions and 
particularity of these women and that their acts only make sense by reference to this wider 
picture.  
 
Drawing these findings together, by adopting the relational agent, “the female offender is no 
longer necessarily innocent or biologically flawed” (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, 18) as the 
‘victim’ portrayal suggests, or alternatively an impeccable demi-god as the ‘ideal warrior’ 
depiction implies. Rather, she is, more realistically, “a complicated construct” (ibid). This 
understanding of the bombers moves away from making (at least) three (false) assumptions 
about these women. First, that referencing anything outside the isolated attack, such as 
reasons behind the act or the particular bomber, reduces agency by default. Second, that the 
bomber can never challenge her social constitution and so has no agency. Third, that it is 
possible for a bomber to choose from a ‘pure’ non-social self. None of these suppositions, 
which are present to differing extents in the ‘victim’ and ‘ideal warrior woman’ societal 
responses, describe how the women decide or are constructed. By moving towards a relational 
model, then, many more possibilities for how the bombers are presented can be realised. They 
need not be limited to being wholly unable to manage their social constitutions as the ‘victim’ 
or fully in control of their lives as ‘ideal warriors’. Rather, they can be considered as complex 
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women with backgrounds and identities that root and restrain them, while they act upon, and 
in, the world in a multitude of ways. Given that the key concern of this thesis was making the 
‘victim’ and ‘ideal warrior’ narratives more nuanced and permitting better representations of 
the bombers, I argue that this is a clear strength of the relational account.  
 
Autonomy 
The second set of implications I consider are about representations of the bombers’ autonomy. 
The relational conception – that focuses on a constitutively social autonomy, reflective 
endorsement from a ‘practically unified’ self, and a spectrum – has various consequences for 
the ‘victim’ and the ‘ideal warrior’ narratives. I contend that the account allows a non-binary 
estimate of the bomber’s autonomy.  
 
First, in the ‘victim’ portrayal – which typically focuses on individual and psychological 
explanations for the bomber’s behaviour – there is usually an underlying assumption that 
autonomy is defined as the bombers ‘deciding for themselves’, without force or interference, 
whether the desire to carry out the attack was what she wanted. Recognising that the bomber’s 
autonomy is an internal and external practice, the relational account regards self-governance 
as always constrained but exercisable in degrees. In this way, few of the women would fall 
into the wholly ‘victim’ frame, where this is taken as the view that anything external 
compromises the bomber’s will and makes her non-autonomous by default. Rather, the will is 
always social, but this does not mean the bombers are non-autonomous ‘victims’. Further, it 
moves away from only searching for psychological and individualistic reasons behind the 
bomber’s acts that are so prevalent in the ‘victim’ narrative to a thorough exploration of the 
contextual factors, since these are relevant to how far she can function in autonomy. By 
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drawing together the will, contexts and others, the relational account, then, maps multiple 
elements and their interrelations on a spectrum to determine the extent of the bomber’s 
autonomy, and this allows a more complicated understanding of the women than the ‘victim’ 
depiction.  
 
Second, the ‘ideal warrior’ narrative – which usually focuses on broader community reasons 
for the women’s acts – often draws on some external factors, such as communal goals 
(thereby moving away from less social conceptions) but at the cost of downplaying the 
individual’s will and broader constraints. With regard to the women, for instance, the will of 
the bombers in the ‘ideal warrior’ narrative is simply substituted for the will of the 
community, and this both disregards the significance of the individual and whether the 
bombers can internally reflect at all. With regard to broader constraints, while the ‘ideal 
warrior’ portrayal does consider external elements in a descriptive sense (the war being what 
makes the bombing necessary) and because the community will is paramount (the war is what 
matters to the community), the women – by carrying out a cohering desire – are ascribed a 
full autonomy. Yet, such an attribution fails to include any proper consideration of how far 
the bombers are restricted by their contexts. By adopting the relational conception of 
autonomy, however, both problems are addressed and the ‘ideal warrior’ narrative 
undermined because the women must reflectively endorse from practically unified wills, and 
constraints are relevant in determining the degree of autonomy. In this regard, the bombers 
are likely to have ambivalent and conflicting wills, and autonomy involves reflection and is 
not naively adopting community values, as the depiction suggests. Moreover, there is no 
maximum autonomy that these women achieve, as the trope presumes, because contexts 
always constrain the extent to which autonomy is exercised. The account, therefore, moves 
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away from the wholly autonomous frame of the ‘ideal warrior’, who acts as someone entirely 
unlimited and is assumed to be fully or perfectly autonomous. 
 
Bringing this analysis together, adopting relational autonomy moves away from two 
assumptions that are present in the ‘victim’ and ‘ideal warrior’ portrayals: that autonomy is a 
narrow internal capacity of the women, and that the bombers are autonomous-or-not. These 
understandings misdescribe the women’s autonomy by overlooking the importance of the 
individual, the internal and external together, and that it is achievable in degrees. The 
relational approach avoids these problems and so is able to offer more complex narratives. It 
implies, for instance, that the women do not have zero autonomy if their will is social and 
constrained as the ‘victim’ trope suggests, or a maximum autonomy if they are acting in a 
god-like capacity as the ‘ideal warrior’ hints at. Rather, it recognises that all agents’ autonomy 
falls along a relational spectrum that resists these non-social, binary portrayals. Since the 
relational approach is able to bypass the ‘victim’ and ‘ideal warrior’ narratives of the 
bombers, and instead focus on degrees of autonomy, I argue it is a promising way in which to 
complicate representations of these women’s autonomy in society, which was a core aim of 
this thesis.  
 
In this section, I have considered the implications of a relational approach for the ‘victim’ or 
‘ideal warrior’ portrayals. I argued that these narratives are dichotomies and rarely describe 
the agency or autonomy of these women, and that a relational conception (with a realistic 





In this chapter, I demonstrated how my spectrum view measures and compares different but 
relevant features of autonomy both for individual bombers and across the bombers as a group. 
By assessing the three axes of the spectrum separately and then together, I have demonstrated 
that it is possible to capture both internal and external elements that are pertinent to 
autonomy, and how they interrelate, in order to form a clearer impression about the overall 
amount of autonomy the bombers exercise. This is because my approach weights the factors 
that contribute to determining the autonomy functioning of these women. It, for example, 
maps an expanded picture of how much autonomy is demonstrated by the bombers (in how 
they reflect, endorse, and justify themselves to others) as well as the extent of the contextual 
limitations that they face (how a war context radically curbs their preferences and intersects 
with other constraints in their lives) and, through this dual-pronged approach, more rigorously 
estimates the degree of autonomy they practice. In so doing, my view approximates the 
amount of autonomy that is exercised without claiming it is a full autonomy (which the 
relational model takes to be an impossibility) or precluding it altogether (since autonomy only 
happens within, not in the absence of, constraint). Further, I argued that this kind of approach 
implies that there will be more nuanced representations of the bombers; portrayals that move 
away from the ‘victim’ and ‘ideal warrior’ to much more complex narratives. In short, my 
spectrum view gauges the appropriate features important for autonomy, allows a comparative 
assessment of these features individually and overall, and permits more gradation in the 





At the outset, I suggested that female suicide bombers were denied a proper attribution of 
agency, and that relational models of autonomy had thus far under-theorised a spectrum.  
Bringing these two elements together, the purpose of thesis was to seek out a nuanced way of 
measuring the autonomy of the bombers. I undertook this task over the course of five 
chapters.  
 
First, I outlined several case studies of female suicide bombers and discussed how they were 
portrayed as either ‘victims’ or ‘ideal warriors’. I indicated that these women were not 
expected to be violent, and that when they were aggressive they had to be ‘explained away’ in 
order to preserve the dominant gender stereotypes of ‘peaceful woman’ and ‘violent man’. I 
argued that these explanations served to distort their agency; they were either non-agential or 
wholly agential, and both misrepresented them.  
 
Second, I characterised liberal models of autonomy as having five features: authentic desires, 
procedural independence, local and basic autonomy, consistent desires and a distinction 
between autonomy and responsibility. Using standard critiques, I mapped the debate and 
indicated that other accounts that were less individualistic, reductive, and internal might be 
more useful for the female bombers of this thesis.  
 
Third, I classified relational models of autonomy as sharing five traits: the relational agent, 
socialised autonomy, a spectrum, broad motivations and complex self-identities. I defended 
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the relational approach against concerns that the agent was socially determined and that the 
account was too far removed from the internal will. I maintained that the social agent did not 
preclude agency and that social autonomy did not ignore the internal will but rather included 
the external too. I argued that the social emphases of this model could potentially represent 
the bomber’s autonomy properly, as these women were are often highly constrained.  
 
Fourth, I applied the relational approach to the female suicide bombers of the case studies to 
further explore its suitability. With regards to the agent, I contended that the relational 
account aptly represented the bombers as social persons and that they operated in a connected 
fashion. With regards to autonomy, I argued that the relational approach was compatible with 
the bomber’s socially constituted self-rule. In this regard, I claimed that the relational 
approach offered a plausible and rich representation of the type of agents the women were, 
and a faithful depiction of the kind of autonomy the bombers had. Further, I contended that 
the relational model might be well suited for all persons, who were social agents with social 
autonomy as much as the bombers. However, I noted that one does not have to endorse this 
argument to accept the primary claim that relational autonomy is better for female suicide 
bombers given their extreme constraints. 
 
Fifth, I proposed my spectrum view as a way in which to map the autonomy of the bombers. I 
offered three axes (constraints, self-regard and reflection), which individually gauged 
different significant features of autonomy and collectively estimated how much autonomy 
was occurring overall. I plotted the autonomy of Dhanu, Zina, Muzhakhoyeva, and Kaplan, 
and – based on a particular set of scenarios – argued that Dhanu had relatively high and 
Kaplan relatively low levels of autonomy, with the other women falling somewhere between 
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them. In this way, I argued that my spectrum view was able to distinguish and approximate 
the separate elements and total autonomy of the bombers in detail, and to contrast each 
woman’s autonomy against the others. Finally, I submitted that the relational spectrum 
facilitated more nuanced representations of bomber’s agency than the binary narratives of the 
‘victim’ or ‘ideal warrior’ would permit.  
 
I conclude that the relational account is a good fit for the suicide bombers (and possibly for 
persons more generally), and that my spectrum view allows us to measure the autonomy of 
the bombers in some detail, and so to differentiate between degrees of autonomy and to 
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